George  Washington  Flowers 
Memorial  Collection 

DUKE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 


ESTABLISHED  BY  THE 

FAMILY  OF 

COLONEL   FLOWERS 


CAVALRY; 


ITS  HISTOKY  AND  TACTICS. 


By  CAPTAESr  L.  E.  Is^OLAN, 

15Ta  HUSSARS. 


FIRST  AMERICAN,  FROM  THE  SECOND  LONDON,   EDITION. 


COLUMBIA,  S.  C: 

EVANS    AND    COGSWKLI.. 

1864. 


1 


E7AN8  &  CCM5SWEL1,  PRIMTKRS,   COLUMBIA.  8.  C. 


f 


TO 

LIEUT.-COLONEL   GEORGE   WILLIAM   KEY, 

15th   HU33ARS, 

THE     FUIENP     OF     MANY     YEARS, 
THIS    WORK    IS    INSCRIBED, 

WITH    AFFECTIONATE    REGARD. 

BY    THE    ALVHOR. 


I 


PREFACE 


There  is,  perhaps,  no  branch  of  the  whole  science  of  war  which  has 
engaged  so  little  of  the  attention  of  military  writers  as  that  which 
refers  to  the  formation  and  employment  of  cavalry;  while  at  the  same 
time  it,  must  he  admitted  that  few  branches  of  the  service  are  rea,lly 
more  important  than  this. 

On  looking,  however,  closely  at  the  subject,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
why  this  should  be  the  case.  The  tactics  of  cavalry  are  not  capable  of 
being  reduced  to  rule,  like  the  mechanical  operations  of  the  engineer, 
or  even  the  slower  and  more  methodical  movements  of  infantry. 

With  the  ca.valry  officer  almost  everything  depends  on  the  clearness 
of  his  coup  d'ceil,  and  the  felicity  with  which  he  seizes  the  happy 
moment  of  action,  and,  when  once  action  is  determined  upon,  the 
rapidity  with  which  his  intentions  are  carried  into  effect.  There  is 
little  time  for  thought,  none  for  hesitation  ;  and,  once  the  movement  is- 
commenced,  its  successful  accomplishment  is  the  only  thought  allowed 
to  pass  through  the  mind  of  the  commander. 

Much,  then,  must  partake  more  of  the  inspiration  of  genius  than  of 
the  result  of  calculation  and  rule.  Still  there  is  a  great  deal  in  the 
profession  of  a  cavalry  officer  which  can  be  reduced  to  writing,  and 
which  it  is  most  important  he  should  know  and  carefully  study ;  many 
things  which  his  knowing  beforehand  will  enable  him  to  profit  by, 
or,  having  carefully  thought  over,  will  suggest  to  him,  in  the  hour  of 
need,  expedients  that  no  amount  of  service  or  of  thought  would  ever 
enable  him  to  perceive  without  previous  reading  and  long  study  of  the 
subject. 

Nothing,  however,  can  well  be  more  difficult  than  to  attain  to  this  in 
the  present  state  of  the  literature  on  the  subject.     Few,  if  any,  special 

A- 


VI  PREFACE. 

looks  exist,  as  before  stated,  treating  exclusively  of  cavalry,  and  none 
•ertainly  of  any  importance  in  the  English  language,  so  that  the  stu- 
dent must  pick  out  for  himself,  from  the  histories  of  campaigns  and 
battles,  or  from  general  treatises  ou  the  art  of  war,  those  parts  be 
stands  in  need  of;  and  as  these  are  seldom  written  by  persons  inti- 
mately acquainted  with  either  the  difficulties  or  advantages  of  this  arm 
of  the  service,  he  must  elaborate  his  conclusions  for  himself,  and  often 
from  the  most  imperfect  and  erroneous  data. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  the  present  little  treatise  will  supply  this 
desideratum  in  military  literature,  or  serve  as  anything  but  a  stop-gap 
to  supply  for  a  time  the  place  of  some  more  worthy  treatise,  which,  it 
is  hoped,  may  before  long  occupy  its  place.  Still  the  author,  having 
served  in  the  continental  cavalry,  and  with  our  own  in  India,  and 
having  thought  much  on  the  subject  during  a  tolerably  extended 
acquaintance  with  the  cavalry  of  various  nations,  hopes  that  he  may 
not  be  deemed  forward  in  contributing  his  mite  toward  an  improve- 
ment in  the  literature  of  cavalry,  and  in  offering  such  suggestions  as 
he  hopes  may  assist  in  bringing  forward  this  important  arm  to  the 
level  of  the  intelligence  of  the  age,  and  to  the  improved  condition  to 
which  all  branches  of  the  service  must  be  brought,  if  they  are  to  com- 
pete successfully  with  their  rivals  in  the  next  great  struggle  that  may 
take  place. 

The  sudden  transition  from  peace  to  war  is  a  critical  moment  for  ail 
armies,  but  more  particularly  to  those  whose  officers  are  deficient  in 
the  theory  of  their  profession. 

Take,  for  instance,  our  cavalry  in  the  last  great  European  war ;  they 
were  superior  to  that  of  most  nations  in  the  headlong  courage  of  the 
men,  the  quality  of  their  horses  and  equipments,  but  unfortunately 
inferior  in  tactics;  the  published  despatches  of  our  greatest  command- 
er bear  too  frequent  testimony  to  the  fact  that  our  officers  often  neg- 
lected to  provide  reserves  when  they  charged,  or  to  take  other  necessary 
precautions,  the  want  of  which  entailed  occasional  defeat  upon  our 
troops,  in  spito  of  the  determined  bravery  which  they  displayed  upon 
all  occasions. 

A  deficiency  in  the  theory  of  war  entails  the  necessity  of  gaining 
experience  at  a  heavy  loss  of  life  when  war  actually  breaks  out,  and  it 
is,  therefore,  the  duty  of  every  officer  to  endeavor  to  gain  a  knowledge 


PREFACE.  VI 1 

of  his  profession  before  he  is  called  upon  to  take  part  in  that  game 
where  every  false  move  is  attended  with  more  or  less  disastrous  conse- 
quences to  his  country  and  to  the  soldiers  under  his  command. 

In  this  work  I  have  endeavored  to  gather  knowledge  from  the  record- 
ed experience  of  others,  and  to  collect  from  various  authors  on  cavalry 
warfare  much  that  may  assist  young  ofiRccrs  in  gaining  a  knowledge  of 
their  profession.  At  the  same  time,  I  hope  it  may  be  understood  that 
the  introductory  sketch  of  the  history  of  cavalry  is  not  meant  to  sup- 
ply the  place  of  what  would  form  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  inter- 
esting works  on  the  history  of  the  art  of  war;  but  is  merely  intended  to 
suffice,  by  stating  what  has  been  done,  to  make  it  intelligible — what  it  is 
thought  may  again  be  accomplished,  when  better  understood  tactics, 
and  better  equipments,  have  restored  the  horseman  to  his  proper  posi- 
tion in  European  armies. 

The  remarks  on  dress,  equipment,  drill,  etc.,  are  merely  the  appli'^a- 
tion  of  the  principle  of  common  sense  to  objects  which,  though  useful, 
perhaps  indispensable,  when  first  introduced,  have  become  positively 
noxious  in  the  course  of  time,  when  they  have  long  outgrown  the  pur- 
pose for  which  they  were  introduced,  but  arc  still  allowed  to  linger  be- 
cause change  in  what  is  so  thoroughly  organized  is  always  difficult,  and 
sometimes  dangerous  ;  but  certainly  neither  so  difficult  nor  so  danger- 
ous as  a  blind  adherence  to  exploded  theories  or  antiquated  usages, 
which  must  eventually  be  abandoned  on  the  first  rude  shock  of  war. 

On  the  tactics  of  the  cavalry  it  is  difficult  to  say  much  that  is  either 
very  definite  or  satisfactory;  but  the  use  of  the  arm  is  generally  so  lit- 
tle understood  that  it  is  important  (even  to  attempt)  to  place  in  a  clear- 
er light  what  is  known  and  admitted  on  the  subject  than  has  hitherto 
been  done  ;  and,  although  the  author  can  not  flatter  himself  that  he  has 
produced  much  to  effect  this,  he  hopes  he  has  made  a  step  in  the  right 
direction,  and  pointed  out  a  path  which  will  (as  in  all  other  subjects) 
be  of  suggestive  interest  fto  many  of  his  brother-officers,  and  which  may 
be  followed  with  more  effect  by  others  who  have  more  leisure  and  more 
of  those  peculiar  qualifications  than  he  can  pretend  to,  for  successfully 
handling  so  important  and  difficult  a  subject. 

The  work  was  written  as  leisure  occurred  in  the  intervals  of  duty  and 
of  other  avocations,  and,  as  might  be  supposed  in  a  book  so  composed 
by  a  person  little  acquainted  with  the  art  of  book-making,  was  some- 
what disjointed  in  its  arrangements. 


Vui  PREFACE, 

I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  James  Fergr.sson  for  the  present  mode  of  ar^ 
rangement,  as  also  for  sundry  hints  by  \vhioh  I  have  profited  in  putting 
the  work  together;  and  for  bi^s  candid  criticism  and  friendly  assistance 
I  shall  ever  feel  grateful, 

I  also  thai;kt'ully  acknowledge  the  valuabld-assistanco  I  have  received 
from  Mr.  Charles  MacJTarlane,  whose  loye  for  the  service  is  well  knowp. 
He  corrected  qiany  prrors  in  the  ^S,,  ci,nd  saw  the  hook  safely  through 
the  press, 

I  have  conscientiously  dravyn  out  whatever  passed  under  my  observa- 
tion, and  in  writing  of  the  different  systems  prevalent  in  the  cavalry  X 
have  stated  freely,  and  without  resaryo,  what  I  believe  to  be  the  truth ; 
this,  I  trust,  Avill  not  give  offence,  or  hi^rt  the  feelings  of  any  individu- 
al ;  and  if  ipy  reijiarks  prove  useful  to  the  service  to  which  I  have  the 
honor  to  belong,  then  niy  object  in  \7riting  this  book  will  hay«  beo^ 
fully  obtained. 


Jinnj  and  ^(ivy  Clv.h^  July  1,  185g, 


\ 


Columbia,  S.  C,  3Ia\j  1,  1864. 
Messrs.  Evans  &  Cogswell: 

Gentlemen  :  I  take  great  pleasure  in  transmitting  to  you  my  copy 
of  CI^ptain  Nolan's  Avork  on  Cavalry,  for  the  purpose  of  republication. 
The  work  is  one  which  has  been  warmly  received  by  European  mili- 
tary men,  and  has  been  commended  to  me,  no  less  favorably,  by  officers 
of  reputation  in  our  army,  among  whom  are  some  general  officers  of 
the  cavalry  service. 

It  gives  a  concise  but  very  correct  sketch  of  the  histor}'^  of  the 
arm ;  it  then  goes  into  practical  matters  appertaining  to  horsemanship 
and  military  evolutions,  suggesting  many  new  things  and  improve- 
snents.  Its  chief  aim  is  to  show  that  the  cavah*}'  service,  and  espe- 
cially what  belongs  to  tactics,  is  entirely  too  complicated,  and  that  all 
that  can  be  done  by  cavalry  ought  to  be  performed  through  three  or 
four  fundamental  manoeuvres.  I  consider  this  little  work,  in  short,  as 
one  of  the  greatest  utility,  and  am  delighted  that  you  desire  to  give  it 
into  the  hands  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  soldier. 

Captain  Nolan,  as  you  may  recollect,  was  the  ofSeer  who  delivered 
to  the  officer  in  command  the  unfortunate  order  which  led  to  the 
charge  of  the  Light  Brigade  at  Balaklava  against  the  Russian  batte- 
ries. Then  temporarily  detached  from  his  regiment  to  the  staff  of  the 
English  commander-in-chief,  Captain  Nolan  voluntarily  joined  that 
now  illustrious  band,  and,  leading  a  squadron,  fell,  pierced  by  many 
wounds.  He  was  deplored  in  England  as  one  of  the  most  promising 
and  gallant  spirits  of  the  army. 

Under  difficulties  which  can  be  readily  understood,  you  have,  gen- 
tlemen, persistently  endeavored  to  contribute  your  share  to  the  great 
work  of  Confederate  independence,  and  to  your  excellent  military  pub- 
lications the  great  strides  which  our  army  has  made  toward  efficiency 
and  military  intelligence  must,  in  a  great  measure,  b;;  ascribed.  Con- 
gress has  never  yet  done  anything  to  supply  us  with  military  works, 
and,  after  a  slumber  of  over  three  yeai-s,  is  not  very  likely  to  do  any- 
thing. We  look,  then,  to  you  to  continue  your  efforts,  and  hope  that 
you  may  be  as  successful  as  your  earnest  endeavors  fully  merit. 
I  am,  gentlemen, 

Very  truly  and  respectfully  yours, 

FEANK  SCHALLER,  Colonel,  C.  S.  A. 


CONTENTS. 


Preface Page  v 

Preface  to  present  sdition ix 

CHAPTER  I. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH. 

Great  cavalry  actions  of  ancient  and  modern  times — English  cav- 
alry under  Prince  Rupert  and  Cromwell — The  Prussian  cavalry 
under  Frederic  the  Great — The  French  cavalry  under  Napoleon. .     1 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE    AUSTRIAN,  RUSSIAN,  AND    PRUSSIAN    CAVALRY    FROM    1793   tO  1815. 

Battle  of  Au3terlit7- — Bad  cavalry  tactics — Battles  of  Ratisbon, 
Pultusk,  Eylau,  Friedland,  and  Liitzen — Ambuscade  of  Haynau 
— Battle  of  Leipzig — General  remarks 25 

CHAPTER  III. 

CAVALRY    IN    GENERAL. 

What  makes  its  strength — The  different  kinds  of  cavalry  estab- 
lished in  Europe — Heavy,  middle,  and  light  cavalry 35 

CHAPTER  IV. 

LIGHT  AND  HEAVY  CAVALRY. 

Their  comparative  value  or  merits — Deplorable  effects  of  over- 
weighting—  Changes   suggested   for   English   dragoons,   etc. — 


CONTENTS.  Xi 

Advantages  anticipated  from  these  changes — General  Warnery's 
opinions  on  heavy  and  light  cavalry — Merits  of  the  Prussian 
hussars— Our  cavalry  charges  at  Waterloo,  etc.— Performances 
of  the  Cossacks — Heavy  and  light  cavalry  in  the  Hungarian 
war  of  1848  and  1849 — Letter  from  an  Austrian  officer  engaged 
in  that  war 39 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE    ORGANIZATION    OF    CAVALRY. 

The  man,  with  his  dress  and  arms,  as  sword,  lance,  carbine,  pistols, 
etc. — The  horse:  the  bit,  the  bridle,  the  saddle — Alterations 
suggested 57 

CHAPTER  VI. 

MILITARY    RIDING. 

Early  schools  of  horsemanship — Foreign  origin  of  our  military 
riding — Some  absurd  practices  on  the  Continent — The  balance- 
seat — Its  immense  disadvantages  —  Anecdotes  —  Changes  pro- 
posed— Horsemanship  of  the  Circassians,  etc 84 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Elementary  drill 101 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
On  intervals 106 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Field  movements  on  a  new  system c 110 

CHAPTER  X. 

CAVALRY     TACTICS. 

General  rules — Examples — Cavalry  versus  cavalry — Cavalry  with 


Xn  CONTENTS. 

an  army — Attack  and  defence  of  positions — Great  cavalry  at- 
tack at  Eylau — The  pursuit  of  a  defeated  array — Ilorse-artillery 
■with  cavalry — The  attack  in  skiruiisbing  order — Reconnoitring.  .129 

CHAPTER  XL 

The  makch — Thk  camp — The  biyouac — The  outpost — The 
skirmish 145 

CHAPTER  XII. 
The  CHARGE;  the  pursuit,  and  the  rally 164 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Detached  service 167 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

CAVALRY  CHARGES  AGAINST  INFANTRY  SQUARES. 

Results  which  have  been  obtained — Improvement  in  artillery  fa- 
vorable to  cavalry — Celebrated  charges  which  have  been  at- 
tended with  success — Conclusion 171 

APPENDIX. 

Cavalry  saddle  and  bridle  proposed  by  the  author 187 

Dress  of  a  cavalry  soldier 190 

Remarks  on  the  rank  entire  system 191 

Proposed  organization  of  cavalry 192 

Troop-horses  and  officers'  chargers 199 


CAVALRY; 

ITS   HISTORY  AjSTD   TACTICS. 


Chapter  I. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH. 

GREAT  CAVALRY  ACTIONS  OF  ANCIENT  AND  MOPERN    TIMES. 

The  horse,  indigenous  to  the  countries  of  the  East,  attained  at  a 
Tery  early  period  to  that  development,  size,  strength,  and  beauty  of 
form,  which  he  did  not  reach  in  any  other  regions  until  after  the  course 
of  many  centuries,  and  the  application  of  numerous  artificial  means, 
and  an  uncommon  and  persevering  attention.  It  should  appear  that 
in  every  part  of  Europe  the  horse  was  but  a  ragged  pony,  or,  at  most, 
a  rough,  stinted  galloway,  when  the  horse  in  Arabia,  Asia  Minor,  the 
vast  plains  of  Mesopotamia  and  Persia,  was  a  splendid  animal,  well 
suited  to  the  purposes  of  war,  and  much  used  in  battle.  All  these 
Eastern  nations  were,  in  fact,  equestrians,  and  made  nearly  an  exclu- 
sive use  of  cavalry  in  their  wars  with  one  another. 

The  horses  of  the  East  were  brought  into  Europe  by  the  Greeks  and 
their  neighbors,  across  the  narrow  straits  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Helles- 
pont, or  were  carried  across  the  iEgean  sea,  from  the  Greek  colonies  in 
Asia  Minor.  The  breed  was  propagated  extensively  in  Thrace,  Thes- 
saly,  Macedonia,  and  other  regions.  The  Athenians  and  most  of  the 
Greeks  imbibed  a  passion  for  beautiful  horses  and  horse-racing  ,•  and 
more  than  a  century  before  the  time  of  Alexander  the  Great  the  Greek 
sculptors  must  have  been  familiarized  with  the  forms  and  action  of 
high-bred  horses,  or  they  could  not  have  left  behind  them  the  noble 
Elgin  marbles.  But  it  does  not  appear  that  the  Greeks  at  this  period 
made  any  extensive  use  of  cavalry  on  the  actual  field  of  battle. 


Z  HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 

The  Romans  subdued  their  neighbors  by  infantry.  In  Livy's  ac- 
count of  their  wars  with  the  Samnites  and  other  peoples,  we  read  of 
cavalry,  and  war-chariots  drawn  at  the  gallop  by  horses;  but  it  should 
seem  that  the  horses  were  few  in  number  and  small  in  size,  that  their 
war-chariots  were  as  primitively  rude  and  as  ineffectual  as  those  of  our 
painted  ancestors  in  Britain,  and  that  such  cavalry  never  really  won  a 
battle  or  decided  a  great  victory. 

In  short,  cavah-y  was  little  used  by  the  Greeks  and  Romans  until 
war  brought  them  respectively  in  contact  with  Asia  and  the  contiguaus 
regions  of  Africa;  and  it  was  in  Alexander's  campaigns,  and  the 
Punic  wars,  that  these  nations  first  learned,  from  their  well-mounted 
enemies,  the  value  of  good  horsemen. 

The  first  formation  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  appears  to  ha,ve  been 
the  same;  they  formed  their  horsemen  in  oblong  squares,  or  in  the 
shape  of  a  wedge,  with  the  idea  that  the  leading  file,  carried  forward 
by  the  mass  in  their  rear,  would  break  through  all  opposition.  This 
system  of  charging  in  a  wedge  has  been  since  adopted  among  the 
Turks  and  other  nations  distinguished  by  their  equestrian  qualities. 

"When  the  great  Alexander  passed  over  into  Asia  for  the  conquest  of 
the  far-spreading  Persian  empire,  his  army  was  composed  chiefly  of 
infantry,  formed  into  phalanges.  The  Macedonian  phalanx  will  be  for 
ever  memorable  in  military  history  ;  but  there  is  no  distinctive  Mace- 
donian formation  of  cavalry  to  share  fame  with  it.  Once  in  Asia 
Minor,  a  country  of  fine  horses,  and  among  the  Greek  colonies  thickly 
scattered  from  the  mouth  of  the  Hellespont  to  that  of  the  Granicus, 
and  from  the  mouth  of  that  river  onward  to  the  confines  of  Syria,  it 
must  have  been  easy  for  the  young  conqueror  to  augment  his  cavalry. 
No  doubt,  between  his  first  landing  in  Asia  and  his  first  battle,  that 
arm  was  both  increased  and  improved. 

At  the  Battle  of  the  Granicus  he  made  four  thousand  five  hundred 
or  five  thousand  horse  ford  the  river.  The  Persians  on  the  opposite 
bank  opposed  them  bravely,  and  fought  hand  to  hand,  but  were  at  last 
driven  off  the  field,  chiefly,  it  is  said,  through  the  exertions  of  the 
Macedonian  horse.  Yet  their  manoeuvring  at  this  battle  was  not  in 
keeping  with  the  spirit  of  cavalry  actions,  for  their  infantry  kept  pace 
with  and  engaged  the  enemy  at  the  same  time  and  together  with  the 
horsemen. 


WARS    OF    ALEXANDER.  3 

Better  tactics  were  displayed  three  years  later  at  Gaugamela,  -trhea 
the  Macedonians  had  gained  experience  from  the  enemy.  At  this  battle 
the  cavalry,  seven  thousand  strong,  was  formed  in  two  separate  bodies, 
and  placed  on  the  flanks  of  the  army.  The  cavalry  of  the  right  wing^ 
led  by  Alexander  in  person,  manoeuvred  against  the  left  wing  of  the 
Persians  (composed  of  horse).  Each  tried  to  outflank  the  other,  and 
the  Persians  had  apparentlj^  succeeded  iu  this,  from  their  greater  num- 
bers, when  Alexander  suddenly  deployed  his  deep  columns  to  the  right, 
and  outflanked  the  enemy.  In  their  hurry  to  prolong  the  left,  to 
oppose  this  unexpected  lengthening  of  the  Grecian  line,  the  Persians 
left  an  opening  in  their  centre.  Alexander  at  once  dashed  in,  divided 
their  forces,  defeated,  and  pursued  them  off"  the  field.  During  the  pur- 
suit a  message  was  brought  to  him  from  Parmenio  (who  commanded 
the  left  wing)  asking  for  assistance.  Alexander  at  once  recalled  his 
cavalry  from  the  pursuit,  and  led  them  toward  the  rear  of  the  Persian 
right.  Finding,  however,  that  Parmenio  had  already  defeated  the  ene- 
my with  the  assistance  of  the  Thessalian  horse,  he  turned  about  and 
followed  up  Darius.  After  crossing  the  Lykus,  the  men  were  allowed 
to  rest  till  after  twelve  o'clock  at  night;  then,  resuming  the  pursuit, 
they  arrived  next  day  (the  da}^  after  the  battle)  at  Arbela,  a  distance 
of  six  hundred  stadiums  !*  Here  was  the  rapidity — the  dash — which 
ought  to  characterize  cavalry  operations. 

The  Persian  horsemen  greatly  outnumbered  their  foes  in  this  battle, 
and  they  were  clad  in  armor;  yet  they  could  not  resist  the  close  array 
and  speedy  advance  of  the  Macedonians.  Alexander  had  his  horse 
well  in  hand,  for  in  the  midst  of  a  victorious  pursuit  he  suddenly 
recalled  and  led  them  to  the.  support  of  the  left  wing,  and  their 
untiring  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  ajfter  all  the  fatigues  of  the  battle,  proves 
that  they  were  capable  of  the  greatest  exertions.  "With  all  this,  after 
Alexander's  death,  the  Grecian  cavalry  sank  into  its  former  insignifi- 
cance. 

With  the  Romans,  cavalry  achieved  even  less  than  with  the  Greeks; 
but  under  Hannibal  the  Carthaginian  horse  did  wonders  in  Italy  and 
on  the  soil  of  Rome. 

They  first  met  the  Romans  in  a  cavalry  skirmish  by  the  Tleinus. 

*  Equal  to  about  seventy -five  English  miles. 


.7; 


4  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

The  Roman  skirmishers  (who  were  on  foot)  were  speedily  driven  in, 
upon  which  they  ran  to  the  intervals,  frightening  the  horses.  Some  of 
the  Romans  were  thrown  j  othfers  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot  (a  common 
practice  among  them).  While  the  cavalry  were  engaged,  Hannibal 
sent  the  Kumldian  light-horse  to  turn  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  and 
attack  him  in  rear.  This  gave  him  the  victory.  The  Romans  were 
defeated,  and  their  commander,  P.  Cornelius  Scipio,  was  wounded. 

At  the  Battle  of  the  Trebia  the  Romans  had  thirty-six  thousand  foot 
and  four  thousand  horse  ;  the  Carthaginians  twenty  thousand  foot  and 
ten  thousand  horse. 

How  different  the  proportions  of  each  arm  in  the  two  armies! 

The  R,oman  infantry  fought  gloriously  at  this  battle,  as  it  ever  did ; 
their  cavalry  fled  before  that  of  the  enemy. 

The  Roman  Legions,  then  attacked  on  all  sides,  still  succeeded  in 
cutting  their  way  through  the  enemy,  though  ten  thousand  only  of 
these  unconquered  men  reached  Piacenza ;  the  remainder  were  left  on 
the  field. 

The  Carthaginian  horse  won  the  Battle  of  Canna?  (B.C.  216).  The 
Romans  brought  eighty  thousand  foot  and  six  thousand  cavalry  into 
the  field;  Hannibal  had  forty  thousand  foot  and  ten  thousand  horse. 

The  Roman  right  wing  rested  on  the  Aufidus ;  both  armies  had  their 
cavalry  on  the  flanks. 

Hasdrubal  first  attacked  the  Roman  horse  with  his  cavalry,  and  drove 
them  into  the  river.  The  battle  now  raged  along  the  whole  line.  The 
Roman  infantry,  as  usual,  were  everywhere  victorious.  The  Numidian 
cavalry  on  Hannibal's  right  were  engaged  in  a  doubtful  contest  with 
the  enemy's  horse  opposed  to  them. 

Hasdrubal,  who  had  done  his  work  on  the  left,  suddenly  appeared  on 
the  right,  defeated  the  cavalry,  and,  after  sending  the  Numidians  in  pur- 
suit, threw  himself  on  the  conquering  Roman  Legions,  and,  in  spite  of 
their  heroic  efforts,  burst  in  among  them,  and  defeated  them  with  fear- 
ful slaughter.  iEmilius  Paulus  and  more  than  forty  thousand  Romans 
were  slain,  and  most  of  the  survivors  made  prisoners.  Polybius  gives 
the  loss  of  the  Romans  at  seventy  thousand  men,  but  attributes  their 
defeat  to  the  fact  of  the  Carthaginians  being  so  superior  in  cavalry  j 
and  he  adduces  this  battle  in  proof  of  his  assertion,  "  That  it  is  better 


BATTLE    OP    CANN^.  5 

* 
to  have  only  half  the  number  of  infantry,  if  you  are  superior  in  cavalry, 
than  to  be  on  a  perfect  equality  of  all  arms  with  the  enemy." 

The  wide  open  plain,  now  called  the  Table  of  Apulia,  on  which  this 
memorable  battle  took  place,  was  admirably  adapted  to  cavalry  evolu- 
tions. It  will  be  remembered  how  -lEmilius  endeavored  to  persuade  his 
rash  and  ignorant  colleague  Varro  not  to  risk  a  battle  there.  After  the 
combat  Varro  escaped  to  the  near  town  of  Venusium  with  only  seventy 
horse.  It  is  affirmed  that  in  all  this  Battle  of  Cannoe,  in  which  he  made 
such  use  of  that  arm,  Hannibal  lost  only  some  two  hundred  horse.  It 
was  mainly  through  his  cavalry,  and  his  skill  in  handling  it,  that  this 
truly  great  commander,  generally  cut  off  from  all  supplies  from  Car- 
thage, was  enabled  to  maintain  himself  in  Italy  for  nearly  sixteen  long 
years. 

The  Roman  Legions  were  so  weak  in  cavalry  that,  when  successful 
against  the  Carthaginians,  they  could  reap  no  advantage  from  their 
victories  ;  nor  could  they  procure  provisions  and  forage  for  their  armies 
while  the  country  round  them  was  swarming  with  the  enemy's  horse. 
The  most  detgrmiued  bravery  on  the  part  of  their  infantry  could  not 
always  save  them  from  defeat,  and  every  affair  in  which  they  were 
worsted  endangered  their  very  existence. 

Montecuculi  says  :  "  The  principal  act  of  an  army  is  to  fight  a  battle  : 
this  generally  takes  place  in  the  plains,  and  then  the  cavalry  is  the  most 
important  arm  engaged.  For  if  the  cavalry  is  defeated,  the  battle  is  gen- 
erally lost;  if,  on  the  contrary, the  cavalry  is  victorious,  not  only  is  the 
battle  safe,  but  the  defeat  of  the  foe  is  complete !" 

Hence,  also.  Marshal  Saxe's  advice  is  to  shut  yourself  up  and  tem- 
porize when  you  are  weak  in  cavalry. 

Fabius  andL.  Plancus,  not  daring  to  appear  in  the  field  against  Ilan- 
nibal's  cavalry,  kept  to  the  hills  and  entrenched  themselves. 

In  the  same  way,  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  -G  ustavus  Adolphus  would 
not  venture  on  the  vast  plains  of  Poland,  but  remained  in  Prussia  till 
reinforced  in  cavalry. 

The  want  of  cavalry  stopped  both  Alexander  and  Csesar  in  their  career 
of  conquest. 

The  Romans  afterwards  swelled  their  cavalry  at  the  expense  of  their 
infantry ;  but  this  was  at  the  period  of  their  rapid  decline,  when  dis- 
cipline, martial  spirit,  and  patriotism,  with  every  other  virtue,  were 
1* 


6  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

dying  out  among  them.  As  the  ancient  and  cherished  Legion  had  become 
worthless,  excellence  was  not  to  be  expected  from  the  mounted  soldiers. 
The  estimation  in  which  cavalry  has  been  held  has  varied  according 
to  times  and  circumstances.  There  have  been  periods  (and  long  ones) 
in  which  it  has  been  prized  above  all  infantry,  and  there  have  been 
others  in  which  it  has  been  considered  as  almost  valueless  when  com- 
pared with  infantry.  Of  course  both  these  extreme  opinions  are  wrong. 
Great  battles  have  been  won  by  each  arm.  But  it  is  foreign  to  our  pur- 
pose to  balance  the  merits  of  horse  and  foot.  It  is  now  admitted  that 
cavalry  must  form  a  part  of  every  army  ;  and  it  is  our  business  to  make 
it  as  good  in  its  way  as  our  infantry  is  generally  admitted  to  be. 

History  sufficiently  proves  the  necessity  of  having  a  powerful  body 
of  horse  with  an  army;  and  also  shows  that,  if  cavalry  has  not  been  at 
all  times  equally  efficient  or  equally  successful,  it  has  almost  invariably 
proved  irresistible  when  well  organized  and  properly  led. 

At  Capua,  A.D.  552,  the  Franks  defeated  the  Roman  infantry,  but, 
being  deficient  in  cavalry,  they  were  outflanked  and  attacked  by  the 
Byzantine  horse  under  the  Eunuch  Narses ;  and,  according  to  the  his- 
torian Agathias,  out  of  thirty  thousand  men  composing  the  army  of  the 
Franks, /<;e  soldiers  only  escaped  from  the  slaughter  which  ensued. 

At  the  memorable  Battle  of  Poitiers,  fought  A.D.  732,  by  the  Franks 
under  Charles  Martcl  against  the  Saracens  under  Abd-er-rahman,  the 
cavalry  of  the  Franks,  led  by  Eudo,  Duke  of  Acquitaine,  defeated  the 
Moors  and  entered  their  camp,  doing  great  execution.  Paul  the  Dea- 
con (Paulus  Diaconus)  says  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand 
Saracens  were  left  dead  in  the  field;  other  historians,  among  them 
Mezeray,  estimate  the  strength  of  the  Moors  at  one  hundred  thousand, 
and  assert  that  most  of  these,  including  their  king,  were  killed  or 
tramrjled  under  foot  by  the  victors.  But,  in  spite  of  these  assertions, 
the  Saracens  left  their  camp  in  open  day,  and  retired  after  the  battle 
across  the  Pyrenees  without  being  molested  by  the  enemy.  The  cav- 
alry was  not  sent  in  pursuit,  from  which  we  must  infer  that  they  could 
not  move  with  sufficient  celerity  in  those  days  to  follow  their  more  nim- 
ble opponents  with  any  chance  of  success. 

In  933,  at  the  Battle  of  Merseburg,  the  European  cavalry,  under 
Henry  I,  had  greatly  improved  in  organization  and  tactics.  By  their 
compact  order  and  discipline  they  gained  a  decisive  victory  over  the 


BATTLE    OF    MERSEBURG.  7 

Hungarian  irregular  horsemen,  who  at  that  time  were  greatly  dreaded 
in  Europe. 

The  success  of  the  cavalry  was  here  due  to  the  manner  in  which  Hen- 
ry had  reorganized  and  trained  them ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that 
light-horsemen  are  first  mentioned  in  this  battle.  Armed  with  cross- 
bows, they  competed  successfully  with  the  Hungarian  horsemen,  and 
distracted  the  enemy's  attention  during  the  battle  by  constant  skirmish- 
ing. 

The  Magyars,  three  hundred  thousand  strong,  loft  their  entrenched 
camp  near  Schkolzig  and  advanced  into  the  plains  north-cast  of  Liitzen 
to  meet  King  Henry.  The  battle  was  long  undecided,  till  Henry, 
breaking  forth  at  the  head  of  his  cavalry,  which  had  been  concealed 
near  Schkolzig,  attacked  them  in  flank  and  routed  them. 

The  enemy  was  at  once  pur.-5ued,  nor  was  any  respite  given  to  the 
fugitives  till  they  had  crossed  the  Bohemian  frontier. 

History  affords  but  two  examples  of  cavalry  being  thus  successfully 
reorganized  and  well  commanded  in  the  field,  namely  :  under  Henry  I 
in  the  tenth  century,  and  under  Frederic  the  Great  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Both  these  princes,  on  their  accession,  found  the  cavalry 
badly  organized,  and  in  their  first  campaigns  worse  than  useless;  but 
thej'  reformed  and  achieved  with  them  their  most  brilliant  victories. 

King  Otto  I,  in  the  field,  managed  well  the  cavalry  which  had  been 
reorganized  under  his  father  Henry.  At  the  Battle  of  Augsburg,  in  Au- 
gust, 955,  he  formed  them  into  separate  corps  to  support  each  other,* 
and  while  he  poured  his  heavy  horsemen  in  great  numbers  on  one  point 
to  strike  a  decisive  blow,  as  soon  as  he  had  gained  an  advantage  he 
sent  his  light-horse  in  pursuit,  and,  gathering  up  his  mail-clad  horse- 
men, struck  again  and  again,  till  victory  crowned  his  efi"orts.  The  bat- 
tle was  lost  and  won  more  than  once  during  the  day;  for  the  Hunga- 
rians, though  their  ranks  were  open  and  their  files  scattered,  yet,  like 
all  good  light  cavalry,  worked  well  together  in  their  attacks,  as  if  each 
individual  horseman  was  instinctively  animated  with  the  same  inten- 
tion. Like  shadows  they  eluded  the  grasp  of  the  heavy  Germans — 
never  left  them — and  hung  on  their  heels  when  tl^ey  turned  back  again. 
The  better  generalship  of  King  Otto  alone  gave  him  the  victory. 

We  now  go  on  to  the  thirteenth  century,  when  the  Mongolian  hordes 
invaded  Poland;  and  we  find,  at  the  Battle  of  Liegnitz  (April  9,  1241), 


8  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

that  the  Polish  cavalry,  all  heavily  equipped  and  partly  clad  iu  armor, 
were  defeated  by  the  more  active  horsemen  of  the  Mongols. 

The  armies  met  in  the  plains  near  Wahlstatt.  The  Polish  army, 
under  Prince  Henry  the  Good,  and  Mizeslav,  Prince  of  Upper  Silesia, 
were  marshalled  in  five  corps,  of  which  some  in  reserve :  their  oppo- 
nents formed  much  in  the  same  way.  The  Polish  right  wing  attacked 
and  defeated  the  Mongols  opposed  to  them,  but  these  soon  rallied  and 
drove  them  back  on  their  reserves,  which,  in  their  turn,  advanced, 
overthrew  the  Mongols,  and  pursued  them.  Suddenly,  however,  ac- 
cording to  Polish  historians,  "  a  spell,  the  effect  of  enchantment,  began 
to  work,"  and  their  countrymen  fled.  This  spell  originated  in  the 
quick  rallying  of  the  Mongols,  and  their  sudden  and  unexpected  return 
to  the  charge  when  their  enemies  were  exhausted  in  trying  to  catch 
them.  Such  a  surprise  was  very  likely  to  act  like  magic  upon  the  un- 
wieldy horsemen  of  the  West. 

Prince  Henry  himself  now  advanced  with  a  corps  which  had  not 
been  engaged :  Peta,  the  leader  of  the  Mongols,  came  to  meet  him,  but, 
as  before,  evaded  the  shock  of  the  first  onset,  and  returned  again  and 
again  to  the  charge ;  when  his  adversaries  were  fairly  tired  out,  he 
then,  with  a  fresh  reserve  (the  last  one  in  hand),  poured  down  and 
swept  the  worn-out  Christians  from  the  field. 

Here,  as  in  the  other  instance,  the  Poles  followed  up  their  first  suc- 
cess, pursuing  the  Mongols  when  they  purposely  retired  before  themj 
again  they  were  spell-bound;  and  this  time  it  is  said  that,  wrapped  in 
clouds  of  dust,  they  were  deprived  of  sight  and  strength. 

We  understand  this  "spell"  also,  and  so  did  the  Mongols;  for,  as 
soon  as  they  saw  it  working,  as  one  man  they  turned  on  their  Christian 
pursuers,  and  slaughtered  them  without  mercj'.* 

The  contact  with  Eastern  nations  has,  from  the  earliest  times,  in- 
fluenced the  progress  of  cavalry  in  Europe;  and  the  very  tactics  dis- 
played by  these  Mongolian  hordes  in  the  thirteenth  century  are  the  rule 
and  the  foundation  of  our  cavalry  tactics  of  the  present  day. 

The  improvement  of  that  noble  animal,  the  horse,  is  comparatively 
of  recent  date  in  England.  At  least  as  late  as  the  time  of  Charles  I 
we  looked  to  the  Continent — chiefly  to  Spain  and  Naples — for  our  best 

*Kricgswissenschaftlichen  Analectcn,  by  Captain  Ganzauge. 


MODERN  EUROPEAN  CAVALRY.  9 

horses  for  the  manege  and  war.  Our  Edward  I  took  cavalry  with  him 
into  Scotland;  and  we  know  what  became  of  the  English  horse  at 
Bannockburn.  The  battles  in  France  of  our  Edwards  and  Henries 
were  infantry  battles,  and  were  gained  almost  entirely  by  the  English 
bow.  The  French  had,  at  times,  a  numerous  cavalry,  but  it  was  de- 
plorably deficient  in  discipline ;  and  when  they  had  a  few  good  squad- 
rons they  evidently  knew  not  how  to  use  them.  Good  horses  were 
scarce,  and  they  had  neither  the  patience  nor  the  money  to  train  the 
mounted  soldier  as  he  must  be  trained  ere  he  can  be  serviceable  in 
war.  The  knights,  and  some  of  the  regular  men-at-arms,  rode  well, 
from  being  constantly  in  the  saddle;  but  the  rest  (as  we  have  seen  it 
said  of  certain  modern  horse-soldiers  raised  in  a  hurry),  "not  being 
accustomed  to  horses,  were  always  falling  off."  It  takes  threefold 
more  time  to  teach  a  man  to  ride  and  to  have  a  perfect  mastery  of  his 
horse  than  it  takes  to  teach  a  foot-soldier  his  complete  drill;  and  when 
the  horse-soldier  is  taught  so  far,  he  has  still  a  vast  deal  to  learn  before 
his  education  can  be  considered  as  completed.  This  difiference  alone 
will  go  far  to  show  how  it  has  happened  that  the  cavalry  soldier  has 
been  inferior  in  his  line  to  the  infantry  soldier  in  his. 

In  modern  Europe  cavalry  first  rose  into  importance  when  the 
nations  of  Germany  overran  the  Continent,  and  felt  the  necessity  of 
having  numerous  bodies  of  horse  with  their  invading  armies;  a  neces- 
sity which  had  not  been  made  apparent  while  they  remained  in  their 
own  country. 

By  degrees  European  cavalry  were  clad  in  armor,  formed  in  single 
ranks,  and  each  horseman  was  expected  to  single  out  an  antagonist  for 
the  fight. 

The  select  French  gendarmes,  who  were  cased  in  heavy  armor, 
greatly  distinguished  themselves  in  this  manner  of  fighting. 

To  these  heavy  horsemen  succeeded  the  Reiters,  German  mercena- 
ries, who,  mounted  on  faster  horses,  equipped  more  lightly,  and  armed 
with  swords  and  pistols,  constantly  beat  the  gendarmes  in  the  civil 
wars  of  France  and  Flanders. 

The  introduction  of  gunpowder  had  brought  about  a  change;  and 
the  cavaliers  by  degrees  had  laid  aside  their  armor,  and  taken  to  fire- 
arms. 

Under  Henry  II  of    France  cavalry  was  formed  again  in  oblong 


10  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

squares  and  in  ten  ranks.  Henry  IV  reduced  their  front,  and,  by  de- 
grees, the  number  of  ranks  to  six. 

In  the  sixteenth  century  detachments  of  infantry  were  mixed  with 
the  cavalry;  and  both  made  to  keep  pace,  and  meet  the  enemy  together 
in  battle. 

At  the  Battle  of  Pavia,  in  1525,  the  Marquis  of  Pcscara  placed  (for 
the  first  time)  bodies  of  heavy-armed  Spanish  musketeers  in  the  inter- 
vals of  the  Imperial  cavalry,  and  thus  (it  is  said)  defeated  the  French. 

The  practice  of  mixing  horse  and  foot  gained  ground ;  and  as  the 
infantry  soldier  rose  in  importance,  so  did  the  cavalry  soldier  sink 
lower  and  lower  in  the  scale. 

With  the  introduction  of  gunpowder  the  distance  at  which  contend- 
ing armies  engaged  in  battle  was  greatly  increased  :  cavalry  could 
effect  nothing  with  fire-arms,  and  were  kept  out  of  the  reach  of  the 
enemy's  shot;  they  were  of  little  use, because  their  movements  were  so 
slow  that  the  opportunity  for  action  was  generally  lost  before  they 
could  go  over  the  ground  which  separated  them  from  the  enemy. 

Gustavus  Adolphus  reduced  the  unwicldly  size  of  the  squadrons  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  (1630);  he  formed  them  in 
four  ranks,  of  which  the  first  three  charged  while  the  fourth  remained 
in  support;  he  stripped  the  men  of  their  armor,  took  from  thorn  their 
lances,  and  made  them  lighter,  more  active,  and  more  useful.  He 
formed  his  cavalry  in  two  lines,  and  generally  placed  them  on  the 
flanks  of  the  army. 

In  France,  under  Louis  XIII,  in  1635,  squadrons  were  reduced  in 
front  and  depth,  and  in  1766  they  were  formed  in  two  ranks;  they 
were  still  unwicldly  and  difficult  to  manoeuvre,  though  they  had  im- 
proved by  being  organized  in  regiments,  and  having  the  heavy  equip- 
ments made  lighter. 

The  practice,  however,  of  sending  cavalry  into  action  supported  by 
bodies  of  musketeers  placed  in  the  intervals,  took  from  them  their  im- 
pulsive power,  and  deprived  them  of  the  advantage  to  bo  derived  from 
the  speed  of  their  horses. 

It  was  reserved  for  Charles  XII  to  alter  this  stylo  of  fighting  on 
horseback,  and  to  improve  upon  it.  His  daring  and  chivalrous  charac- 
ter was  suited  to  the  spirit  of  cavalry  tactics;  he  led  his  horsemen 
sword  in  hand  against  cavalry,  against  infantry,  against  fortified  posi- 


CROMWELL.  11 

tions,  over  any  country ;  he  acknowledged  no  diflSculties  and  over- 
threw all  opposition.  Untiring  in  pursuit,  he  actually  followed  up  the 
Saxons  under  Marshal  Schulenburg  in  their  retreat  into  Silesia  for  nine 
consecutive  days  without  unsaddling,  overtook  them  at  Sanitz,  near 
Punitz,  and,  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry  only,  charged  them,  though 
ten  thousand  strong — rode  over  their  infantry,  who  lay  down  to  avoid 
the  impetuous  rush  of  the  Swedes — defeated  and  drove  the  Saxon 
eavalry  oflF  the  field — then  returned  to  attack  the  infantry  and  guns. 
Night  alone  put  an  end  to  the  combat,  and  the  enemy  profited  by  the 
darkness  to  escape  across  the  frontier.  All  the  guns  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Swedes.  They  appear  to  have  made  a  most  formidable  use  of 
their  long  straight  swords  when  in  pursuit  of  the  cavalry,  for  the  dead 
Saxons  had  all  been  run  through  the  body. 

The  period  of  our  Great  Civil  "War  witnessed  the  introduction  of 
many  changes  besides  those  which  were  merely  of  a  political  nature. 
It  was  then  that  our  horse  first  began  really  to  distinguish  themselves, 
and  to  stand  forward  as  the  gainers  or  deciders  of  victory. 

The  English  cavalry  under  Cromwell  and  his  fiery  adversary.  Prince 
Rupert,  claim  especial  notice;  for  from  the  numerous  cavalry  engage- 
ments of  that  period  many  good  and  useful  lessons  may  yet  be  gleaned 
by  the  cavalry  soldier. 

Cromwell,  forty-four  years  of  age  when  he  first  drew  a  sword,  showed 
himself  a  great  soldier  at  the  very  outset.  He  himself  raised,  organ- 
ized, and  disciplined  his  troops  of  horse,  and  set  his  men  an  example 
which  they  were  not  slow  in  following.  His  mental  and  bodily  energy, 
his  vigorous  conceptions,  quick  decision,  and  the  dread  vehemence  with 
which  he  urged  his  war-steed  into  the  thick  of  battle,  made  of  him  a 
cavalry  leader  second  to  none  in  history.  Indefatigable  and  active,  a 
good  horseman,  and  perfect  master  of  the  broadsword,  he  had  unbound- 
ed ascendancy  over  the  minds  of  his  followers,  and  led  them  through, 
or  over,  all  obstacles  that  human  prowess  could  surmount. 

The  impetuosity  and  rashness  of  Prince  Rupert  were  no  match  for 
the  cool  courage  and  presence  of  mind  of  Cromwell.  The  latter  often 
turned  defeat  into  victory;  the  former  lost  many  a  fair  field  by  letting 
his  cavalry  out  of  hand  after  a  first  success:  and,  during  his  absence, 
his  wary  and  more  able  opponent  secured  the  prize. 


12  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

At  Grantham  tlio  Royalists  had  one-and-twenty  troops  of  horse,  and 
three  or  four  of  dragoons.* 

Cromwell  drew  out  about  twelve  troops  to  meet  them:  they  formed 
at  musket-shot  distance  from  each  other,  and  the  dragoons  fired  for 
half  an  hour,  or  more.  Cromwell  then  led  his  troopers  on  to  the  charge, 
sword  in  hand;  the  Royalists  received  him  standing,  and  were  at  once 
overthrown ;  he  followed  them  up  for  some  miles,  each  trooper  killing 
two  or  three  men  in  the  pursuit. 

At  Gainsborough,  after  a  skirmish  with  the  enemy's  advance,  Crom- 
well gained  the  crest  of  a  hill,  and  saw  suddenly  a  great  body  of  the 
Royalist  horse  facing  him,  and  close  to  him,  with  a  good  reserve  of  a 
whole  regiment  of  cavalry  behind  it.  Though  taken  by  surprise,  Crom- 
well led  on  his  horsemen  to  meet  the  foe,  who  were  pressing  forward  to 
take  him  at  a  disadvantage.  A  good  fight  with  sword  and  pistol  en- 
sued, till  the  Roundheads,  pressing  in  upon  their  adversaries,  routed 
the  whole  body,  and  immediately  pursued,  doing  execution  upon  them 
for  five  or  six  miles. 

Cromwell,  however,  who  commanded  the  right  wing,  kept  back  Major 
Whalley  and  three  troops  of  horse  from  the  chase;  these  he  at  once 
formed  up,  and,  observing  the  enemy's  reserve,  under  General  Caven- 
dish, charge  the  Lincolners  and  rout  them,  he  suddenly  galloped  in  on 
his  rear,  drove  horses  and  men  off  the  field  at  the  sword's  point,  and 
killed  Cavendish. 

At  the  famous  and  disastrous  Battle  of  Marston  Moor,  fought  on  the 
2d  of  July,  1644,  Cromwell  signally  distinguished  himself,  and  gave 
Prince  Rupert  a  taste  of  the  steel  of  his  Ironsides  which  the  latter  did 
not  at  all  relish. 

A  junction  had  been  formed  between  the  Scotch  army  and  the  Eng- 
lish Parliamentary  forces,  and  they  invested  York.  Prince  Rupert  and 
the  Marquis  of  Newcastle  joined  their  forces  to  raise  the  siege,  for  the 
possession  of  this  ancient  city  was  of  great  importance  to  them  in  a 
military  point  of  view. 

The  opposing  forces  numbered  about  fifty  thousand ;  they  were  drawn 
up  with  a  ditch  between  them,  and  did  not  get  into  position  till  five  iu 

*  The  troop  consisted  of  sixty  men,  one  captain,  a  lieutenant,  a  cornet,  and  a 
g  ^quartermaster. 


MARSTON    MOOR.  lo 

the  evening;  the  King's  troops  f.acing  the  west,  their  opponents  the  east. 
A  long  and  bloody  contest  then  ensued.  At  first  neither  party  would 
give  up  the  advantage  which  the  dam  and  ditch  afforded  to  those  who 
remained  on  the  defensive,  till  Lord  Manchester  moved  forward  with 
the  left  wing  of  the  Parliamentary  army  to  the  attack,  seconded  by 
Cromwell,  who  commanded  the  cavalry  of  that  wing. 

The  attack  was  successful  at  every  point,  though  a  desperate  fight 
took  place  between  Cromwoirs  and  Rupert's  horsemen.  Cromwell  had 
kept  part  of  his  cavalry  in  reserve ;  these  suddenly  fell  upon  the  Royal- 
ists whilst  engaged  in  the  melee  with  him,  and  completely  defeated 
them. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Royalists  was  now  closely  pursued  by  horse 
and  foot,  and  driven  far  back  behind  the  left  wing. 

The  exact  counterpart  to  this  had  taken  place  on  the  opposite  wings 
of  the  contending  armies. 

The  left  wing  of  the  Royalists  had  advanced,  attacked,  and  driven 
back  the  right  wing  of  the  Parliament,  defeating  their  horsemen,  who, 
in  galloping  to  the  rear,  spread  confusion  and  dismay  amongst  the  re- 
serves of  Scotch  infantry. 

Lord  Manchester  only  heard  of  what  had  happened  on  his  right  after 
Sir  Thomas  Fairfax's  troops  had  fled  some  miles  on  the  road  to  Tadcas- 
ter;  and  Cromwell,  at  once  collecting  his  cavalry  from  the  pursuit, 
turned  and  followed  the  victorious  Royalists  toward  that  place.  These 
formed  to  receive  him,  were  defeated,  and  fled.  Thus  Cromwell,  by  his 
energy  and  courage,  won  the  day,  after  some  of  the  chief  generals  had 
left  the  field,  and  given  the  battle  up  as  lost.  The  Battle  of  Marston 
Moor  resembles  in  many  particulars  that  of  Zorndorf;  both  were 
brought  about  in  the  same  way,  both  were  gained  by  the  same  ma- 
noeuvre, which  Hasdrubal  employed  at  Canute,  and  Scidlitz  at  Zorn- 
dorf. 

These  three  great  cavalry  generals  were  victorious  first  on  the  left 
wings  of  their  armies  ,•  from  there  they  passed  to  the  right  wing  to  re- 
establish the  fight:  and  all  three  then  succeeded  in  the  same  way  in 
breaking  through  the  enemy's  infantry,  which,  again,  in  all  three  cases, 
fought  manfully.  Thus  these  three  great  battles  are  reckoned  as  cavalry 
victories,  for  to  the  horsemen  was  due  the  success  on  all  three  occasions 
in  question. 
2 


14  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

Curious  that  at  such  distant  periods,  under  such  different  circum- 
stances, the  same  results  should  have  been  achieved,  and  in  almost 
exactly  the  same  manner !  Does  this  not  point  forcibly  to  the  necessity 
of  consulting  the  past,  that  we  may  prepare  for  the  future  ? 

On  the  14th  of  June,  1645,  was  fought  the  Battle  of  Naseby.  The 
right  wing  of  the  Royal  army  was  under  the  gallant  Prince  Eupert,  the 
left  under  Sir  Marmaduke  Langdalc,  the  main  body  under  Lord  Astloy, 
the  reserve  under  the  King  in  person. 

Of  the  Parliament,  the  right  wing  was  commanded  by  Cromwell,  the 
left  by  Ireton,  the  main  body  by  Fairfax  and  Skippon.  Rupert  charged 
hotly  the  loft  wing  of  the  Roundheads,  fairly  broke  them,  drove  them 
through  .the  streets  of  Naseby,  and  continued  the  pursuit.  Cromwell, 
at  the  same  time,  charged  and  dispersed  the  Royal  horse  under  Sir 
Marmaduke  Langdale.  The  Royal  infantry,  in  the  meantime,  engaged 
and  were  driving  the  Parliamentary  foot  before  them.  The  fate  of  the 
day  depended  upon  which  side  should  first  see  their  cavalry  return. 
Cromwell  at  last  appeared,  at  the  head  of  his  dreaded  Ironsides,  charg- 
ed fiercely  on  the  flank  of  the  Royalist  infantry,  and  threw  them  into 
irremediable  confusion.  The  fate  of  the  day  was  sealed  :  Rupert  rer 
turned  too  late  to  do  any  goodj  and  the  King  fled  the  field,  leaving  his 
artillery  and  five  thousand  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  victors. 

Thus  had  Cromwell  again  turned  defeat  into  victory  by  throwing  his 
Ironsides  into  the  scale  at  the  proper  time;  whilst  Rupert,  by  his  head- 
long and  thoughtless  bravery,  lost  to  his  sovereign  for  ever  the  chance 
of  recovering  his  crown  and  kingdom.  Had  he  returned  after  his  first 
success  and  attacked  the  Roundhead  infantry,  the  issue  of  the  whole 
struggle  would  probably  have  turned  in  favor  of  the  King,  for  it  re- 
quired the  best  efi"orts  of  Fairfax  and  Skippon  to  preveiit  their  infantry 
from  running  away. 

A  few  of  the  oflicers  who  served  in  this  war  had  fought  under  Gusta- 
vus  Adolphus,  and  had  charged  with  the  Swedish  cavalry  in  the  plains 
of  Germany  and  on  the  field  of  LiUzen,  where  the  hero  fell. 

For  ages  the  finest  cavalry  seen  in  Europe  was  indisputably  that  of 
the  Turks.  In  great  part,  both  men  and  horses  were  brought  over  from 
the  Asiatic  provinces  of  the  empire,  and  the  rest  of  the  men  and  horses 
were  principally  of  Asiatic  descent.  The  horses,  though  not  large 
(seldom  much  exceeding  fourteen  hands),  were  nimble,  spirited,  and  yet 


TURKISH    CAVALRY.  15 

docile,  and  so  trained  and  bitted  as  to  be  perfectly  under  control ;  the 
hollow  saddle  was  rather  heavy,  but  all  the  rest  of  the  appointments 
were  light;  the  soldier  rode  in  the  broad  short  stirrup  to  which  he  and 
his  ancestors  had  always  boon  accustomed,  and  on  which  they  had  a 
firm  and  (to  them)  natural  seat  out  of  which  it  was  most  dilficult  to 
throw  him;  his  scimitar  was  light  and  sharp,  and,  in  addition  to  it,  he 
generally  carried  in  his  girdle  that  shorter  slightly-curved  weapon  called 
the  yataghan,  with  an  edge  like  that  of  a  razor.  Some  of  the  Spahis 
used  long  lances  or  spears,  but  these  were  always  thrown  aside,  as  use- 
less, in  the  melee  of  battle.  Their  tactics  were  few  and  simple.  If 
they  could  not  get  in  the  small  end  of  one  wedge,  they  tried  another 
and  another  wedge;  if  they  penetrated  the  hostile  line,  they  dealt  death 
around  them — their  sharp  weapons  usually  inflicting  mortal  wounds  or 
lopping  off  limbs.  If  the  enemy  gave  way,  they  spread  out  like  a  fan, 
and,  while  some  pressed  on  the  front,  others  turned  the  flanks  and  got 
into  the  rear.  Occasionally,  to  gain  time,  the  Turks  mounted  some  of 
their  infantry,  en  croupe,  behind  their  Spahis.  Thus,  early  in  the  Bat- 
tle of  Ryminik,  when  they  had  to  contend  with  Marshal  Suwarrow  and 
some  Austrians,  a  body  of  six  thousand  Janissaries  jumped  up  behind 
au  equal  number  of  Turkish  horsemen,  and  were  carried  at  full  speed 
to  occupy  a  commanding  eminence,  of  which  the  Austrians  were  also 
desirous  of  taking  possession.*  We  have  seen,  quite  in  our  own  day, 
this  effective  and  really  brilliant  cavalry  reduced,  by  the  spirit  of  imi- 
tation and  ill-understood  reform,  to  a  condition  beneath  contempt.  The 
late  Sultan  Mahmoud  must  needs  have  his  cavalry  disciplined  alia 
Franca,  or  in  Christian  fashion  ;  and  he  imported  a  number  of  French, 
Italian,  and  German  non-commissioned  ofiicers  to  teach  his  men  to  ride 
with  long  stirrups,  and  to  form,  dress,  and  look  like  Europeans.  To 
the  disgust  and  even  dismay  of  his  Moslems,  he  buttoned  them  up  in 
close  jackets  and  put  them  into  tight  pantaloons.  "With  a  most  per- 
verse determination  the  system  has  been  continued  and  extended  these 
last  twelve  years,  under  his  son  and  successor,  the  present  Sultan 
Abdul  Medjid,  and  it  may  now  safely  be  said  that  the  Turkish  cavalry 
is  no  longer  the  best  in  the  world.  The  men,  always  accustomed  to  sit 
cross-legged,  and  to  keep  their  knees  near  the  abdomen,  can  not  be 

*  Marshal  Marmont.  Travels  in  Turkey,  etc. 


16  HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 

taught  to  rido  with  the  long  stirrup,  a  la  Fraiuyise.  They  are  always 
rolling  oflf,  and  are  frequently  ruptured.  They  are  armed  with  the 
lance,  and  have  seldom  any  other  weapon  except  an  ill-made,  hlunt, 
awkward  sabre.  Their  horses  are  now  wretched  rosses.  The  good 
breeds  have  died  out ;  and  the  Imperial,  centralizing  tyranny — masked 
under  the  names  of  reform  and  civilization — which  has  been  raging 
with  more  or  less  intensity  these  last  fifty  years,  has  not  left  on  the  sur- 
face of  the  empire  a  man  of  hereditary  rank  and  wealth,  or  any  private 
country  gentleman,  with  the  means  of  restoring  the  lost  breeds,  or  of 
supplying  such  good  light  cavalry  horses  as  existed  in  abundance  at 
the  commencement  of  the  present  century.  The  Karasman  Oglus,  the 
Paswan  Oglus,  and  all  those  great  Asiatic  feudatories,  together  with  the 
hereditary  Spahi  chiefs  of  Roumelia,  who  kept  up  the  principal  studs, 
are  all  gone  !  Mounted  as  chey  are,  armed  as  they  are,  and  riding  as 
they  do,  instead  of  dealing  with  European  horsemen  after  the  summary 
fashion  of  the  good  old  Turks,  any  English  hussar  ought  to  be  able  to 
dispose,  in  a  minute,  of  half  a  dozen  of  Abdul  Medjid's  troopers,  train- 
ed ftlla  Franca,  though  he  (the  hussar)  were  armed  only  with  a  stout 
walking-stick. 

The  cavalry  of  the  Russians  and  Austrians  improved  much  during 
their  wars  with  the  Turks  ;  and  of  the  knowledge  thus  practically  ob- 
tained the  Austrians  made  good  use  in  their  first  campaigns  agaiustthe 
Prussians  in  the  Seven  Years'  "War. 

These  Turkish  horsemen,  without  discipline,  rushed  in  like  a  whirl- 
wind, in  swarms  or  irregular  columns,  and  swept  over  all  that  came  in 
their  way,  leaving  death  alone  in  their  track,  so  cflfoctually  did  they  ply 
their  scimitars.*' 

Neither  discipline  nor  the  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  could  save  the 
Christians  from  these  fanatic  horsemen ;  their  only  safety  lay  in  the 
chevaux-de-frise  with  which  every  column  was  provided,  and  each  bat- 
talion had  two  light  carts  to  carry  them. 

When  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  enemy  the  men  took  the  chevaux- 
de-frise  on  their  shoulders,  formed  a  skeleton  column,  and,  when  an  at- 
tack was  threatened,  they  wheeled  into  lino,  fixed  the  joints  in  the 
ground,  and  fastened  them  together. 

*  Berenhorst. 


TURKISH    CAVALRY.  17 

To  these  arraugemcnts  the  Russians  owed  their  first  success  agaiost 
the  Turks,  as  far  back  as  1711. 

When  General  Munich  marched  out  against  the  Turks  in  1736  he  did 
not  consider  the  chevaux-de-frise  a  sufiicient  protection,  and  again 
armed  part  of  his  infantry  with  long  pikes.  His  troops  marched  in 
large  oblong  squares ;  these  were  at  a  moment's  notice  surrounded  by 
the  iron  spikes  of  the  chevaux-dc-frise,  and  flanked  by  artillery.  At 
this  impassable  barrier  tliey  received  their  turbaned  assailants,  and 
poured  upon  them  a  destructive  fii-e  in  perfect  safety. 

No  European  cavalry,  with  all  its  tactics,  large  squadrons,  cuirasses, 
and  lances,  ever  inspired  such  dread,  or  brought  infantry  to  the  neces- 
sity of  seeking  safety  behind  impassable  obstacles.  The  Moslems  alone 
inspired  sufficient  dread  to  call  forth  on  the  part  of  the  infantry  a  hu- 
miliating confession  of  their  weakness  in  the  precautionary  measures 
they  adopted;  for,  unless  surrounded  by  these  formidable  engines  of 
war,  the  Turks  seldom  failed  to  burst  in  among  them,  and  then  handled 
the  sword  quick,  masterly,  and  without  cessation,  until  checked  by  the 
reaction  brought  on  from  the  excess  of  their  own  fury.* 

With  European  cavalry  they  dealt  in  the  same  summary  way  when- 
ever they  got  among  them  ;  but  to  prevent  this,  the  cavalry  were  formed 
in  masses,  with  guns  and  infantry  on  their  flanks  ! 

Now,  if  the  individual  prowess  and  skill  in  single  combat,  the  horse- 
manship and  sharp  swords  of  the  Turks,  made  them  so  formidable  as 
history  here  relates,  how  irresistible  would  cavalry  be  which  to  these 
qualities  should  add  that  discipline  and  method  in  which  they  were 
wanting,  and  which  was  the  cause  of  the  disastrous  termination  of  all 
their  wars  after  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century  ! 

The  Mamelukes  of  Egypt  kept  up  their  high  qualities  as  bold  horse- 
men until  they  were  annihilated  at  the  commencement  of  the  nineteenth 
century  :  but  they  can  scaroely  be  said  to  have  belonged  to  the  Turks. 
If  these  brave  Mamelukes,  drawn  from  diSerent  races  and  from  diflfer- 
ent  countries,  but  chiefly  from  the  ancient  Thessaly  and  Macedonia, 
and  from  the  backgrounds  of  European  Turkey  which  we  now  call  Ser- 
via,  Bosnia,  Albania,  etc.,  had  been  backed  by  only  a  tolerable  infantry, 
the  sanguinary  aff'air  at  the  Pyramids  would  have  been  a  defeat  and 

*  Berenhorst. 
2* 


18  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

not  a  victory  to  the  French.  Single-handed,  the  French  troopers  had 
no  chance  with  those  daring  horsemen  and  expert  swordsmen. 

While  the  Russians  and  Austrians  were  impelled  by  the  Turks  into 
an  improvement  of  their  cavalrj'-,  pains  were  taken  by  the  Prussians  to 
add  to  the  efficiency  of  that  arm.  AVherever  there  was  war,  or  a  prob- 
ability of  it,  it  was  seen  and  felt  that  cavalry  must  bear  an  important 
part,  and  that  there  was  much  to  change  or  to  modify  in  it.  Nobody 
thought  that,  while  infantry  and  artillery  were  improved,  cavalry  could 
be  left  in  statu  quo. 

Frederic  William  the  Stadtholder  and  Leopold  of  Dessau  together 
reorganized  the  Prussian  army,  and  laid  the  foundation  of  that  disci- 
pline which,  under  Frederic  the  Great,  became  so  celebrated,  and  was 
copied  by  almost  all  European  nations. 

Frederic  William  would  have  tall  men  for  his  army  :  they  were  kid- 
napped by  his  recruiting  parties  wherever  they  were  met  with. 

His  cavalry  were  well  drilled  to  fire  in  line,  both  on  foot  and  on  horse- 
back :  nothing  was  done  to  make  them  formidable  in  close  combat ; 
they  charged  at  a  walk  or  a  trot. 

When  Frederic  the  Great  ascended  the  throne,  he  found  his  cavalry 
drilled  in  this  way.  The  horses  and  men  were  colossal :  they  dared 
not  icalk  on  a  bad  pavement,  or  move  beyond  that  pace  on  uneven 
ground. 

At  the  first  battle  against  the  Austrians,  the  Imperial  cavalry,  which 
had  gained  experience  in  the  Turkish  wars,  charged  the  Prussians 
sword  in  hand,  Moslem  fashion,  at  speed,  and  drove  them  from  the  field. 
The  Great  Frederic,  who  did  not  like  the  look  of  matters  (at  this  Bat- 
tle of  Mollwitz),  took  the  advice  of  his  field-marshal,  followed  the  fugi- 
tives, and  only  rejoined  the  army  next  morning,  on  hearing  that  his 
infantry  had  stood  firm  and  won  the  day  in  spite  of  the  flight  of  the 
cavalry. 

When  the  campaign  closed  with  the  conquest  of  Silesia,  Frederic  at 
once  proceeded  with  the  organization  of  this  arm  of  the  service.  Ho 
began  by  doing  away  with  all  firing  in  line,  and  gave  all  his  attention 
to  making  them  good  riders.  Seidlitz  formed  his  hussars  in  two  ranks, 
and  toward  the  end  of  the  campaign  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  fol- 
lowed his  example.  They  were  all  brought  to  do  what  Marshal  Saxc 
laid  down  as  necessary,  namely :  to  charge  at  their  best  speed  for  two 


SEIDLITZ.  19 

thousand  yards  without  breaking  their  array.  Many  of  the  old  Prus- 
sian generals  opposed  these  innovations  to  the  utmost;  but  the  King 
carried  them  through,  for  he  was  convinced  of  the  advantage  of  impetu- 
osity in  the  attack  :  and  his  mounted  troops,  which  had  been  defeated 
constantly  in  the  first  campaign  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  when  thus 
reorganized  and  led  by  Ziethen  and  Seidlitz,  astonished  the  world  by 
their  deeds  of  arms;  not  only  overthrowing  cavalry  in  their  headlong 
career,  but  sweeping  whole  armies  of  infantry  off  the  field.  Witness 
the  Battles  of  Strigau,  Kesseldorf,  Rossbach,  Leuthen,  Zorndorf.  This 
last  was  the  most  glorious  of  all  to  the  Prussian  horsemen,  who,  in  thir- 
ty-six squadrons,  under  Seidlitz,  not  only  turned  the  fortune  of  the  day, 
saved  the  infantry  and  artillery  of  their  own  army,  but  checked  the 
advance,  overthrew  the  victorious  Russian  cavalry,  driving  it  from  the 
field  ;  then  returned  to  fall  upon  the  Russian  infantry,  which,  prepared 
to  receive  the  Prussians,  fought  with  the  most  determined  bravery  ; 
and  when  their  masses  were  broken  into  by  the  furious  horsemen,  those 
who  escaped  the  sword  threw  themselves  again  into  masses,  and  had  to 
be  charged  again  and  again.  In  no  modern  battle  did  so  many  men 
fall  by  the  sword  as  at  Zorndorf,  though  the  Prussians  had  been  twelve 
hours  on  horseback  before  advancing  to  the  charge. 

At  no  time  have  more  glorious  deeds  been  done  by  cavalry  than  were 
achieved  by  the  Prussian  horsemen  of  those  days.  Their  arm  was  the 
sword ;  their  trust  lay  in  the  individual  prowess  and  good  riding  of 
their  horsemen  ;  their  tactics  consisted  in  speed  and  determination  :  and 
to  this  system  is  attributed  not  only  their  wonderful  success,  but  also 
their  generally  trifling  loss  in  killed  and  wounded. 

Seidlitz  practised  his  hussars  at  going  across  country,  using  their 
swords  and  fire-arms  at  speed;  and  various  were  the  feats  to  which  he 
drilled  his  men,  in  order  to  make  them  expert  in  the  management  of 
their  horses  and  arms. 

An  anecdote  is  related  of  him.  When  the  King  inspected  his  regi- 
ment, and  found  fault  with  the  number  of  deaths  occasioned  that  sea- 
son by  accidents  at  drill,  Seidlitz  answered  very  drily  :  "  If  you  make 
such  a  fuss  about  a  few  broken  necks,  your  majesty  will  never  have  the 
bold  horsemen  you  require  for  the  field."  It  was  one  of  the  amuse- 
ments of  this  daring  cavalier  to  ride  in  at  speed  between  the  arms  of  a 


20  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

windmill  while  working.     This  feat  Seidlitz  often  performed  after  he 
had  attained  to  the  rank  of  a  general  officer. 

The  ancient  Greeks  followed  much  the  same  system  as  Seidlitz,  being 
convinced  that  neither  man  nor  horse  would  be  up  to  the  work  unless 
frequently  put  to  it  beforehand.  "  If  you  wish  to  have  a  good  war- 
steed,"  says  Xenophon,  "you  must  try  him  in  all  those  things  which 
may  be  required  in  war.  These  are,  to  leap  across  ditches,  scramble 
over  walls,  spring  up  ascents,  and  dash  down  descents ;  and  to  be 
experienced  in  charging  on  slopes,  uneven  ground,  and  traverse  roads 
or  paths.  Many  horses  fail,  not  for  want  of  ability,  but  for  want  of 
experience  in  these  things.  Let  them  be  instructed,  trained,  and  accus- 
tomed, and  they  will  excel  in  them  all,  if  they  are  healthy  horses  and 
not  vicious."* 

Frederic  the  Great  divided  his  cavalry  in  the  field  into  corps  of 
twenty,  thirty,  and  forty  squadrons,  and  made  them  stand  out  boldly 
and  alone  to  play  their  own  part  according  to  circumstances.  He 
wielded  sword  and  sceptre.  He  directed  these  cavalry  movements 
with  consummate  skill  and  energy ;  he  let  no  opportunities  pass  with- 
out making  his  enemies  feel  the  weight  of  his  sword;  and  the  Prussians, 
thus  encouraged  by  their  King,  and  full  of  confidence  in  their  leaders, 
plied  their  spurs  and  rode  to  victory. 

It  was  a  favorite  saying  of  Frederic  that  three  horsemen  in  the 
enemy's  rear  do  moi*e  than  fifty  in  front;  and  his  generals  always  tried 
to  attack  front,  flank,  and  rear  at  the  same  time.  In  the  two  first 
attacks,  or  in  front  and  flank,  they  generally  succeeded.  Hovr  they 
did  so  has  remained  a  mystery  to  this  day.  It,  however,  appears  that 
they  generally  seized  the  moment  when  the  combined  use  of  artillery 
and  infantry,  or  the  use  of  either  singly,  had  made  an  impression,  and 
then  dashed  in  ;  or  that  they  rapidly  gained  the  enemy's  flank  and 
charged  home.  Out  of  twenty-two  great  battles  fought  by  Frederic  or 
his  generals,  the  cavalry,  thus  employed,  decided  the  fate  oi  fifteen. 

To  his  cavalry  in  action  Frederic  gave  no  orders  beyond  general  direc- 
tions as  to  which  part  of  the  field  it  was  to  act  in.  The  moment  for 
attack  was  always  left  to  the  generals  commanding  the  cavalry,  who, 

*  Xenophon  on  Horsemanship. 


BATTLE    OF   ROSSBACH.  21 

after  securing  their  flanks  and  providing  a  reserve,  spurred  and  start- 
ed; and,  being  once  started,  they  pushed  on  while  there  was  an  enemy 
in  the  held. 

Bereuhorst  (in  his  Betrachtungen  iibcr  Kriegskunst)  gives  the  fol- 
lowing interesting  account  of  the  Battle  of  Rossbach : 

'•The  generals  were  dining  with  the  King  at  Rossbach,  when  a  cry 
arose  of  'The  French  arc  coming!'  They  jumped  on  their  horses, 
and,  as  if  by  inspiration,  gave  the  order  to  fall  in,  form  column,  and 
take  ground  to  the  left;  they  must  have  been  beaten  had  they  awaited 
on  their  own  ground  the  well-planned  attack  of  the  enemy ;  but,  with- 
out any  intention  of  misleading  the  French,  they  left  the  tents  stand- 
ing— for  they  had  no  time  to  strike  them;  and  this  accidental  circum- 
stance deceived  the  enemy  better  than  the  most  cunningly  devised 
scheme. 

"The  right  wing  of  the  Prussians  stood  fast;  the  other,  marching  in 
column  by  its  left,  and  screened  by  a  rising  ground  from  the  view  of 
the  French,  gained  their  flank,  while  the  enemy,  advancing  to  liurround 
the  Prussians,  suddenly  hesitated.  Revel  (one  of  the  Broglio  family), 
who  led  the  French  attack,  fell  mortally  wounded  at  the  first  discharge, 
and  left  his  columns  with  their  flanks  exposed,  and  not  knowing  what 
they  were  to  do  next. 

"  The  Prussian  army,  numerically  weak,  were  full  of  ardor,  the  fore- 
runner of  victory ;  they  despised  the  French.  Those  who  were  moving 
toward  their  flank  and  rear  looked  upon  the  whole  thing  as  a  good 
joke;  they  were  delighted  at  the  idea  of  catching  the  enemy  at  a  dis- 
advantage, and  in  this  they  succeeded. 

"  The  genius  of  the  Prussian  cavalry  sprang  forth  here  from  the 
fields  of  Reichardtswerben,  and  led  them  to  victor}'. 

"  When  the  cavalry  in  order  of  battle,  like  a  pent-up  flood,  is  held 
ready,  and,  at  the  first  signal,  poured  down  in  torrents,  floods  the  field, 
sweeping  all  before  it,  then  has  cavalry  reached  the  ideal  of  perfection; 
and  to  this  ideal  Seidlitz  attained  with  the  Prussian  cavalry  on  that 
day.     Soubise  and  Hildburgshausen  were  swept  from  the  earth." 

In  reviewing  the  deeds  of  the  Prussian  cavalry  of  those  days,  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  they  dealt  with  infantry,  which  sought  the 
open  plain,  advanced  in  long  lines — avoiding  obstacles  of  all  descrip- 
tions, because  such  obstacles  disturbed  their  array.     Their  fire  was 


92 


HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 


quick,  but  not  true  in  its  aim,  and  their  squares  seldom  held  out  long 
against  the  horsemen. 

In  those  days  an  individual  could  often  take  in  at  one  glance  the 
whole  state  of  affairs  at  any  time  during  a  battle,  and  thus  employ  the 
cavalry  at  the  proper  moment.  But  with  the  improvements  in  fire- 
arms the  extent  of  ground  occupied  by  armies  in  position  has  gone  on 
increasing,  and  to  such  an  extent  that  it  is  no  lopger  possible  to  over- 
look the  field,  and,  therefore,  more  diflicult  for  a  cavalry  leader  to 
achieve  the  same  results  as  the  Prussians  did  under  Seidlitz  and 
Ziethen. 

Cavalry  must  now  act  more  in  unison  with  other  arms;  for  great 
results  are  now  achieved  only  by  their  skilful  combinations. 

Since  the  Seven  Years'  War  cavalry  has  fallen  in  general  estimation, 
and  has  lost  that  proud  pre-eminence  at  which  it  stood  when  it  decided 
the  fate  of  battles.  Many  gallant  deeds  have  been  done  in  later  days 
by  English  and  Gorman  horsemen,  as  at  Avesne  le  Sec,  Tillers  en 
Couche,  Gateau  Cambresis,  Emsdorf,  Usagre,  Salamanca,  Garci-IIer- 
nandez,  and  Waterloo;  and  by  the  French  in  many  a  well-contested 
field;  but  they  do  not  come  up  to  the  exploits  of  the  horsemen  of 
Frederic  the  Great,  who,  held  in  hand  in  large  numbers,  till  the 
opportunity  offered  or  necessity  required  them  to  be  let  loose,  then 
burst  over  the  battle-ground,  and  swept  down  all  in  their  impetuous 
ccursc ;  the  word  on  their  hearts,  as  well  as  lips,  being  "Charge 
home !" 

At  the  commencement  of  the  great  war  of  the  French  Revolution 
(1792),  the  cavalry  of  our  neighbors  was  very  far  from  being  either 
numerous  or  good.  In  fact,  as  a  nation,  the  French  are  not,  and  have 
never  been,  truly  equestrian.  Generally  they  are  bad  riders,  and  with- 
out good  riding  there  can  be  no  thoroughly  good  horse-soldier.  We 
do  not  think  that  this  deficicucy  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  in 
nearly  all  parts  of  France  the  ground  is  tilled,  not  by  horses,  but  by 
oxen.  We  attach  more  importance  to  a  second  reason  assigned  by 
General  Foy ;  the  Frenchman's  impatience,  or  what  the  general  calls 
vivacite  {nquiete,  may  prevent  him  from  identifying  himself  with  his 
horse,  or  from  learning  to  ride  as  he  ought.  He  has,  besides,  an  hered- 
itary superstition  for  the  long  stirrup,  and  for  balance-riding,  which 
never  yet  carried  a  man  across  a  rough  country  without  disaster.     In 


THE    FRENCH    CAVALRY.  23 

their  first  campaigns  the  French  had  little  chance  against  the  German 
heavy  horse,  the  Hungarian  hussars,  or  even  the  Walloon  dragoons. 
They  seldom  presented  much  cavalry  in  the  open  field,  and  when  they 
did  it  was  usually  to  their  disadvantage.  Moreover,  the  French  horses 
were  poor,  under-sized,  and  under-bred.  They  got  better  remounts 
when  they  conquered  other  countries  with  their  infantry,  artillery, 
political  propagandism,  and  daring  strategy.  But  the  war-horse  is 
nothing  without  the  rider,  and  cavalry  soldiers  are  not  to  be  impro- 
vised quite  so  fast  as  foot-soldiers.* 

Before  the  reign  of  Bonaparte  some  regiments  of  heavy  cavalry 
served  as  a  corps  of  reserve  to  each  army,  the  rest  of  the  horse  being 
scattered  among  the  divisions  of  infantry  or  joined  with  the  artillery. 
Napoleon  tried  to  give  his  cavalry  the  same  part  to  act  in  battle  as 
Frederic  the  Great  had  given  to  his ;  but  he  organized  them  different- 
ly, and  widely  different  were  the  results.  Napoleon's  horsemen  were 
not  at  home  in  their  saddles;  they  were  heavily  equipped,  and  could 
not  move  with  speed;  he  therefore  formed  them  into  very  large  masses, 
which  obtained  the  curious  name  of  Corjis  d'Armee  de  Cavalerie.  In 
these  large  corps  he  attached  guns  to  each  regiment,  and  used  deep 
formations  for  attack;  thus  his  cavalry  played  a  secondary  part  to  the 
artillery ;  its  movements  were  cramped,  its  approach  necessarily  slow, 
and,  as  it  was  always  heralded  by  its  own  cannon,  the  enemy  was 
seldom  taken  by  surprise  (except  at  Marengo),  but  had  time  to  prepare 
a  reception  which  cost  the  French  masses  of  horse  very  dear.  Still 
his  horsemen,  mostly  clad  in  defensive  armor,  were  poured  on  slowly 
but  in  irresistible  numbers,  and  thus,  regardless  of  the  loss  of  life, 
Napoleon  by  their  means  won  many  a  field.  Even  allowing  for  all  the 
brilliancy  of  Murat,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  he  had  one  cavalry 
leader  whom  Frederic  the  Great  would  have  called  good. 

Napoleon's  cavalry  generals  often  failed  in  bringing  their  troops 
into  action  at  the  right  time,  and  often  threw  them  too  early  into  the 
scale,  and  so,  when  a  reserve  of  cavalry  might  have  decided  the  fate 
of  battle,  none  was  forthcoming. 

They  often  neglected  to  protect  their  flanks  or  to  have  a  reserve  at 


*"La  cavalerie  u'estpas  si  facile  d  improviser  que  Vinfantcrie."    General  Foy, 
Histoire  de  la  Guerre  do  la  Peninsule. 


24  HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 

hand  in  case  of  disaster.  In  1813,  on  the  I6th  of  Octoher,  near  Leip- 
zig, the  cavalry  corps  of  Latour-Maubourg  and  Kellermann,  about  five 
thousand  horses,  led  by  Murat  in  person,  attacked  the  centre  of  the 
allied  army  advancing  by  Wachau  toward  Gossa,  overthrew  the  divis- 
ion of  Russian  Light  Cavalry  of  the  Guard,  captured  thirty  pieces  of 
ca,nnon,  and  broke  through  the  line ;  but  four  hundred  Cossacks  of  the 
Guard,  gallantly  led,  fell  upon  their  flank,  and  not  only  retook  all  the 
guns,  but  drove  them  back  in  confusion,  turning  the  whole  affair  to  the 
advantage  of  the  allies.  These  Cossacks  had  to  gain  the  flank  of  the 
enemy  by  a  path  which  admitted  only  of  single  files. 

At  the  Battle  of  La  Rothiere  the  same  mistake,  and  in  a  greater 
degree,  was  again  committed  by  the  French. 

The  cavalry  divisions,  Colbert,  Guyot,  and  Pire,  having  charged  and 
overthrown  the  Russian  division  of  hussars  under  General  Lanskoy, 
were  preparing  to  fall  upon  the  infantry,  when  General  Washiltschikoff 
brought  up  the  Pantschulitschcff  division  of  dragoons  at  a  gallop, 
attacked  the  French  in  front  and  flank,  drove  them  from  the  field,  and 
pursued  them  to  Alt  Brienne,  occasioning  the  loss  of  twenty-eight 
guns  to  Napoleon's  Garde;  yet  they  had  plenty  of  cavalry  in  the  field 
v/ith  which  to  have  protected  their  flanks,  but  it  only  made  its  appear- 
ance after  the  affair  was  decided  in  favor  of  the  allies. 

Instances  of  this  sort  might  be  adduced  of  the  English  cavalry. 

Charges,  gallant  and  daring  in  their  character,  were  turned  into  dis- 
graceful defeats  or  dreadful  losses  by  the  culpable  negligence  of  their 
oflBcers  in  not  having  reserves  in  hand  to  protect  the  flanks  during  an 
attack,  or  to  oppose  an  enemy  coming  on  with  fresh  troops. 

In  the  Peninsula,  in  1812,  two  regiments  of  English  horse  under 
General  Slade  attacked  and  defeated  two  regiments  of  French  dragoons 
near  Llera,  pursued  them  madly  for  about  eight  miles,  when  the  French 
general,  Lallemande,  fell  upon  them  with  his  reserves,  and  routed  them 
completely. 

The  Union  Brigade  under  General  Ponsonby,  at  "Waterloo,  suffered 
severely  from  the  same  cause :  after  riding  down  everything  in  their 
way,  entering  the  enemy's  position,  and  sabreing  the  artillerymen  at 
their  guns,  they  were  suddenly  attacked  by  the  French  cavalry  reserves, 
and  driven  back  with  great  loss. 

The  3d  dragoons  charged  the  Sikhs  at  Moodkee,  and  drove  along  the 


INFERIORITY    OF    FRENCH    CAVALRY.  ZD 

rear  of  the  whole  of  their  position :  not  only  were  they  not  supporteil, 
but  our  own  artillery  played  upon  them  at  one  time,  and  occasioned 
them  some  loss.  This  gallant  regiment  returned  to  camp  in  the  even- 
ing, having  lost  nearly  two-thirds  of  their  number  in  killed  and  wound- 
ed, and  eifectcd  very  little  except  inspiring  a  wholesome  dread  of 
Eufflish  dragoons. 


Chapter   II. 

CAVALRY  OF  AUSTRIA,  RUSSIA,  ETC. 

Let  us  here  rapidly  examine  the  cavalry  of  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Prussia,  as  displayed  in  action,  from  the  year  1792  to  the  end  of  the 
war  of  the  Revolution. 

In  their  first  campaigns  the  cavalry  of  the  allies  surpassed  that  of 
the  French  in  every  particular.  Thej'  may  not,  in  every  case,  have 
made  the  best  use  of  this  advantage,  but  it  is  most  indisputable  that 
this  superiority  existed,  and  that  the  allies  had  it.  Their  cavalry  corps 
were  composed  of  men  essentially  horse-soldiers  by  nature  and  habit, 
brave,  numerous,  well-mounted,  and  well-organized  :  their  individual 
superiority  was  made  apparent  in  every  action  from  1793  to  the  close 
of  that  century.  That  the  advantarrcs  they  gained  over  the  French  in 
these  numerous  engagements  were  never  attended  with  any  decisive 
result  on  the  campaign,  can  be  attributed  only  to  bad  generalship. 

The  French  cavalry,  at  last,  defeated  the  cavalry  of  the  Austrians  at 
the  Battle  of  Hochstedt,  in  the  year  1800  ;  gained  by  degrees  a  complete 
ascendancy  over  all  other  Continental  cavalry;  and,  in  spite  of  its 
many  inherent  defects,  contributed,  in  no  small  degree,  to  Napoleon's 
successes  in  the  field,  until  their  victorious  career  was  buried  with  them 
in  the  snows  of  Russia  in  1812. 

The  cavalry  of  the  Austrians  and  English,  in  1793  and  1794,  achiev- 
ed at  various  times  the  most  brilliant  successes  in  the  Netherlands. 
Neither  French  horses  nor  French  men  could  stand  against  ours.  If 
3 


26  HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 

they  met,  tlio  weaker  were  literally  rode  down  or  rolled  over ;  but,  un- 
luckily, our  horsemen  knew  little  more  of  their  metier  than  how  to  make 
a  charge,  nor  did  they  always  know  how  to  do  that  in  the  best  way. 

The  campaign  of  1795  (on  the  Ehiue)  was  one  of  manoeuvres.  The 
French  were  defeated  at  Handschusheim  with  the  loss  of  two  thousand 
men  and  ten  guns,  chiefly  through  the  gallant  conduct  of  the  Austrian 
dragoon  regiment  Kaiser,  and  the  hussars  of  Hohenzollern  and  Szekler. 
These  hussars  of  the  period  have  often  been  described  by  old  soldiers 
of  various  nations  (not  excluding  France)  as  the  very  perfection  of 
light  cavalry.  The  most  interesting  incident  in  the  campaign  was  the 
storming  of  the  lines  round  Mayence,  on  account  of  the  glorious  part 
taken  therein  by  the  Austrian  cavalry.  Three  columns  of  attack  were 
formed,  and  to  each  a  few  squadrons  were  attached  j  a  reserve  of  twen- 
ty-two squadrons  was  kept  in  readiness,  and  the  very  moment  the  in- 
fantry stormed  the  lines  these  horsemen  rode  in,  were  let  loose  on  the 
enemy,  and  achieved  a  complete  victory,  with  comparatively  little  loss 
to  themselves. 

The  French  lost  all  their  guns,  amounting  to  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
eight,  and  upwards  of  three  thousand  men;  hero  one  might  well  say 
with  Suwarrow,  "  Vii^ent  le  sahre  et  la  ba'ionnette  !" 

In  the  succeeding  campaign  of  1796  the  Imperial  cavalry  did  good 
service,  and  were  v.'ell  led  during  the  Battle  uf  Wiirzburg,  but  were 
made  no  use  of  after  they  had  gained  the  victory. 

The  whole  of  the  French  cavalry  had  been  united  at  this  battle  under 
the  command  of  General  Bonnaud;  the  cavalry  of  the  Austrians  met 
them  close  to  Emsfeld,  and  drove  in  their  skirmishers;  Bonnaud,  see- 
ing the  Imperial  cavalry  gradually  increasing  in  numbers,  thought  it 
best  to  charge  without  loss  of  time.  The  French  fell  on  with  resolu- 
tion, and  drove  back  the  left  wing  of  the  Austrians,  who  retired  on 
their  reserves ;  in  the  meantime  fourteen  squadrons  of  hussars  burst 
forth  from  behind  a  village,  and  galloped  in  on  the  rear  of  the  French, 
who  were  simultaneously  attacked  in  front  by  the  German  cuirassiers  : 
the  remainder  of  the  French  cavalry  were  then  thrown  in  to  the  rescue, 
but  the  Austrians  held  twelve  squadrons  still  in  reserve,  and  these  de- 
cided the  fate  of  the  day  j  the  French  were  driven  off  the  field,  pursued 
behind  their  infantry,  and  two  battalions  of  the  division  Grcnier  were 
afterwards  destroyed  by  the  victorious  Austrians. 


BATTLE    OF   AUSTERLITZ.  27 

After  tho  storming  of  Mayenee  the  Imperialists  rested  on  their  lau- 
rels, and  concluded  an  armistice;  after  Wiirzburg,  instead  of  following 
up  Jourdan  and  destroying  his  army,  they  halted,  satisfied  with  the  re- 
sults of  tho  day.  They  stopped  at  the  point  which  Frederic  the  Great 
would  have  considered  only  as  a  glorious  starting  point. 

Never  was  so  fair  an  opportunity  thrown  away;  under  the  fiery  spirit 
of  a  Seidlitz  tho  cavalr}'  would  have  swept  like  a  flood  over  the  retreat- 
ing and  disorganized  army,  and  made  of  Wiirzburg  a  second  Rossbach 
for  the  French. 

In  1797  nothing  worthy  of  mention  was  eifected  by  cavalry  on  the 
Rhine;  but  in  Italy  the  Austrian  cavalry  distinguished  itself  at  Man- 
tua. They  were  encamped  near  the  fortress.  Napoleon,  wishing  to 
di-ive  them  into  it,  determined  to  attack.  Massena's  division  succeeded 
in  surprising  them  on  the  morning  of  the  14th  of  September,  and  had 
already  entered  the  camp,  when  the  Austrian  cavalry,  which  had  gone 
out  in  watering  order,  returned  at  a  gallop,  and  (without  saddles  on  the 
horses)  fell  upon  the  enemy  and  defeated  him. 

The  allies  (in  1805),  who  had  one  hundred  and  seventy-two  squad- 
rons of  cavalry  at  Austerlitz,  knew  nothing  of  the  position  of  the 
French  army  nor  of  Napoleon's  dispositions,  which  might  have  been 
easily  unmasked  by  a  ''  reconnaissance  en  force." 

During  the  battle  they  brought  the  cavalry  up  in  front,  while  the 
bulk  of  their  infantry,  in  four  columns,  were  sent  to  turn  the  French 
right,  and  scattered  over  ten  or  twelve  miles  of  country.  This  was  the 
cause  of  their  total  defeat ;  for,  after  the  four  columns  had  been  de- 
tached, they  found  themselves  in  presence  of  the  whole  French  army, 
to  which  they  could  oppose  only  their  right  wing  and  the  reserve. 
Had  their  columns  been  victorious  on  the  left,  of  what  use  would  the 
cavalry  have  been  ?  They  could  never  have  cut  in  on  the  fugitiA'esA 
time  to  prevent  the  French  reaching  the  defiles  of  Bellawitz  and 
Schlappanitz ;  but  had  the  infantry  been  in  front  and  defeated  the 
French  while  the  allied  cavalry  gained  ground  to  their  flank,  not  a  soul 
would  have  escaped  from  the  field.  The  French  remarks  on  this  battle 
are  most  amusing.  They  say  :  "  Les  Russes  avaient  concu  un  plan  de 
bataille  centre  une  armee  qu'ils  ne  voj'aient  point;  et  de  plus,  ils  ad- 
mettaient  Thypnthese  que  les  Francais  resteraieut  immobiles  comme 
des  termes." 


28  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

Some  of  the  Russian  and  the  French  cavalry  regiments  of  the  Guard 
met  in  this  battle  and  fought  with  great  bravery;  the  Russians  were 
overthrown.  It  is  said  that  many  cavalry  engagements  took  place  on 
the  right,  where  the  Ru*siaus  were  well  commanded  by  General  Uwa- 
row,  who,  with  Bagration,  effectually  resisted  the  attacks  of  Lannes 
and  part  of  the  French  cavalry  under  Murat;  but  of  these  engage- 
ments I  can  find  no  particulars. 

The  retreat  of  the  allies  was  covered  by  twenty-two  squadrons  of 
Austrian  cavalry  and  some  regiments  of  Cossacks ;  these  latter  soon 
left  the  field,  but  the  Austrian  hussars  of  Hesse-Hombourg,  Szeckler, 
and  Oreilly,  remained  to  the  last.  These  brave  regiments,  in  spite  of  a 
destructive  fire  from  the  French  artillery,  held  their  ground  between 
Telnitz  and  Aujezd  till  the  whole  of  the  infantry  had  passed,  and 
nobly  repulsed  a  brigade  of  French  dragoons  which  tried  to  cut  in  on 
the  line  of  retreat. 

Often  did  the  Austrian  cavalry  thus  gallantly  cover  the  retreat  of 
their  defeated  armies,  and  enable  them  to  take  the  field  again  and 
again. 

After  the  Battle  of  EckmiJhl  three  Austrian  regiments  of  cavalry 
held  their  ground  against  two  French  divisions.  At  Egolfsheim,  and 
the  following  day  at  Ratisbone,  forty  squadrons  opposed  the  whole 
French  cavalry,  and  gave  the  army  time  to  recross  the  Danube.  For 
three  hours  they  held  them  in  check  by  constant  and  repeated  charges, 
in  which  one  thousand  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  then  effected 
their  retreat  in  safety  through  the  town  by  occupying  the  entrance 
with  some  companies  of  infantry.  The  French  cavalry  was  command- 
ed by  Bessieres,  and  Napoleon  was  himself  present,  being  wounded  in 
the  heel  at  the  close  of  the  fight. 

In  the  first  campaigns  of  this  war  the  Prussian  cavalry  did  nothing 
worthy  of  its  former  reputation.  At  Jena  and  Auerstadt  it  was  de- 
feated, and  followed  up  with  such  untiring  perseverance  hj  the  French 
horse  that  the  Prussians  were  effectually  prevented  from  again  assem- 
bling in  the  field.  The  French  gave  them  no  respite,  and  pressed  on 
to  Berlin. 

The  campaigns  of  1806  and  1807,  in  Prussia  and  Poland,  show  that 
cavalry,  though  numerous  and  brave,  can  seldom  effect  anything  great 
when  the  armies  to  which  they  are  attached  are  acting  on  the  defensive. 


JENA   AND    AUERSTADT — PULTUSK.  29 

When  the  general's  object  is  to  maintain  himself  in  the  field  only,  he 
takes  up  positions  fr^^m  which  it  is  diflicult  to  dislodge  him,  but  in 
which  the  cavalry  can  act  only  partially  in  repelling  the  attacks  of  the 
enemy. 

Beningsen,  though  forced  bj'  the  plan  of  the  campaign  to  act  on  the 
defensive,  made  good  use  of  his  cavalry  at  Pultusk  :  with  them  he 
masked  the  position  of  his  army,  and  began  the  battle  advantageously 
on  his  side  J  but  his  example  would  be  a  dangerous  one  to  follow  in  the 
face  of  an  enemy  superior  in  that  arm,  for,  if  they  succeeded  in  defeat- 
ing the  horse  in  front  and  followed  them  into  the  position,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  whole  army  might  ensue. 

The  Russians  were  in  position  between  the  roads  leading  from  Pul- 
tusk to  Sieroek  and  Nowemiastow.  They  had  Pultusk  with  the  Narew 
on  their  left,  the  road  to  Ostrolenka  in  the  re.ai*. 

Beningsen  only  wished  to  engage  the  enemy  partially,  to  retard  his 
advance,  in  order  to  gain  time  to  fall  back;  but  the  ground  was  heavy 
for  the  artillery,  and  the  advance  of  the  French  so  quick  that  he  was 
obliged  to  engage  his  whole  corps  to  maintain  his  ground. 

He  formed  his  army,  consisting  of  sixty-six  battalions  and  ninety- 
five  squadrons  (about  forty-five  thousand  men)  in  two  lines,  between 
Moczin  and  Pultusk.  In  front  of  the  left  wing  ten  battalions  and 
twenty  squadrons  were  pushed  forward  under  Bagawort,  and  twelve 
battalions  and  ten  squadrons  in  like  manner  in  front  of  the  right  wing 
under  Barclay  de  Tolly.*" 

Two  thousand  yards  in  front  of  his  line  of  battle  ho  distributed  the 
cavalry  by  regiments,  en  echiquier,  with  wide  intervals,  and  five  hun- 
dred yards  in  front  of  them  again  a  line  of  Cossacks,  who  stopped  the 
enemy's  skirmishers,  and  obliged  the  French  to  deploy  their  advanced 
guards  to  drive  them  back. 

Lannes  advanced  in  six  columns  against  the  Ptussian  position.  The 
numbers  of  the  French  are  differently  estimated,  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  they  were  more  numerous  than  their  opponents. 

The  Russian  cavalry  of  the  left  wing  drove  in  the  French  cavalry 
which  preceded  the  columns  on  that  flank,  and  charged  the  infantry, 
some  battalions  of  which  were  ridden  over :  however,  their  success  was 

*  Hist,  de  la  Cavalerie,  par  L.  A.  linger. 
3* 


30  HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 

only  partial;  for,  though  they  retarded  the  advance  of  these  columns 
of  attack,  they  could  not  stop  them. 

In  the  centre  General  Dorochow  retired  slowly  before  the  enemy,  till 
their  columns  were  within  range  of  the  Russian  batteries;  then  the 
curtain  was  rent,  the  Russian  cavalry  withdrew,  and  the  French  found 
themselves  exposed  to  a  murderous  fire. 

On  the  right  Barclay  de  Tolly  had  been  attacked,  but  had  repulsed 
the  French  cavalry. 

The  French  had  now  brought  up  their  artillery  and  the  remainder  of 
their  forces:  Bcningsen  withdrew  the  cavalry  behind  the  infantry. 

The  Russian  advanced  corps  on  the  flanks  were  driven  in  by  the 
French  with  the  loss  of  some  guns  which  they  afterwards  recovered. 
The  flanks  were  reinforced  with  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  the  Russian 
army  formed  in  three  lines:  the  first  deployed,  the  second  in  columns, 
the  third  composed  of  cavalry. 

The  left  wing,  supported  by  twenty  squadrons,  then  advanced, 
charged,  and  drove  the  French  back.  On  the  two  sides  upward  of 
three  thousand  men  were  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  Russians  made 
seven  hundred  prisoners. 

The  Battle  of  Eylau,  which  succeeded  in  the  campaign,  Avas  remark- 
able for  the  grand  charge  of  cavalry  under  Murat,  who  led  seventy-two 
squadrons  forward  against  the  Russian  position ;  but  this  I  shall  have 
occasion  to  speak  of  hereafter. 

After  Eylau  a  cavalry  engagement  of  some  consequence  took  place ; 
the  French  having  upward  of  forty  squadrons  in  the  field.  They  were 
defeated  and  driven  across  the  Trischinz  in  disorder  by  the  Russian 
horse. 

On  the  5th,  6th,  and  7th  of  June  the  allies  had  good  opportunities  of 
using  their  numerous  cavalry  to  advantage,  but  they  failed  to  avail 
themselves  of  them. 

On  the  10th  of  June,  1807,  at  the  Battle  of  Heilsberg,  the  allies  had 
two  hundred  and  five  squadrons,  of  which  twenty-seven  squadrons 
were  Prussian,  the  remainder  Russian.  With  such  a  numerous  body  of 
horse  at  their  command,  the  army  took  up  a  defensive  position  ;  strong 
certainly,  but  one  in  which  their  superiority  in  cavalry  proved  of  no 
avail. 

The  Russian  horse  were  in  reserve  the  greater  part  of  the  day.    The 


BATTLE    OF   LUTZEN.  31 

Prussians  behaved  well,  and  executed  some  gallant  charges;  but  the 
battle  was  undecided.  The  allies  remained  in  position  during  the  11th, 
and  in  the  evening  retired  toward  Bartenstein. 

Then  succeeded  the  Battle  of  Friedland,  where  the  allies  exposed 
their  cavalry  in  line  to  the  destructive  fire  of  the  French  batteries 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  day ;  and,  when  they  had  been  well 
shaken  and  pounded,  the  French  cavalry  charged  and  defeated  them. 

In  these  campaigns  the  constant  system  of  defensive  warfare,  the 
making  cavalry  replace  infantry  in  battle,  and  uselessly  exposing  them 
to  the  fire  of  artillery,  so  demoralized  and  discouraged  that  of  the  allies, 
that  in  1812  they  could  hardly  be  brought  to  face  the  French  horse. 

In  1813,  at  Liitzen,  very  favorable  ground  for  the  action  of  cavalry 
gave  Napoleon  the  impression  that  the  allies  were  at  last  about  to  avail 
themselves  to  some  purpose  of  the  eighteen  thousand  horsemen  they 
had  in  the  field.  To  these  Napoleon  could  only  oppose  five  thousand 
mounted  soldiera  :  for  his  old  cavalry,  inured  to  war  and  accustomed  to 
victory,  had  been  entirely  destroyed  the  preceding  3" ear  in  Russia ;  and 
all  his  power,  resources,  and  genius  had  been  exerted  in  vain  to  replace 
them ;  and  so  conscious  was  he  of  the  danger  of  meeting  the  numerous 
cavalry  of  the  enemy  in  the  open  field,  that,  on  hearing  that  Ney  had 
been  attacked,  he  moved  up  the  troops  to  his  assistance,  formed  in  large 
squares  of  several  regiments  of  infantry,  with  artillery  on  their  flanks 
and  cavalry  in  the  rear. 

When  the  battle  began  Ney  was  alone  on  the  ground:  he  threw  his 
infantry  into  the  villages,  and  maintained  himself  there  in  spite  of  all 
the  efforts  made  to  dislodge  him.  The  allies  grew  obstinate  and  perse- 
vered, feeding  the  fight  with  more  and  more  infantry,  till  their  place  in 
line  was  obliged  to  be  filled  up  with  regiments  of  cavalry,  which  were 
apparently  forgotten  while  this  contest  on  foot  was  carried  on.  During 
this  time  Napoleon  brought  the  whole  of  his  army  into  line,  and  his  ar- 
tillery made  great  havoc  among  the  imposing  army  of  German  and 
Russian  cavalry  with  which  the  background  of  the  picture  was  filled  up. 

The  day  closed  in  ;  the  troops  were  tired  out;  all  the  infantry,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Russian  Guard,  had  been  engaged,  while  the  French 
had  still  fresh  troops  at  hand  for  any  emergenc3^ 

The  allies  had  a  reserve  of  fifty  squadrons  of  Russian  horse,  but  the 
opportunity  for  using  them  had  passed  away :  they  could  do  nothing 


32  HISTORICAL    SKETCH. 

against  the  Frouch,  who  were  established  in  broken  ground,  with  a  bat- 
tery of  sixty  guns  ia  position. 

According  to  Frederic  the  Great,  villages  should  be  occupied  only 
for  defensive  purposes.  An  army  acting  on  the  offensive  should  lose  no 
time  in  contesting  their  possession,  if  they  can  gain  their  point  by  turn- 
ing the  enemy's  position. 

Had  the  allies  done  this,  and  pushed  forward  their  cavalry  to  attack 
the  French  corps  in  the  plains  while  coming  up  to  Ney's  assistance,  the 
result  might  have  been  widely  different;  and  had  they  been  successful, 
Ney's  corps  must  have  laid  down  its  arms. 

That  the  French  infantry  of  that  year  were  incapable  of  meeting  the 
German  cavalry  successfully  in  the  open  field,  was  proved  by  Colonel 
DolCs,  shortly  afterwards,  at  Haynau,  where,  at  the  head  of  twenty 
squadrons  of  Prussian  cavali-y,  he  attacked  General  Maison's  division, 
formed  in  eight  squares  and  protected  by  eighteen  guns,  and  in  less 
than  fifteen  minutes  swept  over  them,  killing,  wounding,  or  making 
prisoners  the  whole  force  and  capturing  their  guns.  The  only  men  that 
escaped  were  a  detachment  of  French  cavalry  who  took  care  to  get  a 
good  start. 

With  all  this,  when  the  French  were  defeated  at  Leipzig,  they  made 
good  their  retreat,  though  the  allies  had  eighty  thousand  cavalry  in  the 
field  !  This  is  not  to  be  satisfactorily  accounted  for  by  the  intervention 
of  a  petty  river  and  the  blowing  up  of  a  bridge  by  the  French. 

In  1814,  when  the  allies,  fighting  on  the  soil  of  France,  defeated  Na- 
poleon at  LaKothiere,  they  allowed  his  army  to  escape  again,  although 
they  were  themselves  strong  in  horse. 

In  1815,  after  the  defeat  at  Waterloo,  though  the  Prussian  cavalry 
started  in  pursuit  of  the  French  from  the  field,  the  French  soldiery  not 
only  escaped  in  large  numbers,  and  rallied  beyond  Paris,  but  their  cav- 
alry, at  Versailles,  defeated  and  made  prisoners  an  entire  brigade  of 
Prussian  horse. 

Cavalry  is  often  doomed  to  total  inaction  in  battle  from  the  manner 
in  which  armies  are  formed  for  the  fight.  Generals  attempt  to  use  armies 
as  they  would  machinery,  quite  forgetting  that  such  different  compo- 
nent parts  as  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  can  not  always  work  to- 
gether. A  happy  combination  of  the  three,  or  a  grand  coup  struck  by 
cavalry  alone,  is  rather  a  rarity  in  modern  warfare.     Isolated  gallant 


CONFUSION    IN    ACTION.  33 

charges  of  cavalry  are  heard  of  (as,  for  example,  the  charge  of  the  3d 
Dragoons  at  Moodkee,  and  that  of  Major  Unett's  squadron  at  Chillian- 
wallah) ;  but  such  charges,  though  executed  with  the  greatest  energy, 
never  go  beyond  the  limits  of  what  is  expected  of  thoso  detachments  of 
cavalry  which  are  attached  to  each  division  of  the  army  in  the  field. 
Thus  we  see  a  display  of  gallantry,  and  even  of  skill,  without  any 
grand  result. 

The  fact  is,  modern  tactics  hold  the  cavalry  in  leading-strings.  The 
system  is  a  timid  one,  and  made  up  of  "ifs  "  and  "  buts" — xcords  which 
ought  to  be  unknown  to  cavalry  soldiers. 

Instead  of  trying  at  once  to  strike  home  when  the  opportunity  oflFers — 
instead  of  pouring  the  whole  cavalry  of  the  army  on  the  enemy's  flanks  or 
rear,  they  fritter  away  their  strength,  march  and  countermarch,  advance 
perhaps  one-third  of  their  force  against  the  enaemy,  keeping  two-thirds 
in  reserve  to  guard  against  unknown  dangers.  They  attack  under 
cover  of  batteries  established  to  insure  them  against  the  ill  conse- 
quences of  failure,  etc.  In  short,  examples  of  successful  cavalry  ac- 
tions (we  mean  simply  and  purely  cavalry  actions)  are  to  be  found  only 
in  few  and  isolated  instances,  where  the  horsemen,  acting  on  the  spur 
of  the  moment,  and  forgetting  their  tactics  altogether,  were  led  away 
by  the  bold  example  of  some  chivalrous  leader.  Such  was  the  case  when 
Murat  attacked  the  Austrians  near  Dresden,  leading  part  of  his  cavalry 
round  their  left  flanks  while  the  remainder  attacked  in  front.  Murat 
fell  upon  them  from  both  sides  at  once,  and,  sword  in  hand,  captured 
sixteen  guns  and  made  fifteen  thousand  prisoners.  This  was,  assuredly, 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  cavalry  actions  of  modern  times. 

A  curious  circumstance,  and  one  worthy  of  remark,  is,  that  in  the  late 
wars,  wherever  the  cavalry  were  made  use  of  in  large  bodies,  the  greatest 
confusion  generally  ensued:  for  instance,  at  Craonne  the  Russian  cav- 
alry, though  successful  in  their  first  charge,  got  into  such  disorder,  and 
so  mixed  up  together,  that  the  whole  mass  was  withdrawn  in  confusion 
from  the  field,  to  save  it  from  destruction.  Luckily  for  them  the  French 
cavalry,  under  Nansouty,  were  far  away  on  the  right  flank  when  this 
happened,  or  they  would  hardly  have  effected  their  retreat  in  safety. 

This  confusion  in  action  may  be  partly  accounted  for  by  the  depth  of 
the  formations,  the  number  of  lines  ranged  one  behind  the  other  when 
going  into  action,  the  uniformity  in  the  dress  of  the  different  regiments 


34  HISTORICAL   SKETCH. 

engaged,  and  the  large  squadrons  which,  once  dispersed,  can  rally  only 
with  the  greatest  difliculty,  and  always  require  a  long  time  to  do  so. 

Lines  of  cavalry  following  each  other  must  get  into  disorder  if  any 
part  of  them  be  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  for  there  are  no  outlets  for  the 
fugitives. 

The  cavalry  of  Frederic  the  Great  generally  doubled  the  extent  of 
their  intervals  when  advancing;  their  second  line  was  only  partly 
deployed :  it  followed  in  echelon,  or  with  intervals  the  breadth  of  a 
squadron. 

The  infantry  of  those  days  formed  in  line,  and  brought  every  musket 
into  play  against  cavalry  charging  them. 

We  English  pride  ourselves  on  having  adhered  to  this  system:  and 
after  the  French  had,  in  columns  and  masses,  walked  over  every  army 
in  Europe,  they  were  defeated  by  our  lines  of  infantry  in  the  Peninsu- 
la. The  French  cavalry,  led  on  by  Lasalle,  Montbrun,  Latour-Maubourg, 
Valmy — all  cavalry  generals  of  high  renown — drew  back  and  shrunk 
from  their  fire  ;  and  the  British  foot-soldier  remained  unconquercd,  and 
gained  many  a  laurel-wreath,  though  he  did  stand  and  fight  in  line  ! 

Yet  neither  lines  nor  masses  of  infantry  stopped  Seidlitz  and  his  glo- 
rious horsemen.  At  Kunersdorf  and  Zorndorf  there  stood  opposed  to 
him,  for  every  yard  of  ground,  ten  or  twelve  infantry  soldiers. 

The  want  of  success  on  the  part  of  cavalry  in  later  years  can  not, 
therefore,  with  justice  be  attributed  to  the  diflferent  formations  of  the 
infantry  :  and  I  would  fain  ask  whether  the  ground  Avas  less  good,  or 
circumstances  less  favorable  for  the  employment  of  cavalry,  at  Lutzen, 
Dresden,  Leipzig,  and  Craonne,  than  at  Rossbach  or  at  Zorndorf? 

The  humiliating  confession  is  forced  upon  us  that,  if  cavalry  have 
fallen  from  their  high  estate,  they  can  blame  only  themselves  and  their 
own  tactics. 


CAVALRY  IN   GENERAL.  35 

Chapter  III. 

CAVALRY  IN  GENERAL. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  in  modern  warfare  we  have  rarely  seen  the 
happy  combination  of  excellent  cavalry  commanded  by  a  perfect  cavalry 
officer.  The  passage  is  somewhat  inflated,  according  to  the  genius  of 
the  language  in  which  it  is  written;  yet  General  Foy  scarcely  exagger- 
ates the  amount  and  union  of  qualities  requisite  to  form  a  first-rato 
cavalry  leader. 

"  Apres  les  qualites  necossaires  au  commandant  en  chef,  le  talent  de 
guerre  le  plus  sublime  est  celui  du  general  de  cavalerie.  Eussiez-voua 
un  coup-d'oeil  plus  rapide  etun  eclat  de  determination  plus  soudain  que 
le  coursier  emporte  au  galop,  ce  n'est  rien  si  vous  ne  joignez  la  vigueur 
de  la  jeunesse,  des  bons  yeux,  une  voix  retentissantc,  I'adresse  d'un 
athlete,  et  I'agilite  d'un  centaure.  Avant  tout,  il  faudra  que  le  ciel  vous 
ait  depart!  avec  prodigalite  cette  faculte  precieuse  qu'aucune  ne  rem- 
place,  et  dont  il  est  plus  avare  qu'on  no  le  croit  communement,  la  bra- 
voure."* 

Of  all  arms,  cavalry  is  the  most  difficult  to  handle  in  the  field. 

It  can  not  engage  an  enemy  except  where  the  ground  is  favorable. 

It  is  always  dependent  on  the  condition  of  its  horses. 

It  is  easily  dispersed,  and  it  easily  gets  out  of  hand. 

However  brave  and  intrinsically  good,  it  is  of  no  use  without  good 
officers. 

The  qualities  requisite  in  a  cavalry  leader  are,  a  good  eye  for  country, 
and  a  quick  one  for  the  enemy's  movements,  great  energy,  courageous 
decision,  and  rapid  execution. 

No  wonder,  therefore,  that  cavalry  has  not  always  developed  its  power 
and  resources  in  the  field;  for,  placing  all  other  considerations  aside, 
how  few  examples  does  history  aflford  of  cavalry  being  well  led  and 
commanded !     When  well  led  it  has  been  invariably  successful. 

Cavaly  ought  to  be  at  once  the  eye,  the  feeler,  and  the  feeder  of  an 
army.     With  good  cavalry  an  army  is  in  comparative  security,  and  in  a 

*  Iliatoii'e  de  la  Guerre  de  la  Peninsule. 


36  CAVALRY   IN    GENERAL. 

condition  to  marcli  into  and  subsist  upon  an  enemy's  country.  It  reaps 
the  fruits  of  victory,  covers  a  retreat,  and  retrieves  a  disaster. 

With  it  the  effects  of  a  defeat  are  not  always  fatal,  and  with  it  the 
army  can  again  resume  the  offensive. 

In  defensive  warfare  it  has  seldom  achieved  great  deeds,  for  to  act  a 
passive  j^art  in  war  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  cavalrj'  tactics. 

When  badly  organized  and  badly  led,  the  more  numerous  it  is  the 
more  useless.  [Witness  the  engagements  of  Mcdellin,  Ciudad  Ileal, 
Ocafia,  and  Alba  de  Tormes,  where  the  Spanish  horse  fled  the  field,  and 
left  their  infantry  to  be  cut  down  by  the  victorious  French.]  It  eats  up 
the  supplies  of  the  army,  and  is  in  battle  a  dangerous  ally.  It  gets  out 
of  hand  in  action,  and,  instead  of  injuring  the  enemy,  entails  defeat  on 
itself  and  on  the  army  to  which  it  belongs. 

Wc  have  seen  that  individual  prowess,  skill  in  single  combat,  good 
horsemanship,  and  sharp  swords,  render  all  cavalry  formidable. 

That  light  and  active  horsemen  have,  in  the  long  run,  prevailed  over 
heavily-equipped  cavalry,  and  that  speed  and  endurance  are  qualities  to 
be  highly  prized  in  the  horseman. 

Therefore,  if  these  views  be  correct,  then  our  European  cavalry  is  not 
organized  on  an  efficient  system. 

For  the  present  riding  drill  makes  few  good  horsemen. 

The  swords,  blunted  by  steel  scabbards,  are  not  efficient  weapons. 

Speed  and  endurance  can  not  be  expected  from  horses  that  are  over- 
weighted. 

Celerity  and  precision  of  movement  can  not  be  attained  with  large, 
unwieldy  squadrons. 

Nor  can  decision  be  expected  on  the  part  of  the  leaders,  under  a  sys- 
tem of  "  Pivot  Flanks/'  and  "Right  or  Left  in  Front." 


There  are  three  kinds  of  cav.alry  now  established  in  Europe — Heavy 
Cavalry,  Dragoons,  and  Light  Cavalry. 

The  different  size,  strength,  and  qualities  of  men  and  horses  seem  to 
require  them  to  be  thus  divided  into  heavy,  middle,  and  light;  for  a 
horse  physically  unfit  to  carry  a  cuirassier  would  be  lost  to  the  service 
unless  made  use  of  in  the  dragoons  or  in  the  light  cavalry.     And  where 


HEAVY   CAVALRY.  37 

there  exists  a  difficulty  in  finding  suflScient  horses  for  the  purposes  of 
war,  a  system  by  which  the  greater  number  of  animals  can  be  made 
available  is  the  one  which  has  been  generally  adopted. 

The  nations  of  the  European  Continent,  who  take  the  field  with  large 
armies,  require  a  numerous  cavalry :  they  can  not  have  them  all  good; 
some  can  not  obtain  horses,  others  can  not  afford  the  heavy  expense, 
and  thus  they  are  of  necessity  reduced  to  a  system  of  expedients. 
But  England,  rich  in  men,  money,  and,  above  all,  in  horses,  should,  in 
this  particular,  avoid  imitating  foreign  armies,  and  instead  of  reducing 
her  cavalry  to  a  par  with  those  on  the  Continent,  she  ought  to  make  her 
own  cavalry  so  superior  as  to  defy  comparison  and  all  competition. 

The  Heavy,  Middle,  and  Light  Cavalry  have  different  parts  assigned 
to  them  in  war,  not  one  of  them  being  fit  to  perform  all  the  duties  re- 
quired of  horse-soldiers  in  the  field. 

Heavy  Cavalry, 

Composed  of  large  men  in  defensive  armor,  mounted  on  heavy,  power- 
ful horses,  are  held  in  hand  for  decisive  charges  on  the  day  of  battle, 
and  their  horses  are  so  deficient  in  speed  and  endurance  (being  so  over- 
weighted) that  they  require  light  horse  to  follow  up  the  enemy  they 
have  beaten.  The  greatest  possible  care  is  taken  of  this  sort  of  cavalry 
in  the  field.  They  do  no  outpost  duty,  no  foraging,  no  reconnoitring  : 
they  can  not  be  made  use  of  even  to  escort  a  convoy,  because,  if  kept 
out  long  on  the  road,  their  horses  fall  off  in  condition,  and  become  in- 
capable of  carrying  their  riders.  They  are  calculated  only  to  show  an 
imposing  front  in  the  line  of  battle,  and  their  history  proves  them  to  be 
more  formidable  in  appearance  than  la  reality. 

Dragoons 

Wore  originally  intended  to  be  a  sort  of  hybrid  corps,  or  infantry 
mounted  on  horses,  in  order  that  flike  the  Janissaries  in  Suwaroff 's  war) 
they  might  arrive  with  more  expedition  at  the  position  in  which  they 
were  to  fight  on  foot;  and  in  a  battle  they  formed  line  and  acted  with 
the  infantry.  At  first  they  were  denominated  Arquebusiera  a  Cheval; 
afterwards  they  were  named  dragoons  by  the  famous  Count  of  Mans- 
feldt,  in  comparison  with  the  imaginary  dragons  represented  as  spitting 
fire  and  being  swift  on  the  wing.  The  Swedes  first  used  them  as  light 
4 


38  CAVALRY    IN    GENERAL. 

horse  against  the  Croats,  a  light  cavalry  of  the  Austrian  Emperor.  At 
a  much  later  period  the  English  and  ILanoverians  mounted  them  ou 
powerful  horses,  substituted  trumpets  for  the  drums  then  in  use;  and 
thus,  by  degrees,  the  dragoons  took  a  higher  place  with  the  cavalry. 
Still  later  they  were,  however,  expected  to  act  both  as  horse  and  foot 
soldiers.  It  was  a  favorite  project  of  Napoleon  thus  to  organize  them 
for  both  services ;  but  after  much  loss  of  time  and  great  expense,  find- 
ing it  did  not  answer,  he  took  away  their  muskets  and  bayonets,  and 
gave  them  carbines  ;  and  thoy  were  reorganized  and  sufficiently  well 
mounted  to  charge  with  advantage,  being  at  the  same  time  lightly 
equipped,  in  order  that  they  might  be  serviceable  as  skirmishers,  for- 
agers, etc.  The  difficulty  of  Napoleon's  first  intention  is  easily  under- 
stood, if  we  consider  the  time  required  to  form  a  cavalry  soldier  and  the 
time  required  to  form  an  infantry  soldier.  If  we  succeeded  in  bringing 
a  body  of  men,  in  time  of  peace,  thoroughly  to  understand  the  duty  of 
both,  how  could  we  keep  our  regiments  of  dragoons  complete  iu  time  of 
war?  How  could  we  then  find  time  for  this  long  double  drill  and 
training  ?  Then,  again,  bring  your  regiment  of  dismounted  dragoons 
into  action,  and  what  would  follow  ?  It  would  be  less  numerous  than 
a  real  infantry  corps  opposed  to  it;  the  long  swords  and  spurs  of  the 
dragoons  would  be  in  their  way,  particularly  if  skirmishing;  and  should 
a  few  '^f  the  enemy's  light  horsemen  make  a  dash  at  the  led  horses,  the 
dragoons  would  run  a  good  chance  of  becoming  only  infantry  for  the 
remainder  of  the  campaign.  Dismounted  cavalry  have  done  good  ser- 
vice in  covering  a  retreat,  in  defending  defiles  and  passes  against  caval- 
ry, and  in  pushing  forward  to  seize  bridges,  and  halting  to  maintain 
them ;  but  they  would  be  quite  out  of  place  if  used  in  storming  posi- 
tions, or  if  expected  to  take  their  post  in  line  of  battle  with  the  infantry. 

Light  Cavalry. 
The  service  required  of  these  is  the  most  important  iu  the  field.  They 
are  called  upon  to  watch  over  the  safety  of  the  army,  and  they  are  con- 
stantly hovering  in  advance,  on  the  flanks,  and  iu  the  rear  of  the  col- 
umns, to  prevent  all  possibility  of  surprise  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 
In  enclosed  countries  they  are  supported  by  light  infantry :  in  the  open 
country  the  light  cavalry  push  on  and  keep  the  enemy  at  a  proper  dis- 
tance from  the  army;  they  are  constantly  employed  in  cutting  ofif  the 


SPEED   PREFERABLE   TO   WEIGHT.  39 

enemy's  supplies  and  communications,  in  reconnoitring,  etc.  This 
varied  and  often  hnpromptu  work  requires  a  combination  of  numerous 
qualities  in  officers  and  men.  And,  in  addition  to  all  these  duties, 
peculiarly  their  own.  they  often  have  to  perform  also  those  expected  of 
the  heavy  cavalry  :  and  with  what  success  they  have  done  this  I  shall 
presently  endeavor  to  show. 


Chapter  IY. 

LIGHT  and  heavy  CAVALRY. 

"Armor  protects  the  wearer,  and  prevents  him  from  injuring  others."* 

The  power  of  heavy  cavalry  lies  in  the  strength  and  breeding  of  the 
horse,  and  the  courage  and  activity  of  the  rider.  The  size  of  the  rider, 
his  cuirass,  defensive  armor,  and  heavy  equipments,  detract  from  the 
speed  and  lasting  qualities  of  the  horse,  and  only  render  the  man  help- 
less; for  they  impede  and  unfit  him  for  any  exertion  in  which  activity 
and  endurance  are  necessary. 

If  a  heavy-armed  horseman  gallops  and  exerts  himself  only  for  a  few 
minutes,  the  horse  is  beat  by  the  weight,  and  the  rider  is  exhausted  in 
supporting  himself  and  his  armor  in  the  saddle ;  his  sword-arm  hangs 
helplessly  by  his  side;  he  can  hardly  raise  his  heavy  broadsword :  such 
a  man  is  at  the  mercy  of  any  light  horseman  that  may  turn  upon  him. 

Speed  is  more  than  weight :  in  proportion  as  you  increase  weight  you 
decrease  speed,  and  take  from  your  cavalry  that  impetus  which  ought 
to  be  its  principal  element.  "We  are  not  the  only  military  nation  who 
have  committed  this  error.  With  horses  far  inferior  to  ours — inferior 
both  in  size  and  in  breed — our  neighbors  have  gone  for  weight.  In  the 
last  war  the  French  cuirassiers  were  reduced  to  charge  at  a  trot,  their 
horses  being  unable  to  carry  such  weight  at  a  quicker  pace.  In  their 
attacks  on  an  enemy's  position,  the  losses  they  sustained  from  the  want 
of  speed  were  frequently  awful.     Under  the  improved  fire  of  the  artillery 

*  This  saying  is  attributed  to  one  of  the  German  emperon. 


40  LIGHT   AND    HEAVY   CAVALRY. 

and  infantry  of  the  present  day,  these  slow  attacks  never  could  be 
carried  out  at  all. 

Heavy  Russian  cuirassiers,  when  opposed  to  the  Turks,  were  obliged 
to  form  in  close  columns  or  in  squares,  requiring  artillery  and  infantry 
to  protect  them  from  the  sharp  scimitars  of  the  Moslem.  These  Turks 
had  no  discipline,  no  lances — had  nothing  but  their  good  swords  and 
steeds  to  trust  to. 

And  what,  in  battle,  is  the  real  value  of  the  cuirass  or  other  ponder- 
ous defensive  armor  for  the  body?  So  long  as  arms,  legs,  and  heads 
are  unprotected,  it  signifies  little  that  the  chest  be  covered  with  armor, 
for  the  moment  either  of  the  horseman's  arms  is  wounded  (it  signifies 
not  which  arm)  he  is  at  the  mercy  of  bis  adversary. 

The  weight  of  the  armor  only  renders  it  more  difficult  for  the  cuiras- 
sier to  defend  himself  against  a  man  who  is  free  from  encumbrances, 
and  who,  if  furnished  with  a  proper  sword,  can  lop  off  a  limb  or  kill  his 
opponent's  horse  at  one  blow. 

The  nations  of  the  Continent,  as  I  have  previously  observed,  can  not 
obtain  sufficiently  well-bred  horses  of  the  required  size  and  power,  and 
they  are  therefore  obliged  to  mount  their  heavy  dragoons  on  large, 
clumsy,  and  slow  horses.  To  make  the  best  of  a  bad  job,  when  their 
men  are  thus  mounted  they  case  them  in  armor,  in  order  that  they  may 
have  a  better  chance  of  reaching  the  point  of  attack  alive,  that  they  may 
be  inspired  with  confidence  as  to  the  protective  power  of  their  shining 
breastplates,  and  that  they  may  work  upon  the  nerves  and  imagination 
of  the  enemy  by  their  imposing  appearance  as  "  men  in  armor."  But 
the  brave  light  horseman  soon  finds  out  that,  whatever  they  may  be  to 
the  eye,  they  are  in  action  scarcely  more  formidable  than  the  men  in 
armor  who  ride  (or  used  to  ride)  once  a  year  in  My  Lord  Mayor's  show. 

England,  if  reduced  to  mount  her  heavy  dragoons  on  Barclay  and 
Perkins'  dray-horses,  would  most  likely  do  the  same  as  the  French,  or 
arm  the  men  cap-a-xiied ;  but,  whilst  no  dearth  of  horses  has  yet 
reduced  her  to  this  expedient,  it  \^  truly  pitiful  that  she  should  copy 
from  such  bad  originals  as  the  Continental  cuirassiers  !  The  Prussian 
major-general  of  hussars,  Warnery,  in  speaking  of  the  English  cava\ry, 
says: 

"The  English  have  everything  which  can  be  desired  to  form  an  ex- 
cellent body  of  cavalry  of  all  species  j  their  light  dragoons  might,  and 


ADVANTAGE    OF   LIGHT   ACCOUTREMENTS.  41 

do,  surpass  everything  which  we  have  ever  seen  of  that  nature;  and, 
as  their  cavalry  is  not  numerous,  they  have  the  greater  facility  in  being 
select  in  its  composition,  both  in  men  and  in  horses,  without  being 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  other  nations,  or  to  look  out  of  their  own 
island — an  advantage  which  few  countries  possess." 

If  England  could  mount  her  cavalry  on  horses  combining  more  power 
and  size  than  any  in  Europe,  with  more  breed,  speed,  and  activity  than 
any  now  in  Asia,  she  ought  to  endeavor  to  adopt  a  system  which,  in 
giving  full  scope  to  their  excellence,  would  enable  the  English  horse  to 
bear  down  and  ride  over  the  disciplined  resistance  of  Continental  troops. 
By  taking  a  lesson  from  the  Asiatics,  she  might  so  arm  and  instruct  her 
dragoons  as  to  make  them  equal  to  any  of  the  people  of  the  East  in 
single  combat. 

Heavy  cavalry  should  have  the  largest  and  most  powerful  horses,  but 
the  men  and  their  accoutrements  should  be  light.  If  you  weight  the 
powerful  horses  with  heavy  men  and  accoutrements,  you  bring  them 
down  to  a  level  with  smaller  and  weaker  horses.  Thus  a  great  heavy 
man  in  armor,  on  a  fine  strong  horse,  could  not  catch  or  ride  down  o 
Cossack  on  a  good  pony;  but  the  same  horse,  with  a  light  active  man 
on  his  back,  would  ride  down  a  dozen  of  such  Cossacks,  one  after  the 
other. 

In  a  charge,  the  same  horses  with  light  weights  will,  by  their  speed 
and  impulsive  power,  ride  down  or  over  obstacles  which  would  certainly 
stop  them  if  heavily  weighted.  The  heavier  the  man,  the  less  available 
the  high  qualities  of  the  horse,  and  the  less  formidable  the  man  on  his 
back. 

What  (except,  perhaps,  the  want  of  opportunity)  is  to  prevent  our 
armor-clad  Household  cavalry  from  meeting  with  the  same  fate  at  the 
hands  of  some  active  and  determined  light  horsemen,  as  befell  the  brave 
French  cuirassiers  when  they  were  shot  and  speared  off  their  horses  by 
the  Cossacks? 

If  English  dragoons  were  properly  organized,  properly  furnished 
with  offensive  weapons,  and  duly  impressed  or  imbued  with  confidence 
in  the  strength  and  speed  of  their  horses,  in  their  own  riding,  and  in 
the  destroying  power  of  their  swords,  no  numbers  eould  daunt  them. 
A  few  such  men  could  hang  like  shadows  round  an  enemy's  cavalry 
column,  reconnoitre  their  movements,  approach,  dismount,  and  pick  off 
4* 


42  LIGHT    AND    HEAVY    CAVALRY. 

their  officers  ;  while  the  enemy  could  neither  catch  them  nor  drive  them 
awaj'.  Then,  again,  in  an  emergency,  our  Englishmen  could  make  their 
way  across  country  where  no  foreign  dragoons  could  ride  and  follow. 

Arm  and  form  your  men  according  to  the  system  which  I  propose, 
and  which  will  be  detailed  in  another  chapter,  and,  in  my  humble  opin- 
ion, you  go  far  to  secure  the  following  advantages: 

When  acting  in  bodies,  no  rattling  of  swords'  scabbards  would  an- 
nounce their  approach  to  the  enemy,  and  prevent  the  words  of  command 
of  their  own  officers  from  being  heard. 

No  unwieldly  squadrons  would  prevent  a  speedy  advance  over  diffi- 
cult ground,  or  exhaust  the  horses  by  pressure  in  the  ranks,  causing 
confusion,  and  occasioning  breaks  and  gaps  in  the  line. 

No  cavalry  could  withstand  the  speed  and  power  of  their  charges,  or 
escape  from  their  death-dealing  blades. 

No  Moslem  could  oblige  them  to  seek  shelter  behind  batteries  or  col- 
umns of  infantry. 

No  light  cavalry  could  swarm  round  their  columns,  spearing  and 
shooting  the  outside  files. 

No  fire  of  infantry  could  be  repeated  sufficiently  quick  to  inflict  a  loss 
of  an  amount  to  check  them  in  their  charge ;  for  they  would  be  upon 
the  infantry  with  the  speed  of  lightning. 

Finally,  commanding  officers,  freed  from  the  incubus  of  pivot  flanks, 
and  right  and  left  in  front,  would  act  boldly,  resolutely,  quickly ;  and 
thus  lead  our  cavalry  to  gallant  deeds  and  to  almost  certain  victory. 


There  have  not  been  wanting  on  the  Continent  military  writers  to 
weigh  the  respective  value  of  heavy  and  of  light  cavalry,  and  to  point 
out  the  long  series  of  successes  gained  by  bold  riders  lightly  equipped, 
well  mounted,  and  armed  with  proper  weapons.  It  is  now  many  years 
since  the  Prussian  general,  Warnery,  published  his  interesting  remarks 
on  these  subjects. 

The  Albanians,  whom  Warnery  mentions  in  the  first  instance,  made 
themselves  truly  formidable  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries. 
They  went  by  various  names,  and  seem  to  have  had  little  right  to  be 
called  Albanians,  for  their  bands  were  composed  of  daring  adventurers 


HUSSARS — ADVANTAGE   OVER   CUIRASSIERS.  43 

from  the  Morea,  from  Ancient  Thessaly  and  Thrace,  from  Servia,  from 
Dalmatia,  and  other  regions,  as  well  as  from  Albania,  The  contempo- 
rary Italian  historians  generally  call  them  Stradiotti.  Apparently  they 
brought  their  horses  as  well  as  their  arms  with  them  into  Italy,  whence ' 
their  renown  as  an  indefatigable  light  cavalry  was  spread  over  Europe. 
They  had,  no  doubt,  taken  lessons  of  the  irregular  Turkish  cavalry. 

"  These  Albanians,"  says  General  Warnery,  "  served  in  the  field  ex- 
actly as  the  hussars  of  our  own  times ;  and  if  they  had  the  good  fortune 
to  throw  the  powerful  gendarmes  into  a  little  confusion,  they  soon  made 
a  great  carnage  amongst  them;  for,  being  hand  to  hand,  and  pell-mell 
with  them,  those  heavy  horsemen  could  make  no  use  of  their  lances, 
and,  ill  fact,  could  scarcely  move  themselves.  One  fact  occurs  in  the 
military  history  of  the  period,  which  appears  almost  incredible,  but  is, 
nevertheless,  true  and  certain  :  the  Swiss  foot,  armed  simply  with  pikes 
and  halberds,  attacked  and  defeated  the  gendarmerie  in  the  plains,  and 
particularly  at  Novara,  where  the  heavy  French  gendarmes  \Yere  almost 
annihilated. 

"Philip  de  Comines  mentions  that,  in  his  time,  when  the  French  and 
Venetians  blockaded  Verona,  defended  by  the  troops  of  the  Emperor 
Maximilian,  a  party  of  Albanians  sallied  from  the  place  and  skirmish- 
ed with  the  French  gendarmes,  and  that  each  Albanian  took  one  of 
the  gendarmes  prisoner,  and  led  him  into  the  town  in  triumph.  [At 
present,  however,  this  would  not  appear  so  very  extraordinary,  as  a 
single  Russian,  or  Cossack,  has  frequently  taken  two  cuirassiers  in  one 
day.] 

"In  a  march  of  ten  German  miles,  supposing  it  to  be  commenced 
with  equal  numbers,  the  hussars  would  certainly  have  the  advantage 
over  cuirassiers.  In  the  open  country  they  would  very  much  harass 
and  dishearten  heavy  cavalry  by  continual  skirmishing  and  hanging 
upon  their  flanks  and  rear  ;  and  the  effect  would  be  very  much  increased 
if  the  heavy  horse  should  be  provoked  to  charge,  even  though  they 
should  be  so  fortunat;e  as  not  to  be  in  disorder  after  charging. 

"  But  in  such  a  length  of  march  there  must  at  last  be  some  defilee,  or 
other  obstacle,  which  would  oblige  this  heavy  cavalry,  already  much 
fatigued,  to  break  off;  and  this  is  the  moment  for  the  light  troops  to 
act  with  the  greatest  vigor,  and  by  continual  pressing  upon  them  in 
Buch  situations  (in  which  they  can  neither  prevent  being  attacked,  nor 


44  LIGHT   AND    HEAVY   CAVALRY. 

take  their  revenge),  they  will  at  length  lose  confidence;  and  the  instant 
they  either  charge  or  disperse,  they  are  generally  certain  of  being 
vanquished. 

*'  To  remedy  this  disadvantage,  the  King  of  Prussia  directed  all  his 
cuirassiers  to  bo  practised  to  the  hussar  exercises,  which  was,  certainly, 
so  far  useful ;  but  their  horses  are  not  proper  for  such  light  and  active 
service. 

"Seidlitz,  whose  regiment  ought  (for  the  useful)  to  serve  as  a  model 
for  all  the  cavalry  in  the  universe,  allowed  that,  in  a  march  of  length, 
he  should  not  be  able,  with  his  whole  regiment,  to  resist  six  hundred 
good  hussars. 

"All  heavy  cavalry  who  lose  confidence,  or  disperse,  in  presence  of 
light,  are  lost :  if  they  determine,  by  one  great  effort,  to  extricate  them- 
selves (at  least  for  some  time),  the  light  retreat  swiftly,  a  la  dehandade, 
in  all  directions. 

"  General  Werner,  with  seven  hundred  hussars,  completely  destroyed 
the  dragoons  of  the  Archduke  Joseph,*  afterwards  Emperor,  by  skir- 
mishing, harassing,  and  hanging  upon  their  flanks  and  rear  in  the 
manner  above  described.  Those  dragoons  were  commanded  by  General 
Caramelli. 

"The  Prussian  hussars  are  equally  capable  of  every  nature  of  ser- 
vice. In  regular  battles  they  have  rendered  the  service  of  cuirassiers; 
they  never  hesitated  to  attack  in  close  squadron  whatever  they  have 
met  with,  which  was  never  known  before  them  to  have  been  done  by  the 
hussars  of  any  other  nation ;  it  being  the  general  opinion,  and  even  of 
the  hussars  themselves  in  those  services,  that  the  nature  of  that  arm  is 
not  proper  to  act  in  line,  nor  do  they  scarcely  ever  make  their  appear- 
ance during  an  action,  which  could  originate  only  in  the  ancient  preju- 
dice that  the  goodness  of  cavalry  consisted  exclusively  in  the  'height 
of  the  man  and  horse.'  "f 

Yet  the  gallant  cavaliers  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  and  Charles  XII  were 
never  mounted  upon  any  other  than  Swedish,  Friesland,  or  Livonion 
nags  or  ponies — and  nevertheless  what  prodigies  did  they  not  perform  ? 

*  An  Austrian  dragoon  regiment  has  fourteen  hundred  horses,  and  upwards,  in 
time  of  war. 
t  Major-General  Warnery,  "  Remarks  upon  Cavalry  Tactics." 


PRUSSIAN    HUSSARS.  45 

Colonel  Maraiuville,  the  French  military  commissioner  in  the  Aus- 
trian camp,  speaking  of  the  Prussian  hussars,  says  :  "  Le  jour  de  la 
bataille  du  5eme  Decembre,  j'ai  vu  de  ces  hussards  pousserune  grande 
garde  de  cavalerie  (cuirassiers)  jusque  dans  le  village  de  Leuthen,  ou 
nous  avions  de  I'infanterie,  et  un  de  ces  hussards  fendre  la  tele  a  un 
cuirassier  a  trente  pas  de  la  premiere  maison  de  ce  village."* 

Even  in  olden  times,  speed  not  weight  was  regarded  as  the  first 
quality  in  cavalry.  Marshal  Saxe  said :  "  Cavalry  which  can  not  charge 
at  speed  over  a  couple  of  thousand  yards,  to  pounce  upon  the  foe,  is 
good  for  nothing  in  the  field."  All  the  tendency  of  modern  times  and 
modern  experience  is  to  impress  upon  us  the  paramount  necessity  of 
speed.  Even  of  the  infantry  Napoleon  was  accustomed  to  say:  "  Arms 
win  fewer  battles  than  logs." 

The  great  improvement  made  in  fire-arms,  and  the  increased  range  of 
the  infantry  musket,  leave  but  little  chance  for  cavalry,  unless  the  speed 
with  which  they  can  pounce  upon  the  infantry  lessens  the  number  and 
the  effect  of  the  discharges  to  bo  received  during  their  advance.  How 
can  this  be  done  with  cuirassiers  ?  Ere  they  could  close  upon  the  foe, 
if  saved  themselves  by  their  armor,  most  of  their  horses  would  be 
wounded  or  killed,  and  where  is  then  the  advantage  of  a  cuirass? 

I  have  been  assured  that  Captain  Minie,  with  the  "culot"  ball,  hit  a 
mark  seven  times  out  of  ten  shots  at  a  distance  of  eighteen  hundred 
yards,  and  even  at  that  distance  it  is  supposed  that  the  ball  *'  prima- 
tive  "  would  take  effect  through  the  cuirasses. 

At  some  of  the  experiments  made  in  England,  a  Mini6  ball  passed 
through  an  earthen  breastwork  three  feet  thick,  and  killed  a  soldier 
standing  behind  it,  smashing  his  skull  to  pieces  !  What  sort  of  cuirass 
would  resist  such  a  bullet  ? 

In  a  melee  the  cuirass  may  save  the  man  from  a  sword-cut  or  point 
in  the  chest,  but  he  is  only  the  more  vulnerable  about  the  arms  and 
legs;  and  when  either  bridle  or  sword-arm  is  injured  the  cavalry  sol- 
dier is  at  the  mercy  of  his  opponent. 

As  fair  a  test  of  the  relative  efl5ciency  of  men  in  armor  and  those 
without  is  to  be  found  in  the  charges  and  conflicts  of  cavalry  at  Water- 
loo.    Our  men  had  no  armor,  they  were  overmatched  greatly  in  num- 

*  Extract  from  a  work  by  Von  Stuhr. 


46  LIGHT   AND    HEAVY    CAVALRY. 

bers,  yet  when  they  charged  thoy  drove  the  cuirassiers  before  them  ; 
and  as  for  single  combatants,  if  we  take  the  life-guardsman  Shaw,  we 
have  a  fair  proof  of  the  superiority  of  the  man  unencumbered  with  ar- 
mor :  it  is  said  he  killed  several  of  his  steel-clad  opponents  in  fair 
fight,  and  when  set  upon  by  four  of  them  at  once,  he  killed  three,  and 
was  then  disabled  by  a  pistol-shot  from  the  fourth. 

Captain  Siborne  thus  describes  a  charge  of  cavalry  at  Waterloo : 
"  They  are  the  far-famed  cuirassiers  of  France,  led  on  by  Keller- 
mann :  gallant  spirits  that  have  hitherto  overcome  the  finest  troops 
that  could  be  brought  against  them,  and  have  grown  grey  in  glory- 
Trumpets  sound  the  charge;  in  the  next  instant  your  ears  catch  the  low 
thundering  noises  of  their  horses'  hoofs,  and  your  breathless  excitement 
is  wound  to  the  highest  pitch,  as  the  adverse  lines  dash  together  with  a 
shock  which  at  the  moment  you  expect  must  end  in  their  mutual  anni- 
hilation. Observe  the  British,  how  they  seem  to  doubt  for  a  second  in 
what  manner  to  deal  with  their  opponents.  Now  they  urge  their  pow- 
erful steeds  into  the  intervals  between  the  necks  of  those  of  the  cuiras- 
siers. Swords,  brandished  high  in  air,  gleam  fitfully  in  rapid  succession 
throughout  the  lines ;  here  clashing  together,  there  clanging  against 
helmet  and  cuirass,  which  ring  under  their  redoubted  strokes.  See,  the 
struggle  is  but  a  moment  doubtful :  the  cuirassiers,  seemingly  encum- 
bered by  their  coats  of  mail,  are  yielding  to  superior  strength,  dexteri- 
ty, and  bravery  combined;  men  and  horses  reel  and  stagger  to  the 
earth;  gaps  open  out  in  their  line;  numbers  are  backing  out,  others  are 
fairly  turning  round;  their  whole  line  now  turns  and  breaks  asunder 
into  fragments :  in  the  next  moment  they  appear,  as  if  by  a  miracle,  to 
be  swept  off  the  crest  of  the  position,  and  being  closely  and  hotly  pur- 
sued by  the  victors,  the  whole,  rushing  down  the  other  side  of  the 
ridge,  are  snatched  from  your  view." 

Sergeant-major  Cotton  relates  the  following  encounter  : 
*'  A  hussar  and  a  cuirassier  had  got  entangled  in  the  melee,  and  met 
in  the  plain  in  full  view  of  our  line ;  the  hussar  was  without  a  cap  and 
bleeding  from  a  wound  in  the  head,  but  that  did  not  hinder  him  from 
attacking  his  steel-clad  adversary.  He  soon  proved  that  the  strength 
of  cavalry  consists  in  good  horsemanship  and  the  skilful  use  of  the 
sword,  and  not  in  being  clad  in  heavy  defensive  armor. 
"The  superiority  of  the  hussar  was  visible  the  moment  the  swords 


ENCOUNTER   OF    HUSSAR    WITH   CUIRASSIER.  47 

crossed;  after  a  few  wheels  a  tremendous  facer  made  the  Frenchman 
reel  in  the  saddle,  and  all  his  attempts  to  escape  his  more  active  foe  be- 
came unavailing;  a  second  blow  stretched  him  on  the  ground,  amid 
the  cheers  of  the  light  horseman's  comrades,  the  Third  German  Hussars, 
who  were  ardent  spectators  of  the  combat/'* 

Captain  Ganzauge,  of  the  Prussian  lancer  guard,  in  his  "  Kriegswis- 
senschaftlichen  Analecten,"  gives  various  instances  in  the  campaign  of 
1813  of  actions  fought  between  the  Cossacks  and  French  cavalry;  all 
of  them  most  interesting,  for  they  show  how  cavalry,  by  its  equipment 
and  system  of  tactics,  can  be  made  so  helpless  as  to  be  unable  to  dis- 
pose of  such  despised  enemies  as  the  Cossacks.  As  the  work  is  not 
generally  known  in  this  country,  I  will  proceed  to  give  a  few  brief 
extracts,  which  I  have  translated  from  the  original. 

"On  the  19th  of  August,  1813,  when  the  armistice  had  expired,  the 
French  troops  began  to  push  the  allies  back  on  Berlin  and  Potsdam. 
Colonel  Bichalow  received  orders  to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Liichenwalde  with  a  regiment  of  Don  Cossacks.  These 
men  had  bivouacked  on  the  Treboin  road,  and  advanced  through 
Scharfenbriick  and  WaltesdorflF.  The  French  picquets  retired  at  our 
approach,  and  afforded  us  a  full  view  of  the  fields  to  the  north  and  east 
of  the  Liickenwalde.  Presently  a  large  body  of  cavalry  issued  in 
haste  from  the  town,  and  formed  in  our  front  in  close  column  of  squad- 
rons; their  skirmishers  fell  in  on  their  flanks,  and  we  had  this  heavy 
column  only  before  us.  The  Cossacks  could  gain  but  little  against  so 
large  a  force;  but  as  there  was  no  great  risk  in  assailing  it,  they  were 
ordered  forward.  The  French  advanced  at  a  trot,  and,  to  prevent  the 
Russians  getting  in  betwixt  the  squudrons,  they  closed  up  and  bore 
right  down  on  the  centre  of  our  line,  which  naturally  oi)cned  out;  the 
Cossacks  attacking  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  column.  The  French, 
having  no  one  in  front  to  oppose  them,  halted,  while  their  tormentors 
kept  spearing  the  flank  files  and  firing  into  the  mass,  which  soon  got 
into  complete  confusion,  and  could  undertake  no  evolution  of  any  sort. 
The  Cossacks,  though  they  never  attempted  to  disperse  the  mass  by  a 
dash  at  them,  still,  conscious  of  their  superiority  in  riding,  continued 
to  shoot  and  spear  them,  executing  partial  charges  when  opportunity 

*  Cotton,  "  A  Voice  from  Waterloo." 


48  LIGHT    AND    HEAVY   CAVALRY. 

offered.  Meanwhile  the  flank  files  of  the  French  faced  outward  and 
unslung  their  carabines,  and,  thus  formed  in  square,  they  kept  up  an 
irregular  fusillade  for  about  half  an  hour.  The  heads  of  French  in- 
fantry columns  were  now  seen  advancing  from  Liichenwalde  toward 
the  scene  of  strife;  and  as  soon  as  their  artillery  opened  fire,  the  column 
of  heavy  cavalry  was  released  from  its  dangerous  situation.  Colonel 
Bichalow  withdrew  his  troops  by  way  of  Scharfenbriick,  without  being 
pursued  by  a  single  Frenchman. 

"  Soon  after  the  Battle  of  Dennewitz,  the  Cossack  regiments,  named 
before,  were  in  the  neighborhood  of  Konigsbriick  and  Dresden.  Colonel 
Bichalow  was  ordered  to  watch  the  French  cavalry,  which  had  been 
pushed  forward  toward  Grossen-Hayn,  and  to  attack  them  if  possible. 
On  the  18th  of  September  we  proceeded  accordingly  toward  Estcle- 
verda.  Here  we  were  told  that  the  French  cavalry  occupied  the  vil- 
lages to  the  south  of  Miihlberg,  and  resolved  to  beat  up  their  quarters 
at  once.  Before  we  reached  the  heath  extending  between  Miihlberg 
and  Spannberg,  General  Slowaisky  joined  and  assumed  the  command 
of  the  Cossack  force,  which,  together  with  the  regiment  he  brought  up, 
amounted  in  all  to  twelve  hundred  men. 

"  I  am  not  aware  whether  this  meeting  was  the  effect  of  design  or 
chance.  When  avc  cleared  the  wood  of  Miihlberg,  we  saw  the  French 
cavalry,  near  Borack,  partly  formed,  while  parties  were  trotting  up 
from  the  different  villages  to  join  them.  The  prisoners  afterward  told 
us  that  their  force  on  the  ground  was  two  thousand  men. 

"  The  French  completed  their  movements  while  the  Cossacks  were 
forming  up;  they  were  formed  in  one  line,  en  muraiUe,  with  a  small 
reserve  in  rear. 

"  The  Cossacks  fell  on,  and  were  received  with  a  discharge  of  cara- 
bines,- the  French  did  not  draw  swords.  Their  fire,  at  first,  sent  the 
Russians  to  the  right  about;  and,  while  they  were  reforming,  the 
enemy  wheeled  into  column  and  opened  out,  so  as  to  get  their  intervals 
wheeled  again  into  line.  We  expected  they  wei-e  about  to  charge, 
but  their  object  appears  simply  to  have  been  to  extend  their  line,  and 
prevent  their  being  outflanked — a  common  mode  of  attack  with  the 
Cossacks. 

"  The  arrangements  being  completed  on  both  sides  about  the  same 
time,  the  Cossacks  were  strictly  admonished  not  to  shrink  from  tl>e 


EFFECTIVENESS    OF    COSSAGK    CAVALRY.  49 

enemy's  fire,  their  officers  receiving  orders  to  cut  down  the  first  man 
that  turned. 

**  Several  squadrons  were  told  off  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  and 
rear  during  the  conflict.  All  these  orders  were  steadily  obeyed ;  they 
pressed  in  upon  the  French,  and  surrounded  their  squadrons :  here  I 
saw,  myself,  many  of  the  French  dragoons  cut  down  or  speared  after 
firing  oflF  their  carabines,  before  they  could  draw  their  swords.  The 
French  steadily  defended  themselves  at  first,  as  well  as  cavalry  stand- 
ing still  can  do,  against  such  active  adversaries,  who  swarmed  about 
them  on  all  sides,-  however,  presently  some  of  them  turned,  and  their 
example  was  soon  followed  by  the  remaining  squadrons.  The  reserve, 
instead  of  advancing  to  restore  the  fight,  joined  in  the  flight;  in  a  short 
time  every  one  was  galloping  toward  Jacobsthal,  and  the  entire  plain 
was  covered  with  scattered  horsemen.  Not  one  troop  was  to  be  seen  in 
close  order ;  it  was  a  regular  hunt ;  and  most  of  those  who  were  taken 
prisoners  in  it  had  previously  fallen  off"  their  horses.  At  last  we  came 
upon  a  line  of  cuirassiers,  in  emerging  from  the  wood,  and  their  steady 
and  imposing  attitude  brought  us  suddenly  to  a  halt,  without  any  word 
being  given.  We  were  quite  satisfied  with  our  victory,  and  turned 
back  to  Miihlberg."* 

Many  more  striking  examples  of  the  superiority  of  the  Cossacks  as 
cavalry  are  upon  record,  and  ought  not  be  overlooked  or  forgotten.  I 
will  quote  a  few  from  a  French  cavalry  officer  : 

"The  Cossacks,"  says  General  de  Brack,  "were  an  arm  which  ren- 
dered the  war  highly  dangerons,  especially  to  such  of  our  officers  as 
were  intrusted  with  making  reconnoissances.  Many  among  them,  and 
especially  of  the  general  staff",  selected  by  the  major-general,  preferred 
forwarding  the  reports  which  they  received  from  the  peasantry  to 
going  to  a  distance  and  exposing  themselves  to  the  attacks  of  the  Cos- 
sacks.    The  Emperor,  then,  could  no  longer  know  the  state  of  affairs." 

Thus,  behold  even  French  officers  not  daring  to  expose  themselves. 
Behold  the  genius  of  Napoleon  paralyzed  by  the  activity  of  these  semi- 
barbarous  horsemen  !  Does  not  this  single  fact  carry  great  weight 
with  it? 

Again,  General  Moraud,  another  French  officer,  says:  "But  these 

*  Captain  Qanzauge,  "  Kriegswiaseachaftlichen  Analecten." 
b 


50  LIGHT    AND    HEAVY    CAVALRY. 

rude  horsemen  are  ignorant  of  our  divisions,  of  our  regular  alignmente, 
of  all  that  order  which  we  so  ovcriceeuingli/  estimate.  Their  custom  is 
to  keep  their  horse  close  between  their  legs ;  their  feet  rest  in  broad 
stirrups,  which  support  them  when  they  use  their  arms.  They  spring 
from  a  state  of  rest  to  the  full  gallop,  and  at  that  gallop  they  make  a 
dead  halt :  their  horses  second  their  skill,  and  seem  only  part  of  them- 
selves ;  these  men  are  always  on  the  alert,  they  move  with  extraordi- 
nary rapidity,  have  few  Avants,  and  are  full  of  warlike  ardor.  What  a 
magnificent  spectacle  was  that  of  the  French  cavalry  flashing  in  gold 
and  steel  under  the  rays  of  a  June  sun,  extending  its  lines  upon  the 
flanks  of  the  hills  of  the  Niemen,  and  burning  with  eagerness  and 
courage  !  What  bitter  reflections  are  those  of  the  ineffectual  manoeu- 
vres which  exhausted  it  against  the  Cossacks,  those  irregular  forces 
until  then  so  despised,  but  which  did  more  for  Russia  than  all  the  reg- 
ular armies  of  that  empire !  Every  day  they  were  to  be  seen  on  the 
horizon,  extended  over  an  immense  line,  while  their  daring  flankers 
came  and  braved  us  even  in  our  ranks.  We  formed  and  marched 
against  this  line,  which,  the  moment  we  reached  it,  vanished,  and  the 
horizon  no  longer  showed  anything  but  birch-trees  and  pines;  but  an 
hour  afterward,  while  our  horses  were  feeding,  the  attack  was  resumed, 
and  a  black  line  again  presented  itself;  the  same  manoeuvres  were  re- 
sumed, which  were  followed  by  the  same  result.  It  was  thus  that  the 
finest  and  bravest  cavalry*  exhausted  and  wasted  itself  against  men 
whom  it  deemed  unworthy  of  its  valoi',  and  who,  nevertheless,  were 
sufficient  to  save  the  empire,  of  which  they  are  the  real  support  and 
sole  deliverers.  To  put  the  climax  to  our  affliction,  it  must  be  added 
that  our  cavalry  was  more  numerous  than  the  Cossacks ;  that  it  was 
supported  by  an  artillery,  the  lightest,  the  bravest,  the  most  formi- 
dable, that  ever  was  mowed  down  by  death  !  It  must  further  bo  stated 
that  its  commandant,  the  admired  of  heroes,  took  the  precaution  of 
having  himself  supported  in  every  manoeuvre  by  the  most  intrepid  in- 
fantry ;  and,  nevertheless,  the  Cossacks  returned  covered  with  spoils 
and  glory  to  the  fertile  banks  of  the  Danaetz,  while  the  soil  of  Russia 
was  strewn  with  the  carcasses  and  arms  of  our  warriors,  so  bold,  so  un- 
flinching, so  devoted  to  the  glory  of  our  country."-}- 


*But,  alasl  so  uuwieldly,  so  encumbered,  and,  therefore,  so  useless. 
t  As  quoted  in  the  work  of  General  de  Brack. 


DISADVANTAGES    OF    HEAVY   CAVALRY.  51 

Now  just  contrast  this  account  of  the  Cossacks — full  of  generous  ad- 
missions, particularly  for  a  Frenchman — with  the  wretched  deeds  of 
the  regular  cavalry  of  the  Russian  army,  and  then  who  will  venture  to 
assert  that  the  organization,  the  heavy,  unwieldly  squadrons,  the  puz- 
zling tactics  of  the  regulars,  have  not  much  to  answer  for  ? 

If  Cossacks,  mounted  on  ponies,  and  wretchedly  armed,  could  thus 
master  the  French  regulars,  in  spite  of  their  artillery,  what  might  not 
be  expected  from  them  if  they  were  mounted  on  well-bred,  powerful 
horses,  and  furnished  with  really  good  weapons?  In  that  war  their 
lances  were  notoriously  bad:  so  much  so  that  there  were  French  sol- 
diers who  received  as  many  as  twenty  lance-wounds  without  being 
killed  or  seriously  injured. 

The  same  contrast  is  presented  by  our  native  irregular  and  our  native 
regular  cavalry  in  India.  The  first,  acting  on  usage  and  instinct,  and 
armed  and  mounted  in  their  own  Oriental  way,  are  nearly  always  effec- 
tive in  the  battle,  or  the  skirmish,  or  the  reconnoissance ;  the  second^ 
cramped  by  our  rules  and  regulations,  and,  as  it  were,  denaturalized, 
are  rarely  of  any  service  whatever.  For  a  long  series  of  years  the 
only  native  cavalry  we  kept  in  India  was  the  irregular.  These  corps 
were  formed  before  our  infantry  sepoys,  and  many  and  most  important 
were  the  services  they  rendered  to  us.  They  were  always  active — 
always  rapid.  The  names  of  some  of  the  most  distinguished  leaders  of 
thi3  brilliant  light  cavalry  are  still  revered  in  India.  If  their  corps 
had  been  Europeanized,  and  turned  into  regulars,  assuredly  we  never 
should  have  heard  of  them  as  heroes. 

Much  more  recent  instances  of  the  superiority  of  light  over  heavy 
arc  to  be  found. 

In  the  Magyar  war  of  184S  and  1849  the  Hungarians  had  nothing 
but  hussars  to  oppose  to  the  Imperialists'  heavy  cavalry  and  cuirassiers, 
and,  though  inferior  in  number,  they  always  met  the  cuirassiers  gallant- 
ly, and  often  defeated  them  with  great  loss.  Indeed,  in  one  instance,  a 
single  squadron  of  the  tenth  hussars  (Frederic  Wilhelm),  at  the  Battle 
of  Teteny  (3d  of  January,  1849),  charged  several  squadrons  of  the  Im- 
perial cuirassiers,  and  defeated  them.  These  heavy  horsemen  had  a 
few  days  previously  made  a  gallant  charge,  under  Colonel  Ottinger, 
against  the  Hungarian  infantry,  breaking  two  squares,  and  capturing 
the  guns  which  flanked  them ;  thus  there  could  be  no  want  of  proper 


52  LIGHT   AND    HEAVY   CAVALRY. 

courage  on  the  part  of  the  heavies,  and  their  defeat  must  be  attributed 
to  the  cumbersome  equipments,  and  the  heavy,  unwieldy  horses. 

The  seventh  division  of  Gorgey's  corps  was  stationed  at  Parendorf 
for  the  purpose  of  covering  the  frontier.  A  few  miles  off,  at  Woolfs- 
thal,  in  the  Austrian  territory,  stood  Jellachich,  his  outposts  held  by 
the  Walmoden  cuirassiers.  The  Hungarian  outposts  were  held  by  the 
Nikolaus  hussars.  Some  squadrons  of  cuirassiers  were  pushed  across 
the  frontier  by  the  Austriaus  into  the  plain  near  Parendorf.  A  body  of 
hussars  then  first  made  their  appearance,  advancing  at  a  trot,  and 
gradually  increasing  their  speed  as  they  neared  the  enemy ;  and,  though 
but  a  handful  compared  to  their  opponents,  they  rushed  upon  them  with 
such  speed,  and  in  such  compact  order,  that  they  broke  through  the 
cuirassiers,  and  scattered  them  over  the  plain,  where  they  fell  an  easy 
prey  to  their  more  active  pursuers. 

On  other  occasions  the  gallantry  and  success  of  the  lights  were 
equally  conspicuous.  I  translate  what  immediately  follows  from  Georg 
Klaptka's  "  National  Krieg  in  Ungarn  und  Siebenbiirgen  :" 

"  On  the  18th  of  December,  1848,  the  enemy's  cavalry,  led  by  the 
Banns,  attacked  the  Hungarian  rear-guard  near  Altenburg.  The  ene- 
my came  from  Sommerin,  formed  up  two  regiments,  and  opened  fire 
with  the  artillery.  The  more  numerous  Hungarian  artillery  soon  had 
the  best  of  it,  the  enemy's  line  became  unsteady,  and  showed  symptoms 
of  turning.  At  this  moment  Major  Cornel  Gorgey  brought  up  four 
squadrons  of  the  tenth  hussars  from  the  second  line,  and  charged  the 
right  wing  of  the  enemy,  inflicting  on  him  a  heavy  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded,  and  driving  him  in  disorder  from  the  field.  The  enemy  gal- 
loped toward  the  reserves  under  Lichtenstein,  which  were  advancing 
to  the  support,  and,  wrapped  in  clouds  of  dust,  the  diifeated  horsemen 
fled  across  the  plain  far  more  rapidly  than  they  had  advanced.  This 
was  the  first  time  large  bodies  of  cavalry  had  met  during  the  campaign  ; 
and  here,  as  in  numerous  skirmishes  which  had  taken  place  previously, 
the  active  hussar  proved  himself  more  than  a  match  for  the  steel-clad 
horseman  and  heavy-armed  dragoon  of  the  Austrians. 

"At  3  p.  M.  on  the  3d  of  January  our  left  wing  was  attacked  in  front 
of  Teteny. 

"  Our  outposts  had  been  driven  in  at  Hamsabeg  at  mid-day,  and  now 
the  enemy  pushed  forward  against  Teteny.  Zichy's  brigade,  about 
three  thousand  men,  took  up  a  position  on  the  south-west  of  the  place, 


EFFECT   OF   CUIRASSES.  63 

across  the  high-road,  with  the  right  resting  on  the  heights,  the  left  on 
the  Danube,  the  centre  on  the  wood  along  the  banks  of  the  river.  The 
enemy,  after  a  few  long  shots,  presuming  on  their  success  at  Moor,  sent 
several  squadrons  of  cuirassiers  forward  to  attack  the  Hungarian  cen- 
tre. One  squadron  of  the  tenth  Wilhelm  hussars,  which  was  posted 
there,  advanced  resolutely  to  meet  them,  and,  led  on  by  their  officers, 
charged  and  burst  into  the  midst  of  their  mail-clad  antagonists;  a 
bloody  and  desperate  melee  ensued,  in  which  great  part  of  the  cuiras- 
siers were  cut  down  or  made  prisoners ;  the  remainder  sought  safety  in 
flight." 

On  the  26th  of  February,  1849,  when  the  Magyars  were  reduced  to 
an  almost  hopeless  condition,  there  was  another  brilliant  light  cavalry 
aflfair  at  Mezokovest : 

"  On  our  retreat  from  Kerecsend  and  Macklar,  the  enemy  sent  a  regi- 
ment of  cuirassiers,  with  a  brigade  of  guns,  in  pursuit.  They  attacked 
and  drove  in  the  rear-guard,  about  two  thousand  yards  from  our  camp. 
So  daring  a  deed  within  sight  of  our  men  was  not  allowed  to  go  un- 
punished. 

"  The  men  of  the  9th  Nikolaus  hussars  sprang  on  their  horses  and 
galloped  to  the  rescue.  A  splendid  sight  it  was  to  see  this  swarm  of 
light  horsemen  dashing  in  on  the  heavy  cuirassiers,  bursting  their  ranks 
asunder,  cutting  down,  destroying,  and  scattering  them  in  all  direc- 
tions. 

"  The  hussars  captured  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  guns,  which,  with  a 
number  of  prisoners,  they  brought  triumphantly  into  camp. 

"  The  enemy's  reserves  formed  on  the  heights  opposite  the  camp,  but 
did  not  attempt  to  recapture  the  guns  lost  by  their  cuirassiers." 

These  accounts  I  have  translated  from  Klaptka,  who  was  thoroughly 
a  Magyar,  but,  as  I  have  bad  concurrent  testimony  from  others  who 
were  not  of  that  party,  I  can  not  suspect  them  of  much  exaggeration. 
But  let  me  now  add  a  few  extracts  out  of  a  letter  received  from  an  old 
cavalry  officer  and  aide-de-camp,  who  served  on  the  side  of  the  Imperial- 
ists, and  against  the  Hungarians,  or  Magyars. 

"May  23,  1852. 
"  My  dear  Nolan  :   "  I  will  try  and  answer  your  questions  about 
our  cavalry,  and  the  effect  of  our  cuirasses. 
6* 


54  LIGHT   AND   HEAVY  CAVALRY. 

"  From  what  the  cuirassiers  say,  their  cuirass  saved  them  from  many 
a  bullet,  and  many  a  thrust,  in  the  melee.  This  may  be  true,  and  the 
advantage  of  the  armor  probably  is,  that  those  who  wear  it  fancy  them- 
selves safer,  and  are,  therefore,  morally  stronger,  and  more  ready  to 
look  danger  in  the  face.  Of  other  advantages  of  heavy  cavalry  over 
light  we  found  none  during  the  Hungarian  campaigns  :  we  were  not  in 
a  position  to  employ  heavy  cavalry  as  it  should  be  employed  to  reap 
advantage  from  it,  and  this  for  many  reasons. 

"We  bad  but  few  regiments  of  light-horse  at  our  command;  the 
heavies  had  to  do  outpost  work,  skirmishing,  reconnoitring,  etc.,  and 
their  horses  were  knocked  up  with  the  weight  they  had  to  carry. 

"  As  to  the  result  of  the  engagements  between  them  and  the  Hunga- 
rian hussars,  I  must  first  tell  you  what  my  opinion  is  in  general  with 
regard  to  charges  of  cavalry,  and  this  opinion  I  formed  upon  the  expe- 
rience gained  during  the  war. 

"The  success  of  a  cavalry  attack  depends  not  so  much  on  the  de- 
scription of  cavalry  or  horse  employed,  as  on  the  determination  of  the 
men; 

"  On  their  being  accustomed  to  victory; 

"  On  confidence  in  their  leader; 

"And  last,  not  least,  on  the  charge  being  made  at  the  right  moment. 

"Thus,  in  the  first  half  of  the  Hungarian  war,  the  depressing  moral 
consciousness  of  having  abandoned  their  colors,  together  with  being 
badly  commanded,  greatly  influenced  the  behavior  of  the  Hungarian 
regiments  ;  and,  after  their  defeat  at  Schwechat,  the  only  difficulties  we 
experienced  during  our  advance  to  Pesth  were  occasioned  by  the  cold, 
and  not  by  the  enemy. 

"At  Babolna  they  tried  to  make  a  stand;  one  of  their  regiments 
formed  square,  but  was  at  once  ridden  over  and  destroyed  by  two  squad- 
rons of  Walmoden  cuirassiers,  who  advanced  to  the  charge  without  the 
assistance  of  artillery  ;  and  this,  as  far  as  I  remember,  was  the  only 
instance  on  our  side  in  which  cavalry  broke  a  square  without  first 
bringing  artillery  into  play. 

"The  squadron  of  the  10th  hussars,  that  did  such  good  service  at 
Teteny,  was  led  by  Mezey,  a  subaltern  in  the  squadron  at  that  time ; 
he  afterwards  became  their  colonel,  and  his  regiment  proved  itself  the 
best  on  the  Hungarian  side. 


SUPERIORITY   OF   HUNGARIAN    HUSSARS.  55 

"Later  in  the  campaign  of  1849  (except  toward  its  close)  the  Hun- 
garians received  great  reinforcements  in  troops,  their  moral  courage 
rose,  and  then  came  the  tug  of  war. 

"New  regiments  were  raised,  and  in  numbers  they  were  superior  to 
us ;  but,  of  course,  it  was  only  the  old  hussar  regiments  that  were  for- 
midable: indeed  they  behaved  most  gallantly,  and  on  all  occasions 
charged  home  at  our  cuirassiers  and  heavy  dragoons,  but  they  never 
liked  to  close  with  our  Polish  lancers. 

"  I  quite  agree  with  you  that  the  strength  and  lasting  qualities  of  the 
horse  make  the  cavalry  soldier  formidable,  and  that,  therefore,  the  ani- 
mal should  not  be  made  to  carry  any  unnecessary  weight,  which  must 
always  diminish  and  detract  from  those  qualities  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree  :  this  is  not  my  opinion  alone,  but  the  prevailing  one  in  this 
service 

"The  Hungurian  saddle  has  now  been  adopted  for  the  whole  of  our 
cavalry. 

"  In  the  bridling,  saddling,  packing,  etc.,  many  improvements  have 
been  made,  as  well  as  in  the  arming  of  the  men. 

"  Our  artillery  is  much  altered  for  the  better.     In  Vienna  you  will 
see  several  schools  of  equitation  ;  and  also  a  '  squadron  of  instruction,* 
composed  of  detachments  from  all  the  regiments  in  the  service. 
"Yours  ever  sincerely, 

*        »        -»        * " 

General  Sir  Charles  Shaw  gave  the  following  most  interesting  account 
of  the  Circassian  horsemen  in  a  letter  published  in  November,  1853,  in 
the  "  Morning  Chronicle."  His  opinions  on  the  subject  now  under  dis- 
cussion have  a  peculiar  value  from  his  great  personal  experience  of 
war,  and  his  practical  knowledge  of  military  matters : 

"  The  noble  Circassians  who  have  been  fighting  against  Russia,  inde- 
pendent of  Turkey,  have  been  within  this  short  time  taken  into  the 
Turkish  service  ;  and  it  may  be  interesting  to  give  a  description^,  by  a 
Prussian  officer,  of  the  Circassian  cavalry,  who  are  about  to  take  a  prom- 
inent part  in  the  coming  conflict.  He  says:  *  The  Circassian  wears  a 
pointed  steel  helmet,  with  a  long  horsetail  pendent  from  it ;  a  net  of 
steel-work  hangs  down  from  the  lower  part  of  the  helmet,  protects  the 
front  and  nape  of  the  neck,  and  is  looped  together  under  the  chin,  un- 
derneath a  short  red  vest,  cut  in  the  Polish  fashion. 


56  LIGHT   AND   HEAVY   CAVALRY. 

"  *  He  is  clad  in  a  species  of  coat-of-mail,  consisting  of  small  bright 
rings  of  steel  intervened;  his  arms,  from  the  wrist  to  the  elbow,  and 
his  legs,  from  the  foot  of  the  shinbone  to  the  knee,  are  guarded  by  thin 
plates  of  steel;  he  also  wears  close  pantaloons  and  laced  boots.  Two 
long  Turkish  pistols,  as  well  as  a  poniard,  are  stuck  into  his  girdle.  He 
has  a  leather  strap  with  a  noose,  like  a  Mexican  lasso,  hanging  at  his 
side,  which  he  throws  with  great  dexterity  over  the  head  of  his  enemy ; 
a  Turkish  sabre  and  a  long  Turkish  musket  are  slung  behind  his  back, 
and  two  cartridge-holders  across  his  breast. 

"  '  The  skill  with  which  the  Circassians  use  their  weapons  is  really 
beyond  belief.  I  have  seen  them  repeatedly  fire  at  a  piece  of  card  lying 
on  the  ground,  at  full  speed,  without  ever  missing. 

"  '  They  will  pick  up  a  piece  of  money  from  the  ground  while  execut- 
ing a  charge,  by  bending  themselves  round  below  the  horse's  belly,  and, 
after  seizing  the  piece,  suddenly  throw  themselves  back  into  the  saddle. 
They  form  the  choicest  body  of  cavalry  in  the  Turkish  service,  and  I 
have  watched  them,  when  charging,  attack  their  opponents  with  a  sabre 
in  each  hand,  managing  their  reins  with  their  mouths ;  they  will  spring 
out  of  their  saddles,  take  aim  and  fire  from  behind  their  horses,  then 
jump  into  their  saddles  again,  wheel  round,  and  reload  their  guns  as 
they  retreat  in  full  career.  They  are  perfect  madmen  in  the  attack, 
and  few  troops  would  withstand  the  utter  recklessness  of  danger  they 
evince.' 

"This  account  of  the  Circassian  cavalry  by  the  Prussian  ofl&eer  may 
appear  incredible  to  our  Life  Guards,  Blues,  and  Heavies ;  but  I  do  not 
forget  that,  while  in  1851  and  1852  I  first  brought  before  the  public  the 
power  of  what  is  now  called  'the  Minie  rifle,'  the  admirers  of  old  Brown 
Boss  attacked  it  right  and  left,  and  now  there  are,  in  1853,  upwards  of 
40,000  of  this  improved  musket  in  the  British  army," 


ORGANIZATION.  57 

Chapter  V. 

THE  organization  OF  CAVALRY. 

Without  further  preamble  I  now  proceed  to  ofifer,  in  as  short  a  space 
as  may  be,  all  that  I  have  to  propose  as  a  New  System,  or  as  a  partial 
improvement  upon  the  old  one,  whose  soundness  and  efficiency  some  of 
our  Continental  neighbors  have  begun  to  doubt.  I  shall  express  my 
convictions  with  the  same  frankness  that  I  have  hitherto  used,  without 
implying  any  disrespect  to  those  who  may  entertain  different  opinions. 
After  long  consideration  of  the  whole  subject,  I  honestly  believe  that 
the  main  principles  I  propose  are  right.  Without  this  conviction  I 
would  not  publish  at  all,  but  with  it  I  should  feel  it  to  be  a  dereliction 
not  to  offer  to  my  brother-officers,  and  the  service  in  general,  the  results 
of  my  practice  and  meditation.  In  spite,  however,  of  my  inward  con- 
viction. I  may  be  wrong.  Therefore,  though  speaking  out  freely,  I 
would  lay  down  nothing  dogmatically.  I  hope  to  remain  open  to  con- 
viction, and  shall  certainly  entertain  no  ill-feeling  against  such  as  may 
differ  from  me  in  opinion.  From  a  comparison,  and  even  conflict  of 
opposite  opinions,  the  service  will  be  sure  to  gain  something.  The  most 
hopeless  condition  to  which  an  arm,  or  a  science,  or  an  art  can  attain  is 
that  where  its  professors  sit  down  with  perfect  self-satisfaction,  under 
the  conviction  that  it  has  reached  perfection,  and  is  susceptible  of  no 
further  improvement.  True  also  is  it,  that  nothing  in  this  world  can 
remain  in  statu  quo,  and  that  whatever  does  not  advance  must  retrocede. 
It  is  a  law  of  nature. 

To  possess  a  fine  cavalry  the  men  must  be  good  as  well  as  the  horso.s, 
and  the  most  delicate  attention  must  be  paid  to  both.  Every  man  may 
be  taught  to  ride,  but  it  is  not  every  man  that  will  make  a  good  rider. 
Many  who  might  be  turned  into  good  foot-soldiers  are  far  from  being 
proper  materials  for  cavalry.  It  may,  however,  be  said  that,  generally, 
Englishmen  have  a  fondness  for  the  horse,  and  a  natural  aptitude  for 
the  saddle.  Though  not  "  Abipones,"  we  are  certainly  an  equestrian 
nation.  Left  to  his  own  free  natural  seat,  and  the  Englishman  beats 
the  world  in  a  ride  after  the  hounds  and  a  run  across  country.  Since 
the  peace  of  1815  this  manly  sport — the  best  of  all  to  form  bold  riders — 


58  ORGANIZATION. 

has  been  taken  up  in  some  of  the  continental  nations;  but  it  is  indige- 
nous— national  and  natural — to  none  of  them;  and,  in  spite  of  the 
interruption  of  railroads,  we  may  still  find  at  some  single  "  meet"  (with- 
out even  going  into  Leicestershire)  more  riders  of  the  right  sort  than 
are  to  be  found  on  the  whole  continent  of  Europe,  if  you  deduct  the 
Englishmen  who  are  there  resident,  and  who  get  up  the  continental 
hunts,  steeple-chases,  etc.  Our  very  ladies  would  beat,  on  the  field,  all 
their  mathematical  riding-masters,  and  take  gates,  fences,  and  ditches, 
from  which  foreign  ofiicers  of  hussars  or  their  dragoon  rough-riders 
would  turn  aside  in  dismay  to  look  out  for  a  break  or  gap. 

In  our  selection  of  men  for  cavalry  regiments  we  ought  to  have  more 
regard  to  agility,  alertness,  and  quickness  of  sight,  than  to  mere  size. 
In  fact,  even  with  our  good  breeds,  nearly  all  our  horses  are  over- 
weighted. More  than  half  of  our  lights  are  really  heavies,  and  would 
be  so  considered  in  every  other  European  army. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  our  hussars  and  dragoons  should  be  men  of 
five  feet  nine  inches,  or  even  five  feet  seven  inches  ;  but  it  is  quite  essen- 
tial that  they  should  be  active,  intelligent,  and  quick-sighted.  N6w, 
these  qualities,  and  in  combination  with  great  physical  strength,  you 
may  find  in  men  not  exceeding  five  feet  four  inches ;  and  here,  while 
your  men  are  equal  in  value,  you  improve  the  value  and  efiiciency  of 
your  horse,  by  lightening  the  burden  on  his  back.  The  Hungarian 
hussars,  who  continue  to  be  esteemed  as  about  the  best  light  troops  in 
Europe,  are  composed  of  compact,  well-set,  little  men.  In  one  of  their 
finest  regiments  the  average  height  did  not  exceed  five  feet  four  inches 
of  our  measurement. 

Our  light  cavalry,  made  up  of  big  men  and  heavily  accoutred,  is  an 
inconsistency  and  a  contradiction.  When  a  man,  with  his  arms  and 
horse-furniture,  rides  twenty  stone  (and  we  have  seen  them  of  that 
weight),  is  he  not  out  of  his  element  in  any  cavalry,  more  particularly 
30  in  a  light  regiment  ?  A  fine  young  recruit,  measuring  five  feet  eight 
inches  or  even  five  feet  ten  inches,  and  being  aged  between  eighteen 
and  twenty-one,  may  not  weigh  much  more  than  ten  stone ;  but  take 
the  same  individual,  and  weigh  him  after  seven  or  eight  years  of  ser- 
vice and  regular  living — or  take  and  weigh  him  again  when  he  is  ap- 
proaching the  age  of  thirty-five  :  at  either  period  you  will  almost 
invariably  find  him  too  heavy  for  a  cavalry  soldier.     What  is  to  bfr 


EASTERN    HORSEMEN.  59 

done  with  him  ?  His  term  of  service  may  be  incomplete,  or  he  may 
wish  to  remain  in  the  service,  although  conscious  that  ho  is  no  longer 
fit  to  be  a  horseman.  Could  not  he,  and  such  as  he,  be  drafted  into 
the  infantry  or  foot-guards,  and  room  be  thus  made  for  a  light  recruit? 
One  regiment  would  gain  a  disciplined  soldier,  requiring  little  to  be 
taught  him,  and  the  other  would  gain  what  it  wants,  light  weight. 


Defects,  Civil  and   Military,  op  the  Indian   Government:  by 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Charles  James  Napier,  G.C.B. 

Sir  Charles  Napier  says :  "  We  assume,  as  the  type  of  the  cavalry 
horse,  the  charger  on  a  Hounslow  Heath  parade.  "Well-fed,  well- 
groomed,  well-trained,  he  goes  through  a  field-day  without  injury, 
although  carrying  more  than  twenty  stone  weight;  he  and  his  rider 
presenting  together  a  kind  of  alderman-centaur.  But  if  in  the  field, 
half-starved,  they  have,  at  the  end  of  a  forced  march,  to  charge  an 
enemy,  the  biped,  full  of  fire  and  courage,  transformed  by  war-work  to 
a  wiry,  muscular  dragoon,  is  able  and  willing;  but  the  overloaded 
quadruped  can  not  gallop — he  staggers  ! 

"  This  is  the  picture  which  should  regulate  the  dross  of  horsemen ; 
bearing  also  in  mind  the  wasting  sun  which  in  India  enervates  man 
and  beast. 

"  Our  poor  horses,  thus  loaded,  are  expected  to  bound  to  hand  and 
spur,  while  the  riders  wield  their  swords  worthily.  They  can  not; 
and  both  man  and  animal  appear  inferior  to  their  Indian  opponents. 

"The  active  vigor  of  the  dark  Eastern  horseman  is  known  to  me; 
his  impetuous  speed,  the  sudden  volts  of  his  animal,  seconding  the 
cunning  of  the  swordsman,  as  if  the  steed  watched  the  edge  of  the 
weapon,  is  a  sight  to  admire ;  but  it  is  too  much  admired  by  men  who 
look  not  to  causes.  The  Eastern  warrior's  eye  is  quick,  but  not  quicker 
than  the  European's ;  his  heart  is  big,  yet  not  bigger  than  the  Euro- 
pean's; his  arm  is  strong,  but  not  so  strong  as  the  European's;  the 
slicing  of  his  razor-like  scimitar  is  terrible,  but  an  English  trooper's 
downright  blow  splits  the  skull.  Why,  then,  does  the  latter  fail?  The 
light- weighted  horse  of  the  dark  swordsman  carries  him  round  his  foe 
with  elastic  bounds,  and  the  strong  European,  unable  to  deal  the  cleav- 
ing blow,  falls  under  the  activity  of  an  inferior  adversary ! 


60  OVERWEIGHTED    HORSEMEN. 

"Look  at  our  officers,  mounted  or  on  foot!  Look  at  the  infantry 
British  soldier  with  his  bayonet!  What  chance  has  an  Eastern  against 
them  in  single  combat  ?  Neville  Chamberlaine,  Robert  Fitzgerald. 
Montague  McMurdo,  Charles  Marston,  John  Nixon,  Francis  McFar- 
lane,  and  many  more,  have,  hand  to  hand,  slain  the  first-rate  swords- 
men of  the  East.  Oh  no  !  there  is  no  falling  off  in  British  swordsmen 
since  Richard  Coeur  de  Lion,  with  seventeen  knights  and  three  hundred 
archers,  at  Jaffa,  defied  the  whole  Saracen  army,  and  maintained  his 
ground.  Why,  then,  is  the  Englishman  inferior  to  the  Eastern  horse- 
man in  India  ? 

"  1st.  The  black  man's  horse  is  his  own  property,  and  private  inter- 
est beats  the  commissary  in  feeding ;  the  Eastern's  animal  feeds  better 
than  the  Englishman's. 

"2d.  The  hardships  of  war  are  by  our  dressers  of  cavalry  thought 
too  little  for  the  animal's  strength;  they  add  a  bag  with  the  French- 
ified name  of  *  valise,'  containing  an  epitome  of  a  Jew's  old-clothes 
shop.  Notably  so  if  the  regiment  be  hussars,  a  name  given  to  Hunga- 
rian light  horsemen,  remarkable  for  activity,  and  carrying  no  other 
baggage  than  a  small  axe  and  a  tea-kettle  to  every  dozen  men.  Our 
hussar's  old-clothes  bag  contains  jackets,  breeches  of  all  dimensions, 
drawers,  snuff-boxes,  stockings,  pink  boots,  yellow  boots,  eau-de- 
Cologne,  Windsor  soap,  brandy,  satin  waistcoats,  segars,  kid  gloves, 
tooth-brushes,  hair-brushes,  dancing  spurs;  and  thus,  a  light  cavalry 
horse  carries  twenty-one  stone. 

"  Hussars  our  men  are  not ;  a  real  hussar,  including  his  twelfth  part 
of  a  kettle,  does  not  weigh  twelve  stone — before  he  begins  plundering. 

"  The  heavy  cavalry  horse,  strange  to  say,  carries  less  than  the  light 
cavalry — only  twenty  stone !  A  British  regiment  of  cavalry  on  parade 
is  a  beautiful  sight;  give  it  six  month's  hard  work  in  the  field,  and 
while  the  horses  fail  the  men  lose  confidence;  the  vanity  of  dress 
supersedes  efficiency.  Take  eight  or  ten  stone  off  the  weight  carried, 
and  our  cavalry  will  be  the  most  eflloient  in  the  world." 


Having  selected  the  proper  man  for  the  cavalry,  one  of  the  first  con- 
siderations is  to  furnish  him  with  proper  weapons.  The  good  workman 
must  have  good  tools :  the  tools  of  the  horse-soldier  are  his  arms. 
These  ought  to  be  of  the  very  best  quality,  and  of  the  kind  best  suited 


THE    ARMING.  61 

to  his  branch  of  service.  Like  the  most  perfect  artisan,  the  best 
trooper  will  lose  confidence  in  his  craft  if  you  put  the  wrong  imple- 
ments into  his  hands. 

The  Arming  op  Cavalry. 

The  devices  of  armament  have  made  progress  in  the  infantry,  and 
enormous  strides  in  the  artillery  ;  but  in  the  cavalry,  where  the  subject 
is  of  vital  importance,  nothing  has  as  yet  been  suggested  likely  to 
make  it  more  formidable  in  action. 

The  frequent  misbehavior  of  the  Indian  regular  cavalry,  which  is 
armed  and  equipped  after  our  fashion,  ought  to  have  drawn  attention 
to  this  matter 

Captain  Thackwell,  in  his  "  History  of  the  Second  Sikh  War,"  says  : 

•*It  was  incontrovertibly  proved  at  this  (Rumnugger)  and  other 
subsequent  actions  that  the  troopers  of  the  light  cavalry  have  no  con- 
fidence in  their  swords  as  effective  weapons  of  defence.  It  would  have 
been  difficult  to  point  out  half  a  dozen  men  who  had  made  use  of  their 
swords.  On  approaching  the  enemy  they  have  immediate  recourse  to 
their  pistols,  the  loading  and  firing  of  which  form  their  sole  occupation. 

"That  such  want  of  confidence  must  very  seriously  impair  the  effi- 
ciency of  regular  cavalry  may  be  easily  imagined.  Very  few  natives 
ever  become  really  reconciled  to  the  long  seat  and  powerless  bit  of  the 
European  dragoons. 

[The  native  regular  cavalry  are  made  to  use  English  saddles,  and 
ride  with  long  stirrups.  To  change  these  saddles  was  beyond  my 
power;  but  my  intent  was  to  abolish  the  egregious  folly  of  long  stirrups. 
Charles  NapierJ] 

"  The  usual  seat  of  the  native  is  short. 

"  It  frequently  happened  during  the  campaign  that  some  dragoons  in 
a  charge  lost  all  control  over  their  horses.  Picture  to  yourself  a  Brit- 
ish or  Anglo-Indian  trooper  dashing  onward  with  a  most  uncontrol- 
lable horse,  and  a  Goorchurra,  or  Sikh  horseman,  after  allowing  his 
enemy  to  pass,  turning  quickly  round  to  deal  him  an  ugly  wound  on 
the  back  of  the  head." 

Again,  in  speaking  of  the  Indian  irregulars — men  of  the  same 
country,  but  diflFerently  armed,  and  riding  in  a  short  good  seat ; 

"  Captain  Holmes,  of  the  twelfth  Irregulars,  was  the  admiration  of 


62  THE   ARMING. 

the  whole  army  on  several  occasions.  In  his  skirmishes  with  the 
enemy  the  mettle  of  his  men  was  strikingly  displayed.  The  irregular 
cavalry  were  conspicuous  in  the  pursuit  at  Goojerat,  always  seeking 
opportunities  of  conflict. 

''Having  witnessed  the  charge  of  the  Scinde  horse  at  the  Battle  of 
Goojerat,  against  the  Aflfghan  force  of  Akram,  I  am  convinced  that  no 
cavalry  could  have  achieved  the  overthrow  of  an  enemy  in  a  more 
spirited  or  effectual  manner.  They  had  confidence  in  their  weapons 
and  accoutrements 

"  The  ninth  Irregulars,  under  Crawford  and  Chamberlaine,  earned 
the  thanks  of  the  commander-in-chief  by  some  gallant  skirmishes  with 
the  Sikh  Goorchurras,  who  were  constantly  prowling  about  in  quest  of 
unprotected  camels. 

"  Supported  by  brave  and  skilful  men,  the  officers  of  irregulars  are 

encouraged  to  gratify  their  noble  thirst  for  distinction The 

young  heroes  of  the  irregulars,  Holmes  Crawford  and  Neville  Chamber- 
laine, Malcolm  Tait,  and  Christie,  would  rather  take  into  action  one 
hundred  and  fifty  of  their  own  men  than  three  hundred  troopers  of  any 
Indian  light  cavalry  regiment." 

The  Sikh  war  showed  clearly — had  any  proof  been  wanting — how 
useless  the  Indian  cavalry  was  when  organized  on  the  English  model ; 
whilst,  at  the  same  time,  brilliant  proofs  were  given  of  the  superiority 
of  the  irregulars,  armed  with  sharp  swords,  and  having  a  proper  com- 
mand over  their  horses. 

Nothing  during  that  campaign  was  more  gallant  and  determined 
than  the  behavior  of  the  Scinde  horse,  whereas  the  distinction  the 
regulars  attained  was  such  that  it  is  best  passed  over  in  silence.  Yet 
the  only  difierence  between  the  men  composing  the  two  arms  lay  in 
their  organization. 

The  regular  Indian  cavalry  are  useless  to  the  public  service ;  but  the 
men  composing  it  behave  well  when  they  are  mounted,  dressed,  and 
armed  after  their  own  fashion. 

"  If  a  soldier  of  undoubted  courage  finds  himself  seated  in  a  slippery 
saddle,  with  long  stirrups,  cramped  by  tight  clothes,  and  a  sword  in  his 
hand  that  is  good  for  nothing,  he  will  hesitate,  nay,  more,  he  will 
refuse  to  charge  an  enemy,  for  if  he  does  he  goes  to  almost  certain  de- 
struction. 


THE   SCINDE   HORSE.  63 

"  A  cavalry  soldier  should  find  himself  strong  and  firm  in  his  seat, 
easy  in  his  dress,  so  as  to  have  perfect  freedom  of  action,  and  with  a 
weapon  in  his  hand  capable  of  cutting  doicn  an  adversary  at  a  blow. 

"  There  is  scarcely  a  more  pitiable  spectacle  in  the  world  than  a 
native  trooper  mounted  on  an  English  saddle,  tightened  by  his  dress  to 
the  stiflfness  of  a  mummy,  half  suffocated  with  a  leather  collar,  and  a 
regulation  sword  in  his  hand,  which  7nust  always  be  blunted  by  the  steel 
scabbard  in  which  it  is  encased. 

"This  poor  fellow,  who  has  the  utmost  difficulty  in  sticking  to  his 
saddle  and  preserving  his  stirrups,  whose  body  and  arms  are  rendered 
useless  by  a  tight  dragoon  dress,  and  whose  sword  would  scarcely  cut 
a  turnip  in  two,  is  ordered  to  charge  the  enemy  :  and  if  he  fails  to  do 
what  few  men  in  the  world  would  do  in  his  place,  courts  of  inquiry  are 
held,  regiments  disbanded,  and  their  cowardice  is  commented  upon  in 
terms  of  astonishment  and  bitterest  reproach.  This  is  truly  ridiculous: 
the  system  and  not  the  vien  is  to  be  blamed."* 

Now  if  this  system,  which  has  had  a  fair  trial,  has  been  found  so 
bad  in  the  East,  why  should  it  be  supposed  to  be  excellent  when  ap- 
plied to  our  own  dragoons  ?  The  color  of  the  men  can  not  make  the 
system  :  the  innate  courage  of  the  British  soldier  carries  him  into  the 
midst  of  the  enemy,  not  confidence  in  the  power  of  the  weapon  he 
wields;  for,  when  he  has  got  amongst  the  enemy  he  can  do  no  execu- 
tion— partly  because  he  has  no  command  over  his  horse,  and  partly 
because  his  sword  is  not  sharp  enough  to  penetrate. 

If  a  native  horseman  should  not  be  put  in  a  helpless  seat  with  long 
stirrups,  and  should  not  be  tightened  by  his  dress,  or  suffocated  by  a 
leather  stock;  if  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  have  a  sword  that  will  cut 
down  an  enemy  at  a  blow — are  these  things  less  necessary  to  the  Eng- 
lish dragoon  ?  or,  if  not  quite  so  necessary,  would  they  not  add  greatly 
to  his  efficiency  in  the  field  ? 

It  doubtless  requires  great  liberality  and  freedom  from  prejudice  or 
preconceived  opinion  to  admit  that  a  system,  on  which  the  talent  and 
experience  of  practical  men  has  been  exhausted  for  ages,  can  be  a  bad 
one. 

Yet  experience  for  many  years  has  shown  how  deficient  cavalry  is, 

*  From  a  letter  published  in  the  Delhi  Gazette. 


64  THE   ARMING. 

how  it  has  fallen  oflf  instead  of  improving,  and  how  much  is  required 
to  be  done  to  render  it  as  useful  to  the  state  and  as  formidable  to  an 
enemy  as  it  should  be. 

When  I  was  in  India  an  engagement  between  a  party  of  the  Nizam's 
irregular  horse  and  a  numerous  body  of  insurgents  took  place,  in  which 
the  horsemen,  though  far  inferior  in  numbers,  defeated  the  Rohillos 
with  great  slaughter. 

My  attention  was  drawn  particularly  to  the  fight  by  the  doctor's  re- 
port of  the  killed  and  wounded,  most  of  whom  had  suffered  by  the 
6word,  and  in  the  column  of  remarks  such  entries  as  the  following 
were  numerous : 

"  Arm  cut  off  from  the  shoulder. 

"Head  severed. 

"  Both  hands  cut  off  (apparently  at  one  blow)  above  the  wrists,  in 
holding  up  the  arms  to  protect  the  head. 

"  Leg  cut  off  above  the  knee,"  etc. 

I  was  astounded.  Were  these  men  giants,  to  lop  off  limbs  thus 
wholesale  ?  or  was  this  result  to  be  attributed  (as  I  was  told)  to  the 
sharp  edge  of  the  native  blade,  and  the  peculiar  way  of  drawing  it? 

I  became  anxious  to  see  these  horsemen  of  the  Nizam,  to  examine 
their  wonderful  blades,  and  learn  the  knack  of  lopping  off  men's 
limbs. 

Opportunity  soon  offered,  for  the  commander-in-chief  went  to  Hyder- 
abad on  a  tour  of  inspection,  on  which  I  accompanied  him.  After 
passing  the  Kistna  river,  a  squadron  of  these  very  horsemen  joined 
the  camp  as  part  of  the  escort. 

And  now  fancy  my  astonishment ! 

The  sword-blades  they  had  were  chiefly  old  dragoon  blades  cast  from 
our  service.  The  men  had  mounted  them  after  their  own  fashion.  The 
hilt  and  handle,  both  of  metal,  small  in  the  grip,  rather  flat,  not  round 
like  ours,  where  the  edge  seldom  falls  true ;  they  all  had  an  edge  like  a 
razor  from  heel  to  point,  were  worn  in  wooden  scabbards,  a  short  single 
gling  held  them  to  the  waist-belt,  from  which  a  strap  passed  through 
the  hilt  to  a  button  in  front,  to  keep  the  sword  steady,  and  prevent  it 
flying  out  of  the  scabbard. 

The  swords  are  never  drawn  except  in  action. 

Thinking  the  wooden  scabbards  might  be  objected  to  as  not  suitable 


THE   SWORD.  65 

for  campaigning,  I  got  a  return  from  one  of  these  regiments,  and  found 
the  average  of  broken  scabbards  below  that  of  the  regulars,  who  have 
steel  ones.  The  steel  is  snapped  by  a  kick  or  a  fall ;  the  wood,  being 
elastic,  bends.  They  are  not  in  the  man's  way ;  when  dismounted  they 
do  not  get  between  his  legs  and  trip  him  up ;  they  make  no  noise — a 
soldier  on  sentry  of  a  dark  night  might  move  about  without  betraying 
his  position  to  an  enemy  by  the  clanking  of  the  rings  against  the  scab- 
bard. All  that  rattling  noise  in  column  which  announces  its  approach 
when  miles  off,  and  makes  it  so  difficult  to  hear  a  word  of  command  in 
the  ranks,  is  thus  got  rid  of;  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  wrapping  straw 
or  hay  round  the  scabbards,  as  now  customary  when  engaged  in  any 
service  in  which  an  attempt  is  to  be  made  to  surprise  an  enemy. 

"  The  cavalry  steel  scabbard  is  noisy,  which  is  bad  ;  heavy,  which  is 
worse  ;  and  it  destroys  the  weapon's  sharp  edge,  which  is  worst.  The 
native  wooden  scabbard  is  best." — General  Sir  C.  Napier. 

An  old  trooper  of  the  Nizam's  told  me  the  old  broad  English  blades 
were  in  great  favor  with  them  when  mounted  and  kept  as  above  de- 
scribed ;  but  as  we  wore  them,  they  were  good  for  nothing  in  their 
hands. 

I  said,  "How  do  you  strike  with  your  swords  to  cut  off  men's 
limbs  ?" 

*''  Strike  hard,  sir !"  said  the  old  trooper. 

"  Yes,  of  course ;  but  how  do  you  teach  the  men  to  use  their  swords 
in  that  particular  way?"  {drawing  it.) 

"We  never  teach  them  any  way,  sir,-  a  sharp  sword  will  cut  in  any 
one's  hand." 

Had  our  men  worn  arms  like  these  in  the  last  Sikh  war,  the  enemy's 
horsemen  would  not  have  met  them  with  such  confidence  in  single  com- 
bat; their  trenchant  blades  would  have  inspired  respect — the  use  of 
them  would  have  carried  terror  into  the  ranks  of  the  foe. 

It  is  well  known  that,  beyond  the  effect  of  the  moment,  severe  wounds 
inflicted  in  action  have  a  depressing  moral  effect  on  the  enemy. 

In  a  pamphlet  published  in  Berlin,  on  cavalry  matters,  it  is  stated 
that,  in  1812,  the  wounds  inflicted  by  the  Russian  horsemen  inspired 
such  awe  that  nothing  but  the  point  of  honor  and  esprit-de-corps  could 
bring  the  Prussian  horse  to  close  with  them. 

Captain  Fitzgerald,  of  the  14th  Dragoons,  received  a  sword-wound  at 
6* 


66  THE   ARMING. 

Rumnugger,  from  the  eflfects  of  which  he  died.  A  Sikh,  on  foot,  crouch- 
ed under  a  shield,  cut  at  him  from  behind.  The  sword  exposed  the 
spinal  marrow,  entering  the  skull  at  the  same  time. 

A  huge  dragoon,  of  the  regiment,  was  found  quite  dead  :  his  head 
had  dropped  forward  from  a  cut  on  the  back  of  the  neck,  which  had 
severed  the  spine  j  and  at  this  very  action,  "it  is  aaid,"  that,  whilst 
our  poor  fellows  labored  in  vain  to  draw  blood,  a  touch  from  the  Sikh's 
sword  across  the  arm  or  leg  left  the  bold  Englishmen  at  their  mercy, 
and  they  soon  hacked  them  to  pieces. 

One  officer,  who  was  in  the  campaign,  said  he  saw  an  English  dragoon 
putting  his  hands  to  the  reins  to  try  and  turn  his  horse,  when  a  native 
horseman,  dropping  his  sword  across  them,  took  off  both  hands  above 
the  wrist. 

A  Sikh,  after  the  retreat  of  our  cavalry  at  Chillianwalla,  galloped  up 
to  the  horse-artillery,  cut  down  and  killed  the  two  men  on  the  leading 
horses  of  the  gun,  one  after  the  other,  and  approached  the  third,  a  cool 
fellow,  who,  seeing  how  badly  his  comrades  had  come  off  with  their 
swords,  instead  of  drawing  his,  stuck  to  his  whip,  with  which  he  flogged 
off  his  assailant's  horse,  and  thus  saved  himself! 

A  squadron  of  the  3d  Dragoons,  under  Major  Unett,  charged  a  goel 
of  Sikh  horsemen,  and  the  major  himself  told  me  that  they  opened  out, 
giving  just  sufficient  room  for  our  squadron  to  enter.  The  dragoon  on 
the  left  of  the  front  rank,  going  in  at  the  charge,  gave  point  at  the 
Sikh  next  him;  the  sword  stuck  in  the  lower  part  of  his  body,  but  did 
not  penetrate  sufficiently  to  disable  him ;  so  the  Sikh  cut  back,  hit  the 
dragoon  across  the  mouth,  and  took  his  head  clean  oflf. 

Colonel  Steinbach,  in  his  History  of  the  Punjaub,  tells  us  that  the 
cavalry  of  the  Sikh  army  is  very  inferior  in  every  respect  to  the  in- 
fantry ;  that,  while  the  latter  are  carefully  picked  from  large  bodies  of 
candidates  for  the  service,  the  former  are  composed  of  men  of  all  sorts, 
sizes,  and  ages,  who  get  appointed  solely  through  the  interests  of  the 
different  sirdars. 

They  are  mean-looking,  ill-dressed,  and,  as  already  stated,  wretched- 
ly mounted.  The  horses  are  small,  meagre,  and  ill-shaped,  with  the 
aquiline  nose  which  so  peculiarly  proclaims  inferiority  of  breed. 

How  comes  it,  if  our  system  is  good,  that  such  men,  of  less  physical 
and  moral  courage,  mounted  on  such  inferior  animals,  should  havo  been 


SIKH    HORSEMEN.  67 

able  to  cope  with  our  English  dragoons  ?  and  not  seldom  successfully, 
for  at  the  Battle  of  Chill ianwalla  they  tell  of  a  Sikh  horseman  chal- 
lenging the  English  to  single  combat  and  unhorsing  three  dragoons 
(the  first,  a  lancei*,  had  the  lance-pole  severed  and  his  fore-finger  taken 
oflf  at  one  blow)  before  he  was  shot  down  !  And  what  does  a  charge  re- 
solve itself  into,  when  the  enemy  are  bold,  but  a  melee  or  a  series  of 
single  combats  ? 

Let  us  contrast  the  two  following  gallant  actions,  both  fought  by 
English  light  dragoons ;  the  first  by  three  troops  of  the  15th  Hussars 
against  five  hundred  French  horsemen,  organized  and  armed  on  the 
model  system ;  the  second  by  two  troops  of  the  3d  Light  Dragoons, 
against  five  hundred  of  these  badly-mounted  rabble  of  the  Sikhs. 

In  the  first  action  the  15th  charged  twice. 

In  the  second  the  3d  Dragoons  charged  through,  but  the  Sikhs  open- 
ed out  to  let  them  back  again. 

Thus  the  15th  Hussars  were  twice  in  a  melee  with  the  French  horse- 
men. 

The  3d  Dragoons  only  once  with  the  Bikhg. 

The  First.— ^'  In  the  general  attack  made  on  the  2d  of  October  (1799) 
on  the  positions  occupied  by  the  enemy  at  Bergen  and  Egmont-op-Zee, 
the  15th  Dragoons  formed  part  of  the  cavalry  under  Colonel  Lord  Paget 
(now  Marquis  of  Anglesey),  attached  to  the  force  commanded  by  Sir 
Ealph  Abercrombj. 

"  Moving  along  the  sea-shore  towards  Egmont-op-Zee,  this  column 
encountered  a  etrong  force  of  infantry  among  the  sand-hills,  with  a 
numerous  body  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  to  their  left  on  the  beach ; 
when  a  severe  contest  ensued,  in  which  the  steady  bravery  of  the 
British  infantry  triumphed. 

"  After  forcing  the  enemy  to  fall  back  for  several  miles,  the  cavalry 
advancing  along  the  beach,  as  the  infantry  gained  ground  among  the 
sand-hills,  the  column  halted  in  front  of  Egmont  The  British  artillery 
moved  forward  to  check  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  two  troops  of 
the  15th  Light  Dragoons  advanced  to  support  the  artillery.  Lord  Paget 
posted  the  two  troops  in  ambush  behind  the  sand-hills;  and  the  French 
general,  thinking  the  British  guns  were  unprotected,  ordered  five  hun- 
dred horsemen  forward  to  capture  them.  The  guns  sent  a  storm  of  balls 
against  the  advancing  cavalry ;  a  few  men  and  horses  fell,  but  the  re- 


68  THE   ARMING. 

mainder  pressed  forward  and  surrounded  the  artillery.  At  this  moment 
the  two  troops  of  the  15th  sallied  from  their  concealment,  and,  dashing 
among  the  assailants,  drove  them  hack  upon  thoir  reserves,  and  then 
returned  to  the  liberated  guns. 

"■  The  opposing  squadrons  having  rallied,  and  ashamed  of  a  flight 
before  so  small  a  force,  returned  to  the  attack.  They  had  arrived  with- 
in forty  yards  of  the  15th,  when  a  third  troop  of  the  regiment  came  up, 
and  a  determined  charge  of  the  three  troops  drove  the  enemy  back 
again  with  loss,  the  15th  pursuing  above  half  a  mile. 

"  The  loss  of  the  15th  was  three  men  and  four  horses  hilled  /  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel James  Erskine,  nine  men,  and  three  horses  wounded.* 

The  Second. — The  cannonade  had  not  been  of  long  duration,  when  a 
body  of  Sikh  horsemen  moved  to  Sir  Joseph  ThackwolFs  left  flank,  as 
if  to  get  into  his  rear.  He  now  ordered  the  5th  Native  Light  Cavalry 
(three  squadrons),  and  the  Gray  squadron  of  the  od  Dragoons  (Unett's), 
to  charge  and  disperse  them. 

The  gallant  general  had  a  lively  recollection  of  what  a  few  squadrons 
of  British  dragoons  effected  in  the  Peninsula  against  the  French,  and 
reasonably  entertained  the  expectation  that  the  force  would  prove  suf- 
ficient to  drive  back  the  Sikh  irregulars.  It  was  his  intention  to  hare 
advanced  the  few  men  left  at  his  disposal,  namely,  the  remaining  squad- 
ron of  the  .3d  Dragoons  and  8th  Light  Cavalry  (native),  on  Outar's  force 
as  soon  as  the  success  of  the  other  charge  became  manifest.  The  charge 
was  sounded,  and  tfnett's  squadron,  in  line  with  the  5th  Native  Light 
Cavalry,  approached  the  enemy.  The  Sikhs  commenced  a  desultory 
matchlock  fire. 

Unett  steadily  advanced,  but  the  5th,  put  into  confusion  by  this  re- 
ception, went  about  and  fled  in  the  greatest  precipitation,  in  spite  of 
the  most  earnest  entreaties  of  their  officers,  of  whom  several  received 
wounds. 

The  3d,  forcing  their  way  through  the  hostile  ranks,  never  pulled  rein 
till  they  had  got  some  distance  beyond  the  enemy.  Unett,  who  was 
severely  wounded,  found  his  men  sadly  dispersed. 

The  few  men  around  him,  with  clenched  teeth,  essayed  to  cut  their 
way  back.  The  Sikhs  opened  out,  and,  giving  the  dragoons  a  passage 
through  them,  abused,  spat,  and  cut  at  them. 

*  Historical  Record  of  the  15th  Hussars. 


FRENCH   CUIRASSIERS.  69 

The  other  parties,  under  their  officers,  the  gallant  Stisted  and  Mae- 
queen,  repassed  the  enemy  as  they  could. 

The  casualties  in  this  squadron  were  not  less  thabU  forty-six. 
The  suspense  of  every  one  was  great;  Sir  Joseph  himself  became  ap- 
prehensive that  the  squadron  was  annihilated.* 

Here  we  see  two  troops  of  English  dragoons  dashing  into  the  middle 
of  500  victorious  French  horsemen,  and,  after  a  melee,  driving  them  ofi'. 
We  then  see  these  same  live  hundred  French  horsemen  returning 
boldly  and  meeting  the  English  (now  reinforced  by  one  troop)  at  the 
charge ;  a  second  melee  ensues,  and  in  both  conflicts  they  only  killed 
three  Englishmen ;  and  these  French  dragoons  are  men  well  mounted, 
of  undoubted  courage,  disciplined  and  trained  according  to  our  own 
system. 

In  the  second  instance,  two  troops  of  the  3d  Dragoons  charge  with 
great  gallantry  and  break  through  the  enemy's  ranks ;  when  charging 
back  the  Sikhs  open  out  and  let  them  through;  in  the  melee  with  these 
men,  so  mean-looking  and  wretchedly  mounted,  they  lose  forty-six  men 
and  horses,  and  nearly'  lost  their  gallant  leader.  Major  Unett,  who  re- 
ceived a  sword-cut  which  divided  his  pouch  and  entered  two  inches 
deep  into  his  back. 

Another  comparison  of  this  kind  may  be  of  use,  if  only  as  an  addi- 
tional impress  to  the  memory. 

At  th€  Battle  of  Ileilsberg,  on  the  18th  of  June,  1807,  a  good  fight 
took  place  between  a  division  of  the  French  Cuirassiers  d'Espagne  and 
two  regiments  of  Prussian  horse ;  one  a  regiment  of  lancers,  the  other 
the  dragoons  of  Ziethen.  The  French  cuirassiers  met  the  Prussians  at 
a  walk  and  at  close  order  :  a  hand-to-hand  fight  ensued,  which  termi- 
nated in  favor  of  the  Prussians,  who  drove  back  their  opponents  into 
the  wood  at  Lavden.  In  that  well-known  French  work,  "  Victoires  et 
Conquetes,"  it  is  mentioned  that  a  French  officer  came  out  of  this  fight 
with  fifty-two  new  wounds  upon  him,  and  that  a  German  officer,  Cap- 
tain Gebhardt,  received  upwards  of  twenty  wounds.  It  appears  that 
Captain  Gebhardt  did  yreat  execution  with  the  shaft  of  a  broken  lance, 
knocking  several  cuirassiers  ofi"  their  horses,  but  that  he  was  himself 
put  hors-de-comhat  by  a  kicking  horse  which  rolled  him  over !     Imag- 

*The  '•  Second  Sikh  War,"  by  E.  J.  Tha«kwell.    Battle  of  Chilliaawalla. 


70  THE   ARMING. 

ine  a  man  receiving  fifty-two  sword  and  lanco  wounds  without  losing 
lifo  or  limb !  No  wonder  the  Prussian  Gebhardt  took  a  big  stick  at 
last  (and  a  broken  lance-sbaft  is  only  a  big  stick)  as  the  most  formida- 
ble weapon  within  reach — and  by  far  a  better  tool  than  such  sabres. 

I  have  little  to  say  about  helmets,  caps,  jackets,  and  dress  in  general, 
except  that  the  most  simple  are  the  best.  This  opinion  is  now  gaining 
ground  universally.  But  by  simplicity  I  do  not  mean  roughness,  shab- 
biness,  or  inelegance.  So  long  as  you  can  keep  a  soldier,  let  him  bo 
well  dressed  and  smart  in  his  appearance.  The  greatest  element  of  true 
elegance  is  the  very  simplicity  which  I  would  recommend.  To  me  it 
appears  that  we  have  too  much  frippery — too  much  toggery — too  much 
toeight  in  things  worse  than  useless.  To  a  cavalry  soldier  every  ounce 
is  of  consequence.  I  can  never  believe  that  our  hussar  uniform  (take 
which  of  them  you  please)  is  the  proper  dress  in  which  to  do  hussar's 
duty  in  war — to  scramble  through  thickets,  to  clear  woods,  to  open  the 
way  through  forests,  to  ford  or  swim  rivers,  to  bivouac,  to  be  nearly 
always  on  outpost  work,  to  "rough  it**  in  every  possible  manner.  Of 
what  use  are  plumes,  bandoliers,  sabretashes,  sheepskins,  shabraques, 
etc.? 

*  "  It  aeems  decreed  that  the  hussar  and  the  lancer  is  ever  to  be  a  popin- 
jay— a  show  of  foreign  fooleries,  so  laced,  and  looped,  and  braided,  that 
the  uninitiated  bystander  wonders  how  he  can  either  get  into  his  uni- 
form or  come  out  of  it.  A  woman's  muff  upon  his  head,  with  some- 
thing like  a  red  jelly-bag  at  the  top,  has  been  substituted  for  the  war- 
rior's helm ;  and  the  plume,  so  unlike  the  waving  horse-hair  of  the 
Roman  casque,  would  seem  better  fitted  for  the  trappings  of  the  under- 
taker than  the  horseman's  brow.  The  first  time  I  over  saw  a  hussar, 
or  hulan,  was  at  Ghent,  in  Flanders,  then  an  Austrian  town  j  and  when 
I  beheld  a  richly  decorated  pelisse,  waving  empty,  sleeves  and  all,  frona 
his  shoulder,  I  never  doubted  that  the  poor  man  must  have  been  re- 
cently shot  through  the  arm ;  a  glance,  however,  upon  a  tightly  braid- 
ed sleeve  underneath  made  it  still  more  unaccountable ;  and  why  he 
should  not  have  had  an  additional  pair  of  richly  ornamented  breeches 
dangling  at  his  waist,  aa  well  as  a  jacket  from  his  shoulder,  has,  I  con- 

— —  ■  -  y 

*  Notes  and  Recollections  of  a  Professional  Life,  by  William  Fergusson,  Eaq. 
M.D. 


HEAD-PIECE.  71 

fees,  puzzled  me  from  that  time  to  the  present,  it  being  the  first  rule  of 
health  to  keep  the  upper  portion  of  the  body  as  cool,  and  the  lower  as 
warm,  as  possible.  Surely  a  horseman's  water-proof  cloak,  made  to 
cover  from  head  to  foot  the  rider  and  his  saddle,  with  his  arms  and  am- 
munition— to  be  his  protection  against  the  pouring  deluge,  his  screen 
and  cover  in  the  night  bivouac — is  the  only  equipment  of  the  kind  the 
country  should  be  called  upon  either  to  furnish  or  suffer. 

"  Man-milinery  in  any  shape,  is  an  abuse  and  prostitution  of  the 
English  character.  Borrow  and  copy  from  foreigners  whatever  may 
be  truly  valuable  in  arms — it  is  right  and  fitting  so  to  do  ;  but  let  us 
dress  ourselves  in  serviceable  garb,  that /ears  no  stain,  nor  needs  a  host 
o/furbUhers  to  keep  it  inorder." 

Of  the  tight  leather  stock  and  head-piece  Dr.  Fergusson  says  : 

"  The  circulation  of  the  ascending  arteries  in  the  neck  is  by  far  the 
closest  of  any  part  of  the  human  body,  and  to  impede  its  relief  by  the 
returning  veins,  which  a  stiff  ligature  of  any  kind  is  sure  to  do,  must 
have  a  stupifying  effect  upon  the  brain. 

*'  It  can  not  fail,  besides,  to  deteriorate  the  sight,  from  the  pressure 
of  congested  blood  upon  the  optic  nerve,  and  the  stock  would  seem  to 
be  preserved  only  for  the  purpose  of  generating  a  tendency  to  all  kinds 
of  apoplectic  and  ophthalmic  diseases. 

"  It  would  be  better,  surely,  to  inflict  an  ulcer  upon  the  soldier's 
neck,  for  the  discharge  might  then  have  the  relieving  effect  of  an  issue : 
but  a  tight  ligature,  not  only  on  the  neck,  but  anywhere  else,  should 
be  rejected  for  ever  from  military  dress  and  equipment  of  whatever  de- 
scription. 

"A  heavy  head-piece  is  everywhere  a  disqualification  and  a  hin- 
drance to  the  wearer;  for,  to  heat  and  cumber  the  brain,  which,  being 
the  source  of  all  our  powers  and  faculties,  ought  ever  to  be  freest,  can 
never  be  justified. 

"  Everywhere  the  direct  rays  of  the  sun  striking  upon  the  eye  must 
be  hurtful ;  but  when  these  are  refracted  from  a  white  rocky  soil,  the 
immediate  effect  becomes  distressing  in  the  greatest  degree.  A  shade 
properly  dropped  from  the  cap  would  effectually  obviate  this,  and  it 
ought  to  be  furnished."* 

*  These  extracts  are  from  a  book  called  "  Notes  and  BecoUections  of  a  Profee- 
aional  Life,"  by  the  late  William  Fergusson,  Esq.,  M.D,,  Imspector-Qeneral  of  Mil- 


72  THE   ARMING. 

Without  defcnsivo  armor  (which  brings  weight  to  the  horse  and 
cramps  the  man),  a  good  uniform  may  afford  valuable  protection,  while 
a  bad  one  may  be  as  inconvenient  as  armor,  and  afford  no  protection 
where  it  is  most  wanted. 

The  most  vulnerable  parts  of  a  cavalry  soldier  are  the  head,  the  back 
of  the  neck,  and  the  arms  and  legs.  The  Asiatics,  well  aware  of  this, 
cover  those  parts  in  their  own  bodies,  and  take  immediate  advantage 
of  those  who  are  not  protected  in  like  manner.  The  Turkish  irregu- 
lars wore  a  turban,  that  was  a  better  defence  to  the  head  than  our  hel- 
mets of  bi-ass  or  of  steel :  with  them  the  leg  was  defended  by  the  deep 
saddle  and  the  broad  shovel-like  stirrup-iron;  the  arms  of  their  jackets 
or  bcneeshes  were  padded,  and  the  blunt  European  sword  seldom  cut 
through  the  dress,  which  was  of  silk,  or  of  silk  interwoven  with  cot- 
ton. The  jacket  of  the  Russian  or  Austrian  trooper  offered  no  such 
impediments  to  their  scimitars,  and  short,  handy,  light  yataghans. 

*"The  propensity  of  the  Sikhs  to  aim  their  cuts  at  the  back  of  the 

itary  Hospitals,  a  work  so  instructive  and  interesting  to  all  military  men  that  I 
recommend  it  strongly  to  their  notice.  It  is  edited  by  his  son,  the  well-known 
Jamee  J<erg\i98on,  a  man  of  distinguished  ability  in  many  ways,  and  one  who,  of 
late,  has  stood  prominently  before  the  public,  and  created  no  small  sensation  by 
hi^  last  work,  "The  Perils  of  Portsmouth,"  and  by  his  new  system  of  Fortification. 
Iq  speaking  of  the  foreign  hussar,  Dr.  Fergusson  was  appai'ently  not  aware  that 
tho  Hungarian  hussar  is  actually  provided  "with  an  additional  pair  of  richly  or- 
namented breeches,"  which  are  worn  under  the  overalls  on  the  line  of  march ;  at 
leaat  they  were  so  provided  when  I  had  the  honor  of  serving  with  them.  Round 
the  neck  they  wore  a  loose  black  handkerchief,  which  I  should  earnestly  recom- 
mend for  imitation :  in  the  copy  wo  have  made  of  their  dross  a  stock  has  been  sub- 
stituted. The  Hungarians  line  their  pelisses  with  fui-,  and  make  them  like  a  pea- 
jacket  to  go  over  the  doUman  (dross-jacket)  in  cold  weather;  our  pelisses  are  not 
large  or  loose  enough  for  this  purpose;  we  therefore  generally  sling  them,  or  wear 
them  instead  of  the  jiickct. 

A  squadron  of  the  loth  Unssars  in  India  marched  into  the  Nizam's  country  in 
1350,  where  the  slung  pelisses  creiited  tho  utmost  curiosity  amongst  the  natives 
at  Hyderabad,  and  gave  rise  to  many  stories  as  to  their  origin.  The  prevailing 
belief,  however,  was,  that  tho  regiment  had  done  such  gallant  deeds  on  one  pur- 
ticular  occasion,  that  the  king  said  "each  individual  fought  as  if  he  had  four 
arms,"  and  gave  them  four  arms  accordingly— a  comfortable  belief,  which  we  took 
c^^e  to  leave  them  in. 

*  TliRckwell,  "  History  of  tho  Second  Sikh  War." 


DRESS.  73 

head  was  so  unequivocally  manifested  on  the  22d  of  November,  that  it 
became  an  object  of  consideration  to  the  officers  of  the  army  to  provide 
some  defence,  however  slight,  for  the  precious  caput. 

"  Some  officers  wrapped  rolls  of  linen  cloth  round  the  back  of  the 
csako,  the  folds  of  which  hung  down  over  their  backs,  affording  some 
protection." 

For  the  arms,  gauntlets  ought  to  be  used,  which  would  leave  the  hand 
free  and  naked  to  grasp  the  sword;  like  those  in  use  with  the  natives 
of  India,  made  of  steel,  to  reach  to  the  point  of  the  elbow.  Arms  thus 
encased  can  be  used  to  parry  blows  aimed  at  the  head  or  body — the 
gauntlets  are  no  weight,  and  the  hands  being  free  and  naked,  gives  a 
great  advantage  in  action. 

Overalls  afford  no  protection  in  the  ranks  or  in  the  melee ;  they  are 
constantly  getting  torn,  the  lower  parts  get  rotten  with  mud  and  wet, 
the  straps  impede  the  bending  of  the  knee  in  mounting,  and  prevent  a 
man  from  exerting  himself  when  on  foot. 

Overalls  without  straps,  and  black  leather  leggings,  made  the  shape 
of  Napoleon's  boots,  with  a  covered  bar  of  steel  running  down  the  side, 
fastened  with  straps  above  and  below,  and  only  worn  when  mounted, 
would  give  the  horseman  the  necessary  protection,  and  enable  him  to 
exert  himself  as  long  as  life  was  in  him ;  for  a  chance  blow  over  arm  or 
leg  would  not  disable  him.* 

Colonel  Ponsonby  was  thus  disabled  at  Waterloo,  and  gives  the  fol- 
lowing account  of  himself: 

"  In  the  melee  I  was  almost  instantly  disabled  in  both  my  arms,  losing 
first  my  sword  and  then  my  rein ;  and,  followed  by  a  few  of  my  men, 
who  were  presently  cut  down,  no  quarter  being  asked  or  given,  I  was 
carried  along  by  my  horse,  till,  receiving  a  blow  from  a  sabre,  I  fell 
senseless  on  my  face  to  the  ground."! 

With  regard  to  fire-arms  for  cavalry,  as  accuracy  of  fire  is  what  ia 
required,  not  rapidity,  I  should  give  them  short  handy  rifles:  these 
should  be  carried  in  a  holster,  about  fourteen  inches  long,  bell-mouthed, 
like  a  tube,  and  open  at  the  bottom.     This  holster  should  be  fastened 

*  When  dismounted  the  dragoon  could  leave  leggings  and  spurs  with  his  horse, 
and  turn  out  in  ankle-boots  and  trousers  without  straps, 
f  Cotton,  "  A  Voice  from  Waterloo." 

7 


74  THE  ARMING. 

below  the  off  wallet,  pointing  to  the  horse's  shoulder.  The  carbine  is 
pushed  through,  and  a  strap  about  one  yard  long  fastens  it  to  the  pom- 
mel of  the  saddle,  and  prevents  the  man  from  losing  the  weapon  if  he 
should  let  go  his  hold  when  firing  or  loading. 

The  cumbrous  bandolier-belt,  with  its  appurtenances,  is  got  rid  of,* 
and  the  man  can  bring  his  carbine  easily  to  his  shoulder;  whereas  it  is 
almost  an  impossibility  to  do  either  whilst  the  carbine  is  attached  to  the 
big  awkward  belt.  No  carbine  stay-strap  is  required  and  no  bucket: 
the  carbine  can  be  drawn  and  returned  with  the  same  ease  as  a  pistol. 
It  rides  in  much  the  same  position  as  at  present,  with  the  bucket  and 
stay-strap,  only  it  rides  steadily  and  does  not  get  into  the  way  of  the 
man's  sword-arm,  which  happens  often  at  present  when  jerked  forward 
by  the  stay -strap.  The  strap  I  propose  unbuckles  from  the  saddle,  and 
serves  as  a  sling  when  the  man  is  dismounted. 

Another  good  way  of  carrying  the  carbine  is  to  sling  it  at  the  back, 
muzzle  over  the  left  shoulder,  the  small  of  the  butt  fastened  to  the  waist- 
belt  on  the  right  side  by  a  small  strap  and  button  to  keep  the  carbine 
steady.  Thus  the  soldier  has  his  weapons  about  his  person,  and  if  un- 
horsed can  effectually  defend  himself;  and  the  carbine  would  often,  in 
action,  save  the  wearer  from  a  sword-cut  across  the  back. 

Many  foreign  regiments  carry  the  carbine  hooked  to  the  bandolier, 
muzale  downwards,  and  let  it  dangle  about  loose.  It  is  terribly  in  the 
-way  of  the  men's  legs  in  the  ranks;  when  galloping,  the  butt  strikes 
against  the  hip-bone,  occasioning  great  sufiering ;  encumbered  with  the 
belt  and  hook,  the  man  can  never  bring  the  weapon  freely  to  his  shoulder 
to  take. aim,  and  it  is  most  inconvenient  in  mounting  and  dismounting. 

It. appears  to  me  that  the  distances  for  which  they  are  now  sighting 
soldiers'  carbines  abroad  are  quite  ridiculous.  Few  have  eyes  good 
enough  to  see  a  man  or  even  a  column  so  far  off.  This  custom,  if  not 
altered,  will  lead  to  the  men  firing  at  everything  they  fancy  they  soe  in 
the  distance,  causing  constant  false  alarms  in  camp.  No  supplies  of 
ammunition  will  suffice  for  troops  firing  in  this  manner.     It  may  be 

*  The  pou<ili-belt,  from  the  manner  in  which  it  is  slung  across  the  man's  back, 
shakes  the  ammunition  to  pieces,  and  eoon  renders  it  totally  unfit  for  use.  The 
ammunition  Bh»uld  be  in  a  water-proof  box,  fHStened  to  the  off-side  of  the  saddle, 
in  lieu  of  the  present  wallet,  the  soldier  carrying  six  rounds  in  his  waiet-belt  for 
immediate  U8€. 


THE  LANCE  AND  THE  SWORD.  75 

very  well  for  some  foreign  troops  to  stand  out  at  such  long  shots,  and 
so  keep  danger  far  off;  but  I  hope  and  trust  that  an  honest  Englishman 
will  always  like  to  look  his  enemy  nearer  in  the  faoe.  I  think  that 
cavalry  carbines  sighted  up  to  300  yards  would  more  than  suffice  for  all 
purposes.  One  of  the  greatest  difiBculties  of  the  officer  is  to  make  his 
men  reserve  their  fire.  Surely  nothing  should  be  done  to  increase  this 
difficulty,  or  to  tempt  the  men  to  such  long  shots. 

The  Lance  and  the  Sword. — Formerly  it  was  a  received  opinion  that 
the  lance  was  particularly  formidable  in  single  encounters,  that  the 
lancer  should  be  a  light,  active  horseman,  and  that  space  was  required 
whereon  he  might  manage  his  horse  and  turn  him  always  towards  the 
object  at  which  he  was  to  thrust.  But  of  late  there  seems  to  be  rather 
a  disposition  to  take  up  Marshal  Marmont's  notion  of  arming  heavy 
cavalry  with  lances,  to  break  infantry  as  well  as  cavalry.  All  seem  to 
forget  that  a  lance  is  useless  in  a  melee — that  the  moment  the  lancer 
pulls  up  and  the  impulsive  power  is  stopped,  that  instant  the  power  of 
the  weapon  is  gone. 

The  16th  Lancers  broke  into  the  Sikh  squares  at  Aliwal,  and  in  the 
melee  that  ensued  these  brave  men  attacked  the  lancers  sword  in  hand 
and  brought  many  of  them  low,  for  they  could  eflFect  nothing  with  the 
lance. 

In  the  second  Sikh  war,  I  have  been  told  that  our  lanoers  often  failed 
in  driving  their  lances  into  a  Sikh,  because  they  had  shawls  wrapped 
round  them.  I  could  tell  them  a  better  reason ;  it  was  because  those 
who  failed  did  not  know  that  it  requires  speed  to  drive  a  lance  home, 
and  that  it  must  be  carried  into  the  object  by  the  horse. 

I  have  often  seen,  when  hog-hunting,  men  with  spears  sharp  as  razors 
unable  to  drive  the  weapon  through  the  boar's  hide,  whereas  others  (old 
hands)  would  send  a  spear  in  at  one  side  and  out  at  the  other,  through 
bone  and  all. 

This  shows  that  the  lanoe  is  not  a  dangerous  weapon  in  all  hands, 
and  therefore  unfit  for  soldiers. 

All  experiments  with  blunt  lances  on  fresh  horses  go  for  nothing,  in 
my  opinion,  for  many  of  the  thrusts  would  not  go  through  a  man's 
jacket;  and  in  a  campaign,  when  horses  are  fatigued,  and  will  not  an- 
swer the  spur,  even  the  skilful  horseman  is  helpless  with  a  lance  in  his 
hand. 

At  speed  you  can  drive  a  lance  through  anything,  bat  not  so  at  a 


76  THE    ARMING. 

slower  pace;  and  at  a  walk,  and  a  stand,  you  become  helpless,  and  the 
thrust  can  be  put  aside  with  ease,  or  the  pole  seized  with  the  hand. 

If  the  advantage  of  the  lance  is  in  its  long  reach,  the  longer  the 
vrcapon  the  more  formidable.  The  French  gendarmes,  whose  lances 
Averc  eighteen  feet  long,  suflfered  such  dreadful  defeats  that  they  gave 
up  the  weapon  altogether, 

Gustavus  Adolphus  took  the  lances  away  from  his  cavalry  in  the 
Thirty  Years'  War.     He  had  practically  experienced  their  inefficiency. 

Let  us  allow,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  a  lance  of  a  proper  length, 
handy,  well  poised,  and  held  at  its  centre,  reaches  further  beyond  the 
horse's  head  than  the  point  of  a  sword  held  at  arm's  length :  in  what 
way  can  this  conduce  to  success,  when  it  is  universally  acknowledged 
that  it  is  the  superior  impetus  and  speed  of  one  of  the  advancing  lines 
which  overthrows  the  other;  the  weapons  only  coming  into  play  after- 
wards ? 

The  lancers'  pennons  attract  the  fire  of  artillery ;  in  single  combat 
they  betray  to  the  adversary  where  the  danger  is,  and  thus  enable  him 
to  avoid  it;  and  if  they  sometimes  frighten  an  adversary's  horse,  the 
animal  shies  and  carries  his  master  out  of  reach  of  the  point  which,  if 
not  decorated,  might  have  run  him  through  the  body. 

The  Asiatics  carry  a  light  spear  (without  pennon),  which  they  say 
they  leave  in  the  body  of  their  first  foe  (or  throw  away),  but  take  to 
their  swords  when  the  tug  of  war  comes  fast  and  fierce. 

I  believe  that  the  only  advantage  of  the  lance  lies  in  the  moral  effect 
produced  (particularly  on  young  soldiers),  not  only  by  its  longer  reach, 
but  by  the  deadly  effect  of  the  home  thrusts.  Thus,  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  the  Prussian  hussars  were  at  first  very  shy  of  the  lances  used  by 
the  Kussians :  some  of  the  Prussian  officers  rode  out  in  front  of  the 
line  engaged,  and  cut  down  several  of  the  Cossacks  and  lancers  in  sin- 
gle combat,  showing  their  men  how  easy  it  was  to  despatch  them  by 
closing  upon  them  at  once;  and  thus  encouraged,  the  hussars  soon 
mastered  their  opponents. 

The  Russian  line  of  outposts  formed  against  the  Circassians  is  in- 
habited by  the  Line  Cossacks,  though  many  Cossacks  of  the  Don  and 
Ural  are  there  on  service.     All  form  part  of  the  army  of  the  Caucasus. 

Those  of  the  Don,  the  Ural,  and  Tschernomor,  are  armed  with  the 
lance;  but  the  Lino  Cossacks,  who  are  in  constant  warfare  with  the 
Circassians,  have  given  it  up,  and  taken  to  the  sword.     They  say  that 


THE   LANCE.  77 

in  irregular  warfare  the  lance  is  useful  against  bad  horsemen,  but  that 
it  is  only  in  the  way  in  a  contest  with  bold  and  skilful  riders  like  the 
Circassians,  who  close  upon  them  at  once. 

These  Cossacks  contend,  and  often  successfully,  against  their  adver- 
saries j  but  the  Circassians,  with  their  swords,  make  short  work  of  the 
other  Cossacks,  and  look  upon  the  Line  Cossacks  alone  as  formidable 
antagonists. 

As  to  the  lance  being  a  more  deadly  weapon  than  the  sword,  it  depends 
entirely  upon  uTiat  swords  it  be  compared  to.  If  to  those  generally  in 
use  in  the  European  cavalry  of  the  present  day,  decidedly  wo  must  give 
it  in  favor  of  the  lance;  but  if  we  compare  it  to  the  scimitar  of  the 
Turk,  the  sword  of  the  Mahratta,  the  Sikh,  the  Circassian,  any  sword 
with  an  edge  to  it,  then,  I  say,  the  lance  is  comparatively  but  a  harm- 
less weapon. 

If  lances  be  such  good  weapons,  surely  those  who  wield  them  ought 
to  acquire  great  confidence  in  them;  whereas  it  is  well  known  that,  in 
battle,  lancers  generally  throw  them  away,  and  take  to  their  swords.  I 
never  spoke  with  an  English  lancer  who  had  been  engaged  in  the  late 
Sikh  wars  that  did  not  declare  the  lance  to  be  a  useless  tool,  and  a  great 
encumbrance  in  close  conflict 

We  often  attribute  want  of  success  or  defeat  to  the  tactics  of  an  ene- 
my, or  to  his  arms  being  superior-anything  rather  than  acknowledge 
that  his  more  manly  courage  won  the  day. 

Thus,  perhaps,  have  the  Line  Cossacks  thrown  away  their  lances  and 
taken  to  the  sword,  to  imitate  their  more  successful  enemies,  the  Circas- 
sians. And  the  Prussians  in  1813  copied  the  Russians,  and  adopted 
the  lance  for  the  landwehr. 

In  the  last  Hungarian  war  the  Hungarian  hussars  were  (as  we  have 
seen)  generally  successful  against  the  Austrian  heavy  cavalry- cuiras- 
siers and  dragoons;  but  when  they  met  the  Polish  lancers,  the  finest 
regiments  of  light-horse  in  the  Austrian  service,  distinguished  for  their 
discipline,  good  riding,  and,  above  all,  for  th^n  csprit-de-corp,  ^nd  gal- 
lantry in  action,  against  these  regiments  the  Hungarians  were  not  suc- 
cessful, and  at  once  attributed  this  to  the  lances  of  their  opponents 
The  Austrians  then  extolled  the  lance  above  the  sword,  and  armed  all 
their  light  cavalry  regiments  with  it. 

Russia  has  armed  the  front  ranks  of  her  heavy  cavalry  with  Ion- 

7*  '^ 


78  THE   ARMING. 

unwieldy  lances,  and  other  European  powers  have  lately  been  following 
the  example.  Marshal  Marmont,  an  exile  from  France,  was  in  Russia 
when  he  took  up  his  new  idea. 

The  failure  of  the  7th  Hussars  in  the  retreat  from  Quatre-Bras,  against 
the  French  lancers,  jammed  close  together  in  the  streets  of  Gomappe, 
was  attributed  to  the  lances  of  their  opponents. 

Of  what  use  were  the  lances  to  the  French  a  few  minutes  later,  when 
a  regiment  of  life-guards  (without  cuirasses)  went  at  them  sword  in 
hand,  and  drove  them  through  the  town,  and  out  at  the  other  side — 
riding  them  down,  and  cutting  them  from  their  horses  in  all  directions  ? 

Yet,  after  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  lancer  regiments,  for  the  first  time, 
were  formed  in  England  ! 

Lancers  are  of  no  use  for  outpost  duty  ;  the  enemy  shoot  them  down, 
and  they  have  no  fire-arms  wherewith  to  keep  the  enemy  off. 

The  French  lancers,  in  attacking  lancers  of  other  nations,  often  slung 
their  lances,  and  drew  their  swords.  General  de  Brack  recommends 
swordsmen,  engaged  with  lancers,  to  close  upon  them,  and  crowd  them 
together.  He  says  :  "  The  lancers,  jammed  together,  can  neither  point 
nor  parry,  and  one  of  two  things  must  happen  :  they  will  either  throw 
down  their  lances,  in  order  to  get  at  their  swords,  or  they  will  retain 
their  lances,  and  in  this  case  you  will  have  the  best  of  the  bargain. 
Our  pivot  files  in  the  lancers  of  the  Imperial  guard  did  not  carry  lances. 
I  remember  upon  two  occasions  in  1814  (at  Hoagstraten,  near  Breda, 
and  at  Pont-a-Trecir,  below  Lisle)  having  to  deal  with  Russian  and 
Prussian  lancers,  who,  like  ourselves,  held  their  own  upon  narrow  roads, 
with  deep  ditches  on  either  hand.  I  placed  carabineers  at  the  head  of 
my  column,  and  made  my  lancers  follow  j  and  these  last  put  their  lances 
in  the  bucket,  and  drew  their  swords ;  and,  having  penetrated  the  ene- 
my, our  success  so  far  surpassed  our  hopes,  that  we  cut  them  down 
without  damage  to  ourselves." 

A  good  plan,  however,  is  often  followed  by  the  Cossacks  when  attack- 
ed by  swordsmen.  They  stand  fast  and  receive  the  assailant  on  their 
left,  keeping  the  lance  to  the  right  front :  when  the  swordsman  is  within 
reach,  they  make  a  circular  parry  toward  him  (from  right  to  left),  and 
turn  the  assailant  aside  by  this  movement.  They  then  turn  to  the  left 
and  follow,  and  charge  home  with  the  lance  at  their  opponent's  left  side. 

The  Poles,  by  constant  habit  and  practice,  may  possess  a  peculiar 


THE   HORSES — THE   BIT.  79 

aptitude  in  the  management  of  their  national  weapon,  but  with  the  rest 
of  the  European  nations  the  lance  may  be  said  to  have  had  its  reign. 
At  least  few  will  now  say,  with  Montecuculi:  "  La  lance  est  la  rexne  deg 
armes  blanches  !" 

The  following  extract  from  a  letter  of  Oliver  Cromwell,  giving  an 
account  of  the  Battle  of  Dunbar,  shows  clearly  that  arming  the  front 
ranks  of  cavalry  with  lances  is  but  an  old  custom  revived : 

"  The  dispute  on  this  right  wing  was  hot  and  stiff  for  three-quarters 
of  an  hour.  Plenty  of  fire,  from  field-pieces,  snaphances,  match-locks, 
entertains  the  Scotch  main-battle  across  the  Brock ;  poor  stiffened  men, 
roused  from  the  corn-shocks  with  their  matches  all  out ! 

"  But  here  on  the  right,  their  horse,  with  lancers  in  the  front  ranh, 
charge  desperately ;  drive  us  back  across  the  hollow  of  the  rivulet — 
back  a  little  j  but  the  Lord  gives  us  courage,  and  we  storm  home  again, 
horse  and  foot  upon  them,  with  a  shock  like  tornado  tempests;  break 
them,  beat  them,  drive  them  all  adrift."  * 

Where  shall  we  find,  in  these  our  modern  days,  a  bulletin  shorter,  and 
better,  than  this  ? 


The  Horse. 

I  assume  that  in  England,  in  Ireland,  in  Cana,da,  in  India,  at  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  in  Australia,  we  have  always  the  means  of 
obtaining  good  remount  horses  for  our  cavalry.  But  as  one  may  make 
something  of  a  horse  of  indifferent  quality  by  skill,  so  the  very  best 
horse  may  be  spoiled,  or  greatly  injured,  by  a  bad  system  of  accoutring 
and  training  him.  For  the  present  I  speak  only  of  bridling  and  sad- 
dling. 

Here  nothing  is  so  important  as  the  selection  of  the  proper  bit.  This 
is  a  subject  upon  which  many  have  been  very  positive  and  pedantic, 
and  few  very  wise. 

The  art  of  suiting  to  each  horse  a  bit  of  more  or  less  power,  accord- 
ing to  the  shape  of  the  mouth,  the  sensitiveness  and  the  temper  of  the 
animal,  is  looked  upon  abroad  as  a  science  ;  and  in  Prussia  it  is  said  to 
stand  higher,  and  to  be  more  difficult  to  learn,  than  riding  itself. 

*  Carlyle's  "  Cromwell." 


80  ORGANIZATION. 

They  say  that  the  best  broken  horse  would  be  ruined  if  a  bit  was  put 
iu  his  mouth  which  did  not  suit;  and  so  far  is  this  carried  by  Germans, 
that  they  will  tell  you  seriously  that  to  shorten  the  curb-chain  07}e  link, 
or  to  use  a  bit  half  an  inch  longer  or  shorter  in  the  cheek,  will  make 
the  diflference  between  a  well-broken  horse  and  a  restive  one. 

What,  then,  does  a  good  hand  go  for  ? 

The  Arab  and  the  Turk  ride  with  bits  so  powerful  that  they  can  break 
a  horse's  jaw  or  pull  up. 

The  Persians,  Sikhs,  and  Mussulmans  have  a  square  snaffle,  with 
iron  spikes;  they  wrap  thread  round  this  mouth-piece,  so  that,  the 
more  the  horse  presses  against  it,  the  farther  the  spikes  come  out  from 
under  their  covering,  and  run  into  him  :  and  farther,  they  have  a  stand- 
ing martingale,  fastened  to  the  rings  of  the  snaffle,  which  keeps  the 
horse's  head  down  and  under  control. 

The  Cossack  and  the  Circassian,  the  latter  particularly  famed  for  the 
wonderful  address  with  which  he  handles  his  horse  at  speed,  and  in 
single  combat,  both  use  a  common  snaffle. 

It  is  not  the  shape  of  the  bit,  the  horse's  mouth  or  temper,  nor  is  it 
the  nation  and  peculiarities  of  the  horseman,  that  render  the  animal 
obedient  and  handy,  but  it  is  the  way  of  riding  and  breaking  him,  and 
the  manner  in  which  you  teach  the  horse  to  obey  the  bit  you  put  in  his 
mouth,  whatever  that  maj'  be. 

A  bit  of  moderate  power  is  the  best  for  general  purposes,  and  if  prop- 
erly used  will  bring  most  horses  under  control. 

The  mouth-piece  should  be  sufliciently  arched  to  admit  of  the  horse's 
tongue  passing  freely  underneath  it,  and  the  cheek  rather  long,  to  give 
power  to  the  lever. 

But  beyond  the  consideration  of  a  mouth-piece,  there  is  another 
quality  of  essential  importance  in  the  bridling  of  cavalry.  It  ia,  to  af- 
ford the  possibility  of  bridling  and  unbridling  quickly;  for  if  there  is 
difficulty  in  bridling  up,  the  soldier  can  not  feed  the  horse  in  the  near 
neighborhood  of  the  enemy,  and  this,  in  a  campaign,  becomes  matter 
of  serious  import,  for  the  condition  of  the  horses  will  suffer.  The  Cos- 
sacks feed  their  horses  at  all  times,  even  in  the  battle-field,  amidst  the 
roar  of  cannon.  Their  horses  kept  condition  in  the  last  war,  when 
others  were  dying  from  exhaustion  and  want  of  food,  and  the  marches 
they  sometimes  made  were  wonderful. 


THE    SADDLE.  81 

The  Russians  have  their  bits  made  with  a  hook  and  link,  and  can. 
take  them  out  of  their  horse's  mouth  without  taking  off  the  bridle. 

Some  of  the  bridles  in  use  in  our  cavalry  (those  of  the  Carabineers 
and  the  Inniskillens)  are.  in  my  opinion,  better  than  those  of  the  Rus- 
sians. They  are  on  a  more  simple  plan,  and,  with  the  Russian  link, 
would  afford  the  same  facility  of  bridling  quickly. 

The  snaffle,  however,  should  have  half-horns,  to  prevent  the  rings  from 
being  drawn  into  the  horse's  mouth ;  and  the  reins  should  be  sewn  on, 
for  the  strain  is  then  on  the  breadth  of  the  rein,  instead  of  the  tongue 
of  the  buckle. 

Ought  not  this  convenient  bridle  to  be  at  once  made  general  in  the 
service?  In  a  campaign  it  obviates  the  serious  evil  which  I  have  indi- 
cated. But,  without  going  to  the  field  of  war,  everybody  in  these  days 
of  railway  speed  feels  the  necessity  of  economizing  time  and  trouble. 
One  has  often  to  bridle  in  a  hurry,  and  sometimes,  it  may  be,  in  the 
dark. 

The  Saddle. — That  saddle  is  best  for  cavalry  which,  being  of  a  simple 
construction,  brings  the  soldier  close  to  his  horse,  in  a  firm  and  easy 
seat.  It  must  be  sufficiently  strong  to  carry  the  necessary  kit,  easy  to 
repair  or  replace  in  the  field  j  it  ought  to  be  roomy,  and,  above  all,  it 
ought  to  give  no  sore  backs. 

I  have  cited  the  "  Magnanimous  Usurper"  as  an  authority,  and  such 
he  must  be  considered  in  cavalry  matters.  The  following  brief,  pointed, 
and  truly  characteristic  letter,  will  prove  the  attention  he  bestowed  on 
horse-gear  and  sharp  swords  ; 

"  WiSBEACH,  THIS  DAY,  11th  NoV.,  1642. 

"Dear  Fiiienu  :    "Let  the  saddler  see  to  the  horse-gear.     I  learn 

from  one,  many  are  ill  served.     If  a  man  has  not  good  weapons,  horee, 

and  harness,  he  is  as  nought. 

"  From  your  Friend, 

'■  Oliver  Cromwell. 
"  To  Auditor  Squire." 

Every  cavalry  oflBcer  will  do  well  to  remember  this  curt  epistle. 

The  present  hussar  saddle  raises  the  man  high  off  his  horse,  because 
the  spread  of  the  side-boards,  and  the  upright  position  of  the  forks,  re- 
quire the  wolf,  or  scat,  to  be  high;  for  if  it  is  not  high,  then  the  sides 


82  ORGANIZATION. 

of  the  boards  raise  up  tho  thighs  of  the  man,  and  prevent  him  from  grip- 
ping his  horse.  The  saddle  is  like  a  wedge  between  the  man's  legs,  on 
which  his  body  acts  as  a  lever  :  thus,  if  he  inclines  or  throws  his  weight 
on  one  side  or  the  other,  he  moves  the  saddle  bodily,  and  by  doing  this 
often  he  naturally  causes  a  sore  back. 

In  this  respect  a  great  improvement  has  been  made  in  the  Hungarian 
saddles  now  given  to  our  heavy  dragoons ;  for  here  the  side-boards  are 
cut  out  like  the  tree  of  our  English  saddle,  the  seat  is  lowered,  and  the 
man  brought  nearer  his  horse. 

The  Hungarian  saddle  is  used  either  with  a  large  blanket  in  twelve 
folds,  or  with  pads  stuffed  with  horse-hair.  Now  both  these  methods 
are  faulty.  The  large  blanket  is,  in  the  first  place,  very  hot  and  oppres- 
sive, the  side-boards,  being  of  a  polished  surface,  have  no  hold  on  the 
blanket,  and  thus  it  often  works  its  way  out  from  under  the  saddle. 
With  pads,  a  free  circulation  of  air  is  indeed  obtained  between  the  saddle 
and  the  horse's  back  j  but  as  the  condition  of  the  horse  varies,  so  does 
the  position  of  the  saddle ;  and  as  this  can  not  easily  be  rectified  by 
means  of  the  blanket,  difi'erent  expedients  are  resorted  to,  such  as  cov- 
ering the  side-boards  with  plaits  of  straw,  or  giving  the  blanket  an  extra 
fold. 

Every  one  must  have  had  occasion  to  observe,  on  a  long  march,  that 
the  edges  of  the  pads  stretch  the  horses'  skins,  and  occasion  sore  backs  ; 
then  they  become  hardened  with  the  sweat  from  tho  horses,  and  gall 
them  severely. 

Instead  of  pads,  I  would  recommend  the  use  of  strips  of  felt,  put  in  a 
cover,  and  laced  on  to  the  side-boards.  For  the  large  blanket  I  would 
substitute  a  felt  saddle-cloth,  to  reduce  the  direct  strain  on  tho  horse's 
skin,  absorb  the  perspiration,  and  prevent  the  edges  of  the  pads  from 
getting  hard.  Tho  slips  of  felt  enable  you  always  to  keep  tho  saddle  in 
its  proper  position  ,•  for,  if  a  horse  falls  off  in  flesh,  you  place  an  extra 
slip  of  felt  in  the  pad,  and,  if  ho  puts  up  condition,  you  take  one  out. 

I  have  seen  a  trial  made  with  a  squadron  that  had  pads  and  many 
sore  backs.  They  then  used  a  blanket  under  the  pads,  nearly  in  the 
manner  I  have  recommended,  and  in  spite  of  forced  marches  the  sore 
backs  got  well,  and  the  squadron,  after  travelling  four  hundred  miles, 
arrived  at  head-quarters  with  only  one  led  horso. 

The  Turks  very  generally  use  felt,  in  the  manner  here  described.    Two 


THE   SADDLE.  83 

recent  English  travellers  found  it  impossible  to  get  on  in  Asia  Minor  with 
their  English  saddles,  without  bringing  in  the  aid  of  strips  of  fol  t ;  but  with 
this  aid  they  made  several  long  journeys  without  once  galling  the  backs 
of  the  very  poor  creatures  they  rode.  Good  felt  was  cheap  in  the  coun- 
try. They  carried  a  supply  of  strips  with  them,  and  these  they  applied 
in  increase,  or  removed,  or  changed,  as  the  occasion  or  the  condition  of 
the  horses  required.  With  a  plentiful  supply  of  this  material,  a  Turk- 
ish or  Greek  peasant,  with  a  clumsy  pack-saddle  made  entirely  of  wood, 
will  ride  a  horse  without  soring  his  back,  or  wringing,  or  galling  him. 

In  Hungary,  the  peasants  use  their  wooden  saddles  without  any  blank- 
et. In  the  French  service  they  have  been  making  experiments  to  dis- 
pense with  the  blanket  altogether.  This,  no  doubt,  might  answer  very 
well  in  time  of  peace,  or  so  long  as  the  horses  can  keep  up  their  con- 
dition; but  the  moment  the  wood  comes  in  contact  with  the  ribs  the 
horses  must  suffer,  and  then  a  very  short  time  will  suflBco  to  wear  through 
their  skin. 

A  very  ingenious  saddle  has  been  constructed  and  tried  in  Belgium : 
it  has  movable  side-boards,  the  front  and  hind  forks  working  on  an  iron 
roller,  so  as  to  allow  of  the  side-boards  always  assuming  a  position  par- 
allel to  the  horse's  back.  But,  unfortunately,  this  saddle  is  very  liable 
to  get  out  of  order,  and  the  kit  does  not  pack  so  firmly  on  it  as  it  ought 
to  do. 

For  details  about  the  saddle  of  my  own  invention,  I  must  refer  to  the 
Appendix  of  the  present  volume. 

The  seat  for  a  horse-soldier  should  certainly  be  low,  like  that  of  a 
hunting  saddle,  and  the  saddle  should  be  broad  and  roomy,  the  front 
part  flush,  the  side-boards  closer  in  front.  If  I  am  not  deceived,  the 
saddle  of  my  proposed  construction  will  meet  all  the  desiderata,  and  will 
be  a  comfort  and  a  security  both  to  man  and  horse. 


84  MILITARY   RIDING. 

Chapter    VI . 

MILITARY   RIDING. 

Horsemanahip,  like  the  noble  animal  itself,  found  its  way  into  Europe 
from  the  East.  Though  no  longer  for  war,  nor  even  for  the  manly 
sports  of  thi  field,  the  art  was  highly  cultivated  during  the  decline  of 
the  Eastern  Empire.  The  hippodrome  of  Constantinople  attracted  the 
attention  of  Europe  when  no  other  object  of  admiration  or  of  sympathy 
was  left  in  that  demoralizing  and  falling  state.  About  the  year  1134 
many  companies  of  Byzantine  circus-riders  went  over  to  Naples,  at  that 
time  the  last  state  in  Italy  which  acknowledged  the  authority  of  the 
Eastern  Empire.  Thus  Naples  became  the  first  school  for  horsemanship 
in  Western  Europe.  From  that  city  the  school  was  gradually  spread 
over  the  rest  of  Italy,  and  into  France  and  Germany.  For  some  ages 
Naples  also  supplied  the  best  horses  for  the  manege.  Down  to  the  close 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  even  to  a  later  period,  the  Neapolitan 
horses  are  frequently  mentioned  by  writers  as  highly  prized  in  England 
as  well  as  in  most  of  the  continental  countries.  They  divided  favor  and 
pre-eminence  with  the  well-bred  horses  imported  from  the  south  of 
Spain,  where  the  blood  of  the  Arab  and  the  Barb  had  been  liberally  in- 
fused. As  stock,  they  tended  to  improve  the  studs  of  other  countries. 
It  should  seem  that,  by  importation  and  by  other  means,  England  must 
have  had  a  certain  supply  of  good  nags  in  the  fourteenth  century,  or  as 
early  as  the  time  of  Chaucer,  for  that  old  poet  frequently  alludes  with 
evident  gusto  to  choice  horses  and  neat  horsemanship.  Of  his  lordly 
sporting  Monk  he  informs  us  that — 

"  Pull  mfiny  a  dainty  horse  had  be  in  stable." 

Of  his  aged  Knight  he  tells  us  that — 

"  His  horse  was  good,  albeit  he  was  not  gay." 

Among  the  accomplishmenta  of  his  young  Squire  he  docs  not  forget  to 
admit  that — 

"  Well  could  he  Bit  his  horse  and  fairly  ride." 


MILITARY  RIDING.  85 

But  the  most  charming  figure  that  rode  with  that  good  and  merry  com- 
pany of  pilgrims  to  the  shrine  at  Canterbury,  was  the  Wife  of  Bath — 

"  Upon  an  ambler  easily  she  sate,"  etc. 

Our  early  school  of  horsemanship  was  certainly  easy  and  natural^  and 
therefore  good.  As  such  it  may  be  said  to  hare  continued — except  for 
the  cavalry  of  our  army.  Whatever  case  originally  belonged  to  the 
Neapolitan  school  (which,  being  of  Eastern  origin,  was  doubtlessly  good) 
was  soon  stiffened  out  of  it  in  France  and  Germany,  as  also  in  every 
part  of  Italy. 

The  Ironsides  of  Cromwell  kept  their  national  and  natural  seats,  and 
rode  on  the  field  of  battle  aa  they  would  have  ridden  across  country. 
But  France  and  Germany,  by  the  time  of  Marlborough,  came  to  be  con- 
sidered as  the  great  emporia  of  military  science,  and  thither  repaired 
all  young  Englishmen  who  aspired  to  glory  and  renown  in  arms,  to 
study  the  practice  as  well  as  the  theory  of  war.  Now  the  French  have 
never  been  an  equestrian  people,  and  the  Germans  must  certainly  yield 
the  palm  of  horsemanship  to  the  English.  Moreover,  both  French  and 
Germans  fell  into  a  very  stiff  and  artificial  mode,  introducing  pedantry 
into  the  riding-school,  and  depriving  both  man  and  horse  of  their  capa- 
bilities and  natural  elan. 

Yet  our  military  riding  is,  to  this  day,  imported  from  the  Continent. 

I  aay  vxilitary,  because  none  of  our  dragoon  or  hussar  officers  would, 
for  a  moment,  think  of  riding  across  country  in  a  foreign  seat,  or  in 
any  other  way  in  the  manege  fashion.  Yet  in  the  business  of  war  our 
cavalry  ought  to  be  able  to  perform  whatever  is  done  in  the  sport  of 
hunting,  and  whatever  interferes  with  the  ability  of  so  doing  must  be 
set  down  as  a  detriment  and  great  evil. 

The  Russians  and  most  other  continental  nations  place  their  saddles 
near  the  loins,  and  girth  their  horses  round  the  belly  instead  of  the 
brisket.*  The  established  seat  is  upright,  the  knee  drawn  back,  and 
the  heel  in  a  perpendicular  line  with  the  point  of  the  shoulder;  and  so 
far  is  this  carried,  that  it  is  no  uncommon  thing  to  see  spur-marks  on 
the  horse's  stifle.     The  man's  legs,  from  the  knee  down,  are  carefully 

*  This  is  the  order  in  our  cavalry  regulations,  though  fortunately  it  is  not  strictly 
carried  out  The  regulations  say :  "  Place  the  saddle  one  hand's  breadth  behind  the 
play  of  the  shoulder." 


86  MILITARY    RIDING. 

brought  away  from  the  horse,  in  order  to  prevent  what  is  called  "cling- 
ing," and  he  is  taught  to  ride  by  balance.  If  this  system  can  be  right, 
I  have  thrown  away  many  years  in  the  study  and  practice  of  horseman- 
ship, and  all  who  arc  bold  riders  at  home,  and  all  the  best  cavaliers  of 
the  East,  are  wrong. 

And  how  do  foreigners  treat  the  horse  ?  The  system  followed  in  their 
riding-schools  wearies  out  all  patience,  both  in  man  and  beast.  The 
simple  breaking  in  of  the  horse  has  no  end  ;  and  if  his  education  is  to  be 
perfected  by  the  addition  of  a  few  "airs  de  manege,"  such  as  croupades, 
pirouettes,  ballottades,  pcsades,  etc.,  then  the  horse  must  be  long- 
lived  to  be  brought  to  execute  them !  And  should  the  veteran  of  the 
manege  take  all  his  degrees  with  the  highest  credit,  for  what  mortal 
work  is  he  fit?  His  life  has  been  consumed  in  doing  unnecessary  things, 
and  he  has  no  strength  and  no  legs  left  to  do  things  necessary  and 
essential. 

In  almost  all  cavalry  services  detachments  from  each  cavalry  regi- 
ment are  sent  to  the  various  riding  establishments  to  learn  to  ride. 
These  detachments  arc  composed  of  picked  men  and  horses,  carefully 
trained  before  they  are  sent  to  these  establishments  for  instruction. 
The  detachments  remain  about  a  year,  in  most  foreign  countries  still 
longer,  and  do  nothing  but  riding-school  work,  for  two  and  three  hours 
a  day,  during  all  that  time,  and  all  this  to  go  through  a  ride  at  a  walk, 
trot,  and  canter,  when  they  are  dismissed.*  Of  what  possible  use  can 
a  system  be  which  requires  trained  men  and  horses  to  ride  daily  in  the 
riding-school  for  a  whole  year,  to  enable  them  to  go  through  a  ride  in 
the  school,  which  constitutes,  after  all,  but  the  first  step  in  their  train- 
ing on  horseback?  for  the  same  men  have  never  ridden  once  at  speed, 
or  used  their  arms  at  that  pace  ! 

The  system  of  brute  force  pursued  by  the  horsemen  of  the  East  is 
far  preferable  to  this ;  in  eight  days  they  make  their  chargers  canter 
round  a  sixpence,  and  pull  them  up  and  turn  thom  at  speed.  This  they 
do  by  tying  the  horse's  nose  down  with  a  standing  martingale,  attach- 
ed to  a  spiked  snaffle ;  they  then  fasten  a  rope  to  the  rings  of  the  snaf- 
fle and  longe  the  animal  on  a  very  small  circle,  with  a  man  on  his  back, 

*  At  our  riding  eetabliahments  they  have  much  improved  of  late.  They  make 
the  meu  perform  the  sword  and  lance  exercise  at  a  gallop,  and  toach  them  to  take 
a  flight  of  fences  put  up  in  the  bunack-liold. 


ESTABLISHMENTS.  bi 

whose  spurs  and  whip  can  not  be  denied.  After  a  few  days  at  this, 
they  practice  the  horse  at  starting  off  at  speed  and  pulling  up  on 
the  spot,  and  their  charger  is  ready  for  the  field  !  True,  he  can  neither 
walk  nor  trot ;  that  is,  he  walks  generally  with  both  legs  of  a  side  at 
the  same  time,*  and  instead  of  trotting  he  ambles ;  but,  nevertheless, 
great  results  have  been  obtained,  for  the  horse  is  handy  and  obedient. 

At ,  on  the  Continent,  Z.  Z.  showed  us  the  royal  stables,  and 

the  horses  broken  in  at  the  riding-school.  One  of  them  had  no  shoes 
on  ;  we  asked  the  reason.  Answer.  "  He  never  works  out  of  the  riding- 
school."  Question.  "  How  old  is  he?"  A.  "  Fourteen  years  old."  Q. 
"  Is  he  quite  perfect  in  the  riding-school  work  ?"  A.  "  Not  quit«,  but 
very  good  at  it." 

We  were  shown  a  "  Springer."  A  groom  led  in  a  horse  with  his  tail 
tied  on  one  side  (I  presume  to  give  a  better  opening  for  the  whip  of  the 
riding-master),  a  cavesson  on,  and  a  young  man  in  jack-boots  riding 
him,  his  legs  drawn  down  and  unnaturally  far  back,  a  cutting  whip 
held  upright  in  one  hand,  and  the  reins  divided  in  both  hands.  The 
horse  was  placed  against  the  side  wall,  the  groom  in  front  with  the 
cavesson  line  held  up  to  prevent  the  horse  springing  forward.  The  ani- 
mal was  evidently  uneasy,  and  looked  back.  No  wonder  !  for  present- 
ly the  riding-master  stepped  up  behind,  and  crack  !  crack  !  went  the 
whip  into  the  "  springer's  "  unprotected  hind-quarters.  He  sprang  in 
the  air  and  back  to  his  place,  for  he  could  not  get  forward.  This  was 
not  enough.  It  appears  that  the  perfection  of  this  performance  consists 
in  getting  the  horse  to  kick  out  behind  at  the  moment  he  is  off  the 
ground  with  all-fours  ;  and,  what  between  the  groom  pulling  the  iron 
band  against  the  horse's  nose  with  all  his  might,  and  the  riding-master 
giving  him  the  whip  with  a  practised  hand,  they  succeeded  in  getting 
the  capriole  required,  sending  the  man  in  boots  on  to  the  horse's  neck 
at  the  same  time.f     The  riding-master,  pleased  with  the  success  of  hia 

*  This  manner  of  walking,  as  well  as  bridle-lameness,  is  common  among  our 
school-horses. 

t  There  are  two  airs  de  manage  of  this  sort  in  the  old  school,  both  equally  use- 
less. The  first  is  called  the  6aHo<^ade,  in  which  the  horse  jumps  off  the  ground, 
bending  both  kneos  and  houghs,  and  showing  his  hind  shoes,  without,  however, 
kicking  out.  The  second,  called  the  capriole,  is  the  same,  only  the  horse  lashes 
out  while  off  the  ground. 


88  MILITARY   RIDING. 

experiment,  turned  to  us  to  explain  how  difficult  it  was  to  get  a  horse 
to  do  it.  I  asked  how  long  had  the  horse  been  at  it.  "  Oh,"  said  he, 
"he  has  been  a  springer  for  several  years."  In  fact,  he  was  a  lucky 
beist,  and  had  got  his  proniotion  early  in  life. 

We  then  saw  the  cuirassiers  of  the  Guard  at  exercise.  The  men  and 
horses  were  heavy  and  unwieldl}'^,  worked  slowly  and  loosely,  and  did 
not  come  up  to  our  expectations.  What  amused  us  greatly  was  that 
they  all  had  their  saddles  so  far  back  as  to  sit  on  the  animal's  loins, 
and  looked  very  much  like  men  riding  their  donkeys  to  market. 

There  was  an  enterprising  medico  attached  to  the  regiment,  who, 
without  the  least  regard  to  his  own  safety,  took  his  horse  several  times 
over  a  dangerous  ditch,  about  two  feet  tcide,  and  when  he  observed  us 
looking  at  him  he  repeated  this  feat  over  and  over  again,  calling  out 
"  hop  !"  with  all  his  might.  He  little  thought  that  we  were  marking 
the  rise  undfall  on  the  church-steeple  in  the  distance,  for  the  city  it- 
self we  plainly  saw  at  every  jump  between  his  seat  and  the  saddle. 

The  result  of  this  long  and  monotonous  course  of  study  is,  that  on 
the  uninitiated  the  school-rider  makes  a  pleasing  and  striking  impres- 
sion; his  horse  turns,  prances,  and  caracoles  without  any  visible  aid,  or 
without  any  motion  in  the  horseman's  upright  and  imposing  attitude. 
But  I  have  lived  and  served  with  them.  I  have  myself  been  a  riding- 
master  for  years,  and  I  happen  to  know  from  experience  what  the  dis- 
advantages are  of  this  foreign  seat  and  system.  These  I  shall  endeav- 
or to  explain. 

The  balance-seat  originated  in  necessity.  It  was  indispensable  when 
combatants,  sheathed  in  armor,  ran  a  course  with  lance  in  rest.  The 
upright  seat  enabled  them  to  carry  the  weight  of  the  armor  with  more 
ease,  and  the  long  stirrup  supported  the  leg  at  that  point  to  which  the 
weight  of  the  armor  pressed  it  down.  They  were  obliged  to  study 
balance  on  horseback,  for,  the  equilibrium  once  lost,  no  effort  of  strength 
could  save  them ;  the  weight  of  the  armor  brought  them  to  the  ground. 

As  a  pole  is  balanced  on  its  end  by  bringing  the  hand  from  side  to 
side,  backward  or  forward,  so  were  these  knights  balanced  by  their 
horses,  through  the  use  of  hand  and  leg.  The  necessity  which  intro- 
duced the  system  has  long  ceased  to  exist,  but  the  system  is  kept  up 
notwithstanding ;  and  the  riders,  accustomed  easily  to  re-establish  their 
balance  in  this  way,  have  no  dependence  whatever  on  their  seat.     This  at 


ANECDOTES  OF  HORSEMANSHIP.  89 

onco  becomes  apparent  if  you  place  them  on  horses  not  thus  artificially 
broken  in,  or  in  situations  such  as  happen  in  war,  where  the  artificial 
training  of  the  horse  gives  way  to  fear. 

All  experienced  cavalry  officers  will  tell  us  that  the  most  docile  and 
best-tempered  horses  are  difficult  to  manage  in  battle.  They  sometimes 
go  mad  with  excitement,  and  they  then  prove  the  most  dangerous  ene- 
my the  horseman  has  to  contend  against.*  When  nature  thus  becomes 
more  powerful  than  teaching,  when  the  horse  in  his  fright  forgets  his 
education,  and  nature  resumes  its  sway,  then  is  the  artificial  horseman 
lost.  Balanced  on  his  fork,  it  is  of  no  use  pulling  at  the  horse  if  he 
tries  to  bolt;  for,  with  legs  and  stirrups  behind  him,  the  rider,  at  the 
slightest  pull,  falls  forward,  and  has  the  greatest  difficulty  in  keeping 
his  balance.  At  the  Battle  of  Minden  two  entire  French  regiments  were 
nearly  destroyed  by  the  horses  taking  fright  and  bolting  in  a  charge. 
The  men  fell  off,  and  were  trampled  to  death. 

Without  being  ill-natured,  I  might  relate  many  riding  anecdotes 
which  would  amuse  Englishmen  ;  but  I  only  mention  the  following  to 
show  how  different  are  the  ideas  of  foreigners  to  our  own.  They  are 
scarcely  necessary  as  showing  the  force  of  artificial  training  and  invet- 
erate habit. 

Two  foreign  cavalry  officers  would  not  mount  horses  of  the  Royal 
Artillery  offered  to  them  for  a  review  at  Woolwich.  I  asked  the  reason ; 
the  answer  was — "  These  English  horses  are  not  broken  in  like  ours, 
and  might  run  away  with  us." 

An  officer  in  the  foreign  regiment  I  once  served  in  took  his  horse  over 
a  low  fence  one  day.  All  expressed  their  admiration  of  him  as  a  horse- 
man, because  he  had  actually  taken  the  leap  in  an  English  saddle, 
which  is  supposed  to  be  very  difficult  to  sit  in,  compared  to  the  military 
kit  in  which  they  are  accustomed  to  ride. 

I  was  once  showing  some  foreign  officers  an  English  sporting  print, 
in  which  the  rider  had  his  hand  in  his  breeches-pocket,  and  a  glass  in 
his  eye,  while  his  horse  was  clearing  a  fence.  They  asked  me  what  it 
meant ;  had  it  any  political  meaning,  or  was  it  a  caricature  ?  I  said 
no,  it  merely  represented  some  one  following  the  hounds.    They  all 

*  A  disobedient  servant  and  a  disobedient  soldier  are  equally  useless ;  but  a  dis- 
obedient horse  is  not  only  useless,  but  often  very  traitorous  and  dangerous. — 
JTenopJion  cni  Horsemanship. 
8* 


90  MILITARY   RIDING. 

buret  out  laughing,  saying,  "As  if  we  are  sucli  fools  as  to  believe  that 
any  man  ever  took  a  jump  like  that  with  his  hand  in  hia  pocket!  No, 
no  !  Englishmen  may  be  cool  fellows,  but  none  of  them  can  do  that." 

The  diflference  between  a  school-rider  and  a  real  horseman  is  this  : 
the  first  depends  upon  guiding  and  managing  his  horse  for  maintaining 
his  seat ;  the  second,  or  real  horseman,  depends  upon  his  seat  for  con- 
trolling and  guiding  his  horse. 

At  a  "  trot"  the  school-rider,  instead  of  slightly  rising  to  the  action 
of  the  horse,  bumps  up  and  down,  falling  heavily  on  the  horse's  loins, 
and  hanging  on  the  reins  to  prevent  the  animal's  slipping  from  under 
him,  while  he  is  thrown  up  from  his  seat. 

Foreign  horses  have  little  action  compared  to  ours,  and  with  them  it 
may  be  endurable ;  but  an  English  dragoon  in  marching  order,  trotting 
ten  miles  in  this  way  on  a  powerful  high-actioned  English  horse,  is  al- 
most sure  to  sore  his  horse's  back  and  his  own  seat.  He  wears  out  his 
constitution  ;  for  the  strongest  chested  man  feels  the  effects  of  it.*  He 
tires  his  horse  more  in  those  ten  miles  than  any  one  else  would  do  in 
fifty  :  he  shakes  his  kit  to  pieces,  and  wears  out  his  overalls. 

Now,  let  me  ask  who  can  explain  the  advantages  of  this  method  of 
riding  ? 

Foreigners  will  tell  you  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  collect  and  keep  the 
horse  in  hand,  as  well  as  for  parade  purposes.  Surely  there  can  be  noth- 
ing more  distressing  to  the  eye  of  a  horseman  than  to  see  men  holding 
on  to  the  reins,  and  bumping  up  and  down  in  the  saddle  j  which,  in- 
stead of  collecting  the  horse  and  keeping  him  in  hand,  is,  on  the  contra- 
ry, the  cause  of  much  unsteadiness  in  the  ranks ;  for  the  unsteady 
seat  alone  is  enough  to  excite  a  spirited  horse,  and  the  constant  pulling 
at  his  mouth  renders  it  in  time  callous. 

The  only  two  instances  in  which  the  method  may  be  used  to  advan- 
tage are,  when  teaching  the  recruit  to  ride  without  stirrups,  and  when 
working  a  young  horse  up  to  the  hand  on  a  mouthing-bit  in  the  riding- 
school. 

When  cantering,  the  foreign  school-rider  never  allows  his  horse  to  go 
straight,  but  has  him,  in  school  parlance,  **  placed :"  which  signifies, 

*  Our  officers  look  upon  their  military  seat  with  the  bumping  as  part  of  their 
equipments,  put  it  on  when  they  fall  in  on  parade,  but  wisely  discard  it  at  all 
other  times. 


THE   FOREIGN   RIDING-SCHOOL.  91 

when  cantering  to  the  right,  the  horse's  head  is  bent  to  the  right,  and 
his  haunches  are  brought  to  the  same  side  by  applying  the  left  leg ; 
when  cantering  to  the  left,  it  is  the  reverse :  thus  either  way  the  horse 
is  made  to  travel  on  the  curve,  with  his  head  and  tail  drawn  toward 
each  other  in  an  unnatural  position.  At  a  walk  it  is  the  same  :  few 
horses  broken  in  on  the  system  will  walk  with  fore  and  hind  feet  on  a 
straight  line.  Fore  and  hind  feet  move  on  parallel  lines,  the  haunches 
being  twisted  to  one  side  or  the  other ;  and  the  amusing  part  of  it  is, 
that  the  more  perfect  the  horse  is  in  his  school  education,  the  more  pal- 
pable is  his  style  of  travelling  on  two  roads  at  once. 

The  advantage  of  this  they  suppose  to  be,  that  the  horse  is  always 
ready  to  turn:  but  why  not  let  the  horse  go  straight  till  he  is  wanted 
to  turn  ?  "What  would  happen  in  an  advance  in  line  at  a  gallop  if  all 
the  horses  carried  their  heads  and  tails  on  one  side  ? 

A  cavalry  soldier  should  always  ride  straight  to  his  point,  and  know 
how  to  "place"  his  horse,  but  never  do  so  except  in  turning,  or  in 
striking  off  at  a  canter  to  either  hand. 

Instead  of  copying  this  seat  and  system  from  the  foreign  riding- 
schools,  why  not  take  example  from  our  bold  cross-country  riders, 
adding  to  the  instruction  of  our  dragoons  that  skill  in  the  breaking  in 
and  management  of  their  horses  with  hand  and  leg,  which  will  render 
them  formidable  singly  ;  and  that  knowledge  of  riding  pace  which  is  so 
necessary  to  ensure  the  steady  working  together  of  bodies  of  horse. 

Give  the  man  a  roomy  saddle,  and  make  him  sit  close  to  his  horse's 
back.  Without  drawing  back  the  thigh,  let  the  leg  be  supported  by 
the  stirrup  in  a  natural  position  :  the  nearer  the  whole  of  the  leg  is 
brought  to  the  horse  the  better,  so  long  as  the  foot  is  not  bent  below  the 
ankle-joint.  Both  man  and  horse  will  immediately  feel  the  immense 
benefit  of  this  return  to  national,  natural  practice;  and,  even  without 
the  adoption  of  any  other  changes,  I  feel  assured  that  when  next  called 
into  action  our  cavalry  will  play  a  distinguished  and  decisive  part. 

Our  cavalry  now  is  wanting  in  it^  most  essential  qualification — 
"riding."  It  is  not  sufficient  that  a  dragoon  can  sit  his  horse;  he 
should  be  completely  master  over  him,  so  as  to  control  and  direct  him 
at  the  slowest  or  fastest  pace  with  equal  ease ;  he  should  know  how  to 
quiet  and  subdue  the  hot-tempered,  and  put  life  and  action  into  the 
sluggish  horse. 


92  MILITARY   RIDING. 

If  cavalry  fought  only  ia  close  bodies,  if  it  acted  like  a  machine,  all 
required  would  be  to  discharge  it  at  the  mark  like  a  projectile.  Then, 
if  the  soldier  could  direct  his  horse  anyhow  to  the  right  or  left,  move 
forward,  and  halt  when  ordered,  it  would  suffice.  But  charges  resolve 
themselves  into  melees,  the  dragoon  is  constantly  exposed  to  the  chances 
of  single  combat,  and  the  unfortunate  fellow  who  can  not  manage  his 
horse  is  lost. 

Our  soldiers  are  never  taught  to  turn  their  horses  quickly  or  make 
half  pirouettes  with  them  ;  which  is  of  all  things  the  most  necessary  in 
a  fight.  The  reason  it  is  not  attempted  is,  that  the  advocates  of  the 
old  system  suppose  that  it  requires  years  to  teach  a  horse  to  pirouette, 
and  they  will  not  believe  that,  by  the  new  system,  horses  are  brought 
to  do  it,  both  on  the  fore  and  hind  legs,  in  a  very  few  lessons. 

A  fight  on  horseback  is  like  a  fencing  match,  in  which  the  skilful 
horseman  always  presents  his  right  side  (which  is  under  cover  of  his 
sword)  to  his  adversary,  and  seeks  to  gain  his  weak  side,  the  left  one. 
Here  all  depends  on  horsemanship. 

How  is  it,  then,  that  so  important  a  branch  of  military  instruction  has 
been  hitherto  attended  with  such  poor  results  ? 

The  fact  is,  they  go  on  wrong  ^j?-inct^/e».  The  instructors  are  not  in 
fault,  as  they  can  do  nothing  with  the  system  they  are  obliged  to 
work  on. 

Now  and  then  a  cavalry  officer  is  found  that  has  broken  away  from 
the  system  so  far  as  to  train  his  own  charger  in  a  perfect  manner,  and 
to  make  himself  a  first-rate  fencer  and  swordsman  on  horseback. 

The  Mysorean  cavalry  of  Hyder  Ali  and  Tippoo  abounded  in  clever 
horsemen  and  first-rate  swordsmen,  who  used  their  sharp  weapons  even 
with  more  eS"ect  than  that  with  which  the  Sikhs  have  since  been  found 
to  wield  their  tulwars.  They  frequently  challenged  our  dragoons  to 
single  combat,  and  they  generally  had  the  advantage  over  them  in  the 
duels.  But  there  was  an  officer  riding  with  our  troopers  who  had 
trained  himself  and  his  steed,  and  who  could  always  give  a  good  ac- 
count of  the  best  of  them.  This  was  Major  Dallas — afterward  Lieut- 
enant-General Sir  Thomas  Dallas — a  cavalry  hero  and  model — a  sort 
of  English  Murat.  Like  that  dashing  Frenchman  he  was  remarkable 
for  his  horsemanship  and  swordsmanship,  for  the  strength,  symmetry, 
and  beauty  of  his  person,  for  his  daring  courage,  and  for  his  love  of 


TRAINING   OF   YOUNG   HORSES.  93 

hand-to-hand  combats.  He  was  sometimes  seen  to  cut  down  three  or 
four  of  the  Mysorean  champions,  the  one  after  the  other,  on  the  same 
day.  He  signalized  himself,  in  the  view  of  admiring  armies,  by  many 
daring  feats  throughout  the  wars  of  Coote,  Medows,  Cornwallis,  and 
Harris  j  and  left  a  name  that  will  be  long  remembered  in  India.  ^Ye 
have  many  officers — ay,  and  men  too — as  brave  as  Dallas,  and  quite 
capable  of  doing  all  that  he  did,  if  they  could  only  be  taken  out  of  the 
shackles  of  a  bad  system,  and  be  properly  trained  to  the  use  of  2>roper 
swords. 

We  have  had  a  variety  of  absurd  systems  in  Europe  within  the  last 
three  centuries,  and  each  of  them,  while  it  lasted,  was  productive  of 
great  mischief.  Yet  every  one  of  them  had  its  bigots  and  enthusiasts, 
who  looked  upon  any  proposed  variation  or  change  as  a  shocking 
heresy.  A  master  of  the  art,  the  celebrated  Grisone  of  Naples,  who 
was  called  the  regenerator  of  the  art  of  horsemanship  in  Europe, 
solemnly  laid  down  the  following  instructions  for  his  pupils  :  "  In 
breaking  in  young  horses  put  them  into  a  circular  pit;  be  very  severe 
with  those  that  are  sensitive  and  of  high  courage ;  beat  them  between 
the  ears  with  a  stick !"  etc.  We  now  laugh  at  his  pit  and  repudiate  his 
stick ;  but  both  pit  and  stick  had  their  reign,  as  other  absurdities  have 
had  or  still  have.  Grisone's  followers,  Pluvinel,  Newcastle,  La  Gueri- 
niere,  Montfaucon,  and  others,  substituted  the  cavesson,  the  longe,  and 
the  whip.  They  tied  their  horses  to  the  stake  (the  pillars),  and  beat 
them  to  make  them  raise  their  forelegs,  etc.  I  defy  any  one  to  find 
out,  from  their  long  rambling  books  on  equitation,  where  to  begin,  how 
to  proceed,  or  how  to  overcome  by  degrees  each  difficulty  offered  by  the 
horse ;  and  these  difficulties,  be  it  observed,  arise  regularly  and  in  suc- 
cession with  every  horse  submitted  to  training.  The  question  is,  how 
to  break  in  a  number  of  horses,  and  upon  what  system  to  conquer 
these  difficulties  owe  by  one  ?  The  old  pedants  could  have  given  no 
answer  to  this  question,  nor  am  I  aware  that  it  can  be  answered  by 
modern  practitioners,  or  system-makers,  or  followers  of  existing  sys- 
tems or  regulations. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  only  man  who  has  entered  fully  on  the  sub- 
ject, and  pointed  out  clearly  how  to  attack  each  point  in  succession,  in 
order  to  gain  the  mastery  over  the  horse,  is  Monsieur  Baucher.  But  he 
has  departed  from  the  beaten  track,  has  disowned  the  old  system,  and 
therefore  big  whole  tribe  have  turned  upon  him. 


94  MILITARY   RIDING. 

I  do  not  assert  that  M.  Baucher's  system  is  faultless.  I  practised  it 
for  years,  applied  it  to  many  hundred  horses,  and  was  myself  obliged 
to  make  some  trifling  alterations  to  adapt  it  to  the  use  of  cavalry  sol- 
diers. It  may  require  further  alterations  to  make  it  perfect;  but  what  I 
assert  is,  that  the  system  is  the  right  one  :  it  is  founded  on  reason  and 
common-sense,  not  on  immemorial  custom  and  prejudice.  So  convinced 
was  I  of  this  by  experience,  that  I  wrote  out  and  published  the  lessons 
as  I  had  carried  them  out  with  hundreds  of  remount  horses,  to  assist 
those  who  might  be  at  a  loss  how  to  proceed  when  young  horses  join  the 
regiments.  Without  system,  and  a  good  system,  it  is  impossible  to 
make  good  troopers.     At  present  we  have  none. 

The  continual  working  at  the  horses'  mouths  now  practised  in  the 
service,  the  attempt  to  throw  the  horses  on  their  haunches  by  strength 
of  arm,  sawing  the  snaffle  from  side  to  side,  teaches  them  to  lean  heav- 
ily on  the  hand,  ruins  their  houghs  and  mouths,  and  wears  them  out 
before  their  time. 

The  attempting  to  work  shoulder  in,  and  passage,  before  the  horse 
has  been  taught  to  obey  the  pressure  of  the  leg,  is  simply  absurd.  It 
rouses  their  temper,  and  makes  them  restive. 

To  rein  a  horse  back  before  the  head  is  brought  home,  and  the  animal 
has  learnt  to  obey  the  log,  is  equally  absurd ;  for  the  horse  with  his 
nose  stuck  out  can  only  be  backed  by  force  or  by  striking  his  forelegs 
with  a  whip,  a  common  practice  in  the  riding-schools :  he  then  steps  to 
one  side  or  the  other ;  you  can  not  keep  his  haunches  in  the  straight 
line,  unless  he  has  been  taught  to  obey  the  pressure  of  the  leg :  the  end 
of  this  generally  is,  that  the  horse  gets  his  hind  legs  under  him,  is 
pulled  back  upon  them,  and  the  whole  weight  of  man  and  beast  is 
thrown  on  his  houghs :  the  rider  pulls  again  to  make  him  go  back,  the 
poor  beast  can  not  do  it,  no  earthly  power  could  move  his  hind  legs, 
and  in  self-defence,  and  to  escape  from  pain,  the  horse  rears,  the  natu- 
ral result  of  trying  to  back  him  by  sheer  strength  of  arm,  and  before 
he  was  prepared  to  yield  to  hand  and  leg. 

The  troop-horses  that  go  through  this  rude  treatment  join  the  ranks 
with  their  action  cramped  and  spoiled ;  they  are  seldom  free  from 
blemish,  and  their  capability  of  long  service  has  been  greatly  impaired. 
Mount  any  troop-horse,  and  you  will  find  him  hard-mouthed  and  stiff- 
necked.  Few,  if  any  of  them,  rein  up  or  yield  to  the  hand;  they  are 
all  down  on  the  forehand,  and  so  accustomed  to  be  held  fast  by  the 


TRAINING  OF  YOUNG  HORSES.  95 

head,  that,  if  you  yield  the  rein  to  them  in  the  least  degree,  they  go  off 
into  a  gallop  at  once,  and  then  both  hands  of  their  riders  are  scarcely 
sufficient  to  stop  them. 

The  system  I  have  proposed  rests  on  a  few  simple  principles.-'^ 

I.  The  hor3e  is  gently  used,  the  progress  is  gradual  but  certain. 

II.  For  a  few  days  he  is  ridden  on  the  snafSe  with  a  loose  rein,  at  a 
walk  and  a  trot. 

III.  Ho  is  then  bitted,  and  a  few  simple  lessons  teach  him  to  yield 
to  the  feeling  of  the  rein  and  the  pressure  of  the  leg. 

IV.  Next  he  is  collected  and  got  in  hand,  not  by  pulling  and  sawing 
at  his  mouth,  but  by  gradually  pressing  him  with  the  leg  till  he  raises 
himself  off  the  bit  and  gathers  himself  up  at  a  walk,  when  he  can  be 
collected  and  put  together  to  any  extent  required,  by  the  judicious  use 
of  the  spur.  As  all  this  is  done  at  the  halt  or  a  walk,  the  horse  under- 
goes no  fatigue. 

V.  Reining  back  then  perfects  the  horse  in  the  use  of  his  limbs  and 
in  unqualified  obedience  to  the  rider's  hand  and  leg.  This  once  attain- 
ed, a  few  lessons  will  teach  the  animal  to  canter,  change  leg,  passage, 
and  pirouette,  and  the  horse  becomes  a  perfect  charger  in  a  very  short 
time,  without  having  in  any  way  suffered  from  his  breaking— indeed, 
without  having  been  once  tired  or  overworked  during  the  whole  of  his 
education  ;  and  from  his  mouth  having  been  gently  dealt  with,  it  remains 
fresh  and  good,  instead  of  being  hard  and  callous. 

I  may  speak  confidently  of  these  results,  as  I  have  myself  obtained 
them  from  the  system  with  horses  of  various  descriptions  and  breeds — 
Arab,  Cape,  Persian,  Australian,  and  the  country-bred  horse  of  India — 
the  last  the  least  tractable  of  any.  I  feel  assured  that,  with  patience 
and  with  a  firm  determination  never  to  attempt  to  do  too  much  at  one 
time,  any  cavalry  officer  may  command  the  same,  if  not  a  greater  de- 
gree of  success,  with  our  English-bred  horses. 

Trained,  ridden,  and  saddled  in  the  way  I  have  explained,  the  horse 
will  carry  the  weight  well,  the  man  will  be  less  liable  to  be  pulled  off 
in  the  ranks,  his  hand  is  likely  to  be  light  because  he  will  not  need  its 
assistance  to  keep  his  seat,  and,  when  required  to  exert  his  strength  to 
manage  his  horse,  his  good  seat  will  enable  him  to  do  so. 


*  «  The  Training  of  Remount  IIorseB.  a  New  System."    London  :  Parker.  Fur- 
nivall,  and  Parker,  1852. 


96  MILITARY  RIDING. 

He  will  not  fatigue  his  horse  so  much,  and  is  less  likely  to  sore  his 
back  on  a  march  j  he  will  sit  him  easily  over  any  obstacle,  and  make  a 
formidable  use  of  his  sword,  if,  instead  of  standing  up  in  his  stirrup?, 
he  sits  close,  carrying  the  weight  and  power  of  his  horse  into  each 
blow,  for  in  this  lies  the  great  secret.  A  child  acting  thus,  in  concert 
with  his  horse  as  one  body,  will  hit  harder  than  a  giant  balanced  on  his 
fork. 

It  is  of  the  first  necessity  that  a  soldier's  horse  shall  obey  the  press- 
ure of  the  leg,  otherwise  he  can  not  be  made  to  close  up  in  the  ranks  or 
turn  quickly :  but  it  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  this  can  not  be 
done  without  screwing  back  a  man's  legs  and  bringing  them  down 
almost  under  the  horse's  stifle. 

The  habit  of  yielding  to  the  pressure  of  the  rider's  leg  is  acquired  by 
the  horse  through  teaching,  and  he  will  readily  learn  to  yield  to  that 
pressure  wherever  it  be  systematically  applied. 

All  practical  riders — the  Cossacks,  the  Circassians,  all  Eastern  na- 
tions, our  own  people — a  nation  of  horsemen  than  whom  none  more 
bold  and  clever — all  ride  in  a  short  seat,  and  keep  their  own  legs  out  of 
the  way  of  the  horse. 

The  Circassians  are  unsurpassed  in  the  management  of  their  war- 
horses  and  arms,  and  so  proud  of  their  skill,  that,  whereas  most  nations 
show  wounds  received  in  action  as  honorable  scars,  the  Circassians  hide 
them  as  silent  witnesses  of  their  awkwardness  and  want  of  address  in 
single  combat. 

'  At  the  Russian  reviews  in  1852  I  saw  a  few  sheets  of  paper  placed  on 
the  ground  opposite  the  Emperor :  he  gave  a  signal  to  some  of  the  Cos- 
sacks and  Circassians  formed  in  line  a  few  hundred  yards  off. 

Down  they  all  came  at  speed  racing  with  one  another:  the  first  up 
fired  at  the  marks  either  with  pistol  or  carbine ;  the  sheets  of  paper 
flew  up  in  pieces :  those  who  followed  fired  into  the  fragments  that  were 
at  hand,  blowing  them  to  atoms. 

The  object  of  all  preparatory  drill  should  be  to  bring  the  dragoon  to 
manage  his  horse  thus  at  speed,  and  use  sword  and  carbine  at  that 
pace — to  teach  him  to  reach  objects  on  the  ground  with  his  sword,  else 
an  infantry  soldier  would  only  have  to  throw  himself  flat  on  his  face, 
and  when  the  cavalry  had  passed  got  up  and  shoot  them — a  manoeuvre 
not  seldom  practised  by  old  soldiers  in  war. 

The  Saxons,  under  Marshal  Schulemburg,  lay  down  to  avoid  the 


TRAINING    OF    YOUNG    HORSES.  97 

charges  of  the  Swedish  dragoons  under  Charles  XII,  during  their  fa- 
mous retreat  through  Poland. 

The  Russian  infantry,  at  the  Battle  of  the  Trebia,  in  1799,  were  charged 
by  the  French  cavalry  when  in  line :  they  fired  during  the  advance  to 
the  last  moment,  lay  down,  and,  letting  the  French  horse  pass  over  them, 
got  up  and  gave  them  a  volley  that  emptied  many  a  saddle. 

A  troop,  by  taking  open  order,  should  be  able  to  go  across  country, 
for  any  distance  required,  at  a  rattling  gallop,  closing  to  their  leader  to 
charge  when  the  signal  is  given. 

All  fighting  with  cavalry  is  generally  either  done  at  speed,  or  you  ad- 
vance at  speed  to  get  at  your  enemy. 

In  a  pursuit  of  cavalry  speed  is  the  only  pace  at  which  you  can  catch 
the  foe  and  destroy  him. 

To  attain  these  ends  we  must  have  a  great  deal  more  out-of-door  work. 
The  soldiers  ought  to  practice  their  various  exercises  in  the  open  field. 
In  making  use  of  heads  and  posts  we  ought  to  scatter  them  in  a  field 
and  allow  the  men  to  ride  at  them  independently  and  chiefly  at  speed, 
in  order  to  teach  them  to  measure  their  distances  with  the  sword,  and 
deliver  their  cuts  and  points  in  proper  time.  As  we  use  the  posts  in 
the  riding-house,  the  man  is  guided  by  the  walls,  and  learns  nothing 
but  to  deliver  the  cut  or  point  required,  whereas  the  difiiculty  always  is 
to  measure  distance  at  rapid  closing ;  and  this  should  be  taught  in  the 
manner  I  have  indicated.  The  Greeks  were  accustomed  to  train  their 
cavalry  to  across-country  work,  to  hunting  and  leaping.  Where  there 
were  no  animals  to  pursue  they  threw  out  a  mounted  trooper,  and  then 
sent  another  trooper  to  give  him  chase.  The  foremost  man  galloped 
through  all  sorts  of  places,  frequently  turning  about,  with  his  lance  or 
spear  presented  to  his  pursuer:  the  pursuer  carried  javelins  blunted 
and  a  spear  of  the  same  description;  and  whenever  he  came  within 
javelin-throw  he  hurled  one  of  his  blunted  weapons  at  the  person  re- 
treating, and  whenever  he  came  within  spear-reach  he  charged  at  him 
with  the  spear.*  Here  we  see  the  counterpart  of  the  Turkish  game  of 
the  Djereed,  the  frequent  practice  of  which  tended  to  make  the  old 
Turkish  irregulars  such  excellent  cavalry.  Since  the  days  of  European 
reform  the  old  Turkish  game  is  never  practised  ! 

*  Xcnophou  on  Horsemansliip. 


^8  MILITARY   RIDING. 

Warncry  says :  "  For  a  soldier  to  be  really  a  light-horeeman  he  must 
be  able  to  turn  his  horse  quick  and  short  when  in  full  speed,  to  raise  up 
and  catch  anything  from  the  ground. 

"  Everything  should  be  taught  the  recruit  which  may  be  requisite  on 
actual  service. 

"  He  ought  to  be  able  to  turn  his  horse  suddenly  upon  his  haunches, 
to  run  at  the  ring  with  the  sword  instead  of  the  lance,  which  very  much 
supples  the  horse  and  forms  the  trooper  to  dexterity  and  firmness  in  his 
seat.  * 

"  As  soon  as  the  squadron  is  mounted  the  troopers  are  practised  to 
leap  ditches,  enclosures,  poles  put  across  for  that  purpose,  etc.  At 
other  times  two  troopers  run  together  full  speed,  trying  to  got  before 
and  carry  off  each  other's  hats  :  they  are  practised  to  swim  their  horses 
across  rivers,  to  manoeuvre  in  broken  and  intersected  ground,  etc. 

"  There  are  targets  to  be  fired  at  by  the  troopers  with  their  pistols, 
walking,  trotting,  and  at  full  speed." 

An  English  dragoon  never  rides  at  speed  once  during  the  whole  of  his 
drilling  and  training,  nor  ever  afterwards,  except  when  the  squadron  to 
which  he  belongs  is  ordered  to  charge;  and  then  they  cry  out  about 
English  cavalry  getting  out  of  hand  !  Let  any  one  think  of  the  first 
time  he  rode  a  horse  at  full  speed,  and  remember  how  helpless  ho  felt! 

I  have  heard  it  said  that  English  horses  are  not  adapted,  like  the 
Arab  and  other  horses  of  Eastern  breed,  to  skirmishing,  to  pulling  up 
from  speed,  and  turning  quickly.  The  better  the  horse  the  more  adapt- 
ed to  all  feats  of  agility  and  strength.  No  horse  can  compare  with  the 
English — no  horse  is  more  easily  broken  in  to  anything  and  everything — 
and  there  is  no  quality  in  which  the  English  horse  does  not  excel,  no 
performance  in  which  ho  can  not  beat  all  competition. 

In  teaching  the  trooper  to  ride  I  would  make  his  first  lessons  almost 
as  easy  and  simple  as  those  given  to  the  horse. 

When  first  put  on  horseback  devote  a  few  lessons  to  making  his  limbs 
supple,  in  the  same  way  as  you  begin  your  drill  on  foot  with  extension 
motions.  Show  him  how  to  close  the  thigh  and  leg  to  the  saddle,  and 
then  work  the  leg  back,  forwards,  up,  and  down. 

Without  stirrups,  make  him  swing  a  weight  round  in  a  circle  from 

*  Vide  the  Training  of  Remount  Horses,  by  C«pt.  Nolan. 


MILITARY   RIDING.  99 

the  shoulder  as  a  centre :  the  other  hand  placed  on  the  thigh,  thumb  to 
the  rear,  change  the  weight  to  the  opposite  hand,  and  repeat  the  same  * 

Placing  one  hand  on  the  horse's  mane,  make  him  lean  down  to  each 
side  in  succession  till  he  reaches  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the 
ground. 

Vaulting  on  to  the  horse,  make  him  place  the  left  hand  high  up  on 
the  mane,  the  right  hand  swung  back,  but  in  the  jump  brought  to  the 
pommel  of  the  saddle. 

OflF  again  in  the  same  way. 

Never  when  mounting  with  stirrups  let  him  place  the  right  hand  on 
the  cantle,  for  with  an  unsteady  horse  he  can  not  »let  go  his  hold  to 
bring  the  leg  over,  and  may  be  thus  thrown ;  whereas,  by  accustoming 
the  man  to  put  his  right  hand  forward  on  the  pommel,  the  saddle  is 
always  open  to  receive  him. 

These  exercises  give  the  man  a  firm  hold  with  his  legs  on  the  horse, 
and  teach  him  to  move  his  limbs  without  quitting  his  seat. 

Then  take  him  in  the  circle  in  the  longe,  and,  by  walking  and  trotting 
alternately,  teach  him  the  necessity  of  leaning  with  the  body  to  the  side 
the  horse  is  turning  to — this  ia  the  necessary  balance  !  Then  put  him 
with  others  and  give  him  plenty  of  trotting,  to  shake  him  into  his  seat. 
By  degrees  teach  him  how  to  use  the  reins,  then  the  leg.  Then  put  him 
through  the  lessons  laid  down  for  remount  drill,  beginning  at  the  first 
lesson  bitted  {vide  the  Training  of  Remount  Horses),  and  going  regu- 
larly through  the  course,  exjilaining  to  him  the  object  of  each  lesson  as 
you  go  on.  In  three  or  four  months  the  soldier  of  common  abilities 
will  be  ready  for  his  further  education  at  squad  drill  (when  he  must  be 
taught  to  go  across  country). 

He  will  learn  to  ride  and  to  break  in  a  horse  at  the  same  time — a 
great  object  to  attain;  for  that  soldier  will  be  fit  the  next  season  to 
take  a  remount  horse,  and  by  pursuing  this  system,  all  dragoons  being 
rendered  equally  able  to  do  so,  they  could,  on  an  emergency,  prepare 
any  number  of  horses  for  the  field. 

I  would  insist  particularly  on  the  propriety  and  necessity  of  explain- 
ing everything  to  the  man  as  he  passes  from  step  to  step  in  his  instruc- 
tion.    School-boys  and  soldiers  have  been  too  long  taught  by  rote,  or 

*  Baucher, 


100  MILITARY   RIDING. 

without  any  proper  endeavor  to  make  them  understand  the  use  and  ob- 
ject of  what  they  arc  sot  to  learn.  Whatever  the  horse  may  bo,  the 
poor  soldier  is,  at  least,  a  rational  being,  and  no  good  soldier  will  ever 
be  made  without  awakening  his  intellect  and  reasoning  faculties. 

Write  up  in  golden  letters — or  in  letters  distinguishable,  and  easy  to 
read — in   every  riding-school,   and   in   every   stable :    "  Houses  are 

TAUGHT    NOT    BY  HAUSIINESS    BUT    BY  GENTLENESS."      WheX'e  the  officerS 

are  classical,  the  golden  rule  may  be  given  in  Xonophon's  Greek,  as 
well  as  in  English. 

The  ancient  Greeks  had  not  only  beautiful  horses  (originally  import- 
ed from  the  East),  but  they  had  also  great  skill  in  training  and  using 
them  as  well  for  the  saddle  as  for  the  raoing-car.  Although  that  short 
treatise  is  more  than  two  thousand  two  hundred  years  old,  there  are  ex- 
cellent lessons  in  Xenophon   "  On  Horsemanship." 

"  In  treating  a  horse,"  says  the  accomplished  Greek,  "  this  precept 
and  practice  will  be  found  best — Never  ill-use  him  through  anger.  For 
anger  frequently  excites  to  such  rash  and  inconsiderate  deeds,  that  they 
must  be  followed  by  repentance. 

"  When  a  horse  sees  anything  suspicious,  and  does  not  wish  to  ap- 
proach it,  he  should  be  made  to  see  that  there  is  nothing  hurtful  or 
fearful  in  it,  more  especially  if  he  be  a  high-mottled  horse;  and  if  this 
can  not  be  done  otherwise,  the  horseman  himself  must  touch  the  object 
exciting  terror,  and  lead  the  horse  gently  up  to  it. 

"  Those  who  force  horses  forward  with  blows  inspire  them  with  still 
more  terror.  For,  when  they  suffer  punishment  in  such  a  situation, 
the  horses  fancy  that  the  suspected  object  is  the  cause  of  it." 

The  whole  of  this  treatise  of  Xenophon  will  well  repay  any  one  the 
trouble  of  an  attentive  perusal.  This  veteran  soldier,  historian,  philoso- 
pher, and  most  elegant  writer,  evidently  loved  the  horse  with  enthusi- 
asm. On  opening  the  essay  he  says:  "As  it  has  fallen  to  my  lot,  from 
long  practice,  to  have  become  experienced  in  horsemanship,  so  do  I 
wish  to  point  out  to  my  younger  friends  how  I  think  they  can  use  their 
horses  most  properly." 


ELEMENTARY   DRILL,  101 

Chapter  V  II. 

ELEMENTARY    DRILL. 

The  power  of  cavalry  in  the  field  depends  upon  the  individual  effi- 
ciency of  the  horsemen  composing  it ;  infinite  care  should,  therefore,  be 
bestowed  on  their  training  and  teaching. 

Riding,  and  the  use  of  the  sword  and  rifle,  are  points  which  should 
be  brought  as  near  to  perfection  as  possible  in  the  education  of  the  dra- 
goon. 

The  field  movements  depend  upon  the  officers  ;  the  soldier  soon  learns 
to  act  his  part  in  them. 

The  steady  working  of  large  bodies  of  cavalry  depends  entirely  on 
the  steady  leading  of  the  officers,  and  that  again  depends  on  their  thor- 
ough knowledge  of  riding  pace,  the  soldier  naturally  conforming  to  it. 

After  the  men  have  been  taught  to  ride  in  the  riding-school,  they 
must  learn  to  ride  in  the  field,  and  to  handle  their  horses  properly  in 
the  ranks. 

To  do  this  they  begin  work  at  open  files ;  the  instructor  can  then 
watch  the  riding  of  each  individual,  and  t«ach  him  his  work  thoroughly. 

A  squad,  working  thus  at  open  files,  should  not  exceed  twenty  men, 
and  they  should  practice  the  following  work  : 

To  dress  up  singly  and  by  ranks  to  three  or  four  files,  which  have 
been  moved  up  from  either  flank  for  that  purpose,  at  a  walk,  trot,  and 
gallop ;  the  distances  to  be  varied,  and  the  proper  pace  to  be  strictly 
enforced ;  and  no  hurrying  allowed  at  any  cavalry  drill. 

To  pass  through  the  intervals  by  alternate  files  at  a  walk,  trot,  and 
gallop. 

Right  files  march,  halt. 

Left  files  march  through  the  intervals  between  the  right  files,  and  so  on. 
Then,  facing  the  files  toward  each  other,  repeat  the  same,  to  accustom 
the  horses  to  pass  through  opposing  lines.  When  practising  at  a  gal- 
lop in  all  these  drills,  give  the  word,  "  on  the  right  ley"  or  "  on  the  left 
leg,"  "gallop  march"  according  to  the  hand  to  which  the  dressing  is; 
thus  you  keep  up  the  breaking  of  the  horses. 

"  Sit  at  ease !" 
9* 


102  ELEMENTARY   DRILL. 

Files  in  succession  advance,  and  engage  on  the  right  and  left  rein. 

Files  from  the  opposite  flanks  ride  forward  at  a  walk,  then,  turning 
toward  each  other,  strike  off  at  a  gallop  on  the  right  leg,  the  sword  at 
the  engage ;  when  abreast  they  come  to  the  right  guard,  circle  round 
each  other,  both  simultaneously  ^'circle  and  change"  to  the  left  leg, 
and  engage  in  the  left  rein  with  the  hanging  guard  ;  they  file  outwards, 
and  the  next  two  files  follow, 

"Advance  in  line  !"  The  men  should  be  taken  over  broken  ground, 
no  hurrying  allowed,  and  the  pace  always  steadily  adhered  to. 

"  Wheeling  at  open  files,"  etc. 

Part  II. — Working  at  close  files  and  with  two  ranks.  The  men  are 
told  off  by  threes,-  no  other  telling  off  is  necessary. 

"  Mounting  and  dismounting,"  Instead  of  having  different  ways  of 
doing  it,  as  in  the  present  system,  it  is  best  done  at  all  times  as  laid 
down  in  H.  M.  Regulations  (p,  143)  for  dismounted  service. 

In  the  formation  by  threes  and  files  I  would  suggest  the  following 
alterations  : 

"Advance  by  threes  from  the  right :"  the  leading  threes  should  move 
up. 

"Advance  by  sections  from  the  right." 

Every  cavalry  soldier  should  move  in  the  column  at  the  same  mo- 
ment when  the  word  "  March"  is  given. 

This  is  impossible  according  to  our  manner  of  advancing  by  threes 
from  the  right.  No  man  in  the  squadron  can  move  till  the  leading  sec- 
tions have  cleared  the  front  of  the  following  sections  of  threes. 

The  leading  sections  of  threes  alone  move  at  the  word  "March,"  and 
each  man  in  the  column  follows  when  he  thinks  it  is  time,  or  when  be 
finds  room  to  do  so. 

"  Front  form."  The  troop  having  gone  threes  right,  they  are  to  form 
to  the  fronton  the  move. 

No  check  of  the  pace  should  be  laid  down  for  the  rear-rank  sections, 
which  always  reacts  on  the  column.  Rather  let  the  front-rank  sections 
inci'ease  their  pace,  the  leading  one  inclining  to  the  right  in  front  oi' 
the  rear-rank  section,  and  then  dropping  into  the  pace  of  the  column. 
Its  rear-rank  section  having  continued  to  move  steadily  on,  and  the 
pace  of  the  column  having  been  kept  up,  the  whole  formation  would 
flow  steadily  on  with  the  stream. 


ELEMENTARY   DRILL.  103 

Increasing  and  diminishing  the  front. 

Advancing  and  retiring  in  line. 

Inclining,  passaging,  and  reining  back. 

"  Dressing."  Always  make  the  cavalry  soldier  dress  up,  never  back. 
Thus  he  learns  to  halt  in  time,  in  approaching  the  line  he  is  to  dress  on. 

Piling  from  the  right  of  threes  to  the  front,  performing  sword  exer- 
cise on  the  move,  at  a  walk,  and  gallop. 

Ranking  past  by  single  files  at  a  walk,  trot,  canter,  and  at  full  speed. 

This  is  the  best  of  all  practice  for  cavalry  soldiers ;  it  keeps  up  the 
breaking  of  the  horses,  inspires  emulation,  brings  each  individual  un- 
der the  notice  of  his  officer,  and  makes  the  men  skilful  in  the  use  of 
their  arms  and  the  management  of  their  horses. 

On  the  caution,  "  Rank  past  by  single  files  from  the  right,"  the  troop- 
leader  places  himself  in  front  of  the  officer  on  the  right.  The  officer 
from  the  left  flank  rides  down  the  front  of  the  troop,  and  halts  when 
his  horse's  head  is  in  a  line  with  the  flank  file  on  the  right ;  his  duty  is 
to  make  the  men  close  well  up  to  the  point  from  which  they  rank  off. 

The  troop-marker  rides  out  at  a  gallop  from  the  right,  to  take  up  a 
position  for  the  men  to  file  to,  and  the  troop  eerrefile  places  himself  at 
ten  yards  from  the  right  flank,  facing  the  passing  line  toward  the  troop. 

Ranking  past  at  a  walk  is  done  at  one  yard  distance  from  head  to 
croup  ;  at  a  trot  and  a  canter  at  three  horses'  lengths ;  and  at  full  speed 
the  distance  is  thirty  yards. 

The  great  difficulty  in  ranking  past  at  a  trot  and  a  canter  is  to  get 
the  files  sufficiently  closed  up  to  the  passing  line  in  order  to  feed  the 
ranking  off;  and  for  this  reason  they  should  rank  off  first  a  front-rank, 
then  a  rear-rank  man ;  thus  both  ranks  close  to  the  passing  line,  and  the 
men  follow  in  quick  succession;  but  if  the  whole  of  the  front  rank  files 
off,  followed  by  the  whole  of  the  rear,  they  come  singly  to  the  passing 
line  instead  of  two  at  a  time,  and  have  to  leave  their  places  in  the  ranks 
at  a  trot  or  a  canter  ;  and  as  this  latter  pace  would  entail  a  change  of 
leg  in  coming  on  to  the  passing  line,  the  men  would  lose  their  distance, 
a,nd  the  horses,  instead  of  cantering  to  the  right  (when  cantering  past 
from  the  right),  would,  most  of  them,  be  on  the  left  leg,  as  they  would 
be  obliged  to  turn  to  the  left  to  get  into  the  alignment. 

On  the  caution  to  rank  past  at  "  speed,"  the  front  rank  draw  swordj, 
the  rear  rank  draw  or  unsling  carbines. 


104  ELEMENTARY    DRILL. 

A  third  marker  rides  at  twenty  yards  beyond  the  first  one,  and  thirty 
yards  from  the  flank  of  the  troop,  on  the  passing  line. 

The  men  walk  their  horses  the  first  ten  yards  to  No.  1  marker,  then 
strike  off  their  horses  at  a  canter  on  the  right  leg.  At  the  second  marker 
they  let  out  their  horses  to  full  speed,  bringing  the  swords  to  the  engage  ; 
tiien  perform  the  pursuing  practice,  endeavoring  to  reach  the  ground 
with  their  swords. 

They  must  be  told  to  give  the  horse  his  head  in  order  that  he  may 
run  straight,  which  he  will  do  if  they  do  not  sway  him  from  the  line 
on  which  ho  is  running,  by  standing  in  their  stirrups  and  balancing 
themselves  to  one  side  and  the  other. 

They  should  sit  well  down  in  the  saddle,  their  leg?  well  closed  to  the 
horae,  and  neither  seat  nor  legs  should  move ;  the  upper  part  of  the 
body  alone  moves  from  side  to  side,  and  leans  over  to  enable  the  man 
to  reach  an  onomy  on  the  ground. 

The  rear-rank  men  make  use  of  their  rifles  and  fire  with  blank  car- 
tridge at  a  sheet  of  paper  placed  on  the  ground  opposite  the  reviewing 
officer. 

An  officer  who  sees  a  regiment  of  cavalry  rank  past  at  a  walk,  trot, 
and  canter  to  both  hands,  as  well  as  at  speed,  can  at  once  tell  what  or- 
der that  regiment  is  in. 

He  can  judge  of  the  bridling  and  saddling. 

The  state  of  the  appointments, 

The  men's  seats  on  horseback. 

Their  riding  and  the  management  of  their  arms. 

The  condition  and  breaking  of  their  horses ; 

And  nothing  can  escape  him,  for  each  individual  in  the  regiment  is 
brought  under  his  notice.^ 

Formation  of  the  Troop. 

The  troop  is  the  tmit,  of  which  a  certain  number  form  the  regiment- 
It  is  perfect  in  itself,  and  requires  no  further  drill  but  its  own  to  en- 
able it  to  take  its  place  in  aline  or  column  and  do  its  part,  provided  the 
officers  are  acquainted  with  the  field  movements. 

*  On  tho  2d  of  August,  1852, 1  saw  a  squadron  of  Saxon  dragoons  (120  horses) 
rank  past  at  a  trot  without  one  horse  breaking  from  it,  and  rank  past  at  a  canter 
to  the  right  without  oue  horse  cantering  false  or  disunited. 


ELEMENTARY   DRILL.  105 

The  troop  should  be  drilled  by  its  officers. 

The  two  divisions  composing  the  troop  form  in  rank  entire,  accord- 
ing to  the  size-roll,  the  tallest  men  and  horses  being  on  that  flank  which 
will  be  the  inward  one  in  the  troop. 

The  officer  commanding  the  division  numbers  it  oflf  from  its  inward 
flank,  tells  off  the  rear  rank,  consisting  of  the  smallest  men  and  horsep, 
and  forms  two  deep  by  filing  or  reining  back  and  passaging.  If  the 
numbers  are  uneven,  he  leaves  the  last  man  but  one  on  the  outward  flank 
of  the  front  rank  uncovered. 

He  then  places  non-commissioned  officers  on  the  flanks  of  both  front 
and  rear  ranks ;  all  others  in  the  ranks. 

The  two  divisions  then  close  in  and  form  the  troop.  Divisions  hav- 
ing been  equalized,  the  troop  is  told  off  by  threes  from  the  centre,  no 
other  telling  off  being  necessary. 

Distribution  of  Officers  and  Non-commissioned  Officers. 

One-half  a  horse's  length  in  front  of  the  centre  (troop-leader). 

One  officer  on  each  flank,  dressing  by  the  front  rank. 

Troop  sergeant-major  in  rear  of  the  centre  (serrefile). 

Troop-marker  on  his  left. 

Two  trumpeters  on  the  flanks  of  the  rear  ranks,  covering  the  officers. 

At  open  order  the  officers  on  the  flanks  move  straight  out  and  dress 
on  the  troop-leader.     Trumpeters  take  their  places. 

The  troop  at  drill  should  be  practised  at — 

Ranking  past  by  single  files,  at  a  walk,  trot,  canter,  to  both  handa, 
from  the  right  or  left ;  as  also  at  full  speed  doing  the  pursuing  prac- 
tice. 

Advancing  by  files,  from  the  right,  of  threes,  and  performing  the 
sword  exercise  at  a  canter : 

All  formations  by  threes  and  files — wheeling,  increasing,  and  dimin- 
ishing the  front ; 

Dismounted  service ; 

Skirmishing ; 

Advancing  in  line  and  charging  ; 

Pursuing;  and 

Going  across  country  in  line. 

If  it  be  objected  that  I  give  the  horses  a  deal  of  work,  my  answer  is, 


106  INTERVALS. 

that  I  have  saved  them  a  deal  of  work  and  much  harsh  treatment  in 
the  riding-school.  My  chargers  are  not  worn-out,  but  fresh,  vigorous, 
»ad  full  of  work.  They  can  go  the  pace,  and  ought  to  bo  made  to  go 
it.  They  must  bo  brought  frequently  into  the  field.  Most  foreign  cav- 
airy,  when  the  gallop  sounds,  instead  of  increasing  their  rate  of  speed 
from  the  trot,  actually  decrease  it,  for  they  ride  the  collected  short  can- 
ter which  they  are  taught  in  the  riding-school,  and  only  gallop  when 
the  charge  sounds.  Matters  are  not  quite  so  bad  with  us,  but  we  shall 
not  get  a  proper  charge  out  of  our  young  soldiers  if  they  are  never 
taught  to  ride  at  speed  until  brought  into  action. 


Chapter  YIII  . 

ON  INTERVALS. 

'•  II  faut  donnor  peu  de  front  et  peu  de  profundeur  aux  escadrons,  pour  qu'ils 

»ient  de  la  celerit6  et  do  I'ensemble  dans  la  charge On  est  aouvent  redevable 

de  la  victoire  k  de  tres  petites  divisions  de  I'armee,  qui  saisiasent  I'instant  favor- 
able k  la  charge. 

"  Moins  le  front  aura  d'6tondue,  moins  le  desordre  sera  grand  et  frfequent." — 
Mottin  dc  la  Balmc. 

It  is  curious  with  what  jealousy  intervals  have  been  admitted  in  cav- 
alry, yet  many  charges  have  failed  in  consequence  of  the  confusion  and 
disorder  occasioned  by  the  want  of  them.  Horses  and  men,  exhausted 
by  the  pressure  against  each  other  in  an  advance,  can  effect  nothing 
when  they  join  issue  with  the  enemy. 

The  line,  once  on  the  move,  can  not  alter  its  direction,  and,  if  over- 
thrown, can  not  get  to  the  rear  without  carrying  its  second  lino  along 
with  it. 

Mottin  de  la  Balme,  a  very  distinguished  French  cavalry  officer,  was 
himself  in  a  charge  of  horse  at  the  Battle  of  Minden,  and  describes  it 
as  follows : 

"A  corps  of  English  infantry  having  dispersed  the  cavalry  in  its 
front  by  its  steady  fire,  the  corps  of  gendarmerie  and  carabineers  receiv- 


INTERVALS.  107 

ed  orders  to  charge.  Tbey  aclvauced  in  line  at  a  gallop  :  at  first  the 
centre  was  heavily  pressed  upon  by  the  wings,  then  the  pressure  relied 
back  to  the  flanks,  particularly  to  the  right  one. 

"  The  infantry  waited  till  we  were  close  upon  them,  then  opened  af  re 
from  the  centi-e  toward  the  flanks.  The  horses  made  desperate  cflTorts 
to  break  away  outward  and  avoid  this  fire. 

"  The  pressure  became  so  great  that  men  and  horses  upset  each  other 
and  rolled  about  in  helpless  confusion;  few  were  killed  by  gunshot 
wounds,  but,  with  the  exception  of  about  ten  men  in  each  squadroB, 
they  were  all  torn  off  their  horses'  backs,  trampled  to  death,  or  their 
limbs  broken.  The  few  that  remained  mounted  were  carried,  some  right 
through  the  enemy's  ranks,  others  to  the  rear  or  off"  the  field. 

"Had  the  advance  been  made  by  alternate  squadrons  we  should  have 
had  plenty  of  room,  the  advance  would  have  been  made  with  speed  and 
impetuosity,  the  horses  could  not  have  broken  away  to  the  right  and 
left,  and  the  English  infantry  must  have  been  ridden  over!" 

The  absolute  necessity  of  intervals  was  at  last  acknowledged,  and 
some  few  introduced,  precautions  being  adopted  at  the  same  time  to  re- 
inforce or  close  up  these  openings  by  placing  mounted  parties  behind 
them. 

In  some  services  these  intervals  vary  in  extent  from  four  to  twelve 
yards  between  each  squadron.  The  Austrians,  however,  put  two  squad- 
rons together,  which  they  call  a  division  (nominally  300  strong),  and 
leave  an  interval  of  twelve  paces  between  these  divisions. 

I  have  ridden  in  these  Austrian  divisions,  and  the  pressure  of  the 
horses  was  often  so  great  as  to  lift  me,  with  my  horse,  off  the  ground, 
occasioning  great  pain,  and  making  one  and  all  quite  helpless.  A  few 
resolute  horsemen  dashing  in  on  such  a  mass  would  throw  it  into  utter 
confusion. 

Where  the  ground  is  perfectly  level,  where  there  are  no  undulatione, 
no  natural  obstacles,  an  advance  of  squadrons  with  small  intervals  can 
be  made,  though  with  difiiculty,  particularly  under  fire,  when  the  horsea 
crowd  together  from  fear ;  but  if  the  country  is  rough,  broken,  or  in- 
tersected (which  most  countries  are),  it  is  impossible  to  advance  quick- 
ly and  preserve  order. 

When  pressure  takes  place,  it  rolls  on  and  on,  increasing  like  a  wave, 
till  it  runs  itself  out  at  the  first  open  interval;  but  squadrons  expoad 


108  INTERVALS. 

when  they  take  flight,  their  intervals  are  thus  closed,  the  waves  meet, 
break  the  line,  impede  its  advance,  and  throw  it  int-o  irremediable  con- 
fuaion. 

The  vicious  and  fiery  horses  contribute  not  a  little  to  this  result.  The 
pressure  drives  them  mad;  they  throw  themselves  against  each  other, 
burst  from  the  ranks,  or  press  out  the  weak  ones  from  the  line,  and 
many  become  so  exhausted  in  the  struggle  as  to  be  unable  to  keep  up. 

If  in  tactics  you  aim  at  the  greatest  precision,  the  consequence  of  the 
smallest  mistake  is  not  leaa  precision,  but  utter  confusion.  Thus,  to 
advance  in  line  with  small  intervals  and  large  squadrons  is  too  much 
to  expect  under  all  circumstances;  for  what  would  create  confusion 
when  standing  still  is  ten  times  worse  when  on  the  move.  Wounded 
men  go  to  the  rear;  wounded  horses  fall  or  break  from  the  ranks,  caus- 
ing confusion  and  difficulty  enough  without  stinting  the  men  for  room, 
which  makes  order  an  impossibility,  and  detracts  naturally  from  the 
flpeed  and  impulsive  power  of  the  cavalry. 

If  every  fifty  horsemen  had  an  interval  of  twelve  yards  in  the  ad- 
vance, their  natural  expansion  would  fill  up  one-half  of  the  intervals  ; 
the  remaining  half  would  prevent  their  crowding,  and  give  each  body 
sufficient  play  to  ensure  its  freedom  of  movement;  thus  they  could 
charge  over  the  most  difficult  ground  close  to  their  own  centre  (easily 
done  by  fifty  men),  and  dash  in  close  array  against  any  line  opposed  to 
them. 

A  charge,  even  on  good  ground,  is  seldom  executed  by  the  whole  line 
at  once;  the  enemy  is  reached  in  succession  by  different  points  in  the 
line  more  advanced  than  others.  It  is,  therefore,  of  the  greatest  conse- 
quence that  those  detachments  which  reach  the  enemy  first  shall  be 
compact,  and  go  at  him  as  one  man,  to  burst  through.  It  is  easily  un- 
derstood that  with  fifty  men  this  can  be  done ;  but  it  becomes  almost 
an  impossibility  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  two  hundred. 

I  should  therefore  form  each  troop  with  the  tallest  men  and  horses  in 
the  centre,  keep  it  up  to  twenty-five  files  in  the  field,  place  the  captain 
in  front,  the  subalterns  on  each  flank,  and  give  tbem  twelve  yards  inter- 
val in  line. 

All  formations  would  then  proceed  easily  and  freely. 

When  wheeled  into  oblique  ec-helon  they  would  not  overlap  each  other, 
nor  require  to  incline  to  clear  their  front  when  forming  line. 


INTERVALS.  109 

They  could  act  independently  when  necessary ;  and  when  required  lo 
act  in  concert  they  could  do  so  more  quickly  and  with  more  energy,  be- 
cause, as  they  can  both  see  and  hear  their  leader  at  all  times,  their 
efforts  would  be  concentrated  round  him. 

They  could  always  alter  the  direction  of  the  advance,  if  it  were  sud- 
denly found  necessary  to  do  so,  without  breaking  into  column. 

And  when  in  column,  they  could  work  with  greater  ease,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  additional  distance  which  the  interval  of  twelve  yards 
affords  from  the  troop  in  front. 

They  would  succeed  against  an  infantry  square  when  a  large  squad- 
ron might  fail,  because  they  could  advance  with  greater  speed.  The 
oflicers  on  the  flanks  could  prevent  their  opening  out  and  riding  round 
the  corners.  The  chances  of  being  hit  would  be  lessened  (both  by  speed 
and  the  smaller  number),  less  confusion  would  ensue,  and  the  men,  con- 
scious that  their  conduct  must  be  observed  by  the  officers,  would  do 
their  duty. 

Again,  if  four  such  troops  of  fifties  fell  in  with  an  enemy's  squadron 
of  two  hundred,  whilst  one  or  two  troops  attacked  in  front,  the  others 
would  fall  upon  his  flanks  or  rear;  or  during  the  time  that  the  great 
unwieldy  squadron  was  trying  to  form  line,  one  troop  of  fifty,  dashing 
in,  would  throw  it  into  disorder :  the  other  troops,  led  independently 
by  their  leaders,  might  then  choose  their  own  points  of  attack,  charge, 
and  overthrow  it. 

They  would  rally  more  quickly,  and  would  do  good  service  over 
country  which  would  entirely  disorganize  large  squadrons  in  an  advance. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  cavalry  to  be  numerous  to  achieve  success,  bu» 
bold,  resolute,  and  rapid. 

Kellermann  retrieved  the  Battle  of  Marengo  with  a  few  hundreds  of 
such  horsemen. 

On  the  third  day  of  the  Battle  of  Arcole  Napoleon  detached  Captain 
Hercule  and  fifty  dragoons  with  orders  to  gain  the  left  of  the  Austrian 
army,  and  charge  it  in  flank  whilst  he  attacked  in  front.  The  charge 
was  gallantly  executed,  and  contributed  greatly  to  the  success  of  the 
day. 

If  Napoleon  considered  fifty  horsemen  suJBBcient  to  attempt  a  charge 
against  the  wJtole  Atistn'an  army,  surely  the  same  number  of  horsemen 
will  be  found  sufficiently  strong  to  take  the  place  of  a  squadron  in  lice. 
10 


no  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

Chapter   IX. 

FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

•'  On  doit  chercher  sans  cesae,  avec  un  eoin  acrupuloux,  &  slmplifier  les  exercices 
de  la  cavalerio,  que  tant  d'innovatours  de  nos  jours  ont  mal-Jl-propos  compliqo^a. 
Oi^ns  ces  Tues,  il  faudra  n6cessairement  former  et  faire  combattre  cette  tronpe  8ar 
ua  front  pea  6tendu." — Mottin  de  la  Balmt. 

The  art  of  manoeuvring  consists  in  Attacking  your  enemy  at  his 
weak  point,  or  falling  on  whilst  he  is  in  the  act  of  deploying. 

The  field  movements  enable  you  to  manoeuvre  with  large  bodies  of 
men,  and  give  you  the  means  of  forming  them  quickly  on  a  given  point 
or  line  for  the  charge. 

How  many  times  might  a  successful  charge  have  been  executed,  how 
macy  times  a  victory  gained,  but  that  the  column  was  either  right  in 
front  when,  to  suit  the  emergency,  it  ought  to  have  been  left  in  front, 
or  the  reverse  ! — and  on  such  things  hangs  the  fate  of  battles. 

What  can  bo  more  preposterous  than  the  position  of  a  commanding 
oflScer  leading  a  column  into  action,  obliged  to  weigh  his  chances  and 
calculate  them  versus  right  or  loft  in  front,  or  which  is  the  pivot? 

Ft  must  make  an  olRcer  nervous,  when  told  to  advance,  to  think  that 
honor  and  renown,  death  or  disgrace,  may  depend  upon  the  choice  he 
makes  betiveen  the  right  flank  or  the  left  one. 

De  Brack,  in  r^peaking  of  some  field  movements,  not  forming  part  of 
the  drill-book,  says :  "  True  they  are  not  laid  down  in  the  regulations, 
but  they  are  necessary,  because  they  are  simple,  and  fulfil  the  grand 
requisite  in  war  for  cavalry,  that  of  being  able  to  front  promptly  in 
every  direction.  By  emergent  and  unexpected  movements  in  action 
the  order  of  the  squadrons  in  the  regiment  is  upset,  and  circumstances 
imperiously  require  you  to  manoeuvre  in  this  state  under  penalty  of 
annihilation." 

Almost  every  authority  on  cavalry  warfare  will  tell  you  the  same,  and 
yet  you  refuse  to  practise  in  peace-time  what  in  war  becomes  a  necessity. 
"When,"  says  De  Brack,  "by  a  sudden  emergency,  we  are  compelled 
to  form  a  line  in  which  the  squadrons  and  troops  no  longer  stand  as 
thoy  nave  been  accustomed  to,  we  arc  all  abroad,  and  hesitation  and 
daag'?r  onaue," 


PIVOT   FLANKS.  Ill 

Ic  Prance,  Colonel  Itier.  of  the  7th  Chasseurs  a  ofacval,  proposed  » 
eyetem  by  which  you  always  worked  and  formed  to  the  right:  this 
would  obviate  the  difficulty  of  choosing  between  the  one  and  the  other; 
and  as  it  would  bo  impossible  to  form,  except  in  the  one  way  laid  down, 
there  would  be  at  least  no  hesitation;  but  it  is  like  telling  a  man  who 
has  two  good  legs  to  use  only  one. 

Colonel  Itier  worked  by  divisions,  and  inverted  them  in  the  squadron, 
and  inverted  the  squadrons,  or  mixed  them,  in  the  brigades  and  divis- 
ions. He  had  a  close  and  an  open  column  of  divisions.  This  is 
etrangc,  for  you  never  can  close  up  divisions  eufBciently  to  get  your 
distance  for  wheeling  into  line.  The  Anstrians,  be  it  observed,  call  a 
column  of  divisions  a  close  column,  for  this  reason. 

These  pivot  flanks  and  right  or  left  in  front  have  been  &  plague,  a 
puztle,  and  a  cause  of  mischief,  to  all  military  men  ever  since  the  pe- 
riod of  their  first  introduction.  This  indisputably  being  the  ease,  is  it 
not  high  time  to  see  if  something  better  can  not  be  substituted  for 
them  ?  I  think  that  here,  as  in  every  other  matter  connected  with  the 
cavalry  service,  we  shall  find  our  best  chances  of  success  in  a  return  to 
simplicity.     What  is  easiest  is  generally  best  in  the  long  run. 

Tacticians  lay  down  as  law,  that 

The  component  parts  of  a  column  shall  always  follow  each  other,  a? 


d 

— and  that,  when  brought  into  line,  they  shall  stand  tbua: 
d         c         h         a 

"For  instance,  the  column  a,  b,  c,  d,  wishes  to  form  line ^ 

to  the  front :  it  can  do  so  to  the  left  of  a,  because  b  comes  ? 

on  the  left  of  a,  £_ 

c  to  the  left  of  b,  ^ 

d  to  the  left  of  o :  and  they  will  thus  stand  as  required  by  tacticians, 
namely : 


112 


FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 


But  they  can  not,  must  not,  form  to  the  right  of  a,  not  that  there  ia 
any  natural  impediment  in  the  way,  but  because  they  yfould  then  stand 
in  line  thus : 

abed 

Let  us  take  an  example. 

The  army  A,  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  expects  the  enemy  in  its  front. 
Intelligence  is  brought  of  the  enemy's  columns,  B,  moving  perpendicu- 
larly to  their  left  flank. 


The  army  at  A  immediately  marches  off  in  columns  to  the  left,  but„ 
instead  of  hitting  on  the  head  of  the  enemy's  columns  at  c,  the  enemy's 
columns  have  marched  so  quickly,  and  gained  so  much  ground  to  the 
rear,  that  the  A  army  strikes  upon  the  rearmost  divisions,  which  have 
been  brought  opposite  to  them  by  the  continued  march  of  the  B  army. 


TACTICS   A   PUZZLE. 


113 


B     . 


A  army  in  column,  left  in  front 

A  wishes  to  engage  B :  to  do  so,  he  must  form  line  opposite  B  bet-jvecn 
E  and  F.  Unfortunately  this  is  impossible :  he  is  left  in  front,  and 
must  bring  his  right  to  G :  as  he  can  only  form  line  to  the  front  between 
E  and  G,  he  can  not  bring  the  enemy  to  action. 

The  tactician  wants  to  measure  his  distances,  to  put  every  individual 
in  his  proper  place,  and  to  teach  him  what  he  has  to  do  j  some  little 
thing  goes  wrong,  and  the  whole  force  is  thrown  out — for  on  the  exact 
fitting  of  all  the  parts  depends  the  working  of  the  system.  The  tacti- 
cian is  drilled  and  drilled  till,  when  perfect,  he  can  do  nothing  bat 
what  he  is  ordered ;  he  loses  all  self-reliance,  and  in  an  emergency  can 
10* 


114  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

Dot  break  from  the  trammels  he  is  held  in;  but  the  less  perfect  tacti- 
'•ian  would  act  on  the  spur  of  the  moment. 

Tbe  knowledge  of  tactics  no  more  makes  the  general  than  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  number  of  syllables  required  in  verses  makes  the  poet.  Ge- 
nius alone  can  make  the  poet  and  the  general. 

The  real  general,  when  going  into  battle  seizes  on  all  the  advantages 
of  a  position,  on  the  openings  given  by  the  enemy,  as  if  by  inspiration  ; 
there  is  no  hesitation  j  ways  and  mea»s  arc  never  wanting. 

If  the  troops  ho  commands  are  capable  of  moving  under  fire,  he 
places  them  by  a  simple  movement  within  reach  of  the  foe.  He  quiet- 
ly waits  the  result;  sending  reinforcements  where  they  are  required, 
or  occupying  in  time,  and  in  strength,  positions  to  cover  his  retreat, 
should  the  day  go  against  him. 

Ziethon,  who  was  born  a  general,  whose  intuitive  perceptions  always 
led  him  right  in  battle,  never  got  on  well  at  the  complicated  sham-fighta 
held  by  Frederic  at  Potsdam  to  try  his  generals.  Frederic,  thinking 
that  a  little  working  up  in  tactics  would  do  Ziethen  good,  sent  for  him, 
tnd  examined  him  as  to  what  he  would  do  with  his  cavalry  under  cer- 
tain circumstances.  Ziethen  answered  very  quietl}' :  "Well,  I  don't 
know  just  now  ;  when  the  circumstances  h.ippen  in  the  held,  and  I  see 
the  enemy  before  mo,  somthoio  it  will  be  sure  to  occur  to  me." 

A  most  curious  instance  of  the  difficulties  to  which  this  system  of 
pivot  flank  leads  happened  before  the  Battle  of  Prague,  and  I  choose 
it  in  preference  to  any  other,  because  it  completely  puzzled  Frederic 
the  (freat,  himself  the  greatest  tactician  of  the  ago. 

The  night  before  the  Battle  of  Prague  Field-Marshal  Schwerin's 
army,  formed  in  two  lines,  broke  into  column  right  in  front ;  the  artil- 
lery between  the  columns,  the  cavalry  following  the  columns  formed 
by  the  second  line. 

The  king  marched  ofi"  left  in  front  in  two  columns,  the  infantry  in 
■jjuj,  the  cavalry  in  the  other. 

The  king  and  the  marshal  met  each  other  at  an  obtuse  angle  on  tha 
S^nmnd  whore  they  wore  to  form  :  and  General  Winterfeldt  marched  iu 
between  them  with  his  column  left  in  front. 

Marshal  Schwcrin's  columns  wore  destined  to  form  the  left  of  the 
army,  which  was  to  advance  by  its  left  against  the  enemy :  but  no  one 
knew  how  to  unravel  the  mass  without  great  loss  of  time :  at  last  the 


hi 


THE   DUKE    OP   BEVEEN.  115 

Dnke  of  Bevern,  with  great  presence  of  mind,  made  the  rear  of  each  of 
the  marshal's  columns  take  ground  to  the  reverse  flanks,  and  move 
forward  followed  in  succession  by  each  detachment  in  it.*  Thus  origi- 
nated one  of  our  field  movements — "  Rear  of  tho  column  to  the  front." 

But  if  an  enemy  came  on  suddenly,  this  manoeuvre,  like  many  more, 
could  not  be  performed,  and  serious  consequences  might  ensue.f 

We  will,  therefore,  have  no  pivot  flanks.  Troops,  when  in  line  or  in 
column,  shall  be  led  by  their  centre,  and  during  all  formations  by  their 
inward  flanks. 

The  troops  (except  on  parade,  when  they  fall  in  by  seniority)  take 
their  place  in  the  lino  of  battle  as  opportunity  ofibrs  or  necessity  re- 
quires.    No  inversion  is  possible.^ 

The  troop  is  tho  unit  of  any  number  of  which  the  regiment  may  be 
formed.  These  troops  file  or  move  by  threes  or  sections  from  either 
flank,  and  form  at  twelve  paces  interval  from  each  other  in  line. 

They  are  alike  in  every  respect;  it  makes  no  difference  where  they 
stand  in  the  regiment. 

The  troops  often  change  from  one  wing  to  another  during  the  move- 
ments ;  as,  for  instance,  the  regiment  is  in  lino  composed  of  the  follow- 
ing troops — a,  hf  c,  d,  e,  f — and  advances  in  double  column  from  the 
centre,  closes  up,  and  deploys  to  the  right;  the  troops  will  stand  in  line 
c  d  h,  e  af.  The  left  wing  is  now  composed  of  the  troops  e,  d,  b,  and 
the  right  wing  of  the  troops  e  a /.  This  makes  no  difference;  the 
troops  are  all  the  same  :  and  of  these  troops  a  certain  number,  not 
certain  troops,  form  the  wings. 

Troops  of  difi'erent  regiments  can  not  mix. 

Regiments  fall  in  by  seniority  on  parade,  but  take  their  places,  when 
manoeuvring,  according  to  circumstances. 

The  commanding  officer  gives  the  word  of  command,  and,  as  it  is  of 

*  Berenhorst. 

t  In  the  following  field  movements  proposed,  details  are  not  given,  for  such  de- 
tails are  matters  for  after  consideration. 

X  Fortunatelj-  the  English  cavalry  have  remained  organized  in  troops,  whilst  all 
continental  troops  are  in  squadrons,  which  they  bring  to  200  horses  and  upwards 
in  war-time.  To  be  oven  with  them  we  might  call  four  troops  a  squadron,  and 
two  troops  half  a  squadron.  Thig  would  facilitate  the  working  in  the  field,  partic- 
ularly if  all  regiments  had  two  such  squadrons,  or  eight  troops. 


116  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

great  consequence  to  have  as  little  noise  as  possible,  in  order  to  avoid 
confusion,  the  two  majors  or  wing-leaders  alone  repeat  that  word  of 
command,  and  ride  at  about  fifty  paces  in  front  or  on  the  flank  of  their 
wings. 

Their  trumpeters  alone  repeat  the  signals,  except  in  the  charge  and 
rally,  when  all  join  in. 

The  adjutant  rides  with  the  colonel;  the  superintendence  of  the  base 
is  confided  to  him. 

Markers  take  up  the  inward  points,  and,  instead  of  dressing  close  up 
to  them,  the  line  is  formed  at  some  distance  behind  the  markers. 

Troop-leaders  only  give  a  word  of  command  when  it  concerns  their 
own  troop. 

The  pivot  flank  is  that  v/hich  brings  the  cavalry  quickest  upon  the 
foe. 

The  commanding  ofiicer  is  hampered  with  no  conditions,  and  forms 
his  line  in  the  shortest  and  most  simple  manner  to  ensure  success. 

Paces. — From  the  halt  the  line  breaks  into  column,  or  the  column 
wheels  into  line  at  a  walk  or  a  trot. 

The  horses  are  only  knocked  about  and  excited  by  trying  to  do  it  at  a 
gallop  ;  the  distance  is  so  short  that  it  is  not  done  one  instant  sooner, 
but  rather  the  reverse;  because  in  doing  it  at  a  gallop  they  fly  out,  and 
have  to  close  in  or  rein  back. 

When  on  the  move,  all  wheels  are  made  at  an  increased  pace. 

The  trot. — For  manoeuvring  the  proper  pace  to  use  is  the  trot,  at  the 
rate  of  eight  miles  an  hour. 

The  canter. — A  distinct  line  should  be  drawn  between  the  canter  and 
the  gallop :  the  former  should  be  as  collected  and  as  short  as  possible. 
It  is  necessary  for  a  man  to  be  able  to  collect  his  horse  to  the  very 
slowest  pace  without  breaking  into  the  trot,  in  order  to  handle  him  in 
single  combat. 

They  should  have  plenty  of  practice  at  cantering  to  both  hands  not 
only  in  the  riding-school  but  at  drill,  by  ranking  past  by  single  files  to 
either  hand,  doing  the  sword  exercise  in  line  at  open  files,  etc. 

The  gallop  should  be  at  the  rate  of  fourteen  miles  an  hour,  and  sel- 
dom used  except  for  forming  line  to  the  front  from  an  open  column ; 
and  in  the  advance,  where  the  men  must  keep  it  up  across  country, 
without  pulling  at  their  horses  or  hurrying. 


CAVALRY   GETTING   OUT    OF    HAND.  117 

The  great  point  is  to  get  the  officers  to  take  up  the  pace  at  once,  and 
keep  to  it  steadily  throughout ;  that  is,  in  an  advance  at  a  trot  or  a 
gallop,  the  ofl&cers  ought  never  to  allow  the  rate  of  either  to  be  in- 
creased as  they  go  on,  otherwise  the  trot  would  soon  break  into  a  gal- 
lop, and  the  gallop  would  end  iu  the  men  going  oflf  as  hard  as  their 
horses  could  run. 

Cavalry  that  hurries  is  never  ready  when  wanted,  because  it  is  "  out 
of  hand."  All  hurrying  must  therefore  be  checked  at  once,  and  at  all 
times,  for  it  is  the  only  way  to  prevent  it  getting  "  out  of  hand :"  a 
fault  to  which  our  cavalry  has  always  had  a  tendency.  In  their  charges 
men,  and  even  officers,  would  often  dash  forward  during  the  advance, 
causing  the  alignment  to  be  lost,  and  breaking  the  power  of  the  charge. 
When  a  regiment  is  advancing  under  fire,  men  and  officers  get  excited, 
hurry  forward,  and  at  last,  goaded  on  by  the  shots  dropping  among 
them,  burst  from  all  control,  and  gallop  madly  toward  the  enemy. 

This  is  nothing  more  than  running  away  ;  though  it  is  running  for- 
ward inst-ead  of  back.  It  shows  the  same  want  of  soldier-like  endurance 
and  fortitude  under  trying  circumstances,  and  often  leads  to  defeat  and 
dishonor ;  for  they  all  get  out  of  hand,  scatter,  and  are  driven  back 
with  loss  bj'  the  enemy's  reserves. 

Men  and  officers  should  therefore  understand  that  to  gallop  forward 
because  the  enemy  are  in  that  direction  is  by  no  means  a  proof  of  val- 
or, but  often  the  reverse ;  and  such  conduct  ought  to  be  severely  cen- 
sured and  checked  on  all  occasions. 

General  Sohr,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  Prussian  cavalry  officers, 

was  keenly  alive  to  the  necessity  of  preventing  such  attempts  on  the 

part  of  individuals,  as  the  following  extracts  from  his  Life  will  show  : 

"  During  the  advance  of  the  Prussian  army  into  France,  on  the  3d  of 

February,  1814 : 

The  1st  Dragoons 4  squadrons 

The  Lithuanian  Dragoons  and  mounted  Riflemen. . .  .5  " 

The  3d  regiment  of  Hussars 5  *' 

The  Brandenburg  Lancers 4  " 

The  Mecklenburg  Hussars 4  " 

Total 22  squadrons. 

"This  force  marched  at  six  o'clock,  a.  m.,  on  the  high-road  to  Chalons  ; 


118  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

at  seven  they  fell  in  with  Sebastiani's  French  corps  of  cavalry  near  the 
village  of  La  Chaussee,  consisting  of  seven  regiments  of  cavalry,  chief- 
ly curiassiers  and  lancers,  lately  returned  from  Spain.  One  of  the 
greatest  cavalry  enagagements  of  the  campaign  now  took  place,  called 
the  Battle  of  La  Chaussee. 

"  General  Katzler,  seeing  that  the  enemy  (who  were  superior  in  num- 
bers) were  anxious  to  form  this  side  of  the  village,  gave  orders  to  fall 
upon  them  whilst  endeavoring  to  form  line,  and  we  were  hurried  for- 
ward to  the  attack,  for  the  rumbling  of  the  enemy's  artillery  was  dis- 
tinctly heard  coming  through  the  village,  and  our  general  would  not 
give  them  the  chance  of  getting  into  position. 

''  The  necessity  of  haste  and  bad  ground  prevented  all  the  regiment^ 
from  coming  into  line  and  charging  together.  It  therefore  resolved  it- 
self into  an  attack  in  echelon,  or  in  succession ;  but  each  regiment 
was  led  steadily  to  the  charge  by  its  commander. 

**  The  charge  was  carried  out  with  the  greatest  determination;  each 
regiment  pushed  eagerly  forward  to  close  with  the  foe. 

'•'We  had  the  advantage.  The  Brandenburg  regiment  of  hussar? 
was  lucky  enough  to  break  through  the  enemy's  centre  (composed  of 
cuirassiers)  and  to  make  many  prisoners,  though  they  fought  most  gal- 
lantly. ^Ye  captured  four  guus  and  two  ammunition  wagons  in  the  act 
of  preparing  for  action. 

"  The  enemy,  driven  through  the  village  of  La  Chaussee,  tried  to 
make  a  stand  on  the  other  side,  but  was  overthrown  and  pursued  some 
miles  towards  Paguy. 

"  The  engagement  lasted  till  dark.  General  Sohr,  then  in  command 
of  the  Brandenburg  Hussars,  displayed  great  coolness  and  energy  in 
the  figbt;  and  I  can  not  refrain  from  relating  what  took  place,  to  prove 
how  necessary  it  is  in  warfare  to  show  determination  at  all  times  and 
under  any  circumstances  in  order  to  keep  troops  in  hand. 

"Whilst  the  regiment  was  advancing  the  rash  behavior  of  one  of  the 
oflScers  had  nearly  caused  the  charge  to  fail. 

"The  gallop  was  sounded;  Count  v.  d.  S.,  a  lieutenant  who  had 
lately  joined  from  the  Saxon  cavalry,  wishing  to  distinguish  himself, 
brandished  his  sword  on  high,  called  to  the  men  to  follow  bim,  and 
dashed  forward  at  speed.  The  second  squadron,  which  began  to  follow 
him,  lost  its  place  in  line.     Sohr  immediately  ordered  the  trot  to  be 


THE    PASS   OF   ROTHKRETCHAM.  119 

sounded,  and  then,  waiting  till  the  whole  regiment  was  steady,  he 
sounded  the  gallop  and  the  charge,  the  only  means  by  which  he  coulu 
h'.<pe  to  break  through  the  enemy's  line.  When  the  engagement  was 
over  Sohr  called  the  oflacers  together,  and  addressing  himself  to  Lieut- 
enant V.  S.,  said:  'You  proved  to  us  this  day  that  you  have  lots  of 
pluck,  and  I  honor  those  who  have,  but  I  am  myself  no  "  Hundsfott," 
and  if  you  again  forget  yourself  as  you  did  this  day,  and  dare  to  inter- 
fere with  me  in  the  leading  of  the  regiment,  I  shall  cut  you  down  in 
front  of  the  line.' 

"  The  lesson  was  a  severe  one,  but  such  examples  seldom  fail  in  their 
effect. 

"  Once  more  Sohr  found  it  necessary  to  enforce  steadiness  in  his 
squadron,  but  on  no  subsequent  occasion  was  it  necessary. 

'•'  To  check  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  a  strong  rear-guard  was  pushed 
forward,  at  three  o'clock,  a.  m.,  from  Weissenberg  to  Wurschen.  The 
enemy  was  brought  to  a  stand  by  the  sudden  opening  of  our  artillery, 
and  more  than  an  hour  elapsed  before  he  received  suflBcient  reinforce- 
ments to  resume  the  offensive  and  drive  in  our  rear-guard. 

"  At  the  pass  of  Rothkretcham,  to  the  eastward  of  Weissenberg,  is 
BJi  arm  of  the  Lobaur  stream,  the  passage  of  which  was  hotly  contested. 
Sohr's  squadron  was  formed  in  the  plain  in  front  of  the  defile,  and  the 
enemy's  troops,  of  all  arms,  were  seen  pressing  forward  on  the  neigh- 
boring heights  to  the  north  and  westward.  When  our  rear-guard  had 
effected  its  retreat  through  the  defile,  Sohr  thought  it  high  time  to  do 
the  same,  and  gave  the  word  *  Divisions,  right  about  wheel — march  !' 

•'  The  enemy  was  near  at  hand,  and  the  divisions  wheeled  about  hur- 
riedly, and  almost  before  the  command  was  given. 

'•  The  experienced  leader,  who  had  an  eye  to  the  future  behavior  of 
his  squadron,  immediately  fronted  the  divisions  again,  and,  placing 
himself  at  their  head,  said;  *I  '11  have  you  all  cut  down  by  the  enemy 
rather  than  see  you  work  unsteadily.' 

"  Ho  faced  the  foe ;  not  a  sound  was  heard  in  the  squadron  ;  the  ene- 
my pressed  on;  and  their  artillery  opened  with  round  shot  on  the  defile 
in  his  rear,  cutting  up  the  ground  on  both  sides  of  the  devoted  band. 
The  sudden  fronting  and  bold  attitude  of  Sohr's  squadron  fortunately 
led  the  enemy  to  suppose  that  supports  were  at  hand,  and  they  ordered 
a  flank  movement  to  turn  his  position.     His  situation  became  more 


120  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

critical  every  moment  be  remained,  for  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  now 
coming  up — still  not  a  movement  was  perceptible  in  the  squadron  till, 
turning  his  horse  toward  them,  he  gave  the  word  in  his  peculiarly 
measured  way : 

"  *  Divisions ',...'  right  about  wheel  '....*  Walk ' '  March ' 

'  Threes  right ! '  and  in  a  voice  of  thunder  he  added,  '  At  speed ! ' 

'March  !*  'Ride  as  hard  as  you  can  !'  The  defile  was  passed  almost 
together  with  the  enemy.  Never  again  did  his  squadron  hurry.  In  the 
hour  of  danger  the  hussars  looked  with  confidence  to  their  leader,  and 
*  were  in  band.'  "* 

.  Field  movements  are  of  two  sorts,  namely  :  those  which  are  made  use 
of  when  close  to  and  immediately  before  engaging  the  enemy,  and  those 
used  when  not  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  danger. 

The  first,  an  open  column  of  troops,  ready  to  form  in  the  shortest 
manner  to  front,  rear,  or  flanks. 

The  head  of  each  column  under  its  own  commanding  oflBcer. 

Each  separate  body  in  the  column  under  its  own  leader,  and  of  any 
number  of  such  separate  bodies  the  column  is  composed. 

Thus,  if  surprised,  they  act  for  themselves,  and  may  still  win  the  day. 

All  open  columns  should  bo  formed  of  troops;  the  troops  kept  up  to 
twenty-five  files. 

Columns  of  smaller  front  have  many  disadvantages  which  are  not 
compensated  for  by  the  only  real  advantage  they  possess,  namely  :  that 
of  saving  the  horses  some  work  in  the  wheeling,  as  they  cover  less 
ground  than  the  column  of  troops. 

In  columns  of  divisions  there  is  great  difficulty  in  keeping  the  dis- 
tances ;  you  never  can  get  them  sufficiently  closed  up,  even  on  a  pjjrade- 
ground,  and  when  they  are  closed  up  sufficiently  the  rear  rank  of  the 
preceding  divisions  is  always  in  the  way  in  wheeling  into  lino. 

Divisions  have  been  used  in  preference  to  fours  and  threes  when  un- 
der fire,  because  no  tellings  off  ai*e  required. 

The  column  of  divisions  is  simply  moved  off  its  ground  to  disengage 
the  dead  and  wounded. 

But  it  must  be  remembered  that  formerly  troops  were  told  off  in  four 

*  Aus  dem  Leben  des  K.  Prexissischcn  General-Lieutenant  Frederick  v.  Sohr,  by 
H.  Beitzke,  Major  A.  J).    Published  in  Berlin,  1846. 


THE   OPEN   COLUMN.  121 

or  five  ways,  and  this  by  the  sergeant  riding  down  the  ranks,  pointing 
with  his  sword  to  each  man,  and  first  telling  him  whether  he  was  a 
centre  or  left  by  threes,  then  a  right  or  left  by  files,  and  so  on  :  this  was 
a  tedious  operation. 

Men  tell  themselves  off  now,  and  that  in  an  instant,  particularly  as 
the  only  necessary  telling  off  is  by  threes ;  and  old  soldiers  will  go 
threes  right  and  left  without  any  telling  off. 

A  column  of  divisions  is  of  all  columns  the  worst  for  going  quickly 
across  country ;  they  are  so  close  to  each  other  that  no  obstacles  can  be 
avoided  or  cleared.  It  is  like  a  close  column.  In  dry  weather  the  dust 
has  no  time  to  be  carried  away  by  the  wind.  It  is  most  difficult  to  hear 
the  words  of  command.  A  sudden  check  throws  such  a  column  into 
confusion,  and,  if  attacked,  the  divisions,  trying  to  form  troops  and 
then  squadrons  to  be  under  their  legitimate  leaders,  would  detract  greatly 
from  the  chances  of  success. 

All  these  things  considei-ed,  I  should  prefer  the  column  of  troops,  and 
only  use  divisions  when  a  troop,  out  skirmishing  or  otherwise  detached, 
requires  a  support  to  its  advanced  parties. 

The  advantages  of  the  column  of  troops  are  numerous ;  some  of  them 
are  set  forth  in  the  chapter  on  Intervals;  the  others  will  become  appa- 
rent as  we  proceed  with  our  field  movements. 

All  formations  from  the  open  column  must  be  made  toward  the  foe ; 
that  is,  the  back  of  no  single  horseman  in  it  should  be  turned  on  the 
enemy  during  the  execution  of  the  movement. 

Should  the  enemy  attack  during  a  formation  made  toward  him,  no 
great  harm  is  likely  to  ensue;  the  troops  would  meet  him  in  succession, 
and  charge  whilst  following  out  the  line  of  formation. 

The  column  forms  line  to  either  flank  by  wheeling  into  lino,  or  form- 
ing in  succession  to  either  flank. 

It  forms  to  the  front  either  right  or  left,  as  ordered,  the  commanding 
oflicer  always  placing  himself  and  giving  the  word  of  command  on  that 
side  to  which  the  troops  are  to  form ;  one  note  of  the  trumpet  signify- 
ing "  right,"  two  notes  "  left,"  which  signal  should  always  precede  the 
word  of  command. 

Majors  shift  their  flank  with  the  commanding  officer. 

Formations  to  the  rear  are  done  by  wheeling  troops  right  or  left  about, 
and  proceed  as  above. 
11 


122  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

Tn  forming  line  from  column  a  flank  is  brought  up  or  thrown  back  by 
the  commanding  ofl5cer  placing  the  base  troop,  and  giving  a  caution, 
before  the  word  "March,"  to  bring  up  or  keep  back  the  flank  forming. 
When  the  head  of  a  column  has  changed  direction,  line  may  be  form- 
ed on  the  new  alignment  to  either  hand ;  the  rear  of  the  column  either 
coming  up  in  oblique  echelon,  or  going  threes  outwards. 

When  not  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  line  may  be  formed 
on  any  central  point  of  the  column,  the  adjutant  marking  the  troop  on 
which  the  formation  is  to  take  place ;  all  the  remaining  troops  wheel  to 
the  hand  to  which  the  formation  is  ordered,  and  those  in  front  of  the 
base  are  then  put  threes  about :  thus  all  possibility  of  a  mistake  is  ob- 
viated. 

When  advancing  against  an  enemy  in  the  open,  do  so  by  double  or 
single  contiguous  open  columns,  either  of  wings  of  regiments  or  of 
regiments  ;  you  thus  avoid  the  disadvantage  of  a  single  column,  which 
requires  time  to  form  line  to  the  front. 

A  column  of  troops  in  passing  a  defile  breaks  into  threes,  and  reforms 
on  coming  out;  breaking  into  threes  does  not  lengthen  the  column,  and 
the  interval  of  twelve  yards  will  prevent  any  check  being  given,  which 
would  most  likely  occur  in  breaking  into  divisions,  and  again  in  break- 
ing from  divisions  into  threes. 

It  would  be  an  immense  advantage  to  have  all  these  things  done  one 
way  J  of  course  when  the  passage  is  too  narrow  to  admit  of  threes,  the 
column  must  halt  and  break  off  by  sections  or  files. 

Double  open  columns,  under  the  existing  system,  have  the  advantage 
over  a  single  column  that  they  extend  over  only  half  the  ground,  line 
is  more  quickly  formed,  and  words  of  command  more  easily  heard. 

The  objections  are,  that  their  greater  extent  of  front  makes  thorn 
unwieldy,  and  they  require  more  favorable  ground  to  work  on ;  they 
can  not  show  a  front  to  the  rear  without  first  forming  line  to  the  front, 
and  they  can  not  break  into  single  column. 

I  propose  that,  in  order  to  make  this  column  useful,  it  can  be  formed, 
as  it  is  now,  from  line  or  from  a  close  column  by  simply  opening  out, 
or  from  contiguous  open  columns  by  closing  two  such  columns  to  each 
other. 

It  forms  single  column  by  the  troops  on  the  loft  halting  and  inclining 
to  the  right,  and   reforms  double  column  in  the  same  way  by  the  alter- 


DOUBLE    COLUMN.  128 

nate  troops  moving  up  to  the  left  at  an  increased  pace.  They  form  con- 
tiguous open  columns  by  opening  out  from  each  other.  The  double 
columns  can  thus  suit  their  movements  to  any  ground  :  for  instance,  an 
obstacle  in  front  of  a  double  column  obliges  them  to  open  out  to  avoid 
it,  the  enemy  suddenly  appears,  and  they  act  as  contiguous  columns  :  if 
contiguous  columns  closed  in  to  each  other,  for  the  same  reason  they 
are  then  ready  to  act  as  a  double  column. 

A  double  column  threatened  suddenly  in  flank  wheels  the  troops  on 
that  side  into  line ;  the  other  wing  may  wheel  into  line  also,  and  follow  as 
a  support,  form  in  succession,  or  move  on  till  clear,  and  form  echelon,  etc. 

It  forms  line  to  the  front,  or  either  flank;  and  by  wheeling  troops  to 
the  right  or  left  about  it  is  ready  to  form  to  the  rear  in  the  same  way 
as  to  the  front. 

Double  columns  are  useful  in  passing  defiles;  but  each  regimenl 
should  form  its  own  double  column  and  follow  in  succession;  for,  by 
forming  double  column  from  the  centre  of  a  line  of  cavalry  the  regi- 
ments are  mixed,  and  if  attacked  by  the  enemy  before  they  have  re- 
formed line  it  will  go  hard  with  them. 

On  issuing  from  a  defile  it  may  be  found  necessary,  after  the  first 
regiment  has  formed,  to  bring  the  next  following  to  form  on  its  right 
or  left,  which  could  not  be  done  if  what  had  debouched  of  the  column 
was  composed  of  the  half  of  a  regiment  from  the  right  flank  and  of 
half  a  one  from  the  left  flank. 

The  object  must  always  be  to  get  into  line  quickly,  since  the 
"charge"  follows;  therefore  always  obviate  the  chances  of  losing 
time,  for,  with  the  loss  of  time,  the  chances  of  success  are  alway.s 
diminished. 

In  going  into  a  defile  it  is  impossible  to  give  orders  as  to  how  to 
form  on  the  other  sidej  this  must  depend  upon  the  enemy's  arrange- 
ments to  receive  you. 

The  formation  must  be  made  parallel  to  the  line  of  attack  ;  circum- 
stances are  not  always  favorable;  the  ground  may  be  bad.  The  officer 
commanding  has  no  time  for  consideration,  but  must  form  and  charge 
to  try  and  keep  the  debouche  open  for  those  following. 

This  can  be  done  very  well  if  regiment  succeeds  regiment  in  double 
column,  the  colonel  leading,  his  majors  on  the  right  and  left,  each  in 
front  of  his  wing;  thus  each  regiment  is  ready  to  act  at  once  in  any 


124  FIELD   MOVEMENTS. 

part  of  the  field,  on  either  flank  :  and  in  case  of  disaster  each  regiment 
being  together  is  more  easily  rallied  and  reformed. 

To  rally  quickly  is  of  vital  importance,  and  for  this  reason  it  is  a 
great  mistake  to  assimilate  the  uniform  of  all  regiments,  for  it  adds 
greatly  to  the  difficulty  of  rallying  in  presence  of  an  enemy. 

In  some  of  the  Prussian  regiments  each  squadron  has  different 
facings,  to  facilitate  their  rallying  in  battle. 

In  the  Danish  service  they  distinguish  the  squadrons  in  the  regiment 
by  a  badge  worn  on  the  breast. 

But,  whether  it  be  done  by  color  of  the  jacket,  by  facings,  by  badges, 
or  by  any  other  method,  I  certainly  consider  it  a  primary  necessity 
that  our  cavalry  regiments  should  be  markedly  and  strongly  distin- 
guishable, even  at  a  distance,  by  their  several  uniforms,  in  order  that 
the  rally  be  not  impeded. 

Close  columns  are  chiefly  for  the  assembly  of  troops  or  reserves  :  to 
bring  them  in  the  neighborhood  of  an  enemy  would  be  dangerous,  for 
they  can  not  show  a  front  to  their  flanks,  and  consequently  can  not 
protect  them.  If  the  enemy  attacked  the  head  of  a  close  column,  and 
at  the  same  time  gained  its  flanks,  the  close  column  would  be  destroyed, 
for  it  could  not  develop  its  strength. 

Thus,  when  approaching  the  enemy  in  an  enclosed  country,  where  a 
surprise  might  be  attempted,  close  columns  must  open  out  and  form 
double  or  single  open  column. 

The  only  occasions  on  which  close  columns  may  be  used  advan- 
tageously for  fighting  are  when  a  regiment  is  surprised  in  the  open  and 
cut  ofi"  from  its  supports  by  a  superior  force.  It  should  then  collect 
into  a  compact  body,  make  a  gap,  and  cut  its  way  through. 

Light  cavalry  regiments  have  acted  successfully  in  close  column 
against  lines  of  heavy  cavalry  advancing  to  the  charge,  their  object 
being  to  break  the  array  and  take  the  heavies  singly  in  the  melee  :  to 
do  this  while  the  adverse  lines  were  advancing  toward  each  other,  the 
lights  suddenly  formed  a  close  column  on  their  centre  at  a  gallop,  and 
at  once  bore  down  on  the  centre  of  the  line :  thus  avoiding  the  charge, 
breaking  through  the  line  of  heavies,  and  throwing  them  into  con- 
fusion, they  spread  out  on  their  flanks  and  rear,  and  attacked  them 
singly  and  with  an  advantage.* 

*  De  Brack. 


CLOSE  COLUMN.  125 

Cavalry  may  be  brought  up  in  close  column,  if  its  flanks  are  pro- 
tected and  its  deployment  covered  by  a  powerful  artillery,  but  under  no 
other  circumstances. 

The  front  of  a  close  column  should  be  composed  of  two  troops  in 
line,  with  the  interval  of  twelve  yards  between  them.  Always  keep 
the  front  of  the  leading  squadron  clear  both  in  forming  and  deploying, 
except  when  it  is  necessary  to  form  or  deploy  on  a  central  squadron. 

In  forming  close  column  to  the  right,  all  squadrons  go  in  rear  of  the 
right  one,  and  vice  versa  to  the  left. 

In  forming  on  a  central  squadron  the  right  squadrons  form  in  front, 
those  on  the  left  in  rear  of  it,  whatever  the  number  of  squadrons  or 
regiments  may  be. 

Now,  let  there  be  any  number  of  regiments  in  close  column,  the  offi- 
cer commanding  requires  a  line  to  the  right. 

"Deploy  to  the  right."  All  go  threes  right,  except  the  squadron 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  which  gives  the  base.  To  the  left,  tiV< 
versa. 

Perhaps  the  general  wishes  to  deploy  from  a  central  point,  bringing 
more  squadrons  to  one  flank  than  to  the  other :  for  instance,  he  has 
three  regiments  in  one  close  column,  and  wishes  to  deploy  two  regi- 
ments to  the  right  and  one  to  the  left. 

"  Deploy  to  the  right  on  the  second  regiment."  The  leading  squad- 
ron of  the  second  regiment  is  the  base,  there/ore  all  in  rear  of  it  go 
threes  right  (the  hand  named). 

The  first  regiment  is  in  front  of  the  base,  and  goes  by  threes  to  the 
opposite  flank  named  for  the  deployment,  and  this  is  the  rule,  namely  : 

All  squadrons  in  rear  of  the  base  go  by  threes  to  the  hand  named 
for  the  deployment. 

All  squadrons  in  front  of  the  base  go  by  threes  to  the  hand  not 
named. 

If  the  general  requires  two  regiments  on  the  left,  and  one  on  the 
right— 

"  Deploy  to  the  left  on  the  second  regiment."  Leading  squadron, 
second  regiment,  is  the  base j  all  in  rear  of  it  "  threes  left"  (the  hand 
named). 

The  first  regiment,  which  is  in  front  of  the  base,  "threes  right"  (the 
hand  not  named). 
11* 


126  FIELD    MOVEMENTS. 

Thus  the  officer  commanding  requires  no  knowledge  of  how  the 
columns  were  formed  to  unravel  them  at  once  in  any  direction. 

When  a  close  column,  composed  of  more  than  one  regiment,  requires 
to  front  to  the  roar,  it  must  be  countermarched  by  ranks  in  each  troop, 
because  it  would  take  up  too  much  time  and  require  too  much  space  to 
open  out  such  a  column ;  but  contiguous  close  columns  of  regiments 
are  opened  to  double  column  distance,  all  simultaneously  wheeled  right 
about  by  troops,  and  then  closed  up  again. 

Countermarching  is  one  of  those  movements  ne^er  to  be  employed 
when  near  an  enemy. 

When  regiments  in  close  column  are  made  use  of  on  the  field  tlioy 
should  never  be  formed  in  one  column,  but  in  columns  of  regiments 
either  contiguous,  at  deploying  distances,  in  echelon  or  echiquier  (al- 
ternate) ;  thus  they  at  once  become  available  for  any  emergency  by 
opening  out  to  double-column  distance. 

Echelon  and  contiguous  open  column. — The  combinations  of  which  the 
echelon  and  contiguous  open  column  are  capable  greatly  simplify 
manoeuvring,  and  supersede  the  necessity  of  many  field  movements. 

They  should  not  be  formed  of  less  than  wings  of  regiments  ;  when 
.smaller  they  do  not  unite  the  samo  advantages. 

Changes  of  position  by  threes  or  oblique  echelon  of  troops  are  ob- 
jectionable, because  the  moment  of  formation  is  always  a  weak  though 
an  unavoidable  one  for  cavalry  :  the  more  ground  the  formation  extends 
over  the  greater  the  danger,  and  to  avoid  this  you  should  bring  your 
troops  in  columns  close  to  the  line  of  formation  before  giving  the  order 
to  form. 

Changes  of  position  are  best  executed  by  a  combination  of  the  eche- 
lon and  contiguous  column. 

Single,  double,  and  close  column  can  all  be  formed  at  once  from 
either. 

Changes  of  front  should  bo  executed  on  the  same  principle  as  laid 
down  in  Her  Majesty's  Regulations. 

The  advance  in  line. — This  has  generally  been  considered  as  simple 
enough ;  yet  it  has  long  appeared  to  me  that  the  arrangements  made 
for  the  direction  of  an  advance  in  line  are  insufficient  and  faulty. 

All  manoeuvres  are  preparatory  only  to  the  advance ;  and  when  the 
line  is  formed  and  launched  forward  on  the  enemy,  if  he  is  suddenly 


ADVANCE   IN   LINE.  127 

found  to  be  on  the  right  or  left  front  instead  of  straight  before  the  ad- 
vancing line,  it  is  too  late  to  alter  the  direction  on  the  move,  and  to 
halt  is  dangerous  ,•  what  with  the  difficulty  of  hearing  words  of  com- 
mand, particularly  when  under  fire,  and  the  impossibility  of  seeing 
what  the  base  squadron  is  doing,  the  cavalry  can  not  easily  be  brought 
to  bear  straight  down  upon  the  foe. 

The  squadron  leader  often  loses  sight  of  the  base  altogether;  it  is 
buried  in  the  ranks,  and,  being  on  the  same  line  with  him,  he  can  not 
distinguish  by  the  position  of  their  horses  whether  they  are  inclining 
toward  him  or  from  him. 

If  the  base  squadron  changes  the  direction  of  the  advance  toward 
him,  he  first  becomes  aware  of  it  by  being  run  into  and  pushed  out  of 
his  place  in  line. 

If  the  base  squadron  changes  direction  away  from  him,  he  is  left 
suddenly  a  long  way  behind. 

The  constant  endeavor  to  watch  the  base  makes  him  often  increase 
the  pace  of  the  squadron  unnecessarily,  and  obliges  him  to  pull  up  as 
suddenly  when  he  finds  that  he  has  overshot  the  mark ;  the  constant 
looking  sideways  renders  it  difficult  for  him  to  lead  the  squadron  on  a 
straight  line. 

I  think  there  ought  to  be  a  guiding  power  established  independent  of 
all  words  of  command,  and  so  arranged  that  the  commanding  officer 
might,  through  it,  influence  the  movements  and  direction  of  the  whole 
line  at  once. 

This  could  be  done  effectually  bj'  a  very  simple  arrangement. 

The  adjutant  places  himself  twenty-five  to  fifty  paces  (according  to 
the  extent  of  the  line)  in  front  of  the  centre  of  the  regiment;  the  two 
troop-markers  of  the  centre  troops  gallop  out  and  place  themselves  at 
five  paces  interval  on  his  right  and  left,  and  raise  their  swords ;  form- 
ing a  conspicuous  group  visible  to  all. 

The  adjutant  (who  rides  with  the  colonel)  knows  what  point  he  is  to 
lead  on.     He  is  answerable  for  the  pace. 

Troops  dress  to  their  centre,  and  the  two  centre  troops  of  the  line 
keep  exactly  behind  the  base,  conforming  to  their  movements. 

When  the  colonel  wishes  the  direction  altered  he  has  only  to  ride  up 
and  toll  the  adjutant,  who,  with  his  flankers,  at  once  circles  into  the 
new  direction,  all  of  them  pointing  to  it  with  their  swords  until  it  has 
been  taken  up  by  the  line. 


128  FIELD   MOVEMENTS. 

The  troops  on  the  flank  which  is  brought  up  increase  their  pace,  those 
on  the  pivot  flank  slacken  the  pace. 

When  the  charge  sounds,  the  base  drops  into  a  walk  till  picked  up  by 
the  line. 

It  would  not  do  for  the  colonel  or  the  field  officers  to  lead,  because 
their  services  are  required  elsewhere. 

They  must  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy  and  look  after  their 
troops. 

The  majors  ride  on  the  prolongation  of  the  line  given  by  the  base, 
and  repeat  the  signals  by  pointing  with  their  swords  in  the  new  direc- 
tion :  this  is  done  by  all  the  officers. 

Thus  without  a  word  being  spoken  a  line  could  be  led  at  once  into 
the  direction  required,  and  the  principle  could  be  carried  out  with  bri- 
gades and  divisions. 

The  line  is  advancing  at  a  trot — a  change  of  direction  is  made  half- 
right  by  the  base. 

All  the  troops  wheel  into  the  new  direction,  and  those  on  the  right  of 
the  centre  drop  into  a  walk  and  incline  to  the  right. 

The  base  troop  on  the  left  of  the  centre  keeps  up  the  pace  of  the  ad- 
vance, the  trot  J  all  troops  on  its  left  increase  to  a  gallop,  and  drop  into 
the  trot  when  in  the  alignment. 

The  base  troop  on  the  right  of  the  centre,  and  all  on  its  right,  keep 
on  at  a  walk  till  the  line  comes  up  to  each  in  succession,  when  they 
resume  the  trot. 

At  a  walk  the  troops  on  the  right  would  halt,  those  on  the  left  come 
up  at  a  trot. 

In  the  advance  in  line,  the  direction  of  the  advance  is  the  important 
point,  and  not  the  perfect  alignment  of  the  squadrons.  So  long  as  every 
horse's  head  is  turned  straight  toward  the  point  of  attack,  it  really 
matters  little  whether  one  squadron  be  or  be  not  a  few  horses'  lengths 
in  advance  or  in  rear  of  the  line.  This  is  the  common-sense  view  of 
the  matter.  Keep  your  alignment  as  perfect  or  as  neat  as  you  can,  but 
do  not  make  sacrifices  to  obtain  the  end,  and,  above  all,  think  of  your 
direction. 


GENERAL  RULES.  129 

Chapter   X. 

CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

"Good  riding  and  skill  in  the  use  of  the  9\vord  are  the  fundamental  points  of 
all  cavalry  tactics." — General  de  Brack. 

General  Bides. 

I.  Always  form  so  as  to  have  your  front  clear  as  well  as  your  flanks, 
unless  protected  by  woods,  gardens,  enclosures,  etc.,  occupied  by  j'our 
troops. 

IL  If  you  have  a  position  to  defend,  form  in  rear  of  it. 

III.  Never  attack  without  keeping  part  of  your  strength  in  reserve. 

IV.  Let  your  formations  extend  in  depth,  not  in  length;  with  large 
bodies  of  cavalry,  attack  with  one-fourth  of  your  strength;  protect 
your  flanks,  follow  up  successes,  or  reti'ieve  reverses  with  the  re- 
mainder. 

V.  Conceal  your  movements  where  the  nature  of  the  ground  will 
admit  of  it;  where  not,  still  endeavor  by  your  speed  to  surprise  the 
enemy. 

VI.  Never  put  a  line  of  cavalry  threes  about  to  retire  in  the  face  of 
an  enemy;  they  get  out  of  hand,  and  are  not  easily  stopped. 

VII.  Never  attack  with  more  troops  than  necessary  to  the  object  in 
view. 

VIII.  When  possible,  always  reconnoitre  the  ground  over  which  you 
are  going  to  charge,  to  ascertain  that  there  are  no  impassable  obsta- 
cles. 

*  IX.  Charges  on  a  large  scale  should  seldom  be  attempted  against 
masses  of  troops  of  all  arms,  unless  they  have  been  previously  shaken 
by  the  fire  of  artillery. 

X.  Always  watch  for  and  try  to  seize  the  right  moment  for  attack. 

XI.  Cavalry  should  not  be  brought  into  action  too  early  in  the  day. 

XII.  Cavalry  is  best  employed  on  an  enemy's  flanks. 

N.  B.  Three  of  these  rules  were  neglected  by  Brigadier  Pope's 
brigade  of  cavalry  at  the  Battle  of  Chillianwalla,  namely :  Rules  III, 
IV,  VL 


130  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

Rule  III.  They  had  no  reserve. 

Rule  IV.  The  four  regiments  of  cavalry  composing  the  brigade  were 
all  formed  in  one  line. 

Rule  VI.  The  line  was  put  threes  about,  and  could  not  be  stopped. 
Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. — The  most  difficult  position  a  cavalry  officer 
can  be  placed  in  is  in  command  of  cavalry  against  cavalry,  for  the 
slightest  fault  committed  may  be  punished  on  the  spot,  and  a  reverse 
lead  to  the  most  disastrous  consequences. 

When  acting  against  the  other  arms,  a  failure  is  by  no  means  irre- 
parable, because  their  movements  are  comparatively  slow. 

Cavalry  caught  in  the  act  of  forming  must  generally  bo  overthrown 
if  its  adversary  profit  by  the  opportunity.  » 

Avoid,  therefore,  all  manoeuvring  when  within  reach ;  advance  in  the 
order  of  attack;  and  if  forced  to  make  a  change  in  your  dispositions, 
do  so  quickly,  and  so  as  to  keep  the  front  of  your  leading  troops  clear, 
in  order  that  they  may  charge  should  the  enemy  attempt  to  interfere. 

When  precluded  by  the  nature  of  the  ground  from  forming  line  be- 
fore advancing  to  the  attack,  advance  in  columns  of  little  depth,  in 
order  to  form  quickly  and  unexpectedly  on  that  point  where  you  wish 
to  strike ;  but  to  execute  a  movement  of  this  sort  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy  is  dangerous,  and  requires  confidence  and  skill,  unless  supported 
by  the  fire  of  artillery. 

A  cavalry  officer  must  know  how  to  mask  his  intentions,  and  how  to 
show  a  front  quickly  under  all  circumstances ;  for  seldom  do  you  come 
upon  the  enemy  in  the  precise  position  you  expected  to  find  him;  nor 
will  he  easily  give  you  an  opportunity  of  carrying  out  a  preconcerted 
plan  of  attack;  the  slightest  move  on  his  part  will  oblige  you  to.make 
a  counter  one,  and  that  without  hesitation. 

The  eye  must  scan  the  distance  between  you,  and  you  must  feel  cer- 
tain that  you  have  time  to  carry  out  a  movement  before  attempting  it, 
for  to  be  too  late  would  entail  defeat. 

And  here  I  would  observe  that  the  eye,  both  of  men  and  officers, 
ought  to  be  previously  and  assiduously  practised  in  measuring  dis- 
tances. One  man  well  accustomed  to  use  his  eye  in  this  way  will  tell  at 
a  glance  the  distance  between  himself  and  any  given  object,  or  will  err 
only  by  a  few  yards  or  feet  j  another  man,  without  the  habit,  will  make 
the  wildest  guess.     In  the  military  schools  of  France  they  make  this 


CAVALRY    VERSUS    CAVALRY.  131 

training  and  practising  of  the  eye  a  regular  part  of  the  officer's  educa- 
tion. So  ought  it  to  be  with  us,  although,  apparently,  no  one  seems  to 
have  given  the  matter  a  thought.  To  the  cavalry  officer  the  eye  is  the 
most  valuable  of  all  the  organs,  and  in  him  everything  ought  to  be 
done  to  develop  its  faculty  and  power. 

Marching  on  a  parallel  line  to  that  of  the  enemy  in  open  column,  to 
wheel  up  and  charge,  is  a  simple  good  movement,  and  sometimes  takes 
the  enemy  by  surprise;  but  it  is  not  always  safe  for  you  to  expose  your 
flanks.  In  such  a  case,  if  the  enemy  approaches,  you  must  at  once 
wheel  into  line  those  troops  that  are  opposite  the  foe;  the  rear  troop? 
continue  their  march  behind  the  line  and  form  up  in  succession ;  or  you 
advance  to  the  charge  with  the  troops  wheeled  up,  whilst  the  rear  of 
the  column  wheel  into  line  also  and  form  your  support. 

An  officer  leading  cavalry  into  action  should  name  some  officers  or 
non-commissioned  officers  (well-mounted)  to  precede  the  column  and 
reconnoitre  the  ground  over  which  the  attack  is  likely  to  be  made. 

If  the  enemy  is  in  sight,  these  officers  should  gallop  straight  toward 
him,  approaching  as  near  as  they  can  without  running  the  risk  of  be- 
ing captured,  and  make  themselves  masters  of  any  feature  in  the  ground 
which  may  be  turned  to  advantage,  or  prevent  their  own  troops  from 
attempting  to  charge  over  obstacles  which  might  lead  them  to  destruc- 
tion. 

Cover  your  movements  and  protect  your  flanks  with  skirmishers,  and 
reinforce  them  according  to  circumstances  when  within  reach  of  the 
enemy.  Under  the  protection  of  your  skirmishers  watch  the  adversa- 
ries' movements.  The  officers  with  the  skirmishers  must  keep  a  good 
lookout  on  the  flanks,  so  as  not  to  overlook  any  movement  toward  them, 
favored  by  the  ground,  or  covered  by  a  village  or  other  enclosures.  By 
a  manoeuvre  of  this  sort  the  French  cavalry  were  defeated  by  the  Aus- 
trians  at  Wurzburg.  The  Archduke  Charles  sent  fourteen  squadrons  of 
hussars  to  turn  a  village  while  the  French  were  advancing  to  attack 
his  cuirassiers ;  the  hussars  allowed  the  French  line  to  pass  the  village 
in  their  advance,  then  galloped  in  on  their  rear,  and  did  great  execu- 
tion. 

When  ordered  to  attack,  take  the  initiative,  and,  when  advancing 
against  a  superior  force  likely  to  outflank  you,  keep  troops  in  reserve 
behind  your  flanks  with  orders  to  act  as  circumstances  require.     Thus 


132  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

having  secured  your  flanks,  and  being  backed  up  by  a  reserve,  fall  on 
without  hesitation  at  the  favorable  moment — such  as  a  change  in  the 
dispositions  of  the  enemy,  when  they  are  in  unfavorable  ground,  or 
when  they  are  suffering  from  the  fire  of  your  artillery. 

The  enemy  may  try  to  take  you  in  flank  or  surround  you,  but  while 
taking  ground  to  the  right  or  left  for  that  purpose  he  exposes  his  own 
flank,  and  the  troops  behind  your  flanks  must  take  him  in  the  fact  while 
you  charge  home. 

"A  manceuvre,"  says  De  Brack,  "  which  is  often  attended  with  suc- 
cess, when  two  lines  are  watching  each  other,  is  to  make  a  squadron 
break  forth  in  column  from  behind  one  of  your  flanks  (or  the  flank 
squadron  itself),  and  press  forward  as  if  to  turn  the  enemy's  flank. 
They  will  immediately  wheel  into  column  to  prevent  this  j  then,  at  once, 
sound  the  gallop,  and  bear  down  upon  them.  This  manoeuvre  is  the 
art  of  war  in  miniature." 

A  fine  example  of  steadiness  and  resolution  was  shown  at  the  Battle 
of  Blenheim  (1704)  by  a  British  regiment  of  cavalry  (the  carbineers) 
in  the  early  part  of  the  action,  just  after  the  great  attack  on  Blenheim 
village,  which,  though  our  infantry  could  not  force  it,  was  eventually 
cut  off,  as  it  were,  from  the  French  line  by  the  occupation  of  the  line 
outside,  and  a  large  body  of  French  infantry  was  pent  up  within  its 
enclosure  and  rendered  useless. 

"  The  Duke,"  says  Kane,  "  having  thus  secured  himself  on  that  side, 
ordered  Colonel  Palmes  with  three  squadrons  to  pass  over  the  brook,  who, 
meeting  no  opposition,  drew  up  at  some  distance  from  the  marshy 
ground,  and  gave  room  for  our  lines  to  form  behind  him.  The  Duke 
followed  Palmes :  the  mills  were  attacked,  but  those  that  were  in  them, 
set  thorn  on  fire  and  made  off.  Both  the  cavalry  and  infantry  which 
the  Duke  kept  with  him  (not  above  ten  squadrons  and  twelve  battalions) 
passed  over  as  well  as  they  could,  and  formed  as  fast  as  they  got  over. 
Tallard  all  this  while,  as  a  man  infatuated,  stood  gazing,  without  suffer- 
ing either  great  or  small  shot  to  be  fired  at  them  ;  only  when  he  saw 
Palmes  advanced  toward  him  he  ordered  five  (some  say  seven)  squad- 
rons to  march  down,  and  cut  those  three  squadrons  to  pieces,  and  to 
return.  The  oflicer  that  commanded  the  French  squadrons,  as  soon  as 
he  got  clear  of  the  lino,  ordered  the  squadrons  on  his  right  and  left  to 
edge  outward,  and  then  to  wheel  in  on  the  flanks  of  Palmes ;  which 


CAVALRY    VERSUS    CAVALRY.  133 

Palmes  perceiving,  ordered  Major  Oldficld,  who  commanded  his  right 
squadron,  and  Major  Creed,  who  commanded  that  on  the  left,  to  wheel 
outward,  and  charge  the  squadrons  coming  down  upon  them  ;  and,  not 
in  the  least  doubting  their  beating  them,  ordered  them,  when  they  had 
done  that,  to  wheel  in  upon  the  flanks  of  the  othev.^.  while  he  at  the 
same  time  would  charge  them  in  front.  Accordingly  everything  suc- 
ceeded, though  with  the  loss  of  some  bravo  men,  and  Major  Creed 
among  them ;  so  that  these  three  squadrons  drove  their  five,  or  seven, 
back  to  their  army.  This  was  the  first  action  in  the  field,  which  took 
up  some  time,  and  gave  the  Duke  an  opportunity  to  form  his  lines."* 

With  a  large  body  of  cavalry  it  is  difficult  to  gain  an  enemy's  flank, 
but  with  small  detachments  the  opportunity  often  occurs.  Cavalry  offi- 
cers, when  they  see  a  good  chance  given  them  by  the  enemy,  should 
never  wait  for  a  better  one. 

If  the  enemy's  cavalry  have  to  clear  a  ditch,  a  hollow  way,  or  any 
other  obstacle  in  their  front,  let  them  attempt  it,  and  fall  on  before  they 
have  recovered  their  order  or  resumed  the  speed  of  their  advance. 

A  cavalry  engagement  is  seldom  decided  by  a  single  charge,  but  the 
advantage  remains  with  those  who  have  the  last  reserve  of  fresh  troops 
at  their  disposal :  this  generally  turns  the  fortune  of  the  day. 

Large  corps  of  cavalry  are  now  generally  formed  in  three  lines — the 
first  line,  the  second  line,  pnd  the  reserve. 

Now  suppose  a  second  line  of  cavalry  deployed  according  to  rule, 
with  intervals  of  twelve  paces  between  squadrons.  The  first  line,  of 
one  thousand  or  twelve  hundred  horsemen,  with  horse  artillery,  are  de- 
feated and  pursued  by  the  enemy.  Si.! outing  at  tho  hotly  pursued 
fugitives  will  never  make  them  diverge  from  the  straight  line,  their  short- 
est and  safest  road,  nor  induce  them  to  ride  round  the  flanks,  nor  can 
they  by  any  possibility  escape  with  guns  and  tumbrila  through  the 
small  openings  left  in  the  second  line. 

The  second  line  could  not  advance  unless  its  front  was  clear,  and, 
seeing  the  enemy  rushing  upon  them  without  the  possibility  of  charg- 
ing against  him,  they  would  probably  turn  and  gallop  for  it. 

The  first  line  alone  should  be  deployed. 

The  second  line  formed  in  double  open  columns,  the  two  flank  col- 
umns outflanking  the  first  line. 

*  Lord  de  Ros,  "  The  Young  OfiBcer's  Companion." 
12 


134  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

Each  column  could  easily  clear  its  own  front  and  break  through  the 
crowd.  Should  the  enemy  continue  the  pursuit  of  the  first  line,  by  de- 
taching the  rear  troops  outward  they  would  fall  upon  the  enemy's  rear, 
and,  galloping  with  thorn,  destroy  them  in  the  pursuit. 

These  columns  could  act  at  once  when  they  had  the  chance,  for  in  the 
confusion  it  would  be  utterly  hopeless  to  expect  one  effort  of  the  whole 
line  at  once. 

Reserves  in  columns  in  rear  of  the  centre  would  be  in  the  best  posi- 
tion to  detach  reinforcements  when  they  were  needed. 

If  the  first  line  succeeds  in  the  attack,  the  columns  of  the  second  are 
ready  to  advance  and  support,  whereas  if  in  line  they  must  first  break 
into  column,  and  thus  lose  much  precious  time. 

When  a  first  Hue  is  not  considered  strong  enough  to  attack  the  enemy, 
the  reserve  joins  the  second  line:  both  deploy  and  advance  together, 
the  first  line  passing  through  their  intervals  to  the  rear  and  forming 
the  reserve. 

The  difficulty  of  advancing  with  a  long  line,  and  the  danger  of  being 
driven  back  at  all  points  at  once,  make  it  advisable  to  use  echelons  in- 
stead of  attempting  to  charge  on  a  large  front  in  line. 

Echelons  are  useful  when  debouching  from  a  defile  to  support  troops 
already  engaged  or  defeated;  also  to  pass  through  intervals  and  attack 
a  line  made  unsteady  by  the  fire  of  infantry  or  artillery,  and  fall  on 
without  giving  them  time  to  restore  order. 

The  echelon  should  not  be  formed  of  less  than  a  wing,  or  it  would 
hardly  take  effect  against  an  enemy's  line :  further,  wings  can  break 
into  echelons,  columns  of  troops,  contiguous  double  and  single  open 
columns,  and  thus  become  handy  in  every  way. 

Some  of  the  advantages  of  an  advance  in  echelon  are: 

You  at  once  avail  yourself  of  an  opening  given  by  the  enemy,  and 
charge  without  waiting  to  form  line. 

You  can  attack  one  of  his  wings,  or  any  other  point  in  his  line,  with- 
out engaging  all  your  troops  at  once;  the  enemy  can  not  attempt  to 
attack  the  flank  of  the  charging  echelon  without  exposing  his  own  to 
your  succeeding  echelon. 

If  the  first  one  is  defeated,  you  support  it;  whereas,  if  successful, 
you  arc  almost  sure  to  defeat  your  adversary,  because,  when  the  remain- 
der of  his  line  advances  against  you,  the  first  victorious  echelon  falls 
upon  his  flank  and  rear. 


ADVANTAGE   IN    ECHELON.  135 

After  a  successful  charge,  rally  forward,  picking  up  the  stragglers  aa 
you  go  on.  If  you  sound  the  recall  you  lose  time  and  bring  the  men 
twice  over  the  same  ground. 

When  rallied,  attack  the  flauk  which  has  been  exposed  by  the  defeat 
of  your  opponents. 

General  Boussard,  at  the  Battle  of  Llerida,  charged  the  Spanish 
horse,  formed  on  the  left  of  the  line,  with  the  13th  regiment  of  cuiras- 
siers, and  overthrow  them  ;  then  bringing  up  his  right  shoulders,  he  fell 
without  hesitation  on  the  Spanish  infantry,  which,  taken  in  flank,  was 
ridden  over,  and  fifty-six  hundred  of  them  were  made  prisoners. 

Cavalry  seldom  meet  each  other  in  a  charge  executed  at  speed  :  the 
one  party  generally  turns  before  joining  issue  with  the  enemy,  and  this 
often  happens  when  their  line  is  still  unbroken  and  no  obstacles  of  any 
sort  intervene. 

The  fact  is  every  cavalry  soldier  approaching  another  at  speed  must, 
feel  that  if  they  come  in  contact  at  that  pace  they  both  go  down,  and 
probably  break  every  limb  in  their  bodies. 

To  strike  down  his  adversary  the  dragoon  must  close,  and  the  chances 
are  he  receives  a  blow  in  return  for  the  one  he  deals  out. 

There  is  a  natural  repugnance  to  close  in  deadly  strife.  How  seldom 
have  infantry  ever  crossed  bayonets  !  some  authors  say  jievcr  !  and  cav- 
alry soldiers,  unless  they  feel  confident  in  their  riding,  can  trust  to  their 
horse,  and  know  that  their  weapons  aro  formidable,  will  not  readily 
plunge  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  ranks. 

Lines  advancing  to  meet  each  other  have  shown  hesitation  at  the 
same  moment,  thus : 

lu  the  retreat  of  our  army  from  Burgos,  three  squadrons  of  French 
chasseurs  charged  some  squadrons  of  our  rear-guard;  these  advanced 
to  meet  them;  both  lines  pulled  up  close  to  each  other  and  stood  fast, 
till  one  of  the  French  made  a  cut  at  the  man  opposite  to  him,  upon 
which  both  lines  instantly  plunged  forward  and  engaged  ;  the  colonel 
of  the  chasseurs  was  killed,  most  of  his  ofiBcers  were  wounded,  and  the 
French  were  driven  back  with  a  heavy  loss. 

The  flanks  of  each  troop  should  be  closed  up  by  officers,  for  it  is 
generally  from  the  flanks  that  men  ride  to  the  rear. 

Cavalry  with  an  army. — When  cavalry  is  assembled  in  large  bodies, 
it  is  for  the  purpose  of  striking  a  decisive  blow. 


136  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

Natural  obstacles,  as  well  as  the  diflBculty  of  breaking  througb 
masses  of  infantry,  often  prevent  cavalry  from  closing  with  the  foe. 

Infantry  now  fight  on  all  sorts  of  ground ;  a  level  plain  is  no  longer 
sought  for  as  a  field  of  battle ;  and  in  an  enclosed  country  cavalry  is 
required  to  act  as  an  auxiliary  to  infantry,  or  a  protection  to  artillery, 
and  must  be  scattered  in  small  bodies  to  effect  this. 

Thus,  to  be  prepared  for  all  emergencies,  it  has  been  customary  to 
add  a  regiment  of  cavalry  to  each  division  of  infantry,  to  serve  as  a 
support  in  battle,  and  to  seize  upon  and  follow  up  any  advantage 
gained. 

The  remainder  of  the  cavalry  is  then  formed  in  reserve,  either  in 
rear  of  the  centre  or  both  flanks  of  the  second  line. 

Cavalry  must  act  independently  once  it  starts  for  the  charge;  the 
fire  of  infantry  and  artillery  may  pave  the  way  before,  or  even  during 
the  attack,  but  there  must  be  no  hesitation  when  the  cavalry  advances 
to  the  attack;  kept  back  till  the  right  moment,  when  it  breaks  forth, 
let  it  be  to  fight. 

The  Battle  of  Mockern,  fought  on  the  16th  of  October,  1813,  affords 
a  striking  example  of  tho  results  obtained  by  a  small  body  of  horse- 
men well  commanded  and  brought  forward  at  the  proper  moment. 

This  battle,  so  glorious  to  General  Torek's  corps,  was  more  particu- 
larly 80  to  Colonel  Sohr,  who,  while  the  battle  raged  around  him, 
waited  steadily  till  the  enemy  gave  him  a  favorable  opportunity,  and 
charging  that  instant  with  determined  bravery,  turned  the  scale  in 
favor  of  his  country,  and  chained  victory  to  the  Prussian  standard. 

The  possession  of  the  village  of  Mockern  was  desperately  contested 
on  the  part  of  the  French,  and  though  tho  Prussians  at  last  carried  it, 
they  could  not  pass  out  on  the  other  side,  the  enemy  having  established 
powerful  batteries  on  the  heights  beyond. 

One  battery  of  fifteen  heavy  guns  spread  death  and  destruction  in 
the  village  itself;  fresh  troops  pressed  forward  on  both  sides  to  the 
attack,  until  on  the  Prussian  side  one  brigade  only  was  available  (it 
was  commanded  by  Colonel  Steinmetz).  These  men  General  Yorck 
threw  into  the  scale ;  they  so  far  re-established  the  fight  as  to  enable 
the  Prussians  to  hold  their  own  in  the  village  and  maintain  the  ground 
on  the  right,  but  they  gained  no  decided  advantage. 

What  was  now  to  be  done  ?     The  only  fresh  troops  on  the  ground 


BATTLE    OF    MOCKERN.  137 

were  the  cavalry  reserves  under  Colonel  Jlirgas,  in  position  near 
Wahren,  but  it  was  no  use  ordering  them  up  while  the  enemy  was 
fresh  and  unshaken. 

Sohr,  with  three  squadrons  of  hussars,  had  been  detached  early  in  the 
day  to  support  the  right  flank  of  the  infantry,  and  stood  in  column 
between  two  ridges  to  avoid  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  ;  their  shells, 
however,  obliged  him  to  shift  his  ground  a  little  to  the  left  of  the  road. 

At  this  time  the  French  again  drove  part  of  the  Prussian  infantry 
back  into  the  village,  and  established  themselves  in  force  in  the  houses 
and  enclosures. 

General  Yorck  rode  up  to  Sohr  and  said :  ''  If  the  cavalry  can  not 
do  something  now,  the  day  is  lost !  Advance,  sir,  and  charge."  Sohr 
drew  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  he  had  no  reserve  to  fall  back  upon 
in  case  of  defeat,  the  cavalry  being  still  in  rear  of  the  centre.  "An 
aide-de-camp  was  sent  oflf  to  order  them  up,  and  the  general,  as  he 
was  riding  oflf,  directed  Sohr  to  try  and  make  our  infantry  hold  their 
ground  till  the  cavalry  came  up;  while  doing  so,  Major  Schack  came 
again  with  an  order  to  charge.  Sohr  answered :  *  Toll  the  general  I 
am  only  waiting  a  favorable  opportunity ;  this  he  must  allow  me  to 
choose;  I  will  then  charge,  and,  on  the  honor  of  a  soldier,  I  '11  charge 
home.'  " 

The  enemy  had  now  advanced  so  close  that  a  charge  of  bayonets 
against  the  Prussian  infantry  was  expected  every  moment.  "Wrapped 
in  clouds  of  smoke  they  came  on  firing,  and  Sohr  could  tell  only  by 
the  whistling  of  the  bullets  that  they  were  quite  near  enough.  He 
passed  through  the  line  of  retreating  infantry,  formed,  and  with  three 
cheers  burst  upon  the  advancing  enemy,  rode  over  and  dispersed  them, 
pursuing  them  into  their  own  batteries.  He  captured  six  pieces  of 
cannon  at  the  first  onset. 

The  enemy's  cavalry,  indeed,  rushed  down  to  the  rescue,  but  a  regi- 
ment of  lancers  from  the  reserve  had  now  joined,  and  they  advanced 
together  and  overthrew  the  French,  the  lancers  pursuing  them,  while 
the  hussars  attacked  the  infantry  formed  in  squares  to  receive  them, 
broke  into  three  squares  in  succession,  and  captured  nine  pieces  of 
cannon;  after  which  they  joined  in  the  pursuit  and  followed  the  enemy 
close  up  to  Leipzig,  inflicting  on  him  a  severe  loss  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  prisoners. 
12* 


138  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

An  oflficer  in  oommand  of  cavalry  must  know  what  he  intends  doing; 
this  he  mihst  carry  out  with  energy  and  resolution,  for  under  vacillating 
commanders  no  cavalry,  however  brave,  will  do  any  good  in  the  field. 

A  commanding  officer  should  not  remain  in  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  his  corps,  but  ride  forward  to  watch  the  progress  of  events, 
and  be  ready  to  seize  a  favorable  opportunity  for  employing  cavalry, 
as  well  as  to  guard  against  surprise ;  and  in  either  case,  unless  he  have 
orders  to  the  contrary,  he  should  act  at  once. 

The  reserves  should  be  placed  out  of  sight  and  sheltered  from  the 
fire  of  the  enemy,  ready  to  follow  up  a  first  success ;  without  them  no 
pursuit  can  bo  kept  up,  for,  when  exhausted,  a  handful  of  fresh  troops 
would  destroy  the  pursuers  and  turn  victory  into  defeat. 

As  a  general  rule,  cavalry  should  not  be  brought  into  action  too 
early  in  the  day,  unless,  indeed,  a  favorable  opportunity  offers;  then,  of 
course,  make  the  most  of  it.  It  should  be  held  in  hand  to  decide  the 
victory,  to  retrieve  lost  ground,  to  cover  a  retreat,  and  save  the  army 
from  the  loss  of  artillery,  etc.;  and  for  any  serious  exertion  fresh  men 
and  horses  are  absolutely  necessary. 

Attach  and  defence  of  positions. — Before  attacking  an  enemy's  posi- 
tion, as  much  artillery  as  can  bo  collected  should  concentrate  its  fire 
on  that  part  of  the  enemy's  line  on  which  the  charge  is  to  be  executed, 
and  the  guns  placed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  allow  of  their  keeping  xip 
their  fire  during  the  cavalry  advance.  If  the  charge  fail,  they  draw 
off  to  the  flank,  and  the  artillery  reopens  its  fire. 

To  repulse  an  attack  of  this  sort,  form  part  of  the  cavalry  ready  to 
attack  them  in  front,  but  so  as  to  avoid  crossing  the  lino  of  fire  of 
your  own  guns;  with  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  take  up  a  position 
to  attack  them  in  flank.  "Wait  till  the  enemy  has  suffered  from  the  firo 
of  your  infantry  and  artillery  in  his  advance,  then  fall  upon  him  in 
front  and  flank  simultaneously.  If  you  succeed  in  overthrowing  him, 
keop  him  going,  give  him  no  time  to  reform,  drive  him  pell-mell  into 
his  own  position,  enter  it  with  him,  and  spread  confusion  everywhere; 
your  second  line  following  up  the  success,  and  detaching  parties  to 
attack  the  gunners  wherever  they  see  an  enemy's  battery,  while  the 
reserves  follow  slowly  and  prepare  to  cover  your  retreat  in  case  of 
accidents. 

Throwing  cavalry  forward  on  an  enemy's  front  succeeds  when  the 


GREAT  CAVALRY  ATTACK  AT  EYLAU.      139 

enemy  is  disheartened  by  previous  defeats  or  disorganized  tbrough 
other  causes.  But  to  throw  cavalry  forward  against  an  enemy's  posi- 
tion is  a  dangerous  experiment,  particularly  when  they  have  cavalry 
in  band  to  let  loose  upon  you.  Should  the  attack  fail,  it  may  then 
result  in  the  total  defeat  and  destruction  of  the  attacking  force. 
Sometimes  it  may  be  necessary  to  make  the  attempt.  For  instance,  at 
tbe  Battle  of  Eylau,  Augereau's  corps,  formed  in  columns  of  attack, 
and  supported  by  a  powerful  artillery,  advanced  against  the  centre  of 
the  Russian  position.  Augercau,  both  his  generals  of  division,  and 
several  other  general  officers,  were  wounded,  some  of  the  regiments 
nearly  annihilated  by  the  destructive  fire  of  the  Russians  and  theif 
charges  of  cavalry  and  infantry.  The  entire  loss  of  this  corps  (th© 
seventh)  was  imminent,  and  its  total  destruction  was  averted  only  by 
the  timely  advance  of  the  French  cavalry.  Napoleon  sent  them  ail 
forward,  under  Murat  and  Bessieres,  to  disengage  Augereau,  and  make 
a  general  attack  on  the  Russian  position.  This  remarkable  charge 
was  executed  by  seventy  squadrons  of  cavalry,  the  flower  of  th-* 
French  array.  They  fell  straight  upon  the  Russians,  broke  through 
their  two  first  lines;  but  the  Russian  cavalry  reserves,  consisting  of  a 
hundred  squadrons,  fell  upon  the  scattered  squadrons  of  the  French, 
and  drove  them  back  with  immense  loss,  while  the  broken  lines  of  th«> 
Russians  at  once  reformed. 

At  Waterloo  every  attack  of  the  French  cavalry  on  our  position  was 
repulsed.  These  attacks  were  preceded  by  a  terrific  fire  of  artillery; 
they  were  continued  and  kept  up  with  the  greatest  obstinacy  and  per- 
severance, yet  they  never  gained  even  a  partial  success  during  the 
battle,  and  the  losses  they  occasioned  to  the  French  were  very  great. 

When  you  are  the  strongest  in  cavalry,  it  is  then  best  employed  on  an 
enemy's  flanks;  otherwise  keep  it  in  hand  under  the  protection  of  your 
infantry  and  guns,  to  be  used  according  as  opportunity  offers. 

When  cavalry  and  guns  can  be  spared,  they  may  be  sent  round  the 
enemy's  position  to  fall  upon  his  rear,  but  only  when  their  march  can 
bo  concealed  from  the  enemy  (unless  intended  as  a  false  attack,  merely 
to  draw  off  his  reserves  in  that  direction);  otherwise  it  is  better  to 
bring  them  into  play  at  once,  for  should  they  go  round,  when  they  do 
reach  the  rear  of  the  enemy  ho  will  have  made  his  dispositions  to 
receive  them,  and  you  will  have  gained  nothing  and  lost  time. 


140  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

If  they  succeed  in  surprising  the  enemy,  his  cavalry  should  be 
attacked  on  the  spot;  but  if  his  infantry  be  prepared,  then  use  the 
horse-artillery  first,  to  ensure  the  result  of  the  charge. 

Cavalry  in  reserve  behind  the  crest  of  a  hill,  up  which  the  enemy  is 
pressing  forward,  should,  when  possible,  form  line  before  coming  in 
sight  of  the  enemy,  and  thus  be  ready  to  fall  on  before  he  can  prepare 
to  receive  them. 

In  the  pursuit  of  a  defeated  army,  cavalry  act  in  bodies,  directing 
their  efforts  against  such  of  the  enemy  as  still  keep  together.  With 
small  detachments  prepared  to  receive  them  in  positions  difficult  of 
approach,  no  time  should  be  lost;  these  arc  sure  to  fall  a  prey  to  the 
infantrj'.  The  cavalry  must  pass  on  to  either  side,  cutting  in  upon  the 
line  of  retreat  and  preventing  order  from  being  restored  in  the  broken 
masses  of  the  enemy. 

In  1796  Napoleon,  at  the  Battle  of  Roveredo,  by  a  well-concerted 
attack  threw  the  Austrian  army  in  disorder  iuto  the  defile  of  Galliano, 
and  routed  them.  One  of  his  aides-de-camp,  Laraarois,  dashed  through 
the  mass  of  fugitives  with  fifty  dragoons,  and  heading  them,  checked 
the  retreat  of  the  column,  and  thus  enabled  the  French  cavalry  to 
secure  several  thousand  prisoners. 

Artillery  is  the  great  support  and  rallying-point  of  a  defeated  army; 
against  this  arm  in  particular  the  most  strenuous  efforts  of  the  cavalry 
should  be  directed.  Once  an  army  has  lost  its  artillery  it  can  not  long 
keep  (he  field. 

Horse-artillery  in  such  a  pursuit  not  only  assists  the  cavalry  in  its 
charges,  but  brings  the  infantry  and  artillery  of  the  enemy  to  a  stand, 
and  thus  they  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  troops  coming  up. 

Horse-artillery  with  cavalry  is  not  only  a  powerful  auxiliary  in  the 
attack,  but  a  friend  in  need  in  the  hour  of  danger  and  defeat.  It  can 
keep  pace  with  the  advance,  and  by  pouring  a  destructive  fire  on  the 
enemy  pave  the  way  for  the  cavalry  to  victory. 

It  dislodges  the  enemy  from  positions  in  which  the  sword  can  not 
reach  him,  or  it  does  fearful  execution  where  the  enemy's  infantry,  con- 
centrated in  masses,  bids  defiance  to  the  horseman. 

It  checks  the  pursuit  and  gives  time  for  the  cavalry  to  reform  under 
its  fire. 

It  is  of  great  use  in  passing  defiles  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  in 


HORSE-ARTILLERY.  141 

defending  broken  ground  against  odds ;  and  in  many  other  ways  it  is 
the  cavalry's  best  assistant. 

Horse-artillery  should  place  itself  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  the 
intended  formations  of  cavalry,  and  always  be  at  hand  to  protect  them 
when  forming. 

It  is  advisable  that  the  artillery  should  be  on  both  flanks,  or  masked 
by  the  flank  troops  during  an  advance,  or  kept  together  on  one  flank, 
particularly  if  the  column  in  forming  line  throws  forward  the  opposite 
flank  or  forms  in  succession ;  the  whole  of  the  guns  are  then  brought 
into  play  on  the  enemy  till  the  line  is  ready  to  charge. 

When  there  is  but  one  troop  of  horse-artillery  it  is  best  to  keep  it 
together  J  so  small  a  number  of  guns  should  not  be  subdivided  without 
an  absolute  necessity. 

Horse-artillery  can  always  take  up  positions  to  engage  the  enemy  at 
two  or  three  hundred  yards  in  front  or  on  the  flank  of  cavalry  and  be 
pretty  safe,  but  it  should  not  venture  further  without  an  escort. 

The  artillery  officer  should,  as  far  as  possible,  choose  his  own  posi- 
tions and  open  fire  when  he  thinks  proper.  Non-professional  officers 
can  not  be  such  good  judges  of  range,  etc.,  and  should  not  interfere  ; 
thus  much  ammunition  will  be  saved  to  the  army. 

If  cavalry  is  defeated,  its  horse-artillery  goes  to  the  rear  as  quickly 
as  possible;  for  it  can  not  at  first,  while  friend  and  foe  are  going  pell- 
mell  to  the  rear,  do  anything  toward  restoring  the  fight;  but  as  soon  as 
it  finds  a  favorable  position  it  should  unlimber  and  check  the  foe. 

When  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  drawn  up  in  battle  array  to  await  the 
onset,  and  its  horse-artillery  is  posted  two  hundred  or  three  hundred 
yards  in  front,  the  guns  of  the  attacking  force  advance  to  within  eight 
hundred  or  one  thousand  yards  and  fire  with  round  shot  upon  the 
artillery  until  their  cavalry  moves  forward.  The  moment  these  latter 
come  within  range  of  grape,  they  direct  the  fire  upon  them — the  rule 
for  artillery  being  to  deal  with  the  most  dangerous  foe  for  the  time 
being. 

In  a  retreat  it  is  usual  to  give  the  officer  of  artillery  notice ;  he  then 
chooses  his  own  positions  and  avails  himself  of  every  advantage  the 
ground  may  ofi"er.  The  cavalry  holds  the  enemy  in  check  till  the  guns 
are  in  position,  then  falls  back  under  their  protection  and  reforms  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  guns  to  the  next  position,  and  so  on.     When  the 


142  CAVALRY   TACTICS, 

cavalry  is  in  motion  the  artillery  should  be  in  position  ;  when  the  horee- 
artillery  is  in  position  the  cavalry  should  be  formed  to  repel  an  attack. 

The  retiring  troops,  if  in  good  order,  can  not  easily  bo  followed 
closely  by  their  pursuers,  who  must  always  advance  with  certain  neces- 
sary precautions,  which  take  up  time,  and  yet  daro  not,  can  not,  be 
neglected.  Those  retiring  occupy  every  favorable  position  to  stop  the 
advance  of  the  enemy ;  and  this  they  can  often  effect  without  firing  a 
Biiot,  by  destroying  bridges,  roads,  etc. 

In  a  pursuit  horse-artillery  follows  the  cavalry  steadily  at  first,  so  as 
not  to  ovei'-excrt  the  horses,  for  while  the  cavalry  are  mixed  up  with 
the  fugitives  the  guns  are  of  no  use  :  but  as  soon  as  the  enemy  begin 
to  gather  together  for  defence,  or  attempt  to  hold  a  position  with  fresh 
troops,  the  guns  come  to  the  front  to  start  them,  and  slip  the  cavalry, 
who  will  keep  them  going. 

Escort  of  artillery  is  not  absolutely  necessary  when  the  guns  are  act- 
ing with  a  column  of  cavalry,  unless  they  move  off  to  a  flank  or  beyond 
three  hundred  yards  from  the  column  ;  then  two  troops  should  accom- 
pany the  battery,  v.'hether  consisting  of  one  or  two  troops  of  horse- 
artillery. 

The  escort  protects  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  artillery;  the  guns 
protect  their  own  front. 

It  should  not  form  directly  in  rear  of  the  guns,  but  on  the  right  or 
left  rear,  or  on  cither  flank:  always  the  outward  flank  when  the  guns 
have  troops  on  the  inner  one,  and  (when  feasible)  covered  from  the 
fire  and  view  of  the  enemy.  When  the  escort  is  necessarily  exposed, 
the  commander  should  watch  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  change 
his  position  from  time  to  time  to  avoid  being  made  a  target  of. 

When  the  escort  is  not  sufficient  to  repel  a  sudden  attack  on  the 
guns,  the  officer  commanding  the  troop  or  squadron  nearest  to  it  should 
at  once  fly  to  the  rescue  without  waiting  for  orders  ;  and  this  principle 
of  mutual  support  should  be  encouraged  under  all  circumstances  be- 
tween cavalry  and  horse-artillery. 

These  remarks  on  horse- artillery  with  ca,v.alry  are  merely  intended 
to  give  a  general  idea  of  the  way  in  which  these  two  arms  support  each 
other  in  war,  and  to  stimulate  their  spirit  of  enterprise  by  reminding 
them  that  if  they  combine  the  use  of  these  two  arms  skilfully,  they  are 
certain  of  obtaining  distinction  in  the  field. 


SKIRMISHING    ATTACKS.  143 

The  attack  x'u  ekinniehing  order  should  be  practised  because  it  ia 
useful  in  various  ways. 

If,  when  advancing  toward  an  enemy,  he  turns  to  make  off,  attack 
in  skirmishing  order  with  part  of  your  troops,  because  the  horses  have 
moro  freedom  of  action  when  not  in  the  ranks  ;  each  man,  acting  for 
himself,  makes  for  his  nearest  foe,  and  is  more  likely  to  catch  the 
enemy  and  inflict  loss  upon  him  than  if  pursuing  in  a  body. 

Artillery,  may  be  attacked  advantageously  in  skirmishing  order,  and 
with  very  few  men.  They  advance  straight  toward  the  guns  till  within 
range  of  grape,  then  put  the  steam  on,  gallop  as  quick  as  they  can, 
opening  from  the  centre,  and  making  for  the  flanks  of  the  battery. 

The  gunners  are  thus  obliged  to  alter  their  aim  and  lose  time.  If 
there  is  much  dust,  or  the  smoke  has  not  cleared  away  from  the  front 
of  the  battery,  they  do  not  observe  the  change  of  direction,  continue 
firing  straight  to  the  front  while  the  horsemen  are  pouring  in  upon  the 
flanks,  and  immediately  attack  the  gunners  to  prevent  them  from  serv- 
ing the  guns,  while  the  cavalry  reserves  advance,  part  of  them  charging 
the  escort,  the  remainder  securing  the  battery. 

The  most  advantageous  moment  to  attack  is  when  the  guns  are 
unlimbering  or  limbering  up;  a  few  moments  gained  being  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  attacking  party,  who  must  always  dash  in 
at  their  best  speed  as  soon  as  the  signal  is  given  to  charge. 

If,  after  getting  into  the  battery,  they  see  a  superior  force  of  the 
enemy  coming  to  the  rescue,  they  should  endeavor  to  do  as  much 
damage  to  the  battery  as  possible  by  cutting  down  the  drivers,  sever- 
ing the  traces,  etc.,  and  then  trust  to  the  speed  of  their  horses  for 
safety. 

Reconnoitring. — This  is  one  of  the  most  diflBcult  problems  in  war, 
to  know  how  to  gain  reliable  and  sufllcient  information  before  it 
becomes  necessary  to  engage  an  enemy.  I  shall,  therefore,  endeavor 
to  give  an  outline  of  the  duty  of  cavalry  when  employed  for  this  pur- 
pose, but  to  enter  into  details  or  go  deeply  into  this  subject  would 
carry  me  quite  beyond  the  limits  of  this  work. 

General  Rules. 
1.  Press  forward  quickly,  and  avoid  engaging  the  enemy  when  it  may 
retard  your  advance. 


144  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

2.  Drive  in  the  enemy's  picquets,  and  press  on  to  the  point  ordered, 
retiring  as  quickly  as  you  came  on. 

3.  Unless  a  favorable  opportunity  oflFers  of  surprising  a  party  of  the 
enemy,  avoid  all  conflicts,  for  it  is  not  the  object  in  view. 

4.  Where  the  enemy  stand  in  your  way,  no  danger  should  turn  you 
from  the  point  aimed  at. 

5.  Supports  should  always  be  moved  up  in  the  line  of  retreat,  and 
bridges  or  defiles  occupied  by  infantry  for  the  reconnoitring  party  to 
fall  back  upon. 

It  is  often  necessary  to  send  out  powerful  detachments,  in  order  that 
the  officer  commanding  them  may  push  forward  far  enough,  or  engage 
the  enemy  and  force  a  reconnoissance,  and  also  to  enable  him  to  detach 
patrols  and  exploring  parties  in  different  directions,  without  being  so 
much  weakened  by  these  necessary  measures  as  to  run  the  risk  of  being 
attacked  and  driven  in  withowt  attaining  his  object.  To  determine  the 
amount  of  force  which  ought  to  be  detached  on  a  reconnoissance  is 
always  a  nice  point. 

A  large  army  (say  of  sixty  thousand  or  seventy  thousand  men), 
marching  in  columns  near  an  enemy,  is  obliged,  when  short  of  cavalry, 
to  make  one  corps  cover  the  flank  of  another,  a  third  one  cover  the 
flank  of  the  second,  and  so  on,  till  the  army  is  often  scattered  into  de- 
tachments, and  spread  over  so  much  ground,  that  a  bold  move  on  the 
part  of  the  foe  is  not  seldom  successful  in  beating  them  in  detail. 

Troops  are  more  easily  detached  than  assembled :  when  together  they 
have  little  to  fear  from  any  manoeuvres  :  therefore,  when  the  nature  of 
the  country  admits  of  it,  two  or  three  thousand  horsemen  are  detached 
to  the  front  and  flanks  to  feel  for  the  enemy,  while  the  army  continues 
its  advance  in  concentrated  strength. 

Cavalry  thus  employed  must  go  well  ahead  of  all  the  columns ;  it 
must  not  hang  together,  but  spread  for  miles  in  all  directions ;  so  that 
nothing  shall  escape  detection. 

It  must  penetrate  everywhere  and  look  up  the  enemy  at  all  points, 
never  forgetting  that  to  fight  is  the  means,  not  the  object;  but  when 
other  means  fail,  then  no  danger  should  daunt  them  from  discovering 
what  the  enemy  attempts  to  mask  from  their  sight. 

For  instance,  the  enemy  is  in  force  behind  a  ridge,  and  occupies  the 
side  toward  you  with  skirmishers  to  prevent  your  discovering  what 


THE    MARCH.  145 

troops  he  has.  These  skirmishers  must  be  driven  in,  or,  while  they  are 
attacked,  a  few  well-mounted  men  or  officers  should  dash  through,  ride 
over  the  ridge,  and  reconnoitre  the  enemy's  position,  trusting  to  the 
speed  of  their  horses  to  regain  their  party.  For  a  dragoon  with  a  good 
horse  under  him  should  fear  no  odds  in  an  open  country. 


Chapter  XI. 

THE  MARCH— THE  CAMP— THE  BIVOUAC— THE  OUTPOST— 
THE  SKIRMISH. 

The  March. 

In  the  campaigns  of  the  last  great  war  in  Europe  it  was  no  uncom- 
mon occurrence  to  see  cavalry  arrive  on  the  field  quite  crippled,  having 
lost  half  their  numbers  before  a  shot  had  been  fired,  the  remaining 
horses  being  in  such  wretched  condition  as  to  be  totally  unfit  for  active 
service. 

This  arose  partly  from  want  of  sufficient  and  good  forage,  as  also 
from  the  fact  that  they  generally  began  their  marches  without  any  pre- 
vious training;  the  horses,  distressed  at  the  start,  never  recovered 
themselves,  and  died  off  by  thousands. 

It  is  well  known  that  neither  horse  nor  man  can  undergo  fatigue 
suddenly  without  suffering  from  the  effects  of  it.  Both  should  be 
brought  gradually  into  working  condition. 

Collecting  large  bodies  of  cavalry  together,  long  before  they  are  re- 
quired to  act  on  the  battle-field,  is  a  great  mistake. 

Such  corps  have  to  go  greater  distances  in  dispersing  to  their  billets 
or  camps,  and  the  same  in  reassembling  in  the  morning.  There  is 
great  difiiculty  in  procuring  forage  for  so  many.  Sickness  is  caused 
among  the  horses  from  the  mere  fact  of  great  numbers  being  collected 
together.  Infection  spreads  far  and  wide,  and  the  difliculties  of  march- 
ing steadily  are  greatly  increased  in  consequence  of  the  frequent  chocks 
and  constant  closing  up  of  the  columns  of  route.  All  this  must  largely 
contribute  to  render  cavalry  inefficient  for  the  field. 
13 


i4G  CAVALRY    TACTIC8. 

I  am  convinced  that,  by  observing  a  few  very  eimple  rules,  the  grea,ter 
part  of  these  serious  losses  might  be  prevented,  and  horses  and  men  be 
brought  into  the  field  of  action  in  excellent  health  and  condition. 

Having  previously  got  the  horses  into  good  working  order  by  de- 
grees, or  by  making  the  march  of  one  day  a  little  longer  than  that  of 
the  preceding  day,  then  begin  your  real  march,  moving  in  small  bodies, 
with  an  interval  of  one  day's  march  between  each  body.  If  fresh  from 
cantonments,  begin  the  marches  very  quietly,  increasing  the  distances 
by  degrees,-  thus  having  got  your  horses  into  hard-working  condition, 
when  you  approach  the  enemy  they  can  be  easily  drawn  together  by 
forced  marches ;  and  if  the  army  win  the  day,  the  cavalry  will  be  in 
such  order  that  the  enemy  will  with  difficulty  escape  from  their  pursuit. 

Until  necessity  requires  it,  the  cavalry  corps  should  bo  detached  j  the 
horses  will  thrive,  they  will  be  well  fed,  well  looked  after,  and  will  not 
be  found  wanting  in  the  hour  of  need. 

With  bodies  of  cavalry  on  a  march,  the  leader  of  each  detachment 
having  an  open  interval  (whether  squadrons  or  troops)  should  lead  at 
a  steady  pace,  not  increasing  and  slackening  as  the  rear  files  of  the 
squadron  in  front  of  him  do  ;  for  in  that  case  the  unsteadiness  commu- 
nicates itself  to  the  rear,  whereas  it  should  stop  at  the  end  of  each 
squadron. 

The  pace  a  slow  trot,  about  six  or  seven  miles  an  hour,  the  meu 
rising  in  their  stirrups,  and  walking  the  horses  up  and  down  hill.  The 
horses  get  in  early  to  their  food,  they  are  groomed  and  better  looked 
after,  and  have  more  time  to  refresh. 

If  you  walk  all  the  way,  the  horses  are  kept  saddled  many  hours 
more  than  is  necessary ;  the  men  got  tired,  sit  unsteady  in  their  sad- 
dles, and  the  horses  get  sore  backs. 

The  crawling  kind  of  march  really  fatigues  men  and  horses  much 
more  than  a  march  at  a  smart  trot.  Let  any  man  ride  a  journey  of 
twelve  or  fifteen  miles  at  a  walk,  without  ever  breaking  into  trot  or 
canter,  and  tell  us  when  he  dismounts  how  he  feels.  The  horse  is 
always  distressed  by  being  too  long  under  the  saddle,  even  though  he 
stand  stock  still  all  the  while. 

Cavalry  is  often  obliged  to  march  slow  in  order  to  keep  company 
with  other  troops;  but  otherwise  it  should  go  on  steadily  at  a  quiet 
trot,  and  keep  the  horeeB  as  short  a  time  as  possible  under  the  saddle. 


A1  VANCED   GUARDS.  147 

Before  starting:  on  a  march,  the  shoeing  of  the  horses  must  be  looked 
to,  and  at  all  times,  whatever  the  object  of  the  march,  the  proper 
military  precautious  must  be  attended  to. 

The  order  of  march  should  be  such  as  to  b«  easily  transformed  into 
the  order  of  battle. 

Advanced  Guards. — All  troops  marching  are  preceded  by  advanced 
guards,  to  cover  the  front  of  the  column,  give  timely  notice  of  danger, 
and  prevent  surprise. 

The  strength  of  an  advanced  guard  is  in  proportion  to  that  of  the 
column  it  precedes;  and  as  a  large  body  of  troops  requires  more  time 
to  make  arrangements  for  receiving  an  enemy  than  a  small  one,  the 
advanced  guard  should  precede  the  column  it  covers  at  such  distance 
and  in  such  strength  as  in  case  of  attack  to  give  time  for  the  main 
body  to  form  before  the  enemy  can  bo  upon  them. 

In  time  of  war  alwaj'-s  procure  a  guide  (by  force,  if  necessary). 

Patrols  should  constantly  push  forward  to  front  and  flanks  to  feel  for 
the  enemy,  search  the  side-roads,  farm-houses,  woods,  etc.,  etc.,  and 
look  into  any  place  likely  to  conceal  troops.  Always  secure  your  flanks 
before  entering  defiles,  by  taking  possession  of  the  heights  or  other 
commanding  positions  near  them. 

When  one  army  is  in  march  to  attack  another,  the  advanced  guards 
are  generally  used  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  position  ;  this 
they  do  by  driving  back  the  enemy's  advanced  posts  the  moment  they 
fall  in  with  thera,  following  them  up  quickly,  and  reconnoitring  the 
enemy's  position  and  strength  from  the  ground  his  picquets  have 
abandoned. 

The  Hear  Ouard  protects  the  rear,  makes  stragglers  keep  up,  and 
prevents  them  from  plundering. 

The  place  of  the  officer  commanding  the  rear  guard  is  with  the  last 
detachment  of  it. 

During  a  retreat  the  duties  of  a  rear  guard  are  most  important,  and 
to  prevent  its  becoming  a  rout  the  troops  must  be  steady  and  well  com- 
manded. 

They  should  halt  in  all  defensible  positions,  but  never  at  the  entrance 
of  a  defile,  and  always  on  the  further  side,  taking  possession  of  the 
outlet  to  check  the  enemy. 


148  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

The  Camp. 
Officers  are  often  required  to  mark  out  camps  for  troops  in  the  field. 
I  will  endeavor  to  convey  to  them  an  idea  of  how  they  ought  to  act  when 
employed  in  this  service;  and  as  no  camps  can  be  traced  until  the  out- 
posts are  taken  up,  it  will  be  well  to  give  a  sketch  of  that  duty  at  the 
same  time.  To  enter  deeply  into  it  would  be  superfluous,  for  we  have 
many  good  books  on  the  subject—  as,  "  Manual  of  Outpost  Duties,"  by 
Lord  Frederick  Fitzclarence ;  "On  Outposts  and  Patrols,"  by  Major- 
General  L.  B.  Lovell,  K.H. ;  "  On  Outposts  and  Patrols,"  by  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Von  Arentschildt ;  "Outpost  Duties,  abridged  from  the 
German,"  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Short,  etc.,  etc.;  and  many  others. 

General  Rules  for  Cam'piny. 

1.  The  object  is  to  put  many  men  in  a  small  compass. 

2.  To  give  them  rest  and  as  much  comfort  as  possible. 

3.  To  place  them  in  such  a  manner  that  they  can  get  under  arms  with- 
out loss  of  time. 

To  attain  this  the  tents  or  huts  must  be  raised  systematically  and 
according  to  rule.  Thus  no  room  is  lost,  the  men  can  attend  to  their 
duties  without  confusion,  and  easily  find  their  way  about  the  camp. 

Camps  ought  to  be  on  the  highest,  or  in  front  of  the  highest  ground, 
with  plenty  of  room,  an  open  view,  with  the  flanks  protected,  with  easy 
communication  from  flank  to  flank  and  front  to  rear,  and  with  wood  and 
water  in  the  neighborhood. 

When  near  an  enemy  you  should,  as  far  as  possible,  encamp  in  order 
of  battle,  or  in  such  a  manner  that  you  can  easily  get  your  troops  into 
position.  Where  circumstances  do  not  require  this  precaution  to  be 
taken,  you  then  encamp  with  a  view  to  the  comfort  of  the  men,  and  in 
such  way  as  to  give  them  as  much  rest  as  possible. 

Camps  are,  therefore,  of  two  sorts — Marching  and  Fighting  Camps 
— according  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  an  enemy. 

Tents  are  seldom  used  in  Europe,  except  for  forming  camps  of  in- 
struction :  they  have  long  since  been  discontinued  in  time  of  war,  be- 
cause they  retard  the  movements  of  an  army  in  the  field;  and  also 
because,  in  a  highly  cultivated  country,  shelter  can  generally  be  found, 
or  material  procured  with  which  to  construct  huts  for  the  men  :  these 
are  much  the  best  description  of  cover. 


THE   CAMP.  149 

Marshal  Oudinot  introduced  a  species  of  tents  among  the  French 
troops,  which  are  set  up  on  the  muskets  and  bayonets  :  these  can  be 
raised  and  struck  in  a  moment,  but  give  little  shelter  against  wind  and 
weather,  and  add  much  to  the  weight  which  the  soldier  has  to  carry. 

Bivouacs  have  the  advantage  over  other  plans  of  camping — that  the 
troops  can  be  at  once  got  under  arms,  and,  therefore,  all  outpost? 
bivouac ;  but  the  army  should  not  do  so  except  in  case  of  necessity,  as 
the  exposure  to  the  night-air,  the  cold,  and  damp,  destroys  the  health 
of  the  men. 

In  a  camp  the  length  of  front  is  calculated  according  to  the  number 
of  regiments  or  squadrons,  adding  the  intervals. 

In  hilly  countries  the  valleys  are  often  left  as  intervals  between  the 
camps.  This  does  not  affect  their  safety,  as  each  camp  is  strong  in  it^ 
own  position,  and  can  protect  each  other  from  attack. 

Cavalry  or  infantry  encamp  either  in  line  or  in  open  column.  The 
infantry  pile  arms  in  their  front 

Cavalry  should  never  encamp  in  the  front  line,  but  either  in  rear,  or 
in  rear  and  on  the  flanks  of  the  infantry  ;  so  that,  in  case  of  attack,  it 
has  time  to  turn  out  and  move  up  to  the  support. 

The  artillery  encamps  with  the  brigades  to  which  it  is  attached  :  the 
artillery  of  the  army  in  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  second  line.  Precau- 
tions must  be  strictly  enforced  against  fire. 

Artillerymen  encamp  fifty  yards  in  rear  of  their  batteries,  and  place 
sentries  to  enforce  all  necessary  precautions  for  the  safety  of  the  am- 
munition wagons,  etc. 

The  artillery  of  reserve,  the  parks,  and  ammunition,  are  placed  in 
rear  of  the  army,  formed  in  one  or  two  lines,  and  surrounded  by  pickets 
and  sentries ;  the  artillerymen  and  horses  in  rear  or  on  the  flanks  of  the 
line,  at  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  two  hundred  yards'  distance. 

The  forges  at  such  a  distance  as  to  avoid  all  danger  from  the  sparks 
All  camps  have  outposts,  with  outlying  and  inlying  pickets.  The  main 
body  alone  are  allowed  to  rest  undisturbed.  Further  measures  must  be 
taken  to  provide  wholesome  food  and  water,  and  to  keep  the  camp  clean, 
and  free  from  beggars,  vagrants,  improper  women,  etc. 

The  Camp  in  time  of  Peace. 
When  the  only  object  is  to  concentrate  large  bodies  of  troops  for  ex- 


150  THE    CAMP. 

ercise,  you  should  pick  out  a  site  where  all  the  uoccssaries  can  be  pro- 
cured close  at  hand,  in  order  to  save  the  men  from  unnecessary  fatigue. 

Avoid  wet,  sandy,  or  swampy  ground.  Pitch  the  camp  ou  a  slope,  to 
carry  off  the  rain  and  all  impurities.  Place  it  near  villages,  woods, 
rivers,  or  streams,  from  which  you  can  obtain  wood,  water,  and  straw. 

No  washing,  bathing,  etc.,  should  be  allowed  in  streams  near  the 
camp,  except  below  it,  so  as  to  keep  the  water  pure  for  use.  In  these 
eorts  of  camps  the  men  are  generally  under  canvas. 

MARCHiNa  Camps. 

The  same  rules  apply  as  for  camps  of  exercise,  except  that,  as  the 
troops  pass  the  night  only  in  them,  they  generally  bivouac  or  shelter 
themselves  from  the  weather  in  the  best  way  they  can,  with  branches 
of  trees  or  thatches  of  wicker-work,  straw,  etc. 

The  ofScers  who  mark  out  these  camps  endeavor  to  have  the  forage, 
wood,  and  straw  brought  in,  and  thus  save  the  men  the  necessity  of 
going  out  for  them  after  a  long  march.  They  can  then  cook  at  once, 
and  make  arrangements  for  the  night. 

Fighting  Camps 

Are  generally  placed  exactly  in  the  contrary  positions  to  those  already 
described;  for  instance,  they  should  be  on  high  ground,  whereas  the 
others  follow  the  course  of  the  streams  into  the  valleys,  which  are  natu- 
rally more  thickly  inhabited,  better  cultivated,  Jind  afford  the  necessary 
supplies. 

Camps  in  the  field  depend  upon  the  line  of  operation.s  and  intentions 
of  the  commander  ;  all  other  considerations  are  sacrificed  to  the  higher 
objects  in  view. 

They  must  be  placed  in  advantageous  military  positions.  To  choose 
these,  officers  of  experience  are  sent  forward  with  reconnoitring  parties  ; 
they  ai-e  guided  by  the  following  rules  : 

Ist.  That  the  flanks  are  protected  by  mountains,  ravines,  water,  or 
villages,  which  oblige  the  enemy  to  go  far  to  turn  them. 

2d.  That  the  front  of  the  camp  is  clear,  as  far  as  guns  can  range. 

3d.  That  the  camp  is  not  intersected  by  water,  hollow  ways,  woods, 
etc.,  or  anything  which  would  give  the  enemy  opportunity  or  cover  for 
aa  attack,  or  the  means  of  passing  unobserved  to  the  rear. 


TO    MARK    OUT   THE    CAMP.  151 

4th.  That  according  iis  the  army  is  formed  in  two  or  more  linos,  the 
ground  shall  afford  sufficient  depth  for  them  to  camp  with  the  proper 
distance  hetween  each,  and  give  room  for  the  parks  and  ammunition 
in  rear  of  all. 

6th.  That  the  ground  be  dry,  and  have  water  and  wood  at  hand. 

Though  often  necessary,  it  is  not  always  possible,  to  entrench  a  camp 
so  as  to  secure  it  from  the  enemy,  because  the  time  is  generally  too 
short  to  cover  the  approaches  with  regular  works.  In  such  cases  the 
roads  and  the  approaches  are  barricaded  or  made  difficult  of  access, 
and  these  precautions  should  never  be  neglected;  they  enable  you  to 
hold  the  enemy  at  bay  till  the  troops  get  under  arms.  In  order  to  have 
time  to  take  these  necessary  precautions  for  the  safety  of  the  camp,  it 
should,  when  possible,  be  occupied  early  in  the  day  ;  this  rule  ought 
not  to  be  departed  from,  except  after  an  eugagemeut  or  under  other  pe- 
culiar and  unavoidable  circumstances. 

Man  and  beast  suffer  if  a  camp  is  occupied  at  night.  No  one  knows 
hie  whereabouts  ;  the  men  are  worn  out  with  fatigue,  going  in  search  of 
food,  wood,  water,  and  only  begin  to  cook  when  they  should  have  been 
at  rest,  to  enable  them  to  meet  the  fatigues  of  the  morrow.  Horses,  in 
the  same  way,  are  not  fed  till  late  in  the  night,  from  which  they  suffer 
more  than  from  long  marches. 

2'o  mark  out  a  Camp. 

Two  non-commissioned  officers,  with  one  private  per  troop,  are  sent 
under  an  officer.  He  is  furnished  with  a  return  showing  the  strength 
of  the  regiment  or  regiments,  and  receives  instructions  from  the  quar- 
termaster-general's office  as  to  where  the  corps  will  encamp. 

The  usual  way  of  encamping  is  in  open  column  of  troops,  the  teats 
or  huts  in  lines  perpendicular  to  the  front  of  the  camp. 

Cavalry  camping  in  line  requires  double  the  extent  of  its  front,  in 
consequence  of  intervals  between  the  horses  to  enable  the  men  to  groom 
and  handle  them;  it  is  therefore  only  resorted  to  when  the  ground  will 
not  admit  of  any  other  plan. 

In  marking  out  the  ground  for  a  regiment  to  camp  on  in  column,  the 
front  line  of  the  camp  is  the  exact  extent  of  the  regiment  in  line,  with 
intervals. 

The  depth  of  the  troop  lines  is  calculated  according  to  the  size  of  the 
tontg  or  huts,  and  the  strength  of  the  troops. 


152  THE   BIVOUAC. 

The  officer  must  see  all  the  lines  paced  off  and  marked  with  flags. 

The  front  computed  for  a  mounted  troop-horse  in  the  ranks  is  one 
yard,  and  when  picketed  four  feet. 

In  pacing  off  the  ground  for  the  troops  the  officer  will  therefore  cal- 
culate the  extent  of  front  as  follows  : 

For  a  regiment  of  four  squadrons,  each  of  160  horses,  extent  of  front 
of  each  squadron  80  yards.     Add  to  this  three  squadron  intervals,  each 
computed  at  one-fourth  the  front  of  the  squadron,  namely,  20  yards. 
TotJil  front     80  X  4  =  320 
Intervals        20  X  3  =     60 

Total     380  yards, 
the  extent  of  the  front  line. 

When  troops  are  weak  in  numbers,  the  best  mode  of  encamping  will 
be  in  open  column  of  squadrons. 

It  is  his  duty  then  to  moot  the  regiment  and  lead  them  into  camp, 
forming  them  on  the  front  line ;  it  is  then  pointed  out  to  the  men  that 
on  this  line  they  form  in  case  of  alarm  ;  they  are  then  wheeled  into 
column  of  squadrons,  the  ranks  opened  and  filed  from  the  inward  flank? 
to  their  places  in  camp. 

The  Bivouac. 

When  in  bivouac,  as  soon  as  they  have  dismounted  and  fastened  their 
horses,  each  man  fixes  his  sword  in  the  ground,  in  rear  of  his  horse, 
placing  the  carbine  against  it ;  he  then  takes  off  his  belts,  etc.,  and  hangs 
them  on  the  sword-hilt,  and  behind  them  again  he  places  his  kit,  and 
sleeps  there  at  night ;  otherwise,  if  required  to  turn  out  in  a  dark  night, 
he  could  not  find  horse  or  arms. 

The  whole  subject  of  the  bivouac  is  one  of  vital  importance.  Some 
officers  have  been  known  to  ruin  half  the  horses  of  a  regiment  in  one 
position  of  this  sort  because  they  knew  not  how  to  choose  their  ground. 
De  Brack  says  :  "  Of  two  leaders  of  pretty  equal  merit,  one  of  whom 
is  a  good  and  the  other  an  indifferent  selector  of  bivouacs,  the  first,  at 
the  end  of  a  campaign,  will  be  able  to  show  a  numerous  and  well- 
mounted  body,  while  the  other  will  have  only  a  few  half-starved  horses." 

All  huts  ought  to  be  constructed  with  the  door  or  opening  toward  the 
horses,  in  order  that  the  men  may  always  have  their  eyes  upon  them. 
Let  it  be  always  remembered  that  the  fire-arms  must  bo  removed  from 


OUTPOST    DUTY.  153 

the  horses  the  moment  you  dismount,  for  otherwise,  should  your  horses 
take  to  rolling,  your  fire-arms  will  be  broken  or  lost. 

Outpost  Duty.* 

Outposts  have  a  double  object:  to  watch  over  the  safety  of  the  army, 
and  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

When  a  corps  forms  the  advanced  guard  of  an  army,  then  the  chain 
of  outposts  is  formed  in  front  of  that  corps  ;  but  where  there  is  no  ad- 
vance guard  the  chain  of  posts  is  established  immediately  in  front  of 
the  position  which  the  army  has  taken  up. 

When  the  outposts  are  at  a  distance,  and  positions  lie  between  them 
and  the  army  which  would  be  useful  for  them  to  fall  back  upon,  or  which 
would  assist  the  army  in  maintaining  its  ground,  such  places  are  oc- 
cupied by  detachments  from  the  army,  and  not  from  the  troops  on  out- 
post duty. 

The  necessity  of  outposts  to  all  troops  in  the  field,  whether  a  small 
detachment  or  an  army,^  must  be  equally  obvious.  Men  can  not  stand 
ready  under  arms  day  and  night  to  resist  an  attack ;  the  wants  of  men 
and  horses  must  bo  satisfied  ,•  they  must  have  rest,  or  they  can  not  ful- 
fil their  duties  :  thus  every  position,  of  whatever  kind  it  may  be,  is 
surrounded  by  a  chain  of  guards  to  protect  it  from  surprise,  and  to  give 
rest  and  security  to  the  occupants. 

Outposts  must  be  so  placed  that  every  movement,  more  particularly 
an  advance  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  shall  be  at  once  detected ;  that 
nothing  can  pass  unobserved  between  them  into  their  own  camp  ;  and 
that  they  can  hold  their  ground  sufficiently  long  against  an  enemy  to 
prevent  their  troops  from  being  taken  by  surprise. 

Thus  troops  on  outpost  duty  are  disposed  of  according  to  the  difi'er- 
ent  parts  they  have  to  act — namely  :  those  who  watch  the  enemy,  and 
those  who,  in  case  of  an  attack,  endeavor  to  stop  him. 

*  Lord  Frederick  Fitzclarence,  in  Ills  excellent  "Manual  of  Outpost  Duties," 
gives  a  private  journal  of  General  Crawfurd's  admirable  outpost  operations  on  the 
Coa  and  Agueda  in  1810,  by  Major-General  Shaw  Kennedy.  This  journal,  teach- 
ing by  example,  and  abounding  in  matter  suggestive  of  reflection  and  comparison, 
ought  to  be  diligently  studied  by  every  young  officer.  But  the  whole  of  Lord 
Frederick's  concise,  compact  manual  is  of  value  to  every  man  who  would  be  really 
a  soldier. 


154  OUTPOST   DUTY. 

The  first,  called  vedettes,  are  pushed  forward  to  a  post  whence  they 
can  overlook  all  roads  lea<ling  from  the  enemy's  side  ;  they  are  sup- 
ported by  a  non-commissioned  officer's  post,  and  by  the  outlying  pic- 
quet,  who  are  supported  in  their  turn  by  the  reserves. 

Time  is  the  great  object  to  gain  when  outposts  are  attacked,  conse- 
quently the  reserves  should  be  sufficiently  strong  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check  and  cover  the  approaches  to  camp. 

Troops  for  outpost  duty  are  selected  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground  :  with  an  army  they  are  generally  composed  of  light  troops  of 
all  arms — namely  :  horse-artillery,  light  cavalry,  and  light  infantry.  In 
an  intersected  country  the  infantry  is  chiefly  used;  in  ao  open  country 
the  cavalry.  In  both,  the  cavalry  furnishes  patrols  to  the  front  and 
flanks,  and  generally  occupies  the  high-roads.  The  cavalry  pushes  ve- 
dettes forward  beyond  the  infantry  chain,  for  these  can  gallop  back, 
whereas  infantry  soldiers  might  be  cut  off  and  made  prisoners. 

The  reserves  should  be  composed  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,- 
how  far  the  chain  of  outposts  should  extend  depends  upon  the  strength 
of  the  army,  the  nature  of  the  country,  and  other  circumstanccF. 

But  it  is  so  easy  to  go  round  or  turn  detachments  composed  of  regi- 
ments, brigades,  or  even  divisions,  and  to  attack  them  unexpectedly  in 
rear,  that  in  many  cases  it  is  necessary  to  extend  the  chain  of  outposts 
all  round  the  camp. 

In  countries  where  the  people  were  unfriendly  it  has  often  happened 
that  whole  armies  have  thus  been  attacked  in  rcai*. 

When  your  rear  is  protected  by  natural  obstacles,  then  the  chain  of 
outposts  should  extend  well  to  both  flanks  :  when  the  flanks  are  open, 
then  you  must  protect  them  by  strong  picquets,  and  send  out  parties  of 
cavalry  to  scour  the  country  on  both  sides. 

The  distance  of  the  outposts  is  also  entirely  dependent  on  the  strength 
of  the  main  body  and  the  peculiarities  of  the  ground.  The  weaker  the 
main  body  the  less  strong  its  outposts,  and  consequently  the  nearer  to 
camp;  otherwise  the  picquets  might  be  destroyed  before  they  could 
effect  their  retreat. 

Armies  or  corps  push  forward  their  outposts,  sometimes  six  or  eight 
miles ;  and  this  distance  diminishes  in  proportion  with  divisions,  bri- 
gades, regiments,  etc. 

Where  vedettes,  for  instance,  are  four  miles  from  the  camp,  their  re- 


A    CHAIN    OF    OUTPOSTS.  155 

serves  should  be  half-way  between  the  two,  that  ia,  at  two  miles ;  the 
outlying  })icqiiets  half-way  between  them  and  the  vedettes  (viz:  one 
mile):  and  the  non-commissioned  ofllcer's  post  half-way  between  the 
picquet  and  the  vedettes.  These  distances  diminish,  as  already  stated, 
according  to  the  strengh  of  the  detachments. 

With  small  bodies  of  troops  the  number  detached  for  outpost  duty  is 
generally  in  the  proportion  of  from  one-third  to  one-fourth  of  their 
strength  ;  with  large  bodies  of  troops,  a  fifth  or  sixth  only. 

The  nature  of  the  country  has  much  to  do  with  the  number  of  men 
employed.  In  open  ground  a  few  vedettes  can  see  a  long  way.  In  in- 
tersected country,  where  gardens,  thickets,  rows  of  trees,  heights,  and 
other  obstacles  intercept  the  view,  both  vedettes  and  picquets  must  be 
placed  closer  together,  and  therefore  require  to  be  more  numerous. 

Cavalrj'  forming  a  chain  of  outposts  in  an  open  country  can  place 
vedettes  by  day  at  from  six  hundred  to  one  thousand  paces,  for  they 
can  see  each  other  at  that  distance,  and  also  hear  a  shot  fired. 

A  regiment  of  three  hundred  horses  on  outpost  duty  would  keep  one 
hundred  in  reserve;  one  hundred  form  the  support,  one  hundred  the 
line  of  outposts,  of  which  fifty  form  the  outlying  picquet;  the  remain- 
ing fifty  are  detached  as  a  post,  from  which  sixteen  vedettes  are  sup- 
plied for  the  chain.  These,  at  seven  hundred  paces  from  each  other, 
enable  you  to  cover  eleven  thousand  two  hundred  paces  of  ground,  or 
about  six  miles  ;  equal  to  what  it  is  calculated  to  require  one  thousand 
infantry  soldiers  to  do. 

But  all  these  things  depend  so  much  on  circumstances  that  no  exact 
rules  can  be  laid  down,  and  much  must  always  be  left  to  the  good  sense 
of  the  oflScer  in  command. 

Thus  cavalry  vedettes  may  be  plactd  sometimes  at  greater  distances, 
and  with  good  effect;  whereas  infantry  vedettes  are  generally  at  one 
hundred  yards,  and  sometimes,  in  a  close  country,  they  are  drawn  to- 
gether to  within  forty  or  fifty  yards  of  each  other.  Both  must,  of 
course,  lessen  their  circle  and  draw  closer  together  at  night. 

When  troops  encamp  for  any  length  of  time  in  one  place,  in  addition 
to  the  common  measures  of  security  which  are  always  ado^Jted,  they 
strengthen  their  outposts  by  abatis,  redoubts,  etc.,  and  their  chains  of 
outposts  by  fortifying  farm-houses,  barricading  villages,  bridges,  de- 
files, and  in  other  ways  render  all  possible  approaches  to  the  oamp  both 
difficult  and  dangerous. 


156  OUTPOST   DUTY. 

The  outposts  are  under  the  command  of  some  one  specially  appointed 
for  this  service,  and  to  him  all  reports  are  made,  and  from  him  all 
orders  received  and  carried  out.* 

Having  thus  endeavored  to  convey  an  idea  of  the  general  use  and  em- 
ployment of  troops  on  outpost  duty,  I  shall  now  take  a  squadron,  and, 
considering  myself  detached  with  it  on  picquet,  proceed  accordingly. 

The  squadron  is  formed,  and  consists  of  ninety  men  and  horses.  I 
collect  the  nominal  rolls  of  the  men  from  the  non-commissioned  officers, 
then  inspect  the  ammunition  and  fire-arms,  and  order  the  men  to  load. 
Finding  they  have  neither  forage  nor  provisions,  I  report  the  deficiency 
in  writing ;  and  having  ascertained  who  commands  the  outposts,  and 
where  the  reports  .are  to  forwarded,  I  form  an  advanced  guard  with 
flanking  parties  and  a  rear  guard  and  march  ofi"  to  the  ground  I  am 
directed  to  take  up. 

While  on  the  march  I  ride  forward  and  examine  the  country,  taking 
notes  of  all  places  where  I  can  make  a  stand  in  case  of  attack.  Places 
where  troops  can  act  only  on  a  narrow  front,  and  where  the  flanks  are 
inaccessible  to  the  enemy,  can  be  held  by  a  small  party  (determined  to 
do  its  duty)  against  almost  any  odds.  For  instance,  a  bridge,  the  road 
through  a  thick  wood,  a  causeway  running  through  marshy  ground,  etc. 

On  arriving  on  the  ground,  I  choose  a  spot  for  the  picquet  close  to  the 
main  road  and  behind  a  bridge,  ravine,  or  wood,  so  that  I  can  make  a 
stand  at  once  when  attacked. 

I  then  divide  the  squadron  into  three  equal  parties  of  thirty  men 
each.  One  of  these,  No.  1,  moves  off"  to  the  front,  while  the  other  two 
dismount ;  No.  2  remains  in  readiness ;  while  No.  3  unbridles.  A  dis- 
mounted sentry  is  at  once  placed  a  little  in  advance  of  the  pioquet,  to 
give  notice  of  anything  that  takes  place  in  front. 

No.  1,  having  advanced  to  where  the  non-commissioned  officer's  post 
is  to  be  established,  "  halts."  I  take  one-third  of  their  number  to  the 
front  to  be  posted  as  vedettes. 

To  fix  upon  the  requisite  number,  I  ride  up  to  the  high  ground  and 
observe  the  number  of  roads,  etc. ;  then  give  directions  to  the  non-com- 
missioned officers  as  to  where  to  place  them;  and  while  this  is  being 


*  The  troope  employed  on  this  duty  form  a  curtain  behind  which  the  move- 
ments of  the  army  are  carried  on,  concealed  from  the  view  and  knowledge  of  the 
enemy,  and  by  vigilance  and  bravei-y  they  must  endeavor  to  render  that  curtain 
quite  imponotrable. 


GENERAL   RULES    BY   DAY.  157 

done,  I  make  a  little  sketch,  marking  roads,  rivers,  bridges,  and  fords, 
morasses,  hollow  roads,  woods,  towns,  villages,  and  their  distances. 
Having  thus  acquired  a  knowledge  of  the  country,  I  fix  upon  the  spot 
where  the  vedettes,  post,  and  picquet  are  to  be  placed  at  night,  and 
communicate  my  orders  to  the  non-commissioned  officer  in  command  of 
the  post. 

The  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  post  reports  that,  on  comparing 
the  strength  of  his  post  with  his  vedettes,  he  has  three  men  for  « ach 
relief,  and  some  men  to  spare.  His  vedettes  will  therefore  be  relieved 
every  two  hours  ;  the  spare  men  are  sent  to  patrol,  or  employed  as  ex- 
tra sentries,  during  the  night,  and  his  post  is  i-elieved  every  six  hours : 
that  is,  No.  1  is  followed  by  No.  2  ;  and  No.  2,  having  been  six  hours  on 
the  outpost,  is  relieved  by  No.  .3  from  the  picquet,  and  so  on  till  the  pic- 
quet is  relieved.  The  post  now  dismounts,  and  places  a  dismounted 
sentry  in  front  to  watch  the  vedettes. 

Patrols  are  sent  from  the  picquet  to  communicate  with  the  picquets 
on  either  flank,  and  at  uncertain  hours  between  reliefs  to  visit  the 
vedettes,  and  patrol  along  the  front  and  flanks;  before  daylight  si 
patrol  goes  to  the  front  and  on  to  the  highest  ground,  then  it  awaitS' 
daylight,  and  watches  for  signs  of  the  enemy. 

General  Rules  by  Day. 

If  it  should  be  found  necessary  to  have  two  or  more  posts  instead  of 
one  in  front  of  the  picquet,  in  consequence  of  branch  roads  or  heights 
interrupting  a  view  of  the  vedettes,  the  non-commissioned  officer's 
party  is  divided  into  so  many  parts,  each  relieving  their  own  vedettes, 
but  all  other  arrangements  remain  as  before. 

If  the  picquet  is  a  small  one,  and  the  country  to  be  watched  is  ex- 
tensive, then  the  picquet  must  be  divided  into  two  parties,  each  reliev- 
ing the  other.  In  auch  cases  the  picquet  should  be  relieved  oftener 
from  the  main  body.  The  feeding  of  horses  on  picquet  takes  place  by 
divisions,  one  hour  after  the  return  of  the  morning  patrol,  at  noon,  and 
an  hour  before  dark.  When  the  men  go  to  water  their  horses,  they 
must  bridle  them  up,  and  take  everything  with  them. 

The  men  must  not  bo  allowed  to  go  into  houses  or  villages  in  the 
neighborhood. 

The  principal  object  of  vedettes  is  to  notice  the  advance  of  an  enemy; 
14 


158  OUTPOST    DUTY. 

therefore  they  should  be  so  posted  as  to  give  the  widest  scope  for  their 
observations  which  the  nature  of  the  ground  will  admit  of.  In  order 
to  spare  men  and  horses,  no  more  vedettes  than  necessary  are  to  be 
out. 

In  a  fog,  vedettes  are  taken  oflf  the  heights  and  drawn  closer  together, 
much  in  the  same  way  as  at  night. 

When  a  vedette  discovers  anything  on  the  side  of  the  enemy,  be 
moves  his  horse  in  a  circle  at  a  walk.  The  officer,  or  non-commissioned 
officer,  from  the  post,  at  once  rides  out  to  see  what  it  is.  Occurrences 
of  all  kinds,  relating  to  movements  of  the  enemy,  are  reported  by  the 
officer  in  command  of  the  picquet. 

If  vedettes  see  troops  marching  toward  them,  but  yet  far  off,  they 
ride  the  circle  at  a  trot     The  officer  goes  out  as  before. 

If  the  enemy's  troops  are  advancing  rapidly,  and  at  no  great  dis- 
tance, for  instance  a  mile,  then  the  vedettes  circle  at  a  gallop,  and  the 
officer  mounts  his  picquet  and  at  once  advances. 

If  the  enemy  is  so  near  as  to  drive  in  the  vedettes,  they  fire  off  their 
carbines  to  give  the  alarm. 

All  strangers  or  deserters  must  be  made  to  halt,  lay  down  their  arms, 
and  advance  singly  to  the  vedettes.  When  many  come  together,  a 
party  from  the  post  or  picquet  goes  out  to  meet  them. 

Picquets  should  not  be  pushed  across  bridges  or  causeways,  unless 
their  reserves  or  other  troops  are  in  position  close  to  them. 

A  picquet  should  not  be  posted  within  musket-shot  of  any  covered 
ground,  as,  for  instance,  near  the  edge  of  a  wood,  in  dells  or  defiles 
where  passes  lead  to  the  rear  which  are  not  occupied. 

Picquets  should  be  covered  from  the  enemy's  view. 

In  case  of  necessity,  when  you  have  not  sufficient  troops  to  organize 
a  regular  chain  of  outposts,  the  best  plan  is  to  leave  out  the  supports 
and  picquets,  and  merely  establish  small  posts  with  vedettes  beyond. 
The  main  body,  being  then  considered  as  the  support,  must  be  ready  to 
turn  out  at  a  moment's  notice. 

Gbnbral  Rules  by  Niqht. 

If  the  enemy  is  near,  no  fires  are  to  be  lighted.  As  soon  as  the 
vedettes  can  no  longer  see  each  other  distinctly,  it  is  time  to  take  up  a 
position  for  the  night.     Do  not  post  vedettes  near  rushing  water,  mills, 


GENERAL   RULES    BY    NIGHT.  159 

or  near  anything  where  there  is  noise;  for  by  night  they  must  depend 
upon  their  sense  of  hearing  more  than  their  sight.  When  near  the 
enemy  part  of  the  post  and  picquet  must  be  mounted,  the  mounted  men 
being  pushed  forward  to  give  the  dismounted  ones  time  to  get  on  their 
horses  if  attacked. 

At  night  the  vedettes  should  be  relieved  every  hour.  They  are  close 
to  the  posts,  and  this  can  be  easily  done;  the  reliefs  going  round  do 
the  duty  of  patrols  at  the  same  time.  When  any  part  of  a  picquet  or 
post  is  mounted,  no  dismounted  sentry  is  required  in  their  front. 

Double  vedettes  are  always  best,  for  one  man  can  bring  in  the  report 
of  any  occurrence  to  the  post  without  loss  of  time.  Vedettes  are  taken 
off  the  hills  or  heights,  and  placed  on  the  roads  behind  fords,  bridges, 
or  ravines.  In  clear  moonshine  they  should  bo  concealed  in  the  shadow 
of  a  tree  or  bush.  If  they  hear  a  suspicious  noise,  one  vedette  rides 
in  and  reports  it;  no  one,  whether  deserter  or  otherwise,  is  allowed  to 
approach  too  close  at  night,  but  is  ordered  to  dismount  and  wait  till 
the  relief  or  patrol  comes  round. 

If  attacked  and  driven  in,  the  vedettes  must. not  retire  straight  to 
their  post,  but  some  hundred  yards  to  the  right  or  left  of  it. 

The  posts  and  picquet  have  thus  time  to  attack  the  enemy's  flank  or 
rear. 

You  do  not  skirmish  by  night,  but  hold  every  defensible  position, 
and  fire  as  much  as  possible  to  alarm  the  camp. 

Relieving  another  Picquet. — Take  over  all  written  instructions,  and 
write  down  the  verbal  orders  received.  Copy  the  sketch  of  the  country 
made  by  your  predecessor.  Ask  to  whom  reports  are  to  be  made,  and 
what  improvements  are  recommended  for  the  security  of  the  picquet. 

Have  all  unknown  roads,  as  well  as  the  spot  where  the  picquet  and 
posts  will  stand  at  night,  pointed  out  to  you  by  men  of  the  old  picquet. 
Ride  round  with  the  oflBcer  of  the  old  picquet  to  the  relief  of  the  ve- 
dettes, and  hear  the  instructions  given. 

All  these  things  must  be  punctually  attended  to,  or  the  original  or- 
ders would  vary  greatly  after  a  few  reliefs  had  taken  place. 

Skirmiahing. — The  skirmishing  of  cavalry,  as  now  carried  on,  is 
notoriously  ineffective.     "  It  is  certain,"  says  Warnery,  "that  hussars 


160  SKIRMISHING. 

will  sometimes  keep  up  a  scattered  fire  for  a  whole  day  with  very  little 
efiFect."  I  have  hoard  it  stated  that  cavalry  was  known  to  skirmish  for 
whole  days  in  the  Peninsula  without  having  a  single  man  or  horse  kill- 
ed, or  even  wounded. 

A  man  in  pursuit  of  another,  or  being  himself  pursued  and  riding  at 
speed,  may  fire  with  some  chance  of  hitting  his  mark,  but  he  is  not 
likely  to  hit  anything  while  moving  round  in  a  circle,  as  our  skirmish- 
ers do — trying  to  stop  their  horses  for  a  moment,  so  that  they  may  fire. 
This  ought  to  be  remedied. 

In  an  intersected  country  let  every  second  or  third  man  dismount, 
and  pick  off  the  enemy  with  his  rifle. 

In  an  open  country,  if  you  are  required  to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  cer- 
tain distance  from  your  columns,  ride  out  and  occupy  the  line,  but  do 
not  waste  your  ammunition.  If  the  enemy  keep  at  a  respectful  dis- 
tance, well  and  good;  if  they  close,  let  your  men  charge  sword  in 
hand,  and  decide  the  matter. 

Some  of  the  Sikh  horsemen  often  dismounted  in  battle,  and  if  you 
charged  they  proved  more  formidable  with  these  dismounted  men 
among  them  that  when  they  were  all  in  the  saddle.  If  you  rode  at  the 
dismounted  man,  the  mounted  trooper  would  interpose,  and,  while  you 
were  engaged  with  him,  the  man  on  foot  would  quickly  shoot  you  down, 
or  knock  over  your  horse. 

Are  there  not  easy  means  of  securing  and  making  something  of  the 
horse  from  which  our  dragoon  or  hussar  dismounts?  If  the  collar- 
chain  had  a  hook,  the  right  file  would  fasten  the  horse  of  the  left  file  to 
his  own ;  the  right  file  would  thus  have  the  full  use  of  both  his  arms, 
and,  if  attacked,  the  led  horse,  instead  of  being  in  his  way,  would  ef- 
fectually protect  his  weak  side  (the  near  one)  from  an  assailant. 

There  can  be,  therefore,  no  great  danger  in  pursuing  this  plan ;  when 
the  enemy  is  at  a  distance  it  is  the  only  way  to  do  execution  with  the 
rifle. 

In  intersected  ground  it  would  give  a  decided  advantage,  and  a  few 
active  fellows,  thus  trained,  and  good  shots,  would  at  any  time  inflict 
heavy  loss  on  columns  of  heavy  cavalry,  whose  pistols  would  be  but 
a  slight  protection  against  the  rifle. 

It  would  at  least  make  the  men  active,  to  practice  skirmishing  in  the 
following  manner  at  squad  drill :  On  the  signal  to  skirmish,  the  right 


DISMOUNTED.  161 

files  close  to  the  left,  to  hold  the  horses ;  the  left  files  spring  to  the 
ground,  unsling  their  rifles,  move  a  few  yards  to  the  front,  or  further, 
according  to  the  ground,  and  open  fire  till  the  advance  or  retreat,  or 
right  or  left,  is  sounded ;  they  then  mount  and  take  the  place  of  the 
right  files,  who  dismount  in  their  turn  on  the  next  signal  to  skirmish. 

When  retiring,  take  advantage  of  all  natural  obstacles — get  quickly 
behind  them,  and  occupy  them  with  dismounted  men. 

It  is  no  easy  thing  to  clear  even  a  very  small  ditch  in  the  face  of  a 
fire  of  small-arms:  the  enemy  must  try  to  dislodge  you  on  foot  (unless 
he  can  turn  the  obstacle),  which  will  give  your  men  time  to  inflict  loss 
upon  him,  and  then  continue  the  retreat. 

In  an  open  country  always  retire  by  alternate  ranks  with  drawn 
swords,  and  when  the  enemy  presses  closely  turn  upon  him  and  charge. 

Squads  should  practice  against  each  other — advancing,  retiring,  etc.; 
practising  the  attack  and  defence  of  bridges  and  defiles,  drawing  to- 
gether in  the  advance,  to  be  ready  to  charge,  and  scattering  at  the 
signal  to  skirmish. 

They  should  charge  one  another,  each  man  circling  round  his  oppo- 
nent to  the  right  at  a  gallop,  crossing  swords,  then  returning  again  to 
their  places. 

The  reserves  always  advance  to  the  support. 

"  The  Cossack  skirmishers  often  close  together  for  a  charge,  but  dis- 
perse in  retreating. 

"Our  skirmishers  almost  invariably  do  exactly  the  contrary,  what- 
ever may  be  the  facilities  ofi'ered.  The  Cossacks  are  right,  and  we  are 
wrong.  In  fact,  how  often  have  we  not  seen  our  troopers,  when  retir- 
ing, rush  one  upon  another  in  such  a  manner  as  to  deprive  them  in- 
dividually of  the  use  of  their  arms,  hampering  and  arresting  their 
progress  !  and  this,  by  still  further  retarding  that  of  men  not  so  well 
mounted  as  themselves  and  keeping  them  to  the  rear,  has  been  the 
means  of  causing  these  poor  wretches  to  be  cut  down  or  taken  prison- 
ers, their  backs  answering  as  a  shield  to  their  guilty  comrades. 

''*A  too  crowded  retreat  is  always  put  to  the  sword,  for  two  very 
simple  reasons :  the  first  is,  that  the  troopers  who  are  retreating,  by 
crowding  excessively  together,  paralyze  their  individual  means  of  de- 
fence, and  render  both  the  halt  and  the  wheel  about  impossible  j  and 
the  second  is,  that  the  attacking  trooper,  who  has  only  one  object  iu 
14* 


162  SKIRMISHING. 

eigbt,  and  who  is  not  at  nil  harassed  upon  his  flanks,  hurls  himself 
forward  with  all  his  impulsive  power  and  all  his  audacity  upon  this 
unresisting  mass,  which  he  hacks  and  hews  in  perfect  security,  and  can 
drive  before  him  as  far  as  he  chooses. 

"  This  is  not  the  case  in  a  retreat  in  which  the  men  scatter  as  they 
go;  a  man  who  retreats  in  this  fashion  preserves  all  his  defensive 
power;  ho  is  equal  in  all  points  to  the  attacking  party,  who  takes  care 
not  to  rush  recklessly  upon  him,  because  his  flanks  are  threatened,  his 
attention  diverted,  and  the  danger  equal  on  both  sides.  A  retreat  con- 
ducted in  this  manner  is  never  so  vigorously  pressed,  nor  so  far  pur- 
sued. The  slowest  horses  will  perform  it  as  well  as  the  swiftest;  it 
disturbs  the  attacking  party,  stops  him  short  just  when  he  might  have 
obtained  the  advantage,  and  it  can  wheel  round  and  resume  the  offen- 
sive. Polybius  tells  us,  in  his  description  of  the  passage  of  the  Trebia, 
'Nevertheless  Sempronius  caused  the  retreat  to  be  sounded,  in  order  to 
recall  his  cavalry,  which  did  not  know  how  to  manoeuvre  against  the 
enemy  in  its  front.  In  fact,  it  had  to  deal  with  the  Numidians,  whose 
custom  was  to  retreat  scattered  in  different  directions,  and  to  return 
vigorously  to  the  charge  when  the  enemy  least  expected  it.'  "* 

At  Stockholm,  on  the  29th  of  June,  1852,  I  saw  the  regiment  of 
Swedish  Horse-Guards,  under  Count  Stedingk — a  fine  body  of  men, 
but  rather  under  mounted. 

They  bad  four  squadrons,  each  of  about  seventy-five  horses,  divided 
into  three  divisions,  which  they  call  troops.  The  squadron-leader  alone 
was  in  front,  an  officer  on  each  flank,  and  one  in  the  rear:  they  had  no 
markers,  and  no  one  out  of  the  ranks. 

They  skirmished  by  squadrons  against  each  other,  frequently  sound- 
ing a  charge,  when  the  men,  seizing  their  swords,  galloped  toward  each 
other,  each  man  riding  round  his  opponent  at  a  gallop  and  crossing 
swords ;  the  reserves  advancing  to  the  support. 

On  a  signal  to  advance  at  a  gallop,  the  skirmishers  drew  together 
toward  the  centre  of  their  divisions,  and,  after  the  charge,  resumed 
their  line. 

The  regiment  went  through  a  field-day. 

They  change  front  on  the  move  in  open   columns  of  squadrons. 

♦=  Do  Brack. 


THE   SWEDISH   HORSE-GUARDS.  163 

They  always  form  a  close  column  in  rear  of  the  squadron  named. 
Their  open  column  is  one  of  squadrons  generally.  They  advance  in 
open  column  from  any  named  squadron,  and,  when  forming  line,  the 
squadron  which  has  lost  its  place  in  line  resumes  it  on  reforming,  and 
takes  the  shortest  road  to  get  there. 

I  was  much  struck  with  the  deep  silence  that  reigned  throughout. 
The  colonel's  word  of  command  was  followed  by  a  caution  from  the 
squadron-leader  only;  the  trumpet  sounded  and  the  movement  was  ex- 
ecuted. There  was  no  noise,  no  shouting,  no  hurrying.  If  a  halt  was 
sounded,  they  stood  motionless;  all  hung  on  the  word  of  command; 
not  a  move  was  perceptible ;  no  dressing  up,  no  reining  back,  no  closing 
in;  not  a  word  was  spoken! 

Their  working  in  the  field  was  as  fast  as  the  power  of  their  horses 
would  admit  of.  In  coming  into  line  they  halt  the  squadrons  in  rear 
of  the  line  of  dressing.  The  squadron-leader  and  the  officers  on  the 
flanks  of  the  squadron  move  up  to  the  alignment,  and  then  the  squad- 
ron dresses  up  between  the  officers. 

Their  charges  were  excellent  and  made  at  their  utmost  speed  (I  rode 
with  them  to  try  it) :  the  flanks  were  always  well  closed  up ;  no  flying 
out  was  perceptible;  and  if  they  opened  in  the  least  during  the  ad- 
vance, they  closed  up  gradually  again.  There  were  no  breaks  in  the 
line  at  any  time,  and  they  halted  at  once  and  all  together  at  the  signal. 
They  have,  instead  of  a  cloak,  a  good  thick  great-coat  with  sleeves,  in 
which  they  can  ride,  fight,  or  do  anything. 

For  parade  purposes  they  have  a  slow  canter  :  when  marching  past 
by  squadrons,  and  the  reviewing  officer  is  on  the  right,  they  lead  with 
the  right  leg;  when  on  the  left,  then  the  horses  lead  off  with  the  left 
leg. 

This  is  one  of  the  best  regiments  of  foreign  cavalry  I  have  ever  seen. 

I  conclude  these  remarks  on  skirmishing  with  extracts  from  the  letter 
of  a  distinguished  foreign  cavalry  officer  : 

"  During  great  part  of  the  last  war  against  the  French  I  was  at- 
tached to  the  Cossacks  of  the  Don.  These  men  were  at  that  time  bat 
little  accustomed  to  the  use  of  fire-arms.  While  advancing  into  West- 
ern Europe  the  advantages  of  fire-arms  became  apparent;  more  par- 
ticularly when  acting  in  intersected  and  difficult  ground :  and  the  Cos- 
sacks managed  to  arm  themselves  with  French  infantry  muskets  which 


164  CAVALRY  TACTICS. 

they  picked  up  on  the  field.  Then  originated  among  them  the  practice 
of  dismounting  by  turns  where  the  ground  was  favorable,  and  thus 
engaging  the  enemy  in  skirmishing  order.  I  have  myself  seen  them 
in  this  way  beat  cavalry  very  superior  to  them  in  numbers,  and  infantry 
also,  when  either  the  cavah-y  or  the  infantry  attempted  to  attack  them 
singly.  In  such  cases  the  infantry  soldiers  opposed  to  them  were  afraid 
of  the  mounted  men,  Avho  stuck  close  to  their  dismounted  comrades 
with  the  led  horses;  and  these  dismounted  men  were  ready  to  jump 
into  the  saddle  at  any  moment,  and  rush  upon  the  enemy,  if  they  gave 
way  or  were  driven  from  their  cover. 

"  To  this  manner  of  skirinishing  I  attribute  entirely  the  snccess  of  these 
Ooasacks  during  the  campaigns  on  the  Elbe  and  the  Rhine,  and  the  decided 
8u2)eriurity  (hey  acquired  over  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  all  outpost  work  and 
detached  icarfare. 

"  H.  V.  Ganzauge, 
"  Captain  in  the  2d  Regiment  of  Prussian  Lancers  of  the  Guard" 


Chapter    XII. 

THE  CHARGE,  THE  PURSUIT,  AND  THE  RALLY. 

" Une  charge  en  ligne  n'est  rSellemont  qn'uue  suite  rapide  de  charges 

successives,  dont  les  bi'aves  forment  les  point  saillants;  co  sont  ces  causes  qui 
rendent  le  8uc*&s  des  charges  si  iucertain,  et  qui  doivent  faire  6viter  d'en  entre- 
prendre  sur  de  grands  fronts." — C.  Jacquinot  de  Presle. 

The  charge  must  be  decided  promptly,  and  executed  vigorously; 
always  made  and  carried  out  at  speed. 

The  first  object  is  to  break  through  and  disorder  the  enemy's  array, 
then  make  use  of  the  sword  to  complete  his  discomfiture. 

Powerful  horses  urged  to  theiv  utmost  speed,  their  heads  kept  straight 
and  well  together,  will  seldom  fail  to  attain  the  first  object  in  view: 
sharp  swords,  individual  prowess,  and  skill  do  the  rest. 

Officers  must  bear  in  mind  that,  however  successful  a  brave  and  de- 
termined body  of  horsemen  may  be,  there  is  a  limit  to  everything. 
The  horses  must  in  time  get  blown,  the  men  tired  out,  the  squadrons 


THE    CHARGF.  165 

scattered^  they  are  then  at  the  mercy  of  any  body  of  fresh  horsemen. 
Reserves  must  always  be  at  hand  to  follow  up  steadily  any  success 
achieved,  or,  in  case  the  first  line  is  brought  back,  which  is  sure  to 
happen  sooner  or  later,  to  fall  upon  the  pursuing  enemy,  and  give  the 
fugitives  time  to  reform. 

The  first  line  will  never  think  of  turning  so  long  as  every  man  in  it 
feels  that  the  reserves  are  close  at  hand  to  back  him  up.  Thus,  in 
every  case,  the  reserves  should  follow  closely  and  be  ready  to  act  when- 
ever and  wherever  their  action  is  required.  When  a  charge  has  once 
begun,  carry  it  out  whatever  may  be  the  odds  that  suddenly  present 
themselves  against  you.  As  your  first  line  moves  forward,  your  re- 
serves, distributed  in  different  echelons,  take  up  in  succession  the  posi- 
tions which  have  been  carried. 

Innumerable  reverses  are  attributable  to  the  neglect  of  these  rules 
about  reserves. 

In  an  attack  upon  cavalry  formed  and  advancing  to  meet  you,  spare 
your  horses  and  husband  their  resources  for  the  hour  of  need.  Bring 
them  up  at  a  trot  to  within  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  then  sound  the 
gallop,  and  immediately  afterward  the  charge:  thus  brought  up  close 
to  the  enemy  fresh  and  well  in  hand,  you  hurl  them  upon  him  in  close 
array  with  irresistible  speed. 

Should  the  enemy  begin  galloping  earlier,  you  must  do  the  same,  for 
lines  approaching  each  other  close  very  quickly;  and  therefore  be  care- 
ful not  to  be  caught  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  before  you  have  put  on 
your  speed  to  meet  him. 

Artillery  in  an  emergency  may  use  their  horses  to  the  utmost,  be- 
cause when  they  come  into  action  their  horses  are  at  rest;  with  cavalry 
it  is  the  reverse,  for  it  is  then  that  the  horses  are  required  to  exert  them- 
selves most. 

If  you  meet  the  enemy's  cavalry  with  blown  horses,  you  are  pretty 
sure  of  being  thrown ;  but  even  should  success  attend  the  first  rush, 
that  success  would  be  useless,  for  it  could  not  be  followed  up. 

In  heavy  ground  bring  your  men  slowly  as  near  as  possible  to  the 
point  of  attack. 

If  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  in  column,  or  in  the  act  of  forming,  sound 
at  once  a  gallop,  and  try  to  overthrow  him  before  he  has  completed  hi« 
array. 


166  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

Against  iufantry  squares  formed  to  receive  you,  begin  to  gallop  as 
soon  as  the  first  fire  has  been  delivered,  but  do  not  let  the  men  rush  for- 
ward at  speed  until  they  are  -within  fifty  yards  of  the  square. 

Charges  of  cavalry  on  a  large  scale,  against  masses  of  troops  of  all 
arms,  should  be  carried  out  with  the  greatest  impetuosity  and  speed ; 
no  time  must  bo  allowed  to  the  enemy  to  prepare. 

No  distance  can  be  laid  down  at  which  to  charge,  it  depends  on  so 
many  different  circumstances.  When  the  ground  is  favorable  and 
your  horses  are  in  good  condition,  you  can  strike  into  a  gallop  sooner; 
but  the  burst,  the  charge  itself,  must  always  be  reserved  till  within  fifty 
yards,  for  in  that  distance  no  horse,  however  bad,  can  be  left  behind, 
nor  is  there  time  to  scatter,  and  they  fall  upon  the  enemy  with  the 
greatest  eflfect. 

The  Pursuit  and  Rally. — If  you  have  succeeded  in  overthrowing  the 
enemy's  line,  your  own  will  be  in  disorder.  The  melee  which  ensues, 
soon,  however,  turns  into  a  pursuit,  and  this  afi"ords  the  opportunity  of 
destroying  those  who  have  turned;  for  the  charge  and  melee  do  not 
last  long  enough  to  inflict  or  sustain  a  heavy  loss  in  men  or  horses. 

If  a  defile  is  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  the  first  duty  of  the  officers 
pursuing  is  to  dash  on  with  some  well-mounted  men  to  intercept  and 
cut  oflf  the  line  of  retreat.  When  this  has  succeeded,  then  make 
prisoners. 

The  pursuit  must  be  kept  up  with  vigor.  Each  man  singles  out  his 
foe,  and  woe  to  those  who  are  pursued  by  men  with  better  horses, 
whose  superior  speed  brings  the  avenging  sword  upon  them  ;  whose 
better  blood  and  condition  give  them  endurance  to  continue  the  pursuit! 

In  such  circumstances  it  is  difficult  to  recall  the  men :  they  are  mad- 
dened with  the  excitement  of  the  fight,  and  intent  only  on  cutting 
down  the  unfortunate  fugitives  in  front  of  them.  This  is  not  the  time 
to  stay  the  slaughter,  but  watch  over  the  safety  of  the  pursuers  with 
your  cavalry  reserves  till  the  flying  enemy  is  entirely  dispersed. 

Then  rally.  If  you  try  to  reform  line  and  pursue  with  flank  troops 
or  reserves,  you  only  give  your  enemy  the  opportunity  of  riding 
through  the  intervals  of  his  second  line  and  there  reforming. 

The  line  rallies  in  the  order  the  attack  began. 

Each  troop  rallies  for  itself,  and,  when  formed,  is  led  into  line. 


DETACHED    SERVICE.  167 

Second  line. — If  the  enemy  have  a  second  line  behind  the  first  one, 
drive  the  first  one  upon  it,  giving  them  no  time  to  choose  the  road. 
Dash  into  the  second  line  pell-mell  with  the  fugitives,  which  is  sure  to 
disorder  it.  It  will  probably  be  carried  oflf  with  the  stream  ;  if  not, 
detachments  from  your  reserves  must  do  the  needful. 

Should  the  enemy's  second  line  be  formed  on  the  flanks,  then  you 
must  rally  from  the  pursuit  as  quick  as  possible,  and,  together  with 
your  second  line  or  reserves,  charge  them  instantly. 

Time  is  here  of  great  moment,  and  each  troop,  when  rallied,  should 
at  once  be  led  against  the  foe.  Attack  in  succession,  in  echelon,  or 
any  how,  the  great  object  being  to  throw  the  second  line  into  disorder 
before  the  first  one  can  rally  again. 

Once  a  line  of  cavalry  hurled  against  the  enemy,  all  orders  from  the 
commanding  officer  must  necessarily  cease  for  a  time.  The  men  of 
each  troop  look  to  their  leader;  the  oflBcers  on  the  flanks  keep  them  as 
much  as  possible  together  in  order  to  concentrate  their  efforts  round 
their  captain. 

The  captain  must  act  with  his  troop,  without  hesitation,  wherever 
opportunity  offers;  he  must  never  remain  idle  nor  wait  for  orders 
while  an  enemy  is  near. 


Chapter  XIII. 

DETACHED  SERVICE. 

Events  in  war  are  so  varied,  that  to  lay  down  rules  for  all  ca?e8 
would  be  quite  impossible;  still  it  may  be  useful  to  point  out  the  appli- 
cation of  a  few  general  rules  meant  to  assist  officers  in  command  of 
detachments  of  cavalry  in  the  field. 

1st.  Unless  taken  by  surprise,  never  engage  the  enemy  without  having 
reconnoitred  his  strength  and  dispositions. 

2d.  Never  retire  before  an  enemy  without  taking  the  same  precau- 
tion. To  do  the  first  proves  temerity  and  want  of  head ;  to  do  the 
second  shows  timidity  and  want  of  heart. 

Reconnoitring  a  superior  force  of  cavalry  requires  judgment,  for  it  is 


168  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

often  attended  with  danger;  but  infantry  may  be  reconnoitred  in  per- 
fect security,  for  they  can  not  pursue. 

3d.  Hesitation  is  always  dangerous  in  war;  decide  promptly  one 
way  or  other.  Better  a  wrong  decision  than  a  delay  which  will  not 
allow  you  to  decide  at  all,  and  which  must  expose  you  to  the  will  or 
decision  of  your  foe. 

4th.  When  you  can  take  an  enemy  by  surprise,  always  do  so.  By 
stratagem  you  attain  your  object  more  easily  and  with  less  loss  of  life 
than  by  open  force. 

5th.  A  reserve,  however  small,  appearing  at  a  critical  moment  in  a 
charge,  will  generally  decide  it;  therefore,  however  small  your  detach- 
ment, always  keep  a  few  men  in  reserve,  and,  if  possible,  out  of  sight 
of  the  enemy;  their  sudden  and  unexpected  appearance  will  then  have 
more  effect.  Even  at  the  risk  of  repetition  and  a  little  tedium,  for  the 
benefit  of  young  cavalry  officers  I  dwell  upon  these  vital  points. 

Even  when  supported  by  infantry,  behind  whom  you  can  retire  in 
case  of  defeat,  always  keep  a  reserve  (unless  you  have  not  sufficient 
men  to  charge  with);  the  probabilities  are  that  the  enemy  has  a 
reserve,  which,  when  you  are  engaged  with  him,  will  attack  you  in  rear 
or  flank  and  cause  your  defeat,  unless  you  have  some  men  ready  to 
attack  him  in  the  same  way. 

6th.  Always  pass  a  defile  quickly.  When  through,  attack  at  once 
with  the  leading  detachment,  and  keep  the  outlet  clear  for  those  fol- 
lowing. 

Form  the  reserve  at  the  entrance  of  the  defile ;  for  if  the  troops  are 
driven  back,  it  stops  the  pursuers  and  covers  the  retreat. 

Occupy  half  the  road  only,  and  make  the  men  keep  the  near  side  of 
it  to  prevent  the  troops  getting  jammed  up  when  attacked,  and  to  keep 
that  side  clear  on  which  the  cavalry  soldier  makes  uso  of  his  sword 
(the  right). 

Before  entering  a  defile  reconnoitre  it.  Wooded  places  and  defiles 
of  no  great  length  are  reconnoitred  by  making  a  man  of  the  advanced 
guard  gallop  through,  followed  at  some  distance  by  another  single 
horseman.  If  there  is  no  direct  impediment,  the  advanced  guard 
then  gallop  through  and  keep  the  outlet  till  the  main  body  has  passed 
out. 

When  a  cavalry  detachment  without  infantry  has  no  choice,  but  is 


DETACHED    SERVICE.  169 

obliged  to  pass  a  defile  known  to  be  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  their 
best  chance  is  to  attempt  it  at  night  and  at  a  gallop.  If  a  barricade 
has  been  raised,  the  advanced  party  give  notice,  and  a  few  dismounted 
men  endeavor  to  remove  it.  If  the  obstruction  is  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  be  impassable  on  horseback  and  impossible  to  remove,  the  party  will 
have  to  turn  back. 

When  acting  with  infantry,  these  reconnoitre  the  defile ;  for  it  would 
be  dangerous  for  the  cavalry  to  find  an  enemy's  infantry  posted  there 
on  their  flanks  and  out  of  reach  of  their  swords. 

When  a  defile  is  occupied  the  infantry  try  to  force  it,  and  the  cavalry 
endeavor  to  turn  it. 

When,  in  passing  through  a  defile,  you  are  suddenly  attacked  by 
cavalry,  charge  at  once ;  if  you  turn,  you  are  lost.  You  can  not  get 
away,  and  are  sure  to  be  cut  down ;  whereas  by  charging  you  place 
yourself  on  equal  terms  with  the  foe,  who,  whatever  his  numbers,  can 
not  bring  more  men  into  line  than  the  breadth  of  the  road  will  admit 
of,  and  you  can  do  the  same. 

If  you  have  infantry  with  you  in  a  defile,  and  you  meet  the  enemy, 
let  the  infantry  try  to  gain  his  flanks  while  you  charge  him  in  front. 

7th.  When,  in  pursuit,  you  come  up  to  the  enemy  at  the  entrance  of 
a  defile  or  village  where  he  has  made  dispositions  to  receive  you,  then 
leave  a  few  men  to  watch  him,  and  ride  round  the  village,  or  turn  the 
defile  and  cut  in  on  his  line  of  retreat. 

8th.  Always  attack  at  once  any  working  parties  left  by  an  enemy  to 
destroy  bridges  or  roads,  etc. 

9th.  In  covering  a  retreat  through  a  defile  endeavor  to  stop  the 
enemy's  cavalry  by  upsetting  wagons  or  by  otherwise  encumbering  the 
road,  and  defend  these  barricades  with  a  few  dismounted  men. 

If  you  have  no  means  of  barricading,  form  at  the  outlet  of  the  defile 
with  a  party  on  the  flank,  and  charge  the  enemy  in  front  and  flank 
simultaneously  the  moment  he  attempts  to  force  his  way  out. 

10th.  Rivers  should  not  stop  cavalry,  unless  the  banks  be  so  steep 
as  to  aflFord  no  footing  for  the  horses  to  land.  There  are  plenty  of 
examples  of  cavalry  swimming  rivers  without  loss.  For  instance,  the 
night  before  the  Battle  of  Hastembeck  three  hundred  horse,  with  as 
many  foot-soldiers,  were  detached  from  the  camp  of  the  Duke  of 
Broglie  and  swam  the  Weser,  the  foot-soldiers  holding  on  to  the  horses' 
15 


170  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

manes.  Again,  twenty-four  squadrons  of  Austrian  cuirassiers  swam 
the  River  Main  on  the  3d  of  September,  1796,  leaving  the  bridge  for 
the  use  of  the  infantry. 

Cavalry  should  swim  by  ranks  in  line,  going  in  abreast  to  break  the 
current.  The  men  ought  to  look  to  the  opposite  bank,  not  at>  the 
water;  for  if  they  do  so  they  are  very  apt,  insensibly,  to  follow  the 
current.  They  hold  by  the  mane,  and  only  use  the  snaffle-rein  to 
direct  the  horse  ;  both  reins  should  be  tied  up  short,  to  prevent  the 
horses  putting  their  feet  into  them  when  swimming. 

When  boats  are  at  hand  and  no  enemy  in  the  near  neighborhood, 
the  men's  kits  and  arms  should  be  taken  across  in  the  boats,  to  keep 
them  dry  and  make  it  easier  for  the  horses  to  swim. 

11th.  Cavalry  never  surrenders,  under  any  circumstances,  in  the 
open  field,  but  must  always  attempt  to  cut  its  way  through,  or,  by 
scattering,  elude  pursuit. 

If  an  eneiuy  is  expected  to  cross  a  river  in  your  front,  do  not  scatter 
the  cavalry  along  its  banks,  but  concentrate  it  at  some  distance  from 
the  river  in  different  points.  It  can  then  move  up  in  force  quickly 
with  its  horse-artillery  to  any  place  at  which  the  enemy  attempts  the 
passage. 

In  the  attack  and  defence  of  entreHckments,  cavalry  in  the  defences  is 
kept  out  of  reach  of  shot,  and,  when  the  enemy  is  in  the  act  of  storm- 
ing, it  gallops  out  of  the  entrenchments  and  charges  them  in  flank — 
going  out  at  the  right  and  re-entering  the  entrenchments  by  the  left,  or 
vice  versa.  When  this  is  not  feasible,  it  waits  inside  till  the  enemy 
have  effected  an  entrance,  and  then  charges  to  drive  them  out.  When 
the  outlets  are  narrow  and  only  admit  of  files,  it  does  the  same,  because 
in  filing  out  it  might  be  taken  in  flank,  and  if  defeated  it  would  not 
escape  through  so  narrow  an  entrance  without  sustaining  heavy  loss. 

Jn  the  attack  the  cavalry  is  masked,  when  possible,  behind  the  infan- 
try columns,  ready  to  meet  a  sortie  on  the  part  of  the  garrison,  or  to 
profit  by  any  moans  of  entering  the  entrenchments  which  may  be 
secured  for  it  by  the  infantry.  It  may  bo  sent  to  turn  the  entrench- 
ments, or  otherwise  assist  in  their  capture  j  but  it  is  out  of  place  for 
cavalry  to  attempt  to  take  a  leading  part.  A  division  of  French 
cuirassiers  that  tried  to  ride  into  the  entrenchments  at  Wagram  wore 
nearly  destroyed  without  doing  any  good. 


CAVALRY   AGAINST    INFANTRY.  171 

hi  sieges,  when  a  place  is  to  be  invested  by  a  rapid  march,  the  caval- 
ry occupy  all  the  surrounding  passes  and  villages  in  the  neighborhood, 
and  hold  them  till  the  infantry  come  up.  They  then  escort  convoys, 
bring  in  provisions  to  camp,  etc. 

When  with  tho  besieged,  they  are  of  use  in  making  sorties,  forays, 
etc. ;  and  when  the  outworks  at  last  fall  into  tho  hands  of  the  enemy, 
the  dragoons  either  serve  the  guns  or  retire  from  the  fortre33,  and 
throw  themselves  into  the  enemy's  rear. 

To  effect  their  retreat  the  garrison  make  a  sally  at  night,  and  tho 
cavalry  escape  in  the  dark. 


C  H AFTER      XI  y. 
CAVALRY  CHARaES  AGAINST  INFANTRY. 

"  Zu  alien  Zeiten,  wo  die  Kuust  verfiel, 
Verfiel  Sie  durch  die  Kunstler." — Schiller. 

I  have  already  spoken  briefly  of  cavalry  verstis  cavalry,  and  of  caval- 
ry against  artillery.  I  have  purposely  reserved  the  matter  contained 
in  this  chapter  for  the  conclusion  of  my  little  work.  It  will  show  what 
cavalry  has  done,  and  what  it  may  do  again.  I  will  not  aflBrm,  with 
Colonel  Mitchell  and  some  other  military  writers,  that  cavalry,  if 
properly  armed,  mounted,  and  led,  will,  under  every  circumstance  or 
combination  of  circumstances,  break  an  infantry  square — I  will  only 
say  that  it  may  frequently  do  so.  Let  no  infantry  officer  take  offence 
at  my  opinion.  A  greater  respect  for  our  own  matchless  foot-soldiers 
than  that  which  I  entertain  can  not  be  felt  by  any  man,  either  in  the 
service  or  out  of  it.  But  if  I  carry  any  of  my  propositions  too  far, 
let  it  be  remembered  that  I  am  a  cavalry  ojjicer. 

Cavalry  is  now  often  reduced  to  "play  a  secondary  part  iu  war,  in 
consequence  of  the  greater  ease  with  which  armies  in  the  field  change 
their  positions.  Tho  infantry,  no  longer  tied  down  to  a  battle-field 
chosen  for  its  level  ground,  or  a  position  covering  their  encampment^ 
more  lightly  armed  and  equipped,  move  off  during  an  engagement,  if 
threatened  by  a  powerful  cavalry,  and  neutralize  its  effort  by  occupying 
enclosures,  or  getting  into  a  hilly  or  otherwise  difficult  country. 


172  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

Instead  of  forming  long  lines  and  open  columns,  they  move  in 
compact  masses,  or  throw  themselves  into  squares,  which,  supporting 
each  other  by  a  cross  fire,  and  protected  by  artillery,  often  defy  the 
efiforts  of  cavalry.  But  can  they  alwaj's  move  in  an  open  country,  and 
laugh  at  the  efiforts  of  that  arm,  the  thundering  of  whose  approach  was 
Buflacient,  formerly,  to  inspire  them  with  awe  ? 

If  infantry  squares  are  impregnable  and  artillery  safe  within  the 
swoop  of  bold  horsemen,  then  our  cavalry  is  no  longer  indispensable  to 
the  eflSciency  and  safety  of  an  army. 

Why  then  are  such  large  sums  expended  by  every  nation  in  Europe 
to  organize  an  efficient  cavalry,  and  raise  their  numbers  to  nearly  one- 
fifth  of  an  army  in  the  field  ?  why  this  expense  if  cavalry  is  hencefor- 
ward to  be  used  only  for  outpost  duty,  for  skirmishing,  for  carrying 
despatches  and  orders  in  the  field? 

Unfortunately,  in  our  cavalry  the  general  opinion  is  against  the  possi- 
bility of  infantry  squares  being  broken. 

If  troops  believe  a  thing  impossible,  success  is  not  to  be  expected. 
If  cavalry  are  led  to  suppose  that  they  can  not  break  an  infantry  square, 
they  will  add  one  more  example  to  the  frequeuc^'^  of  such  failures  when- 
ever they  are  next  ordered  to  charge. 

If  to  infantry  soldiers  you  admit  that  they  can  not  stand  exposed  to 
the  fire  of  artillery,  such  men  will  be  always  ripe  for  defeat. 

Those  whose  duty  it  is  to  instruct  the  men  under  their  command 
should  instil  confidence  in  the  power  of  that  arm  to  which  they  belong, 
and  never  allow  soldiers  to  doubt  of  success  when  they  do  their  duty 
manfully. 

In  the  Seven  Years*  War,  as  much  if  not  a  greater  portion  of  artil- 
lery was  used  than  in  more  modern  times ;  for  instance,  at  Leuthen, 
Frederic  the  Great  had  between  thirty-three  thousand  and  thirty-four 
thousand  men  in  the  field,  and  one  hundred  and  sixty-seven  guns — a 
proportion  of  five  guns  to  every  thousand  men ;  in  the  more  recent  cam- 
paigns the  average  has  seldom  exceeded  three  guns  to  one  thousand 
men  ;  but  neither  the  numerous  artillery  nor  well-drilled  infantry  stop- 
ped the  cavalry  in  those  days. 

The  numerous  improvements  effected  in  the  artillery  are  in  favor  of 
tbo  cavalry,  not  against  their  chances  of  success. 

No  infantry  can  now  escape  from  its  fire,  and  when  subjected  to  it 


CAVALRY   AGAINST   INFANTRY.  173 

the  better  practice  will  throw  them  sooner  into  disorder,  and  make  tliem 
ripe  for  the  harvest  of  the  sword. 

Horse-artillery  can  move  with  almost  equal  speed  and  act  in  concert 
with  cavalry,  where  formerly  the  cavalry  must  have  acted  alone.  With 
such  powerful  assistance  (under  almost  all  circumstances)  cavalry  are 
surely  more  formidable  than  before,  and  with  horse-artillery  they  must 
always  destroy  infantry,  however  good  and  tried  it  may  be ;  for,  sup- 
posing the  cavalry  alone  can  do  nothing,  the  artillery  can  destroy  them 
with  its  fire  if  they  keep  together,  and  if  they  attempt  to  deploy  they 
must  fall  a  prey  to  the  horsemen.  Both  artillery  and  cavalry  can  keep 
out  of  range  of  the  infantry's  fire  all  the  time. 

Thus,  if  the  improved  tactics  of  infantry  have  given  them  an  advan- 
tage over  the  cavalry,  the  latter  have  more  than  made  up  for  it  by  the 
improvements  of  the  artillery,  which,  by  keeping  company  with  them, 
can,  by  their  fire,  afford  the  cavalry  those  favorable  moments  at  which 
to  charge  is  to  conquer. 

An  infantry  square  ought  to  be  attacked  with  a  front  smaller  than 
the  side  of  the  square  charged. 

If  you  outflank  it,  the  men  on  the  flanks  ride  round  the  sides,  and 
those  in  the  centre  open  out  and  follow  suit. 

The  officers  on  the  flanks  must  look  to  this,  the  cavalry  put  their 
horses  to  their  utmost  speed,  ride  home,  and  the  square  must  go  down. 

Saddles  will  be  emptied,  horses  killed  and  wounded,  but  no  horse,  un- 
less he  is  shot  through  the  brain,  or  has  his  legs  broken,  will  fall ;  though 
stricken  to  the  death,  he  will  struggle  through  the  charge.* 

When  the  ground  and  other  circumstances  admit  of  it,  a  good  plan  to 

*  For  a  horse  must  be  very  much  wounded  to  make  him  fall  upon  the  spot. 
"  One  without  his  rider,  at  Strigau,  which  had  one  of  his  hind  feet  carried  away  by 
a  cannon-ball,  joined  the  left  of  the  squadron,  where  he  remained  with  the  others 
during  all  the  battle,  although  we  were  several  times  dispersed;  at  the  sound  of 
the  call  he  always  fell  into  the  same  place,  which  was,  without  doubt,  the  same 
that  he  had  before  belonged  to  in  the  squadron. 

'•  Another  time,  a  cuirassier's  horse  fell  in  the  grand  attack  at  the  exercise  at 
Breslau ;  the  cuirassier  got  him  up  again  and  mounted  him ;  at  three  hundred 
paces  he  fell  down  dead.  The  late  General  Krokow,  colonel  of  the  regiment,  had 
him  opened,  and  it  was  found  that  the  sword  of  the  cuirassier  had  penetrated  his 
heart  a  tenth  of  an  inch.  These  facts  prove  that  a  horse  is  not  easily  to  be  brought 
down  unless  a  ball  should  break  his  skull." — General  WameTy. 
15* 


174  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

attack  a  square  is,  for  two  troops  to  charge,  one  the  front  side,  the  other 
the  adjoining  side,  of  the  square;  a  third  troop  meanwhile  forms  oppo- 
site the  angle  of  the  square,  the  two  sides  of  which  are  charged  at  the 
same  moment  by  the  first  two,  who  having  drawn  the  fire,  the  third 
troop  rushes  down,  and  is  upon  the  square  before  they  are  aware  of  its 
approach. 

A  favorite  manoeuvre  of  the  great  Frederic,  and  one  executed  with 
great  success  by  his  cavalry  under  Seidlitz  at  Zorndorf,  under  Marshal 
Gesler  at  Strigau,  and  under  General  Liideritz  at  Kesseldorf,  was  to 
form  a  close  column  at  some  distance  in  front  of  the  centre  of  a  line  of 
cavalry,  and  thus  bear  down  on  the  enemy's  infantry  and  attack  them 
at  speed.  When  they  broke  through  the  line,  the  two  rear  squadrons 
of  the  column  wheeled  outward  and  rolled  up  the  broken  infantry,  while 
the  cavalry  in  line  rode  over  them  and  followed  the  leading  column  to 
be  ready  to  fall  on  the  enemy's  cavalry  should  it  press  forward  to  the 
rescue.  The  Prussian  cavalry  were  ordered  to  shout  and  make  as  much 
noise  as  possible  when  attacking  infantry,  to  prevent  their  hearing  the 
whistling  of  the  bullets  ;  but  when  charging  cavalry  the  deepest  silence 
was  preserved,  and  all  hung  in  breathless  suspense  on  the  word  of  com- 
mand which  was  to  hurl  them  simultaneously  on  the  foe. 

I  will  now  adduce  some  instances  of  successful  charges  of  cavalry 
against  infantry  squares,  namely  : 

At  the  Battle  of  Frauenstadt  the  Swedish  dragoons  cut  down  tbe 
whole  of  the  Saxon  infantry  formed  in  squares. 

At  Ilohen/riedberg  the  dragoon  regiment  of  Bairouth  rode  over  twen- 
ty-one battalions  of  infantry,  took  four  thousand  prisoners,  eixty-sis 
stands  of  colors,  and  five  pieces  of  artillery. 

Zorndorf. — See  ante,  page  19. 

Combat  of  Avesne-le-Sec. — Three  thousand  French  infantry,  with 
twenty  guns,  formed  in  squares  to  receive  the  charge  of  four  Austrian 
cavalry  regiments,  under  Prince  Liehtenstein  and  Count  Belgarde,  and 
were  overthrown  at  the  first  onset :  two  thousand  men,  five  stands  of 
colors,  and  twenty  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors ;  the  remain- 
der of  the  French  were  cut  down,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  hundred 
stragglers,  who  reached  Cambray  and  Bonchain. 

Villiers-en-Conche. — The  French,  fifteen  thousand  strong,  were  de- 
feated by  ten  British  and  four  Austrian   squadrons :  part  of  this  force 


CJAVALRY   AGAINST   INFANTRY.  175 

dispersed  the  French  cavalry,  while  two  British  and  two  Austrian  squad- 
rons broke  through  the  French  square,  killed  nine  hundred,  and  took 
four  hundred  men  prisoners,  together  with  five  pieces  of  cannon. 

Cdteaii  Cambreais. — One  i-egiment  of  Austrian  cuirassiers  and  nine 
British  squadrons  defeated  General  Chappuis'  army,  twenty-seven 
thousand  strong,  inflicting  a  loss  of  three  thousand  men,  and  capturing 
twenty-two  guns  and  twenty-nine  ammunition  wagons. 

A  fairs  of  Edesheim  and  Kaherlautern. — Marshal  Blucher  defeated 
the  French  at  Edesheim  with  two  cavalry  regiments  ;  and  at  Kaiserlau- 
tern  charged  six  hundred  French  infantry  soldiers  with  eighty  hussars  : 
though  they  were  prepared  to  receive  him,  he  broke  in,  killed,  wounded, 
or  captured  the  whole  party. 

Nordlingen. — On  the  retreat  of  the  Austrian  cavalry  from  Ulra,  in 
the  year  1800,  they  broke  and  defeated  three  regiments  of  French  in- 
fantry, belonging  to  the  division  of  General  Montrichard. 

Au&terlitz. — The  Russian  cavalry  broke  the  squares  of  French  infan- 
try formed  by  the  brigade  of  General  Schinner,  division  Vandamme  of 
Soult's  corps  ;  and  a  regiment  of  their  lancers  broke  the  square  form- 
ed by  the  fourth  regiment  of  the  line,  and  captured  their  eagle. 

AueratadL — The  Prussian  dragoon  regiment  of  Irving  destroyed  a 
square  of  French  infantry,  which  stood  firmly  to  the  last,  and  gave  thero 
a.  volley  at  fifteen  paces  which  brought  down  nine  officers  and  many 
men  j  but  the  dragoons  wex*e  not  to  be  stopped  :  they  rushed  in  and  cut 
them  to  pieces. 

Waltersdorf,  the  5th  of  February,  1807. — The  French  cavalry  over 
took  the  Prussian  rear-guard,  consisting  of  five  battalion?,  ten  squad- 
rons, and  a  battery  of  horse-artillery.  They  charged  and  overthrev? 
the  cavalry,  and,  after  a  gallant  resistance,  nearly  destroyed  the  whole 
of  the  infantry.  The  remains  of  some  battalions  alone  were  saved  by 
the  charge  of  the  Prussian  hussars  of  Prittwitz. 

At  the  Battle  of  Pidtusk  th.Q  Russian  General  Koschin  charged  and 
overthrew  the  right  wing  of  the  French. 

On  the  5th  of  May,  1809,  the  Prussian  Major  Schill,  with  six  hun- 
dred hussars,  attacked  eighteen  hundred  French  infantry,  who  were 
posted  with  two  guns  in  broken  ground.  Their  commander,  General 
Michaud,  wrote  as  follows  to  the  Minister  of  War,  Eble  :  "  Ces  hussards 
ne  se  battcnt  pas  comme  des  soldats  ordinaires,  maia  comme  dcs  en- 


176  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

rages  :  ayant  romjiu  et  sabre  mes  quarres,  ils  fireut  Ics  rcstes  prisoa- 
niers.     Venez  a  mon  sccour,*'  etc. 

Action  of  Gdrci  Hernandez,  22>d  July,  1S12. — Three  French  squares 
were  broken  by  the  King's  German  Legion, 

Combat  of  the  Goerdt,  Iflf/i  Se^ncv.iher,  1813. — Here  a  corps  of  nine 
thousand  French  with  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery,  partly  posted  in  broken 
ground  and  partly  in  the  open,  after  defying  the  attacks  of  the  Cos- 
sacks and  the  cavalry  of  the  Russian-Gernaan  legion,  were  charged  by 
the  3d  Hanoverian  hussars,  and  those  squares  which  were  in  the  open 
were  completely  defeated  with  the  loss  of  their  guns. 

Ambuscade  of  Jloynan,  26fh  of  April,  1813. — Here  General  Maison's 
division  of  the  victorious  French  army,  eight  battalions,  with  eighteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  were  ridden  over  and  captured  by  Colonel  Dolfs  at 
the  head  of  twenty  Prussian  squadrons.     (Seepage  32.) 

It  is  impo.ssible  for  the  infantry  soldier  physically  to  resist  the  power 
of  a  horse  when  at  speed ;  that  the  horse  will  face  both  fire  and  bay- 
onet is  proved  by  the  many  examples  given. 

The  horse  often  feels  the  man's  unwillingness  to  go  on,  and  turns, 
but  then  it  is  in  obedience  to  the  bridle  hand. 

The  following  is  a  translation  from  Berenhorst's  "  BetrachtungeQ 
iiber  Kriegskunst."  His  reputation  as  a  writer  on  military  matters^ 
and  his  personal  experience  in  war,  must  entitle  his  views  to  some  con- 
sideration : 

''Against  cavalry,  it  is  the  rule  for  infantry  to  fire  steadily  by  word 
of  command,  and  not  to  begin  too  soon  Here  again  it  is  assumed  that 
the  cavalry  will  turn.  All  regulations  are  silent  as  to  what  is  to  be  done 
when  they  do  not  turn  after  the  last  shot  has  been  fired  and  the  horses 
arc  on  the  bayonets. 

'•  To  demonstrate  the  matter  better,  we  will  examine,  measure  out, 
and  calculate  the  chances  of  a  charge  of  cavalry  against  infantry,  con- 
ducted according  to  rule. 

"  Let  one-sixth  of  the  horses  be  shot  down  (the  riders  are  not  taken 
into  consideration),  this  does  not  stop  the  advance  of  the  remainder. 
Suppose  the  infantry  in  the  situation  as  above,  for  which  no  instruc- 
tions are  given,  namely :  the  volley  has  been  delivered  and  the  muskets 
are  brought  to  the  charge. 

"  The  second  and  third  rank  may  have  their  muskets  at  the  charge, 


CAVALRY   AGAINST   INFANTRY.  177 

or  be  busy  loading  ;  but  the  front  rank  have  their  muskets  thrown  for- 
ward ;  the  right  hand  grasps  the  small  of  the  stock ;  in  this  position 
the  musket  and  bayonet  reach  only  three  feet  beyond  the  man's  elbow. 
Is  the  infantry  soldier  now  to  aim  at  the  dragoon  or  his  horse  ?  He 
can  not  reach  the  man  :  it  is  four  feet  from  the  horse's  nose  to  the 
man's  belly,  and  three  and  a  half  from  the  horde's  forehead  to  the  man's 
breast.* 

'<  The  man  is  further  protected  by  the  head  and  neck  of  his  horse.f 
and,  if  the  infantry  soldier  tries  to  thrust  at  him,  he  comes  in  contact 
with  the  horse  and  is  thrown  down. 

"But  let  us  admit  an  impossibility.  Every  bayonet  has  been  buried 
in  the  stomach  or  breast  of  the  horsemen ;  still,  the  horses  alone  will 
break  the  ranks  of  the  infantry. 

"  The  infantry  soldier  can  only  try  and  aim  his  bayonet  at  the  horse's 
breast,  and  let  him  spit  himself  like  a  wild  boar.  In  this  case  he  must 
hit  the  heart  to  kill  him,  for  any  other  wound  would  be  quite  useless  at 
the  moment;  and  even  reaching  the  horse's  heart  can  not  save  him,  for 
the  horse,  with  his  great  weight  and  the  impulse  of  his  speed,  will  dash 
the  whole  rank  to  the  ground  in  his  fall. 

^'  Infantry  can  therefore  depend  only  on  its  fire  :  it  has  time  to  de- 
liver two  volleys,  no  more,  and  therewith  barely  the  power  to  knock 
over  every  sixth  horse. 

"  Experience  shows  that  the  effect  of  musketry  is  very  trifling  at 
more  than  three  hundred  yards  ;  within  that  distance  it  would  not  be 
advisable  to  try  more  than  two  discharges. 

'*  The  calculation  is  that  the  fusileer  can  discharge  his  piece  five  times 
in  the  minute,  thus  for  each  shot  twelve  seconds  of  time  are  required,  j 

^*  The  cavalry  soldier  will  pass  over  six  hundred  paces  in  thirty  sec- 
onds, to  each  one  hundred  paces  five  seconds. 

"  If  the  fusileer  delivers  his  first  fire  at  three  hundred  paces,  and 
twelve  seconds  later  the  second,  he  has  only  three  seconds  left,  can  not 
load  again,  and  will  be  ridden  over  in  the  interim. 

*  Berenhorst. — This  measurement  is  taken  on  horses  of  a  small  stamp. 

•f  The  horao's  neck  and  the  soldier's  musket  act  like  two  swords  crossed :  if  the 
one  turns  the  point  of  the  othtsr  from  the  straight  line  the  thrust  goes  off  side- 
ways.— Berenhorst. 

t  Note  hy  Berenhorst. — "  We  wish  to  be  generous,  for  with  ball-cartridge  the 
soldier  could  not  reload  under  fifteen  seconds. 


178  CAVALRY   TACTICS. 

"  A  battalion  whicli  dolivere  its  fire  at  sixty  paces,  aud  wants  to  re- 
load, is  ripe  for  mowing  down.  As  sixty  yards  is  quite  far  enough  to 
miss  at,  particularly  when  the  rushing  in  of  the  cavalry  shakes  the  earth 
and  men's  nerves  at  the  same  time,  it  would  bo  far  better  to  order  one 
discharge  only  at  thirty  paces,  and  bring  the  bayonets  to  the  charge 
without  attempting  to  reload. 

"  Then  the  infantry  are  still  in  the  position  already  alluded  to,  and 
in  which  the  superiority  of  the  cavalry  has  been  demonstrated.* 

*•'  In  speculating,  however,  on  this  subject,  the  advantage  is  entirely 
on  the  side  of  the  infantry.  Assume  that  each  file  fire  true,  and  thus 
send  their  bullets  into  the  breasts  of  the  front  rank  horses  ;  those  of 
the  rear  rank  fall  over  them,  and  it  is  all  up  with  the  cavalry ;  the  men 
are  stretched  on  the  ground  among  a  whole  line  of  dead  and  dying 
horses,  and  all  they  can  do  is  to  pick  themselves  up  and  surrender. 

''In  the  battles  of  civilized  nations  among  the  too  sober  warriors  of 
the  West,  the  probabilities  are  that  the  horsemen  will  gallop  slowly  ;  in- 
stead of  plying  their  spurs  within  the  last  three  hundi-ed  or  four  hun- 
dred paces,  they  will  pull  at  the  reins,  and  when  the  bullets  begin  to 
whistle  they  will  turn  and  gallop  to  the  rear  by  whole  squadrons.f 

"  The  infantry  will  fire  too  soon,  fire  badly,  lose  its  presence  of  mind, 
and  sometimes  its  order  ;  both  sides  much  alike. 

"  The  success  or  failure  will  depend  on  those  unlooked-for  circum- 
stances which  in  war  generally  decide  between  victory  and  defeat. 

"Still,  on  carefully  comparing  the  chances,  the  balance  is  in  favor  of 
the  horsemen  :  the  misfortune  is,  that  they  are  seldom  anxious  to  avail 
themselves  of  it.  The  cavalry  of  Charles  XII  and  Frederic  the  Great 
alone  used  their  advantage  to  some  purpose." 

At  the  Battle  of  the  Pyramids  many  single  Mameluke  horsemen 
dashed  right  through  the  French  squares,  and  out  at  the  other  side.    If 

*  By  the  author. — It  ninst  be  a  very  fast  horse  to  go  over  six  hundred  paces  In 
thirty  secondfl.  Cavalry  could  not  well  do  it  under  forty  seconds.  With  the  pres- 
ent musket  the  soldier  could  not  deliver  more  than  two  volleys  against  an  advan- 
cing Hue,  for  it  would  be  useless  to  fire  at  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards. 
The  long-range  gun  is  therefore  not  to  be  despised :  and  the  needle  gun  of  the 
Prussians,  which  can  be  loaded  quicker  and  fired  with  greater  accuracy,  and  with 
these  advantages  combines  the  long-range,  is  a  formidable  projectile  in  the  handi* 
of  a  steady  soldier  1 

t  Note  by  BerenJiorst.—'*  The  author  saw  this  happen  himself." 


CAVALRY    AGAINST    INFANTRY.  179 

only  twenty  of  them,  with  the  same  determination  evinced  by  these  in- 
dividual horsoinen,  had  charged  the  French  squares  together,  they  mu?t 
have  succeeded  ;  but  they  exhausted  their  horses  in  irregular  charges, 
each  man  coming  on  in  his  turn  to  be  shot  down,  till  at  last  their  cour- 
age was  tamed  by  repeated  failure,  and  they  fled  the  field. 

*  In  the  pursuit,  after  the  Battle  of  Salamanca,  at  Garci  Hernandez, 
where  the  English  cavalry  (German  legion)  rode  over  three  squares  of 
French  infantry,  five  dragoons  actually  charged  one  square  by  them- 
selves, broke  in,  and  two  of  them  cut  their  way  through  and  got  out  at 
the  other  side. 

At  the  Battle  of  Aliwal  a  squadron  of  the  16th  Lancers,  under  Capt. 
Pearson,  rode  through  the  Sikh  infantry  :  the  gallant  leader,  dashing  in 
alone,  went  through  them  first. 

(Japtain  Bere,  of  the  same  regiment,  with  a  squadron,  went  right 
through  a  Sikh  square,  wheeling  about  and  re-entering  it  again. 

But  our  infantry  have  stood  unconqucred  against  the  best  cavalry  of 
France  in  many  a  bloody  field ;  they  marched  against  them,  and  int-o 
the  midst  of  them,  at  Quatre-Bras,  under  General  Picton. 

The  Sikh  infantry  were  not  wanting  either  in  discipline  or  valor ; 
they  also  at  Aliwal  advanced  against  the  British  cavalry .f 

But  infantry  squares  that  stood  firm  and  undaunted,  that  delivered 
their  fire  with  good  effect,  have  nevertheless  been  overthrown  and  total- 
ly destroyed  by  the  charge  of  a  few  gallant  horsemen. 

Contrast  the  two  following  instances,  which  show  that  the  safety  of 
the  infantry  does  not  depend  upon  the  courage,  upon  the  steady  dis- 
cipline, and  firm  behavior  of  the  square,  but  rather,  solely,  on  the  for- 
bearance of  the  cavalry. 

1.  In  the  expedition  to  Russia  in  1812,  while  endeavoring  to  save 
the  wounded  at  Mojaick,  fifty  of  the  light  company  of  the  33d  (French) 
clambered  up  a  height,  the  summit  of  which  was  occupied  by  the  ene- 
my's cavalry  and  artillery.  The  French  army,  halted  under  the  walls 
of  Mojaick,  looked  on  with  astonishment  at  this  handful  of  men,  who, 
dispersed  over  the  unprotected  declivity,  annoyed  thousands  of  the 

♦GeschichtederSpaniscfaen  Monarchie,  v.  1810  bis  1823,  v.  Obersten  v.  Schee- 
seler. 
t  Sir  H.  Smit-h'a  despatches. 


180  CAVALRY  TACTICS. 

Russian  cavalry.  The  consequence,  which  might  have  been  anticipat- 
ed, soon  appeared:  several  Russian  squadrons  were  seen  in  motion, 
who,  the  next  moment,  surrounded  these  brave  men.  They  instantly 
formed  a  square;  but  they  were  too  few,  among  so  many  horsemen,  and 
"in  so  vast  a  plain,  and  were  soon  lost  to  the  view  of  the  French  army. 
Some  smoke,  which  arose  from  the  centre  of  the  mass,  prolonged  the 
uncertainty ;  the  anxiety  lasted  for  some  moments,  when  all  at  once 
the  army  gave  a  shout  of  admiration  on  seeing  the  Russian  cavalry 
disperse,  in  order  to  escape  the  well-directed  fire  of  that  handful  of  he- 
roes, who  were  thus  left  masters  of  a  large  field  of  battle,  of  which  they 
barely  occupied  a  few  feet.^ 

2.  At  the  Siege  of  Trichinopoli,  in  the  month  of  February,  1763,  a 
company  of  British  infantry  held  a  fortified  post  at  some  distance  from 
the  town  :  they  were  attacked  by  a  party  of  Mahratta  horsemen,  and 
beat  them  off  with  great  loss.  When  relieved  at  their  post,  they  had  to 
march  across  the  plain  to  return  to  cantonments.  The  Mahrattas  were 
waiting  for  them.  The  English  soldiers  marched  out  full  of  confidence ; 
they  were  repeatedly  attacked,  but  formed  in  square,  and,  reserving 
their  fire  each  time  till  they  could  deliver  it  with  deadly  effect,  they 
strewed  the  plain  with  men  and  horses,  and  continued  their  march, 
taunting  the  cavalry,  and  daring  them  to  come  on. 

The  Mahrattas,  much  reduced  in  numbers,  but  still  determined  to 
have  their  revenge,  formed  in  two  ranks,  the  second  at  some  distance 
behind  the  first ;  they  then  advanced  steadily  up  to  the  bayonets  j  the 
English  took  a  deliberate  aim,  poured  upon  them  a  most  deadly  fire, 
and  down  went  the  leading  ranks,  men  and  horses :  the  Mahrattas  had 
drawn  the  fire,  as  had  been  agreed  among  them  ;  but  over  their  pros- 
trate bodies  rushed  the  rear  rank  like  infuriated  fiends,  to  avenge  their 
fall,  and,  dashing  in  through  the  bayonets,  these  horsemen  killed  every 
man  in  the  detachment. 

Near  Augsburg,  and  between  that  place  and  Sulzbach,  the  French 
20th  regiment  of  light  infantry,  formed  in  square,  was  attacked  by  some 
Austrian  cavalry,  and  beat  them  off  twice ;  but  the  third  charge  was 
successful  J  the  Austrians  rode  over  them,  and  killed  or  captured  the 
whole  regiment. 

♦  Segur,  Exped.  de  Russie. 


: 


CAVALRY   AGAINST    INFANTRY.  181 

At  Rh'oli  the  French  cavalry  did  great  execution  on  the  Austrian  in- 
fantry. Near  San  Giovanni  the  Cossacks  attacked  the  French  infantry 
nnder  General  Dombrowski  with  comijlete  success,  and  destroyed  sev- 
eral battalions. 

At  "Wertingen,  in  1805,  Murat,  at  the  head  of  three  divisions  of  cav- 
alry, surprised  and  defeated  General  AufFenberg's  Austrian  corps  of 
nine  battalions,  four  squadrons  :  the  infantry  was  formed  in  square, 
and  made  a  gallant  resistance.  Many  fell  under  the  sword ;  two 
thousand  prisoners,  of  whom  fifty-two  were  officers,  eight  guns,  and 
three  standards,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  French. 

Many  more  instances  can  be  found  by  referring  to  the  Battles  of  Me- 
dellin,  Ciudad-Rcal,  Margaleff,  Todendorf.  The  French  say  that  their 
seventh  and  ninth  regiments  of  chasseurs  broke  three  squares  of  Eng- 
lish infantry  at  the  Battle  of  Fuentes  de  Oiloro. 

I  now  proceed  to  my  last  cxaiQples,  taken  from  the  Hungarian  war, 
to  show  that  neither  the  improved  fire  of  artillery  nor  the  long-range 
muskets  could  save  the  squares  when  the  cavalry  did  their  duty. 

"  On  the  28th  of  December,  1848,  at  eight  o'clock,  a.  m,,  General 
Gorgey's  rear-guard,  consisting  of  two  battalions  of  infantry  and  a 
small  detachment  of  hussars,  were  attacked  by  the  cavalry  brigade  (of 
the  Austrians)  under  Colonel  Ottinger,  who,  in  spite  of  several  dis- 
charges of  musketry  from  the  squares,  continued  their  steady  advance, 
charged,  broke  the  first  square  completely  (formed  by  the  regiment  of 
the  line  Preussen),  and  partly  destroyed  the  second  square,  inflicting 
on  us  a  loss  of  three  hundred  to  four  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  and 
taking  seven  hundred  prisoners ;  among  the  latter,  Major  Szel,  who 
defended  himself  to  the  last,  and  received  sixteen  wounds  l)efore  he 
could  be  captured."* 

Battle  of  Moor,  SOth  of  December,  184t8.—"  In  front  of  Moor,  about 
twelve  hundred  or  fifteen  hundred  yards  from  the  wood,  a  line  of 
heights  intersects  the  road  at  right  angles;  on  these  Perczel  formed  his 
troops,  and  placed  his  guns  so  as  to  command  the  outlets  from  tlie 
forest. 

"He  had  five  thousand  men  under  his  orders,  consisting  of  four  bat- 
talions of  infantry,  four  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  ten  guns.     His  ob- 

<■■  Klaptka,  Hist,  of  the  Magyar  Wan 
16 


182  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

ject  was  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  getting  out  of  the  wood,  and  give 
Gorgey  time  to  bring  up  the  left  wing  of  the  army  (the  brigade  Karger) 
from  Csakvar,  then  attack  the  enemy  at  a  disadvantage. 

"  The  enemy  had,  at  first,  but  one  brigade  up,  yet  they  made  many 
gallant  but  fruitless  attempts  to  gain  the  open  country,  but  the  Hun- 
garian artillery,  playing  constantly  on  the  outlets,  rendered  all  their 
attempts  abortive.  After  two  hours'  fighting,  however,  one  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  established  itself  on  a  height  to  the  right  of  the 
road,  and  by  a  well-directed  fire  did  much  execution  ou  the  Hungarian 
left.  At  this  moment  Ottiuger  aiTived  with  his  cavalry  brigade  (con- 
sisting of  two  or  three  regiments),  dashed  at  the  Hungarian  position, 
and  swept  all  before  him.  In  an  instant  our  bravest  infantry  regiments 
were  broken  and  in  full  flight  along  the  road  to  Stuhlweissenburg  and 
Csakvar ;  one  of  our  batteries  was  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

"  Our  hussars  (the  regiment  Nikolaus),  with  the  greatest  contempt 
for  death,  threw  themselves  upon  the  enemy's  horse,  though  six  times 
more  numerous,  and  saved  what  they  could  from  the  wreck.  A  des- 
perate hand-to-hand  fight  ensued,  but  the  brave  sons  of  the  Pusta* 
devoted  their  lives  to  stem  the  tide  of  the  enemy's  advance  till  the  re- 
maining infantry,  with  four  guns,  made  good  their  retreat.  The  hus- 
sars left  half  their  number  ou  the  field.  We  lost,  altogether,  fourteen 
hundred  or  fifteen  hundred  men  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  and  six 
guns."t 

If  cavalry  (without  artillery)  have  boon  repulsed  more  than  once  in 
charging  a  square,  they  should  not  be  led  against  the  same  sides  of  the 
square,  or  brought  forward  over  the  same  ground,  because  the  fallen 
horses  and  men  form  a  rampart  for  the  infantry. 

Let  us  now  consider  how  a  cavalry  officer  should  iuit  to  support  in- 
fantry which  is  attacked  by  a  numerous  cavalry. 

The  infantry,  formed  in  squares  or  columns,  will  rest  its  flanks  on 
any  available  obstacle  or  cover  which  may  be  within  reach,  and  such 
cover  will  further  bo  occupied  by  flanking  parties,  who  fire  in  on  the 
flanks  of  the  advancing  horsemen. 

If  the  cover  on  the  flanks  of  the  infantry  intercept  the  view  of  the 
enemy's  movements,  they  must  be  watched  by  mounted  men,  while  the 


*  The  Prairioe.of  Hungary.  t  Klaptka. 


CAVALRY    AGAINST    INFANTRY.  183 

cavalry,  formed  in  small  columns  behind,  or  opposite  the  intervals  of 
the  infantry  squares,  are  held  in  readiness  to  act.  Should  artillery 
play  on  the  squares,  the  cavalry  is,  as  far  as  possible,  kept  out  of  range, 
or  out  of  the  line  of  fire.  But  as  soon  as  the  enemy's  cavalry  advance, 
they  do  the  same ;  and  when  the  infantry  has  given  them  a  few  dis- 
charges, or  beat-en  them  ofif,  they  break  forth  between  the  intervals, 
form,  and  charge,  but  without  pursuing  too  far.  The  object  is  to  de- 
fend the  position,  and  thev  must  return  to  their  place  to  be  ready  to 
repeat  the  same  manoeuvre  as  often  as  it  becomes  necessary. 

If  the  object  is,  however,  to  cover  a  retreat,  the  infantry  then  take 
advantage  of  the  repulse  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  to  move  off;  their  ar- 
tillery follow  with  the  prolonge,  and  are  protected  by  the  cavalry. 

In  an  open  plain,  where  there  is  no  cover  for  the  infantry,  the  caval- 
ry forms  from  three  hundred  to  four  hundred  yards  in  rear  and  on  the 
flanks,  so  as  to  charge  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  flank  when  they  are 
thrown  into  disorder  by  the  fire  of  the  squares. 

This  is  a  difl5eult  position  in  which  to  be  placed  when  inferior  to  the 
enemy  in  cavalry.  They  will  of  course  try  to  turn  the  flanks,  and  the 
cavalry  must  then  take  refuge  in  the  intervals  of  the  squares,  and  wait 
for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  charge. 

When  retiring  along  a  road  the  cavalry  keeps  the  road,  the  infantry 
moves  on  both  flanks ;  when  they  reach  a  pass  or  defile  the  cavalry 
moves  on  and  takes  up  a  position  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  columns. 

We  have  not  sought  to  conceal  the  difficulties  that  cavalry  has  to 
contend  with  when  brought  ia  contact  with  good  infantry :  they  are 
often  so  great  that  the  best  cavalry,  though  well  led,  will  fail  to  make 
an  impression;  still,  at  equal  chances,  the  physical  superiority  of  the 
cavalry  ought  to  give  them  the  advantage. 

Nothing  is  more  trying  to  infantry  than  a  charge  of  cavalry ;  nor  is 
anything  more  formidable  to  cavalry  than  an  infantry  fire  in  square. 
The  infantry  soldier  knows  well  that  if  the  horsemen  break  in  nothing 
can  save  him;  the  dragoon  again  is  well  aware  that  neither  riding  nor 
manoeuvring  can  save  him  from  the  bullets  of  his  antagonists. 

Success  on  either  side  depends  so  much  on  the  moral  courage  of  the 
parties  engaged,  and  that  success  has  been  so  varied,  that  numberless 
examples  might  be  cited  to  prove  the  case  against  the  cavalry  as  well 
as  for  it. 


184  CAVALRY    TACTICS. 

Good  infantry  will  generally  hold  its  own  against  cavalry  if  these 
are  badly  led,  if  their  horses  are  tired  and  worn-out  with  fatigue,  if  the 
ground  is  heavy  and  deep,  and  the  charge  can  not  bo  made  with  speed 
and  well  together,  or  if  artillery  scatters  the  squadrons  in  their  ad- 
vance. 

It  would  be  ridiculous  to  infer  from  such  examples  that  cavalrj'  can 
not  break  infantry  squares;  when  we  lock  into  the  defeats  of  cavalry 
we  can  often  trace  their  want  of  success  to  circumstances  of  the  sort 
just  mentioned,  winch  are  generally  passed  over  unnoticed  by  historians. 

For  our  purpose  let  it  suffice  that  we  have  shown  to  our  cavalry  that 
it  can  be  done,  and  we  leave  it  to  them  to  remove  all  doiibt  oii  the  sub» 
ject  50  soon  as  thej  sht^M  hstve  a.n  opportunity. 


APPENDIX. 


16* 


APPENDIX. 


THE  SADDLE  AND  BRIDLE. 

The  bridle  I  propose  has  only  four  buckles,  namely  :  two  on  the  head- 
collar,  one  on  the  bit  head-stall,  and  one  on  the  bridoon  head-stall. 

The  bit,  bridoon,  and  their  head-stalls  are  provided  with  hooks  and 
Sinks,  by  which  means  the  bits  can  be  slipped  out  of  the  horse's  mouth, 
for  the  purpose  of  feeding,  without  taking  the  bridle  off  the  horse's 
<5iead. 

The  bridoon  has  half-horns  to  prevent  its  being  drawn  through  th* 
'horse's  mouth,  which  often  happens  when  they  have  the  ring  only. 

The  head-stalls  are  fastened  to  the  collar  by  a  stmp  and  button  on 
■'he  brow-band,  like  the  bridles  in  use  with  the  regiment  of  carabineers 
4ind  others  in  the  service. 


The  Saddle. 

The  tree  is  constructed  to  combine  the  adxantages  of  a  hunting  sad- 
-dle  with  the  simplicity  of  the  Hungarian  troop-saddle. 

The  side-boards  are  cut  away  under  the  man's  leg,  they  then  spread 
out  under  his  seat,  and  are  feathered  and  bronght  well  ofiT  the  horse'is 
back  in  rear. 

The  hind  fork  is  broad  at  the  base,  where  it  joins  the  side-boards, 
vand  is  bevelled  off  to  add  length  to  the  seat. 

The  front  fork  is  constructed  with  a  peak,  and  with  points  to  give 
the  tree  a  firm  hold  on  the  horse's  back,  and  prevent  it  from  turning 
.Tound,  as  well  as  to  bring  the  man's  bridle-hand  low. 

Both  forks  are  strengthened  with  iron  plates. 

The  holes  cut  for  the  stirrup-leathers  leave  a  lohoU  hack,  to  prevent 


188  APPENDIX. 

the  atirrup-leather  from  bulging  or  embedding  itself  in  the  panel,  and 
pressing  on  the  horse's  back. 

Oyer  this  tree  a  seat  of  blocked  leather  is  stretched,  like  that  of  a 
hunting  saddle,  and  fastened  with  screws  to  the  forks. 

For  the  Pads. 

Three  strips  of  felt  are  slipped  into  a  cover  of  serge,  and  put  on  to 
the  side-boards  with  leather  pockets;  more  of  theae  slips  of  felt  can  be 
put  in  should  tho  horse  fall  off  in  condition,  or  Ihey  can  be  taken  out 
should  the  harse  put  up  condition  f  and  thus  the  saddle  always  ridea 
even,  and  the  tree  never  requires  to  be  altered.  Leather  flaps  are  theii 
screwed  on  to  the  tree,  and  the  saddle  is  complete. 

The  Saddle-Ci-oth 

Is  cut  to  lit  the  horse's  back,  and  to  the  outline  of  the  saddle.  It 
has  pockets  for  the  points  to  fit  into,,  and  is  made  of  felt  one  inch  thick, 
to  protect  the  horse's  back,  absorb  the  perspiration,  and  prevent  the 
edges  of  the  pads  from  getting  hard  and  occasioning  sore  backs. 

The  breastplate  is  attached  to  ditto,  let  into  the  side-boards  (not,  as 
now,  to  the  peak),  and  is  made  with  a  loop  in  front  to  slip  in  case  of  a 
fall. 

The  crupper  is  attached  to  a  central  point,,  to  avoid  tho  friction 
caused  by  a  split  crupper. 

The  under  girth  buckles  on  both  sides,  because  it  will  wear  longer, 
as  the  soldier  is  not  obliged  to  girth  up  always  in  tho  same  holes. 

The  girth-straps  should  be  joined  together  with  web  girthing,  to 
protect  the  seat  of  tho  saddle  when  put  on  the  pegs  in  the  stable. 

The  shoe-cases  have  loops,  the  strap  being  made  a  fixture  to  the 
hind-fork;  the  reason  for  this  is,  that  the  soldier  in  passing  the  strap 
under  the  hind-fork  is  apt  to  leave  a  twist  in  it,  which  is  sure  to  give  a 
sore  back. 

'  The  wallets  are  made  flat,  because  they  hold  more  and  sit  closer; 
they  are  slanted  forward  to  give  room  for  the  mun's  leg. 

Under  the  off  wallet  the  carbine  is  run  through  a  holster;  it  can 
thus  be  got  at,  and  returned,  in  an  instant.  It  is  fastened  to  the  peak 
by  a  strap  about  a  yard  long,  which  serves  as  a  sling  for  the  carbine 
when  dismounted. 


THE    SADDLE.  189 

The  valise  has  tho  troop  letter  and  the  man's  number  on  the  near 
side,  to  enable  him  to  recognize  it,  and  the  number  of  the  regiment  on 
the  other  side,  as  the  10th  Hussnrs  have. 

I  consider  a  shabraque  a  useless  encumbrance;  but  if  worn,  it  should 
be  made  of  cloth  not  water-proof.  Water-pro.of  cloth  is  less  durable, 
and  confines  the  heat  to  the  horse's  back. 

Those  parts  which  cover  the  valise  and  eloak  might  be  lined  with 
water-proof,  but  the  scat  should  be  of  cloth  only,  and  cut  to  fit  the 
saddle  without  skirts. 

Sheepskins  are, bad,  because  once  wet  they  take  many  days  to  dry, 
iind  the  heat  of  them  is  bad  for  man  and  beast. 

In  packing,  the  dragoon  should  be  instructed  to  take  every  hard 
substance  out  of  his  valise.  His  brushes,  hold-all,  rubbers,  sponges, 
and  forage-cap  should  go  in  his  wallets,  where  he  can  get  at  them  at 
once  on  dismounting. 

•  The  valise  should  be  packed  so  as  to  be  quite  hollow  in  the  centre, 
and  the  centre  baggage-strap  shortened,  in  order  to  enable  the  soldier 
to  draw  it  tight,  and  bring  the  kit  well  off  the  horse's  back. 

Boots  or  high-lows  should  bo  packed  under  the  flap  of  the  valise 
\Tith  the  heels  outward  (not  inward). 


The  saddle  I  have  proposed  would  be  much  better  for  the  men  li-ith- 
<Mit  flaps.  With  horsemen  everything  depends  on  their  having  confi- 
dence in  the  firmness  of  their  seat  on  horseback. 

Leather  flaps  are  slippery,  and  do  not  give  a  firm  hold  to  the  leg ; 
iwhereas,  take  them  away  altogether,  substitute  a  double  felt  saddle- 
cloth cut  square,  and  the  men  will  have  a  stronger  seat ;  the  horses  will 
be  more  under  control  on  that  account,  as  well  as  because  they  feel 
and  must  obey  more  quickly,  the  pressure  of  the  riders*  legs. 

The  whole  of  the  Austrian  cavalry  ride  without  flaps  to  their  sad- 
dles,- but  boots  or  leather  overalls  are  then  indispensable  on  account  o 
the  sweat  from  the  horse. 

The  saddles  without  flaps  would  be  lighter,  and  far  more  handy  for 
saddling. 

My  attention  has  been  directed  for  a  long  time  to  the  constructing  of 


190  APPENDIX. 

a  saddle  for  military  purposes.  With  this  end  in  view,  I  have  for  years 
past  taken  notes  of  what  came  under  my  observation,  and  put  every- 
thing to  the  test  of  a  trial  when  I  had  the  opportunity. 

On  my  return  from  the  Russian  camps  last  year,  being  ordered  to 
join  the  depot  troop  of  my  regiment  at  Maidstone,  I  there  construct/ed 
the  first  of  these  saddles  which  I  now  propose.* 

Many  hints  and  improvements  I  had  from  Colonel  Key,  15th  Hus- 
sars j  for  instance,  the  manner  of  joining  the  hind  fork  to  the  side, 
boards  I  copied  from  a  saddle  which  Colonel  Key  obtained  from  an 
ofiScer  of  Danish  hussars  at  Copenhagen.  The  addition  of  points  to 
the  front  fork  was  a  suggestion  of  Sergeant  Johnson,  saddler  at  Maid- 
stone, a  very  intelligent,  clever  man,  with  whose  assistance  I  also  con- 
trived to  improve  upon  the  hooks  and  links  of  the  bit  and  snaffle  which 
I  had  brought  from  Russia. 

One  of  the  greatest  improvements  suggested  I  believe  to  be  the  felt 
aaddle-cloth.  The  blankets  accumulate  dirt  and  dust  in  their  folds; 
they  constantly  work  out  from  under  the  saddle.  In  camp  they  must 
always  be  kept  ready  folded,  and,  in  case  of  surprise  at  night,  they 
are  most  inconvenient,  for  if  a  man  drops  one  he  can  not  refold  it 
without  assistance. 

In  this  saddle  the  man  can  be  put  in  a  proper  seat,  he  will  have^ 
greater  control  over  his  horse,  and  I  do  think  that  with  them  sore  backs 
in  the  cavalry  will  be  of  rare  occurrence. 


DRESS  OF  A  CAVALRY  SOLDIER. 

The  dragoon  should  be  supplied  annually  with  one  good  suit  of  ser- 
vipeable  clothes,  which  be  should  be  made  to  wear. 

At  present  he  has  too  many  things ;  the  full  dress  is  seldom  wornj, 
and  never  worn-out;  the  man  does  all  his  duty  in  bis  stable-dress, 
while  the  kit  is  swelled  out  with  unnecessary  things,  and  the  horse  is 
overweighted. 

One  pair  of  overalls. 

*  Meeers.  Gibson  &  Son,  6,  New  (Coventry  street,  constructed  all  those  subsequent- 
ly made,  and  improved  much  upon  the  original  one> 


RANK  ENTIRE  SYSTEM.  191 

One  waistcoat,  say  red.  with  sleeves  and  pockets. 

One  surcoat  of  blue  cloth,  made  loose,  with  the  sleeves  to  unbutton  to 
the  elbow  (like  those  in  use  with  Spanish  soldiers),  and  turn  up  when 
the  gauntlets  are  put  on.  This,  with  a  good  great-coat  or  cloak,  a  low 
head-dress  properly  ventilated,  would  answer  all  purposes  for  the 
cavalry  soldier. 


REMARKS  ON  THE  RANK  ENTIRE  SYSTEM. 

The  rank  entire  S3'stem  has  been  again  brought  before  the  public  in 
an  article  in  the  "United  Service  Gazette"  of  March  12,  1853,  and 
recommended  by  some  of  the  very  highest  authorities,  including  the 
lat-e  Duke  of  Wellington,  and  several  of  our  most  distinguished' cavalry 
officers.  Under  these  circumstances  it  would  be  presumptuous  in  me 
to  attempt  to  give  an  opinion  of  my  own,  but  I  shall  adduce  what  I 
think  may  be  considered  a^  arguments  against  the  rank  entire  system, 
founded  on  the  authority  of  other  distinguished  ofiScers  of  cavalry. 

Seidlitz  and  Ziethen  fixed  upon  tioo  ranlcs,  on  small  squadrons,  on 
ioide  intervals. 

Single-rank  men  have  no  backers  sufficiently  near  to  inspire  them 
with  confidence  and  perseverance;  and  this  confidence  is  as  necessary 
in  the  horses  as  in  the  men  to  induce  them  to  rush  into  fire. 

However  good  your  cavalry  soldiers  may  be,  they  are  not  all  fit  for 
the  front  rank;  neither  are  all  horses  fit  to  lead,  though  all  will 
follow. 

Broken  up  in  a  melee,  the  single  ranks  (men  being  equal)  would  be 
overpowered  before  they  could  get  assistance,  and  the  single-rank 
reserves  would  be  again  overmatched  by  the  double-rank  reserves. 

A  single  rank,  if  successful,  can  not  spread  like  a  double  one  in  the 
pursuit,  sweeping  up  all  before  them,  but  they  will  be  so  much  scat- 
tered that,  in  riding  in  between  the  retreating  dragoons,  their  own  flanks 
will  be  exposed,  and  the  retreating  horsemen,  on  their  left,  will  imme- 
diately close  upon  them  and  cut  them  down  while  they  are  endeavor- 
ing to  assail  the  men  on  their  right  front ;  thus  the  chase  will  become 
more  perilous  to  the  pursuers  than  to  the  pursued. 


192  APPENDIX. 

A  squadron  of  the  First  Lancers  (British  legion),  formed  in  rank 
entire,  consisting  of  sixty  horses,  charged  three  hundred  Carlist  caval- 
rj-,  pursued  them  three  miles,  and  killed  nearly  one  hundred  of  them. 
"Would  the  same  sixty  Englishmen  have  failed  to  do  the  same  had  they 
been  formed  in  two  ranks  ? 

To  add  that  great  essential,  rapidity,  to  the  movement  of  cavalry, 
keep  the  squadrons  small,  and  give  them  plenty  of  ©ibow-room-— thatis, 
sufficient  intervals. 

There  was  no  want  of  speed  shown  by  the  Prussian  cavalry  under 
Seidlitz. 

The  advantage  of  having  an  officer  to  command  each  detachment  of 
the  rank  entire  system  can  be  equally  shared  by  the  two-rank  system- 
This  is  simply  a  question  of  expense^  and  must  depend  upon  how 
many  officers  you  would  attach  to  each  one  hundred  men. 

Those  nations  whose  cavalry  formerly  acted  on  the  rank  entire  sys- 
tem have  given  it  up.     Take  the  Cossacks  for  example. 

However,  whether  it  be  in  txco  ranks  or  in  one,  let  your  cavalry  be 
formed  in  small,  distinct  bodies,  with  sufficient  intervals  between  each. 

Let  there  be  no  pivot  flanks,  and  no  rifjTit  and  left  in  front,  and? 
doubtlessly,  cavalry  will  prove  much  more  efficient  in  the  field. 


PROPOSED  ORGANIZATION  OP  CAVALRY. 

From  the  "  United  Service  Gazette,"  March  12,  1S53. 

In  the  "  United  Service  Gazette  "  of  the  8th  May  last  wo  noticed  a 
very  interesting  pamphlet  by  Colonel  Kinloch,  on  the  subject  of  the 
constitution  of  a  Yeomanry  Eorce,  and  especially  in  reference  to  the 
organization  of  cavalry  in  "rank  entire."  We  have  now  the  pleasure 
of  publishing  a  letter  from  Colonel  Kinloch,  embracing  the  opinions  of 
the  late  Duke  of  Wellington,  Lord  Yivian,  Lord  William  Russell,  and 
General  Bacon,  upon  that  momentous  subject.  It  ia  pecixliarly  well- 
timed,  as  at  the  present  moment  great  interest  is  taken  in  the  question 
of  increasing  the  efficiency  of  our  present  weak  regiments  of  cavalry, 
and  of  rendering  the  yeomanry  fit  for  active  home  service. 


PROPOSED    ORGANIZATION.  193 

"  To  the  Editor  of  the  United  Service  Gazette. 

"Sin:  la  a  pamphlet  I  published  last  year  on  'the  defence  of  the 
country  by  means  of  a  volunteer  force,'  I  ventured  to  recommend  cav- 
alry, and  yeomanry  in  particular,  to  be  formed  in  'rank  entire/  instead 
of  in  two  ranks,  as  is  usual  in  most  armies. 

"I  have  lately  found  copies  of  the  opinions  of  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton and  several  cavalry  officers  on  this  subject,  which  I  could  not  lay 
my  hand  on  at  the  time  I  wrote  the  pamphlet.  These  opinions  were 
addressed  to  General  Anthony  Bacon  (who  commanded  the  cavalry  of 
Don  Pedro,  in  Portugal,  in  1833-34),  and  who  was  good  enough  to  give 
me  copies  of  them." 


I. 

From  F.  M.  the  Duhe  of  Wellington,  K.G. 

"Stratfieldsaye,  20th  November,  1833. 

"  Cavalry  is  essentially  an  offensive  arm,  whose  use  depends  upon 
its  activiti/,  combined  with  its  steadiness  and  good  order. 

"  I  think  that  the  second  rank  of  cavalry,  at  the  usual  distance  of 
close  order,  does  not  increase  the  activity  or  the  cavalry.  The  rear 
rank  of  the  cavalry  does  not  strengthen  the  front  rank,  as  the  centre 
and  rear  ranks  do  the  front  rank  of  the  infantry.  The  rear  rank  of 
the  cavalry  can  augment  the  activity  or  even  the  means  of  attack  of 
the  front  rank  only  by  a  movement  of  disorder. 

"  If  the  front  rank  should  fail,  and  it  should  be  necessary  to  retire, 
the  second  or  rear  rank  is  too  close  to  be  able  to  sustain  the  attack  or  to 
restore  order.  The  second  rank  must  be  involved  in  the  defeat  and 
confusion,  and  the  whole  must  depend  upon  some  other  body,  whether 
of  cavalry  or  infantry,  to  receive  and  protect  the  fugitives. 

"  I  have  already  said  that  the  rear  rank  can  only  augment  the 
means  of  the  first  rank  by  a  movement  of  disorder. 

"  This  is  peculiarly  the  case  if  the  attack  should  be  successful.     In 

all  these  cases  the  second  rank,  at  a  distance  sufficiently  great  to  avoid 

being  involved  in  the  confusion  of  the  attack  of  the  front  rank,  whether 

successful  or  otherwise,  could  aid  in  the  attack,  or,  if  necessary,  cover 

17 


194  APPENDIX. 

the  retreat  of  the  attacking  party,  and  thus  augment  the  steadiness 
and  good  order  of  the  cavalry  as  a  body ;  while,  by  the  absence  of  all 
impediments  from  the  closeness  of  the  rear  rank,  the  activity  of  the 
front  rank  would  be  increased. 

"It  can  not  bo  denied  that,  till  required  for  the  actual  attack,  the 
less  cavalry  is  exposed  the  better.  My  notion  of  the  distance  of  the 
lines  of  cavalry  was  as  much  as  a  cavalry  horse  could  gallop  in  a 
minute ;  the  second  line  should  pull  up  at  a  walk  when  the  first  charges; 
the  third  and  other  lines  in  columns  should  deploy,  or  be  used  accord- 
ing to  circumstances. 

"I  conceive  that  the  one-rank  system  would  require  a  change,  not 
only  in  the  discipline,  but  in  the  organization,  of  the  cavalry.  If  I  am 
not  mistaken,  it  would  render  the  use  of  cavalry  in  an  army  mtich  more 
general  than,  it  is  at  2>res€nt. 

"Wellington." 


II. 

Extract  from  a  letter  to  General  Bacon  from  Lieutenant-General  Sir 
Hussey  Vivian,  G.C.B.  [afterwards  Lord  Vivian,  and  3f aster- Getieral 
of  the  Orrfnojice). 

''  I  rejoice  to  find  Don  Pedro's  cavalry  has  fallen  under  the  orders  of 
a  man  so  capable  of  leading  them.  I  again  congratulate  you  on  your 
very  high  and  honorable  station.  In  short,  I  feel  confident  you  will 
do  credit  to  yourself,  your  cavalry,  and  to  your  Peninsular  education. 

"I  quite  entirely  agree  with  you  in  all  you  say  of  the  value  of  the 
lance. 

"  As  to  the  rank  entire  system,  I  am  by  no  moans  certain  that  it 
would  not  always  be  a  good  thing,  if,  on  advancing  to  an  attack,  or 
standing  in  line,  the  rear  ranks  were  to  form  a  reserve  at  the  distance, 
say  of  eighty  or  one  hundred  yards ;  when  so  circumstanced  they 
would  be  much  better  able  to  follow  up  an  advantage  gained  by,  or  to 
repel  a  successful  attack  of,  the  enemy  on  the  first  rank.  The  fact  is, 
that  the  second  rank  is  of  little  use  but  to  fall  over  the  first. 

"  Let  me  congratulate  you  on  your  brilliant  success  and  gallant  con- 
duct at  Leyria.     I  will  run  over  and  pay  you  a  visit. 

"R.  HussEY  Vivian." 


PROPOSED   ORGANIZATION.  195 

III. 

Extract  from  a  letter  to  General  Bacon  from  Lord    William   Russell, 
Colonel  commanding  Eighth  Hussars. 

"I  wish  you  joy  of  your  promotion  and  command.  The  cavalry 
will,  I  have  no  doubt,  be  in  excellent  order  in  your  hands ;  but  don't 
be  rash — they  are  too  numerous  for  you  to  cope  with,  and  their  horses 
are  better  fed. 

"Anything  that  proves  the  efificiency  of  the  single-rank  system  is 
interesting  to  me ;  and  it  certainly  was  thoroughly  proved  on  the  16th 
of  October  (1833),  when  your  force  of  cavalry  imposed  on  more  than 
treble  your  numbers ;  this  quite  destroys  the  argument  that  a  single 
rank  'looks  so  weak,'  and  'invites  the  enemy  to  charge.'  Your  adver- 
saries were  not  to  be  tempted  on  the  16th.  Keep  notes  of  all  the  oc- 
currences ;  we  will  one  day  put  them  in  print. 

"I  am  delighted  to  find  that  Vivian  (Sir  Hussey)  looked  with  a  more 
favorable  eye  on  the  system.  Depend  upon  it  they  will  all  come  round- 
He  wants  to  get  off  on  the  mezzo  termine  of  leaving  the  rear  rank  be- 
hind. This  I  entirely  disapprove,  because  the  rear  rank  eo  left  would 
have  no  one  to  command  it,  and  cavalry  depends  entirely  on  its  ojDivers. 

"  There  is  no  doubt  that,  if  cavalry  is  to  act  in  one  rank,  a  different 
organization  is  necessary.  You  must  turn  your  mind  to  this,  as  the 
end  of  the  war  brings  to  your  aid  the  practical  reflections  you  can 
make  now.  The  Duke  of  Wellington  is  in  our  favor,  but  the  prejudices 
of  the  cavalry  officers  are  difficult  to  be  overcome. 

"I  send  you  up ,  and  if  you  can  convert  him  you  will  do  won- 
ders.    He  never  in  his  life  gave  up  a  once  formed  opinion. 

"  Try  Head's  (Sir  Francis)  plan  with  the  lasso  for  your  guns. 

""William  Russell." 


IV. 

Extract  from  a  letter  from  General  Bacon. 

"11th  Septkmbkr,  1835. 
"My  dear  Kinloch  :  I  hope  you  stick  to  it  'rank  entire.'     Depend 
upon  it,  it  is  the  most  efficient  way  of  using  cavalry.     You  are  quicker, 


196  APPENDIX. 

and  have  more  reserves.  Enclosed  are  some  extracts*  respecting  my 
system  with  cavalry.  Lord  Anglesea,  Brotherton,  and  many  other 
oflScers  I  could  name,  agree  ^with  me.  As  I  am  the  only  man  who  has 
tried  it,  I  give  you  a  few  of  my  reasons. 

"  In  one  rank  all  movements  are  made  with  greater  precision  and 
more  rapidly  than  in  two. 

"When  cavalry  has  to  reform  after  a  charge  it  is  efiected  more 
readily  and  far  quicker,  for  each  man  gets  at  once  to  his  own  troop, 
and,  if  such  formation  be  required  under  fire,  the  YsduG  of  quickness 
will  admit  of  no  argument  against  it. 

"I  have  tried  this  in  presence  of  a  superior  enemy  very  frequently, 
and  at  times  when  hotly  pressed,  and  under  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery 
and  musketry. 

"  A  charge  in  one  rank  will  bo  more  rapid,  consequently  more  likely 
to  succeed,  than  one  in  two  ranks,  because  the  horses  are  more  at 
liberty,  not  likely  to  be  cramped  by  the  endeavors  of  the  rear  rank  to 
get  to  the  front,  and  the  men  will  have  a  more  free  use  of  their  arms  j 
every  one  will  do  his  duty  j  slcidkers  can  not  so  easily  pull  up,  and  such 
are  found  in  all  armies. 

"In  advancing  in  line  for  any  distance  (and  before  an  enemy  you 
have  rarely  a  fine  open  country)  the  intervals  are  never  preserved  be- 
tween squadrons,  and  it  frequently  happens  that  a  line  of  two  ranks 
toward  the  centre  becomes  a  disordered  column ;  in  reforming,  a  rear 
rank  is  never  sure  of  its  '  telling  ofi".' 

''In  all  columns  I  should  form  my  second  rank  in  a  column  in  rear 
of  my  first,  that  is,  as  a  second  regiment;  and  this  will  always  be  easy 
by  keeping,  when  in  line,  a  distance  equal  to  the  depth  of  a  close  col- 
umn ;  you  may  always  close  your  lines  if  you  think  it  desirable,  and, 
when  about  to  form  columns,  it  is  only  t^  open  your  ranks,  or,  instead 
of  a  column  of  squadrons,  to  form  on  the  centre  a  contiguous  close 
column  of  half-squadrons. 

"Another  great  advantage  in  the  system  is,  that  all  your  ranks  are 
commanded  by  officers.  Whenever  you  are  asked  for  a  squadron,  re- 
member it  is  a  troop,  and  if  you  send  two  troops  they  are  two  squad- 
rons, and  they  become  a  proper  command  for  a  major. 

*  The  above  from  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  etc. 


PROPOSED   ORGANIZATION.  197 

"  I  could  give  you  many  other  reasons  for  the  system,  but  I  hope  to 
be  with  you,  and  perfect  that  which  I  have  begun,  and  with  a  fair  por- 
tion of  success. 

"Believe  me,  etc., 

"A.  Bacox." 


A  squadron  of  the  First  Lancers  of  the  British  legion  in  Spain,  under 
the  command  of  Major  Hograve,  and  consisting  of  only  sixty  hoi-ses, 
charged  three  hundred  of  the  Carlist  cavalry  (after  they  had  defeated 
several  squadrons  of  Christino  cavalry),  pursued  them  above  three 
miles,  and  killed  nearly  one  hundred  of  them.  The  squadron  of  the 
First  Lancers  was  formed  in  "  rank  entire,"  the  Carlists  in  two  ranks, 
and  thus  proved  triumphantly  the  efficiency  of  that  system. 

From  the  above  opinions  of  distinguished  and  experienced  officers, 
supported  as  they  are  by  facts  on  the  few  occasions  the  "rank  entire" 
formation  has  been  tried,  it  appears  worthy  of  consideration  whether  it 
should  not  now  be  acted  upon  in  the  British  army. 

I  find  that,  in  the  Regulations  for  the  Drill  and  Exercise  of  the 
Yeomanry  Cavalry,  they  are  recommended  to  adopt  the  "  rank  entire  " 
system,  which  I  was  not  aware  of  when  I  wrote  my  pamphlet  last  year. 
This  formation  is  particularly  suitable  for  yeomanry  and  all  irregular 
and  half-disciplined  cavalry,  on  account  of  its  great  simplicity  and 
freedom  of  action.  As  the  Duke  of  Wellington  "conceived  that  it 
would  render  the  use  of  cavalry  in  an  army  much  more  general  than  it 
is  at  present;"  as  Sir  Hussey  Vivian  said  "that  the  second  rank  is 
of  little  use  but  to  fall  over  the  first;"  and  as  General  Bacon  observes, 
"a  troop  becomes  a  squadron,  and  each  rank  is  commanded  by  offi- 
cers;" it  appears  that  the  eigfective  strength  of  our  cavalry  maybe 
greatly  incrensed,  if  not  fully  vovb^kt),  by  adopting  the  rank  entire 
system.  The  principal  change  in  the  organization  called  for  by  this 
alteration  appears  to  be  a  small  and  economical  addition  to  the  otiicers. 

Captains  commanding  troops  will,  when  in  line,  command  squadrons, 
for  a  troop  will  occupy  the  same  front  in  single  rank  that  a  squadron 
does  in  two.  (The  interior  economy  of  the  troop  remains  as  before.) 
The  officer  who  commands  two  troops  or  squadrons  when  in  line  will 
have  a  fit  command  for  a  field-officer. 
17* 


198  APPENDIX. 

I  would  therefore  suggest  that,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  advantages 
of  the  "rank  entire"  system,  and  render  it  thoroughly  efficient,  a 
second  major  should  be  restored  to  each  cavalry  regiment;  and  ae  a 
half-troop  will  become  a  half-squadron,  there  should  be  another  subal- 
tern to  each  troop. 

Perhaps  the  two  or  three  senior  captains  should  have  a  higher  rank 
than  merely  captain,  as  they  may  sometimes  command  two  troops  or 
gquadrons;  the  higher  rank  of  chef  d'escadron,  as  in  other  armies,  or 
brevet  major,  might  be  given  to  them. 

The  only  additional  expense,  therefore,  would  be  a  second  major  for 
each  regiment,  and  a  second  lieutenant  to  each  troop.  A  very  small 
expense  certainly,  if,  as  it  is  assumed,  the  cavalry  will  be  greatly  in- 
creased in  efficiency. 

Let  the  troops  be  increased  to  fifty  horses  per  troop,  with  the  above 
addition  to  the  officers,  and  adopt  the  "rank  entire  "  formation;  then 
our  cavalry  will  be  ready  for  any  service  that  might  be  required  of 
them;  but  at  present  the  regiments  are  verj'  weak  in  horses,  and  in 
double  ranks  are  only  about  two  good  squadrons  strong. 

I  must  apologize  for  troubling  you  so  long;  but  as  the  economical 
increase  of  the  army  is  the  great  question  of  the  day,  and  cavalry  ap- 
pears not  much  noticed,  I  trust  the  foregoing  remarks  and  opinions  on 
the  organization  and  efficiency  of  that  chivalrous  and  important  arm 
of  the  service  will  not  be  considered  uninteresting  to  your  military 
readers. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be  your  obedient  humble  servant, 

John  Kinloch. 

Logie,  7th  March,  1853. 


P.  S. — The  following  sentences  are  extracted  from  my  pamphlet, 
before  referred  to. — J.  K. 

"It  was  on  his  (General  Bacon's)  recommendation  that  I  adopted 
this,  which  appeared  to  me  to  be  the  proper  and  common-sense  forma- 
tion of  cavalry  (and  raw  cavalry  in  particular),  in  the  first  or  'Reyna 
Ysabel'  regiment  of  lancers  in  the  British  legion  in  Spain,  which  I 
had  the  honor  to  organize  and  command  in  1835-36;  and  to  that  simple 


TROOP-HORSES   AND    OFFICERS'    CHARGERS.  199 

formation  I  attribute  tbc  very  creditable  and  efficient  manner  in  which 
they  could  go  through  the  manoeuvres  of  a  field-day,  and  do  their  duty 
in  the  field,  after  very  little  practice  and  drilling.  After  being  broken 
in  a  charge,  or  dispersed  in  pursuit,  a  squadron  in  rank  entire  may 
'  rally  '  and  'tell  off'  in  much  less  time  than  the  front  and  rear  ranks 
would  take  to  scramble  into  their  places;  and  thus  much  timo,  ao  val- 
uable in  cavalry  movements,  would  be  gained. 

''  Many  smart  soldiers  dislike  being  in  the  rear  ranks,  and  feel  them- 
selves thrown  in  the  background;  they  arc  apt  to  become  careless,  and 
merely  to  follow  their  front-rank  files,  without  knowing  or  caring  wha; 
is  going  on;  whereas  in  rank  entire  every  man  is  under  the  eye  of  his 
officers,  and  must  be  on  the  qui  vive  and  wide  awake.  Every  man  has 
an  equal  share  in  the  attack,  which  is  not  the  case  with  two  ranks. 
Rank  entire  may  apxtear  loose,  and  show  more  '  daylight '  between  the 
files,  but  is  not  in  realiUj  more  loose;  on  the  contrary,  cavalry  accus- 
tomed to  work  in  rank  entire  will  be  found  to  be  better  cloeod  together 
than  with  two,  though  the  two  ranks  help  to  'fill  up  '  better,  and  make 
them  appear  closer  and  more  solid. 

"  I  consider  that  a  charge  of  cavalry  in  rank  entire,  on  fair  ground, 
fit  for  a  good  gallop,  will  'hit  harder,'  and  every  man  and  horse  'tell' 
with  greater  effect,  than  if  the  rear  rank  were  treading  on  their  heels. 
The  rear  rank  can  not  give  much  assistance  to  the  front,  but  they  may 
actually  incommode  them.  In  the  rank  entire  system  young  and  un- 
trained horses  will  be  quiter  and  steadier,  and  not  so  likely  to  be  lamed 
by  the  rear  rank  treading  on  the  front  rank  horses'  heels,  and  they,  in 
turn,  'lashing  out'  and  laming  those  behind.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
two  ranks  have  answered  very  well  on  former  occasions,  but  it  may 
be  a  fair  question  to  ask,  whether  half  the  number  would  not  have  done 
as  well  ?  or  whether  the  same  number  in  two  lines,  instead  of  two  ranks, 
would  not  have  done  better?" 


TROOP-HORSES  AND  OFFICERS'  CHARGERS. 

Before  I  left  India  some  very  interesting  trials  were  made  at  Madras, 
by  order  of  the  Commander-in-chief,  General  Sir  George  Berkeley,  the 


200  APPENDIX. 

object  of  which  was  to  test  the  csipabilities  of  the  troop-horses,  as  well 
as  the  relative  merits  of  entire  horses  and  geldings  for  the  purposes  of 
war. 

Three  trials  were  made. 

The  first  with  two  regiments  of  Native  Eegular  Cavalry,  one  of  stall- 
ions, one  of  geldings. 

The  next  with  two  troops  of  Horse-Artillery. 

The  third,  and  last,  with  two  hundred  English  dragoons  (15th  Hus- 
sars)— one  hundred  riding  stallions,  and  one  hundred  mounted  on  geld- 
ings. This  squadron  marched  upwardsof  eight  hundred  miles — namely, 
from  Bangalore  to  Hyderabad,  where  they  remained  a  short  time  to 
take  part  in  the  field-days,  pageants,  etc.  They  then  returned  to  Ban- 
galore, four  hundred  miles,  by  forced  marches:  only  one  rest-day  was 
allowed  them,  and  the  last  six  marches  in  wei'e  made  at  the  rate  of 
thirty  miles  a  day.  They  brought  in  but  one  led  horse;  stallions  and 
'geldings  did  their  work  equally  Avell,  and  were  in  equally  good  condition 
on  their  return.  The  question  was,  however,  decided  in  favor  of  the 
latter,  because  they  had  been  cut  without  reference  to  age,  and  only  sis 
months  before  the  trial  took  place. 

The  English  cavalry  in  India  is  well  mounted.  On  an  emergency 
any  one  of  these  Indian  regiments  would  gallop  fifty  miles  in  a  pursuit, 
leave  few  horses  behind,  and  suffer  but  little  from  the  effects  of  such 
exertion.  The  horses  on  which  they  are  mounted  are  small  but  power- 
ful. The  Arab,  the  Persian,  the  Turcoman,  the  horses  from  the  banks 
of  the  Araxes,  are  all  unrivalled  as  war-horses.  I  have  seen  a  Persian 
horse  fourteen  hands  three  inches  carrying  a  man  of  our  regiment  of 
gigantic  proportions,  and  weighing,  in  marching  order,  twenty-two  and 
a  half  stone :  I  have  seen  this  horse  on  the  march  above  alluded  to,  of 
eight  hundred  miles,  carrying  this  enormous  weight  with  ease,  and 
keeping  his  condition  well;  at  the  crossing  of  the  Kistna,  a  broad,  rapid, 
and  dangerous  river,  the  owner  of  this  horse  (Private  Heme,  of  0  troop) 
refused  to  lead  the  animal  into  the  ferry-boat  to  cross,  but,  saying, 
"An  hussar  and  his  horse  should  never  part  company,"  he  took  the 
water  in  complete  marching  order,  and  the  gallant  little  horse  nobly 
stemmed  the  tide,  and  landed  his  rider  safely  on  the  opposite  bank. 

An  otlicer  in  India  made  a  bet  that  he  would  himself  ride  his  charger 
(an  Arab,  little  more  than  fourteen  hands  high)  four  hundred  measured 


TROOP-HORSES   AND    OFFICERS'    CHARGERS.  201 

miles  in  five  consecutive  days,  and  he  won  the  match;  the  horse  per- 
formed his  task  with  ease,  and  did  not  even  throw  out  a  windgall.  The 
owner,  an  officer  of  the  Madras  Artillery,  died  shortly  afterwards. 

General  Daumas  relates  that  the  horses  of  the  Sahara  will  travel  dur- 
ing five  or  six  days  from  seventy-five  to  ninety  miles  a  day,  and  that  in 
twenty-four  hours  they  will  go  over  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  one 
hundred  and  eighty  miles,  and  this  over  a  stony  desert.  Diseases  of 
the  feet  and  broken  wind  are  almost  unknown  among  them. 

What  would  become  of  an  English  cavalry  regiment  if  suddenly  re- 
quired to  make  a  few  furced  marches,  or  to  keep  up  a  pursuit  for  a  few 
hundred  miles  !  Their  want  of  power  to  carry  the  weight,  and  want  of 
breeding,  makes  them  tire  after  trotting  a  few  miles  on  the  line  of 
march. 

Our  cavalry  horses  are  feeble ;  they  measure  high,  but  they  do  so  from 
length  of  limb,  which  is  weakness,  not  power.  The  blood  they  require  is 
not  that  of  our  weedy  race-hox'se  (an  animal  more  akin  to  the  greyhound, 
and  bred  for  speed  alone),  but  it  is  the  blood  of  the  Arab  and  Persian, 
to  give  them  that  compact  form  and  wiry  limb  in  which  they  are  wanting. 

The  fine  Irish  troop-horses,  formerly  so  sought  for,  are  not  now  to  be 
procured  in  the  market.  Instead  of  the  long,  low,  deep-chested,  short- 
backed,  strong-loined  horse  of  former  days,  you  find  nothing  now  but 
long-legged,  straight-shouldered  animals,  prone  to  disease  from  the 
time  they  are  foaled,  and  whose  legs  grease  after  a  common  field-day.* 
These  animals  form  the  staple  of  our  remount  horses. 

Decked  out  in  showy  trappings,  their  riders  decorated  with  feathers 
and  plumes,  they  look  well  to  the  superficial  observer;  but  the  English 
cavalry  are  not  what  they  should  be.  If  brought  fresh  into  the  field  of 
battle,  the  speed  of  the  horses  and  the  pluck  of  the  men  would  doubt- 
less achieve  great  things  for  the  moment ;  but  they  could  not  oxhtre, 
they  could  not  follow  up,  they  could  not  come  a<jain. 

All  other  reforms  in  our  cavalry  will  be  useless  unless  this  important 
point  be  looked  to.  It  is  building  a  house  on  the  sand  to  organize  cav- 
alry without  good  horses.  Government  alone  could  work  the  necessary 
reform  by  importing  stallions  and  mares  of  Eastern  blood,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  breeding  troop-horses  and  chargers  for  the  cavalry  of  England. 

*  "  On  the  Condition  of  our  Saddle-Horsea :"  T.  Ilatchard,  Piccadilly. 


202  APPENDIX. 

It  is  said  that  a  goA'ernment  stud  is  opposed  to  the  principle  of  com- 
petition. What  competition  can  there  be  among  breeders  for  the  price 
of  a  troop-horse,  when,  by  breeding  cart-horses,  they  obtain  forty  pounds 
for  them  when  two  years  old  ?  How  could  they  possibly  afford  to  rear 
animals  with  the  necessary  qualifications  for  a  cavalry  horse  of  the  first- 
class?  To  breed  such  horses  a  cross  must  first  be  obtained  with  our 
race-horses:  this  would  entail  a  large  outlay  of  capital;  and  when  the 
good  troop-horse  was  produced,  the  breeder  could  not  obtain  his  price 
for  him. 

The  rules  of  our  Turf  encourage  speed  only,  and  that  for  short  dis- 
tances. Horses  are  bred  to  meet  these  requirements,  and  from  theso 
weeds  do  our  horses  of  the  present  day  inherit  their  long  legs,  straight 
shoulders,  weak  constitutions,  and  want  of  all  those  qualities  for  which 
the  English  horse  of  former  days  was  so  justly  renowned.* 

I  had  heard  of  fine  horses  in  Russia,  but  I  complacently  said  to  my^ 
self,  '•'Whatever  they  are,  they  can  not  be  as  good  as  the  English." 
However,  I  went  to  Russia — and  seeing  is  believing.  Their  horse-ar- 
tillery and  cavalry  are  far  better  mounted  than  ours;  and  their  horses  are 
immeasurably  superior  in  those  qualities  which  constitute  the  true  war- 
horse — namely:  courage,  constitutional  vigor,  strength  of  limb,  and 
great  power  of  endurance  under  fatigue  and  privation. 

The  excellent  example  set  by  Sir  George  Berkeley  in  India  might  be 
followed  up  at  home  with  groat  advantage  to  the  service ;  the  capabili- 
ties of  our  cavalry  horses  of  the  present  day  should  be  severely  tested, 
and  the  saddles  should  be  tried,  and  experiments  made  to  ascertain  how 
sore  backs  may  be  avoided. 

*  "On  the  Condition  of  our  Saddle-Horses." 


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